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ABSTRACT 
This  is  a  study  of  the  development  problems  of  a  particular  category  of  developing 
countries,  i.  e.,  the  developing  small  island  state  (SIS).  The  thesis  seeks  to  establish  their 
position  within  development  theory  emphasising  the  constraints  that  they  confront  in 
their  development  efforts.  The  main  argument  presented  is  that  although  small  size  is  a 
development  constraint,  its  effects  are  exacerbated  by  several  other  factors  that  are 
largely  the  result  of  not  only  size  but  also  having  a  peripheral  location  and  role  within  the 
global  economy.  A  review  and  discussion  of  the  literature  relating  to  small  states  and  SIS 
development  is  made  focusing  on  the  period  following  decolonisation  when  a  plethora  of 
Lilliputian  states  emerged.  Their  viability  was  questioned  while  more  recently  the 
emphasis  has  shifted  to  their  vulnerability  and  to  the  need  for  sustainable  development. 
Methodologically,  the  study  identifies  a  range  of  problems  commonly  affecting  SIS  while 
through  the  use  of  statistical  techniques  a  typology  of  SIS  is identified.  From  this  regional 
example,  Zanzibar,  the  Comoros,  the  Maldives  Seychelles  and  Mauritius  are  selected  and 
an  in  depth  comparative  analysis  is  made.  Through  an  historical  approach,  their  post 
independence  development  experiences  are  analysed  from  which  some  important  lessons 
are  drawn.  Focusing  subsequently  on  Zanzibar,  an  empirical  investigation  is  made 
focusing  on  its  recent  development  experiences.  The  background  to  independence  and  the 
Revolution  (1964)  is  analysed,  identifying  the  socio-economic  and  political  factors 
which  have  influenced  its  development  before  and  after  1964.  Three  distinct  phases  are 
identified  in  post-Revolution  Zanzibar.  Though  distinct  from  one  another  in  their 
respective  development  strategies,  they  retain  one  common  denominator,  i.  e.  Zanzibar 
remains  a  dependent  and  vulnerable  SIS.  Analysing  socio-economic  data  generated  through 
a  survey,  a  socio-economic  profile  of  Zanzibar  is  constructed  and  some  major  problems 
and  trends  are  noted  in  its  contemporary  socio-economic  make-up.  The  results  confirm 
its  position  as  a  SIS  and  highlight  the  need  for  some  unconventional  approaches  to  the 
development  problems  of  SIS  belonging  to  such  a  category.  The  economic  and  political 
impacts  of  Zanzibar's  unique  position  as  an  autonomous  unit  in  a  Union  with  Mainland 
Tanzania  are  discussed.  Finally,  the  thesis  draws  out  theoretical  and  policy  considerations 
from  the  analysis  of  the  Zanzibar  case. V 
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GLOSSARY 
CSs  =  Coastal  States 
GoZ  =  Government  of  Zanzibar  (also  Serikali  ya  mapinduzi  ya  Zanzibar  -  SMZ) 
JMT  =  Jamhuri  Ya  Muungano  wa  Tanzania  (United  Republic  of  Tanzania) 
LDCs  =  Least  Developed  Countries 
LLCs  =  Land-Locked  Countries 
NICS  =  Newly  Industrialising  Countries 
PPC  =  Pemianant  Planning  Commission 
SIS  =  Small  Island  States 
SS  =  Small  States 1 
1.0  Introduction 
This  is  a  study  of  the  development  problems  of  small  island  states,  focusing  on  those 
located  in  the  Western  Indian  Ocean  region  and  specifically  the  case  of  the  semi- 
autonomous  island  state  of  Zanzibar.  Thus  Zanzibar  is  studied  in  its  regional  setting 
and  by  doing  so  the  research  seeks  to  draw  the  development  experiences  of  different 
developing  small  island  states  and  assess  their  applicability  in  the  search  for 
appropriate  and  sustainable  development.  The  regional  dimension  sheds  some  light  in 
an  area  in  which  there  has  been  relatively  less  developmental  work,  compared  to,  for 
example,  the  small  island  states  (SIS)  of  the  Pacific,  Caribbean  or  Mediterranean 
regions. 
1.1  Aims  of  the  Thesis 
This  thesis  seeks  to  obtain  an  in-depth  understanding  of  the  development  constraints 
facing  developing  small  island  states  in  general.  However  it  adopts  a  regional  dimension 
focusing  initially  on  the  island  states  of  the  South-West  Indian  Ocean  and  then 
concentrating  on  Zanzibar.  The  ultimate  objective  is  to  evaluate  Zanzibar's  post- 
Revolution  socio-economic  development  and  especially  its  contemporary  development 
problems  and  prospects.  It  involves  an  extensive  study  of  the  evolution  of  the  island 
state's  socio-economic  structure  covering  the  period  since  just  before  the  1964 
revolution.  A  month  before  the  revolution  Zanzibar  had  its  independence  from  Britain. 
although  it  was  developments  in  the  period  leading  to  independence  which  had  already 
set  the  seal  for  the  January  1964  Revolution.  In  the  immediate  post-revolution  period 
the  small  island  state  became  locked  into  Cold  War  politics.  Its  development  path  was 
influenced  by  internal  and  external  factors.  Internally,  the  Revolution  was  the  result  of 
the  socio-economic  and  political  struggle  of  the  dispossessed  population.  However, 
externally,  the  superpowers  were  concerned  about  the  developments  occurring  in 
Zanzibar  and  their  potential  effects  within  the  region. 
The  Revolution  not  only  brought  the  severance  of  ties  with  the  former  colonial  power. 
Britain  but  with  Western  interests  in  general.  The  influence  of  Eastern  Bloc  countries 
was  considerable,  seeking  to  establish  a  'sphere  of  influence'  in  the  region.  Other 
historical  links  were  ended,  notably  with  Oman,  where  before  becoming  a  British 
Protectorate,  Zanzibar  had  been  part  of  Oman  following  its  colonisation  by  Omani 
Arabs.  The  Revolutionary  regime  in  the  Isles  was  aware  of  the  inherent  dangers  of  the 
Cold  War  politics  and  partly  because  of  this  and  partly  to  reinforce  their  own  position.  a 
political  Union  was  established  with  Tanganyika  to  form  the  United  Republic  of 2 
Tanzania.  However.  Zanzibar  maintained  a  considerable  degree  of  autonomy, 
particularly  over  internal  issues  and  to  some  extent  even  where  external  relations  were 
concerned.  The  domestic  affairs  of  Zanzibar  were  and  still  remain  to  a  considerable 
degree,  the  responsibility  of  the  Zanzibar  Revolutionary  Government  (ZRG).  Motivations 
for  the  Union  were  based  on  the  islands'  vulnerability  insofar  as  its  security  was 
concerned,  especially  with  the  threat  to  the  regime  by  expelled  and  purged  Zanzibari 
elements  and  from  the  interests  of  the  global  powers  vying  for  strategic  positions  in  the 
Indian  Ocean. 
Amongst  the  first  tasks  of  the  Revolutionary  Government  was  the  attempt  to  redress  the 
socio-economic  disparities  between  racial  and  class  factions.  Disparities  were 
pronounced  spatially,  between  rural  and  urban  areas  and  between  the  two  main  islands 
of  Zanzibar,  Unguja  and  Pemba  and  this  essentially  characterised  the  Isles'  role  in  the 
expansion  of  the  global  economic  system  following  the  industrial  revolution.  The 
instruments  for  implementing  these  objectives  (egalitarianism)  included  land 
redistribution,  central  control  of  the  economy  by  the  state,  nationalisation  of  dominant 
aspects  of  the  economy  such  as  import-export  business  or  trade  and  provision  of  basic 
needs,  and  attempts  at  diversifying  the  island  economy  through  encouraging  non- 
agricultural  activities  such  as  fishing  and  manufacturing.  Self-reliance  and  self 
sustained  development  was  given  prominence  in  the  various  development  objectives 
that  ensued.  Reducing  dependence  on  former  colonial  powers  became  a  central 
objective,  though  the  goal  of  rapid,  planned  egalitarian  development  through  technical 
assistance  offered  by  East  Germany  and  the  Peoples'  Republic  of  China  became  an 
important  support  to  the  populist  regime  in  Zanzibar.  Meanwhile,  strong  links 
continued  to  be  forged  with  the  Mainland. 
By  the  mid-1980s  the  economy  of  Zanzibar  was  on  the  verge  of  collapse.  Many  of  the 
grand  aspirations  set  out  at  the  start  of  the  Revolution  had  not  been  attained.  The 
reasons  given  for  this  situation  were  that  the  world  price  for  Zanzibar's  main  export 
crop,  cloves,  had  collapsed  and  hence  its  major  source  of  foreign  exchange.  Exogenous 
factors,  such  as  increasing  oil  and  food  prices  strained  the  limited  amount  of  foreign 
exchange  Zanzibar  was  earning.  However,  there  are  other  inherent  problems  related  to 
the  socio-economic  and  political  development  of  Zanzibar,  which  help  explain  its 
economic  plight.  Even  if  the  prices  of  cloves  had  not  collapsed,  the  economic  situation 
would  have  improved  only  marginally  better.  There  are  deeper  and  more  far  reaching 
structural  problems  belonging  to  its  status  as  a  developing  small  island  economy  which 
help  explain  its  economic  failure  since  independence. 
This  study  aims  to  fill  the  gaps  which  exist  in  the  case  of  Zanzibar  and  by  so  doing 
contribute  to  the  on  going  debate  on  the  development  of  small  island  states.  An 
historical  approach  is  taken  in  which  an  analysis  will  be  made  of  each  of  the  distinct 3 
phases  of  Zanzibar's  post-Revolution  development.  I 
Some  constraints  to  development  are  outwith  the  control  of  the  state.  particularly  the 
exogenous  ones,  and  these  need  to  be  identified.  It  is  important  to  understand  how 
they  inhibit  development  in  the  Isles.  An  analysis  of  the  internal  factors  is  also 
important  since  it  is  significant  to  know  where  policies  and  programmes  went  wrong 
and  why  and  whether  there  were  other  options.  In  this  way  it  is  possible  to  identify  the 
'manipulable'  factors  in  development.  2 
In  comparing  the  experiences  of  a  group  of  SIS,  a  statistical  exploratory  technique, 
Cluster  Analysis,  is  used  to  establish  whether  there  exist  categories  of  small  states  (and 
SIS)  and  reveal  associations  and  structures  in  their  basic  data.  3  Comparative  Analysis 
is  then  used  to  explain  the  existence  of  different  categories.  Such  an  analysis  focuses 
on  SIS  within  the  Indian  Ocean  region.  comparing  the  development  experiences  and 
outcomes  of  five  SIS.  It  also  reveals  patterns  and  trends  that  are  used  to  explain  why 
and  how  there  exists  different  levels  of  development  in  SIS  within  the  region.  This  has 
implications  for  SIS  elsewhere  in  the  developing  world  and  highlights  the  need  for  and 
emergence  of  yet  another  category  of  states  in  the  development  debate  and  literature. 
The  main  theme  addressed  In  this  study  Is  the  development  of  Zanzibar  and  SIS.  It 
brings  into  focus  Important  issues  relating  to  development  theory,  such  as  such  as 
dependency,  double  dependency,  and  interdependence.  Development  theory  and  the 
different  strands  within  it  are  useful  in  identifying  and  explaining  the  problems  of 
development  (and  underdevelopment)  and  these  concepts  are  used  in  the  empirical 
analysis  of  Zanzibar. 
An  understanding  of  the  problems  of  (and  prospects  for)  Zanzibar  requires  an  historical 
approach.  Much  of  the  Isles'  contemporary  economic  structure  is  inherited  from  its 
colonial  past  and  in  its  participation  the  East  African  trade  of  slaves,  ivory  and  spices. 
Since  the  1964  Revolution,  the  psychological  dependence  of  a  large  section  of  the 
population  on  a  hierarchical  social  structure  based  on  race  has  been  changed.  4  There 
1  The  development  of  the  Zanzibar  Revolutionary  Government  between  1964  to  date  is  divisible  into  three  distinct 
phases  characterised  by  different  leadership  styles  (policies  and  strategies)  The  First  Phase  (1964-1972)  was  led  by 
Sheikh  Karume  and  highly  populist.  The  Second  Phase  (1972-1983)  was  led  by  Sheikh  Jumbe  and  the  Third  Phase 
(1983  to  date)  started  with  Ali  Hassan  Mwinyi  and  was  succeeded  by  Idris  Abdul  Wakil  and  recently  by  Salmin 
Amour.  The  phases  are  used  by  used  by  the  ruling  Party  Chama  Cha  Mapinduzi  (CCM)  to  identify  and  distinguish 
political  developments  in  the  Isles  and  they  are  adopted  here  mainly  because  of  the  policy  and  socio-economic 
differences  that  occurred  during  each  phase.  Further  details  of  their  respective  policies  are  discussed  in  chapters  7.8 
and  9. 
2  'Manipulable'  factors  are  those  which  are  within  the  grasp  of  the  government,  i.  e.  those  which  can  be  manipulated  to 
achieve  certain  goals. 
3  Small  States  (SS)  and  Small  Island  States  (SIS)  are  combined  to  increase  the  sample  size  as  there  is  difficulty  to 
obtain  similar  data  for  enough  SIS  but  the  inclusion  of  small  states  does  not  necessarily  invalidate  the  search  for 
characteristics  of  small  island  states,  since  these  are  discussed  in  depth  in  chapters  four  and  five.  4  But  has  not  been  entirely  eliminated.  A  significant  reduction  in  economic  and  political  power  differentials  based  on 4 
has  occurred  a  gradual  but  firm  polarisation  of  development  both  in  terms  of  spatial 
and  class  development,  with  urban  areas  and  the  bureaucratic  bourgeoisie  being 
relatively  favoured.  Like  many  developing  SIS.  Zanzibar  has  become  increasingly 
dependent  on  external  sources  for  capital  (loans,  aid,  remittances,  private  investment, 
etc.  ),  a  situation  that  contradicts  development  philosophies  adopted  after  the 
Revolution.  Accompanying  its  growing  dependence  is  the  steady  erosion  of  self- 
sufflciency,  self  -reliance  and  its  autonomy  within  what  Connell  (1988)  terms  as  a 
'negotiated  dependence'  -  albeit  on  unequal  terms.  '  Significantly,  and  especially  in 
recent  years,  it  appears  that  the  government  has  become  resigned  to  increased 
dependence  and  views  interdependence  with  metropolitan  economies  as  the  best  option 
for  survival.  The  study  examines  the  metamorphoses  and  role  of  dependence  and 
interdependence  In  Zanzibar's  development  strategies  to  test  the  hypotheses  that  it  is 
characterised  by  greater  dependency  compared  to  the  early  years  of  the  Revolution. 
This  in  turn  has  repercussions  resulting  in  increased  spatial  and  class  differentiation. 
1.1.1  Hypotheses 
The  principal  hypothesis  postulated  states  that  Zanzibar  is  becoming  increasingly 
incorporated  into  the  global  economy  through  increasing  levels  of  dependence,  and  this 
has  amplified  endogenous  development  problems. 
This  over-arching  hypothesis  is  followed  through  by  a  number  of  sub-hypotheses  that 
help  to  define  the  processes  by  which  the  development  of  the  isles'  socio-economic 
structure  has  evolved,  highlighting  its  current  development  constraints.  They  state 
that: 
1]  the  economic  characteristics  of  the  economy  of  Zanzibar  have  developed  into 
what  is  characterised  as  a  MIRAGE  economy.  Its  social,  economic  and  political 
characteristics  have  been  transformed  dramatically  over  the  last  decade  and  are 
currently  characterised  by  predominance  of  migration  and  increased  remittances 
emanating  from  this  population  movement.  Foreign  aid  dominates  development 
expenditure  and  the  government  remains  the  largest  employer  in  the  absence  of 
alternative  viable  economic  activities.  These  characteristics  encourage  urban 
growth  and  counter  rural  and  agricultural  development.  and  as  such  the 
economy  of  Zanzibar  can  be  described  as  a  MIRAGE  (MIgration,  Remittances,  Aid 
race/ethnicity  and  class  has  taken  place,  although  it  is  argued  that  this  was  replaced  by  a  bureaucratic  bourgeoisie.  In 
recent  years  there  has  emerged  an  increasingly  powerful  merchant  class  and  representatives  of  multinational 
corporations  establishing  footholds  within  the  national  economy.  Whether  these  will  take  up  racial/ethnic  dimensions 
remains  to  be  seen. 
1  Negotiated  dependence  refers  to  a  situation  in  which  SIS  increasingly  negotiate  for  bilateral  and  multilateral 
assistance  for  both  their  development  and  recurrent  budgets  and  also  to  seek  preferential  access  for  their  exports,  a 
phenomenon  which  Connell,  1988a  terms  as  'aid  with  dignity'. 5 
and  dominance  of  Government  Employment).  economy  and  one  which  is  far  from 
sustainable  1 
21  major  spatial  disparities  exist  in  levels  of  development  both,  between  rural  and 
urban  and  between  the  core  and  peripheral  islands  and  such  spatial  disparities 
have  both  spatial  and  developmental  repercussions  in  areas  and  sectors  of  the 
economy,  implying  that  socio-economic  transformation  has  accentuated  internal 
inequality  and  this  is  in  part  a  result  of  the  MIRAGE  economy. 
31  small  size  (physical,  economic  and  population)  and  remoteness.  have  significant 
effects  since  they  create  a  situation  of  limited  options  for  the  islands, 
highlighting  the  difficulty  of  achieving  development  in  small  island  states. 
41  despite  efforts  aimed  at  increasing  self-reliance,  a  higher  degree  of  dependency  - 
both  bi-lateral  and  multi-lateral  -  and  'double-dependency'  has  developed  in 
Zanzibar,  further  inhibiting  the  possibility  of  self-reliant  development.  Such  a 
position  further  debilitates  its  development  potential,  and  especially  as  its 
development  strategies  are  becoming  increasingly  under  the  influence  of  external 
parties,  that  have  failed  to  address  some  fundamental  flaws  in  the  global 
economic  system. 
51  small  island  states  (SIS)  share  a  number  of  common  constraints  in  their  socio- 
economic  development,  but  these  are  not  homogeneous.  Numerous  factors 
account  for  the  existence  of  a  typology  of  small  island  states  (SIS)  and  Zanzibar 
belongs  to  a  grouping  which  is  defined  by  its  historical  legacy,  economic 
linkages,  political  affiliations,  geopolitical  and  geostrategic  position,  and  internal 
composition  of  the  population  (cultural,  skills  and  demographic).  In  addressing 
the  development  problems  of  SIS,  it  is  important  to  take  note  of  such  factors, 
since  they  continue  to  influence  the  path  and  rate  of  development  (and 
underdevelopment)  of  SIS. 
1.1.2  Why  the  study  of  Small  Island  States  (SIS) 
A  basic  premise  of  this  research  is  that  there  exists  a  group  of  small,  isolated  and  poor 
island  countries  (SIS)  that  form  a  separate  category  of  LDCs  facing  a  specific  set  of 
problems  different  from  other  developing  countries.  The  problems  are  different  either  in 
the  extreme  effects  of  some  factors,  such  as  population,  physical  or  geographical  and 
economic  size.  fragmentation,  remoteness  or  isolation  and  a  paucity  of  physical  and 
human  resources,  or  in  the  existence  of  some  different  factors,  such  as  problems  of 
1A  concept  formulated  by  Bertram  and  Watters  (1985,1986),  and  referred  to  by  Munro  (1986)  cited  by  Tisdell  and 
Fairbairn  (1984),  Brookfield  (1986)  and  Connell  (1988a.  1988b). C 
distance,  communications,  and  geopolitical  and  geostrategic  considerations.  Until  the 
1970s  there  was  little  research  and  discussion  on  such  problems.  However  the 
situation  has  changed  since,  though  there  remain  gaps  in  the  knowledge  about  the 
development  process  in  the  smaller  and  poorer  SIS  particularly  those  of  the  SIS  of  the 
Western  Indian  Ocean  Region.  1  As  the  SIS  In  the  region  are  different  from  each  other, 
they  provide  the  benefit  of  comparing  their  development  experiences  and  highlight  their 
strengths  and  weaknesses  and  especially  in  terms  of  policy  measures.  The  study  hopes 
to  contribute  in  filling  in  that  gap  and  establish  a  link  between  development  theory  and 
praxis. 
1.1.3  Why  study  Zanzibar? 
Zanzibar  is  of  particular  interest  in  that  while  it  is  a  SIS,  it  is  unique  in  being  formally 
incorporated  within  a  political  Union  between  Itself  and  what  was  Tanganyika,  the 
United  Republic  of  Tanzania.  It  is  a  form  of  a  federal  union,  with  Zanzibar  retaining  a 
considerable  degree  of  autonomy.  It  maintains  its  own  government,  parliament 
(representative  council)  and  head  of  state.  It  runs  all  matters  (e.  g.  social  and  economic 
development)  except  those  which  are  designated  as  Union  matters  (e.  g.  foreign  affairs, 
home  affairs,  defence,  currency,  etc.  ).  Although  part  of  a  union  with  a  mainland  or 
continental  developing  country,  it  exhibits  all  the  characteristics  and  problems  of  the 
smaller  and  poorer  SIS,  little  attention  to  which  has  been  given  in  the  understanding  of 
its  development  problems.  Other  opportunities  may  exist  by  virtue  of  it  being  part  of 
the  union,  and  provide  it  with  some  'room  for  manoeuvre'  in  confronting  its 
development  problems,  particularly  by  comparison  with  other  SIS  which  are  defined  as 
Independent  (sovereign)  states. 
1.2  Statement  of  the  problem 
Despite  pursuing  development  policies  and  programmes  aimed  at  achieving  self- 
reliance.  self-sufficiency  and  diversification  of  their  economies,  SIS  economies  in  general 
and  Zanzibar  in  particular  have  become  even  more  dependent,  narrow  and  vulnerable. 
Their  economic  structures  are  open  and  distorted  with  a  considerable  degree  of  social, 
economic  and  spatial  differentiation.  Despite  policies  aimed  at  eliminating 
underdevelopment  in  Zanzibar,  it  occupies  amongst  the  lowest  positions  in  the 
'development  league'  of  developing  small  island  states,  (SIS)  using  any  combination  of 
development  indicators?  There  is  a  high  degree  of  spatial  differentiation  in  development 
(social  and  economic)  within  and  between  the  islands  and  between  rural  and  urban  in 
1  They  exclude  territories,  departments  and  dependencies  LL.,  DOMs  and  TOMs). 
2  Using  basic  and  simplistic  indicators  such  as  GNP  and  GDP.  the  island  is  amongst  the  poorest.  The  inclusion  of 
quality  of  life  indicators  improves  the  situation  somewhat,  but  then  only  marginally.  Increasingly,  there  are 
indications  that  the  achievements  of  the  early  years  of  the  revolution  have  been  eroded. 7 
spite  of  the  various  development  programmes  and  populist  policies  which  have  aimed  at 
egalitarianism. 
1.3  Specific  Objectives 
This  is  an  empirical  study  couched  within  the  theoretical  frameworks  of  dependency 
theory  and  interdependent  development.  Both  have  substantial  implications  for  the 
concept  of  sustainable  development,  a  concept  that  has  been  of  immense  relevance  to 
small  states  and  small  island  states,  as  they  are  intricately  linked  to  resource  use, 
survival  and  the  potential  for  development.  The  objective  is  to  identify  and  analyse  the 
various  development  disadvantages  or  constraints,  options  and  advantages  that 
Zanzibar  encounters.  The  specific  objectives  are  to: 
1]  show  that  the  island  economy  has  become  increasingly  dependent  on  the 
metropoles  despite  efforts  aimed  at  the  opposite; 
21  analyse  the  underlying  structures  of  the  Zanzibari  economy  and  show  how  the 
socio-economic  development  of  the  country  is  affected  by  this.  It  will  also  show 
how  in  recent  years  these  have  been  transformed  into  one  with  urban  bias  and 
increasingly  dependent  on  government  employment,  aid,  remittances  and 
migration  as  a  safety  valve. 
31  analyse  the  nature  of  the  political  union  linking  Zanzibar  with  Mainland 
Tanzania  and  show  how  this  relationship  is  being  transformed  into  an  economic 
one.  enhancing  the  interdependence  between  the  two  developing  countries. 
41  show  the  degree  of  spatial  differentiation  within  the  island  state  and  its 
relationship  with  socio-economic  developments  in  the  country. 
51  assess  whether  under  the  severe  constraints  that  SIS.  and  Zanzibar  faces,  there 
are  other  untried  and  perhaps  even  unconventional  possibilities,  or  what  Selwyn 
(1975b:  2)  called  'room  for  manoeuvre'. 
61  attempt  a  comparative  analysis  with  other  small  island  states  (SIS)  within  the 
Western  Indian  Ocean  region  to  show  the  individual  differences  between  them, 
explain  why  these  exist  and  assess  whether  there  is  any  relevance  to  Zanzibar's 
development  experiences.  A  typology  of  SIS  is  attempted  with  the  aim  of 
assessing  and  explaining  Zanzibar's  position. 
Development  is  a  multi-faceted  process  whose  nature  cannot  be  understood  by  the 
political  scientist.  economist  or  the  sociologist  alone;  each  has  a  narrowness  of  scope 
limiting  the  ability  of  appreciating  the  multi-faceted  nature  of  development.  In 8 
considering  this  situation,  the  study  attempts  a  multidisciplinary  approach  to  the 
problem.  This  is  one  of  the  strengths  of  human  geography  and  explains  why  in  recent 
years  the  study  of  small  states  and  small  island  states  (SIS)  has  seen  an  increasing 
contribution  by  geographers  as  the  physical,  environmental,  spatial,  economic,  human 
and  political  dimensions  are  considered  (Clarke  et.  al.,  1987;  Connell,  1988a.  1988b; 
Kaminarides  et  al,  1989;  Beller,  et  aL  1990).  The  complexities  of  development  in  most 
developing  SIS  demand  this  approach  to  arrive  at  any  meaningful  analysis. 
1.4  Background  to  the  research 
One  of  the  major  motivations  for  this  study  is  the  relative  lack  of  understanding  of 
development  issues  of  the  small  island  states  (SIS)  adjacent  to  the  African  continent. 
Although  in  recent  years  considerable  information  has  been  generated  about  small 
states  and  SIS  in  general  (Selwyn,  1975a,  ;  Shand,  1980a,  1980b,  1980c;  Shaw,  1982; 
Jalan,  1982a;  Dolman,  1984,1985a,  1985b;  Dommen  and  Hein,  1985,  Clarke  and 
Payne,  1987;  Beller  et.  ai,  1990),  relatively  little  research  has  been  published  on  African 
Island  states  (Shand,  1980b;  Cohen,  1983,  Appleyard  and  Ghosh,  1988).  Moreover,  the 
progress  of  island  states  next  to  the  African  continent,  as  with  much  of  Sub-Saharan 
Africa,  appears  to  be  slower  or  even  worsening  compared  to  most  other  SIS. 
Despite  the  Increased  realisation  of  the  difficult  development  prospects  of  developing 
SIS  relatively  little  socio-economic  empirical  research  has  been  carried  out  on  the 
problems  of  peripheral  developing  small  island  economies  There  is  a  lack  of  adequate 
statistical  information  and  sustained  empirical  work  on  their  past  development 
experience  (Jalan,  1982b;  Hein,  1989).  Although  UNCTAD  III  (Resolution  65  III). 
suggested  that  the  needs  of  developing  island  countries  may  be  different  from  those  of 
larger  LDC's  and  it  is  important  to  understand  the  specific  conditions  of  each  SIS  before 
the  complete  range  of  development  constraints  facing  them  can  be  fully  understood  and 
appreciated,  still  very  little  empirical  work  has  been  done. 
Zanzibar  has  undergone  several  phases  in  its  socio-economic  development  since  1964. 
Many  of  its  problems  and  experiences  are  found  in  other  developing  SS  and  SIS  and 
there  is  need  to  compare  and  contrast  them  with  Zanzibar's  and  analyse  them. 
Ironically,  despite  being  a  semi-autonomous  SIS,  the  period  after  the  1964  Revolution 
has  failed  to  recognise  that  because  of  its  small  island  status  and  peripheral  role  in  the 
global  economy,  it  faced  development  constraints  that  were  to  some  extent  different 
from  those  of  other  developing  countries  and  so  failed  to  take  appropriate  measures  in 
confronting  them. 
In  one  sense  the  small  size  of  Zanzibar  implies  that  it  is  a  manageable  forum  for 
research.  However.  Its  small  size  conceals  considerable  diversity  and  complexities  of 9 
development.  Bearing  this  in  mind  and  given  the  limited  time  and  resources  available, 
other  logistical  difficulties  (such  as  transport)  and  the  tense  socio-economic  and 
political  atmosphere  prevailing  at  the  time  the  research  still  had  to  be  carried  out. 
The  thesis  adopts  a  positivist  stance.  Although  the  principal  approach  to  the  study  is 
from  the  geographical  perspective.  much  of  the  argument  is  economic,  sociological, 
political  and  historical.  Given  the  complexity  of  the  problems  and  prospects  facing  SIS 
in  the  developing  world  the  research  cannot  limit  itself  to  the  'traditional'  definitions  of 
geography  alone.  However.  one  of  the  strengths  of  human  geography  is  that  It  is  able  to 
seek  explanations  from  the  social  sciences  as  a  whole. 
1.5  Research  approach 
Of  the  different  development  paradigms,  this  study  is  based  on  a  dependency  approach 
It  discusses  the  strands  of  dependency  analysis,  modifies  and  utilises  them  in  the 
study  of  development  problems  of  SIS.  (Brookfield,  1975;  Cardoso,  1972;  Dos  Santos, 
1972;  Frank,  1969,1977;  Griffin,  1969:  Johnson,  1972;  Kay,  1989:  Seers,  1979; 
Sunkel,  1972).  With  the  exception  of  Brookfield's  (1975)  work  and  perhaps  the  few 
contributions  of  the  "Caribbean  dependency  school%  there  is  a  striking  absence  of 
dependency  literature  on  small  states. 
The  research  extends  the  problems  of  dependency  to  the  concept  of  Double  Dependency, 
which  has  been  devised  for  land-locked  countries.  While  these  are  problems  commonly 
associated  with  dependency  analysis  this  does  not  invalidate  their  application.  For 
example,  Kay  (1990)  notes  the  continuing  relevance  and  utility  of  dependency  analysis 
and  recommends  the  renewal  and  progression  of  traditional  structuralist  and 
dependency  analysis  in  attempting  to  present  an  alternative  to  the  neoclassical  and 
modernisation  paradigms  (Kay,  1989;  1990).  This  approach  is  taken  up  here  and 
applies  the  remodelled  dependency  analysis  to  the  current  development  problems. 
Although  the  analysis  is  based  on  a  remodelled  and  more  realistic  version  of 
dependency  analysis,  the  possibility  that  other  paths  of  development  exist  -  and  need 
not  be  within  the  simplistic  confines  of  capitalism  or  socialism,  outward  or  inward 
directed  development,  or  import  substitution  or  export  promotion  industrialisation  -  are 
recognised. 
In  the  1970s  most  of  the  discussions  and  debates  on  Dependency  Theory  revolved 
around  larger  countries  and  the  manner  in  which  they  were  linked  to  the  global 
economy  and  influenced  by  it.  In  a  study  of  small  economies  in  1965.  Demas  argued 
that  a  small  domestic  market  placed  sharp  limitations  on  the  process  of  import- 
substitution  Industrialisation.  thus  removing  the  option  of  balanced  growth.  This  goal. 
he  believed,  could  only  be  realistically  attained  by  large  continental  countries.  However, 10 
these  views  were  seen  as  being  'environmentally  deterministic'  by  Best  (1971).  He 
argued  that  such  views  focused  only  on  physical  variables  such  as  size  instead  of 
'manipulable'  policy  variables.  He  suggested  that  emphasis  should  be  upon  the 
organisation  of  small  economies  instead  on  their  size  per  se.  Underdevelopment  was  no 
longer  seen  as  a  passive  condition  in  which  states  found  themselves  at  birth.  instead  it 
was  a  phenomenon  brought  about  by  their  dependence  upon,  and  peripheral  location 
within,  the  international  economy  as  a  whole  (Payne.  1987:  85).  It  is  important  to 
understand  that  such  economies  are  both  small  and  dependent,  and  not  dependent 
because  they  are  small.  Nonetheless,  a  claim  does  need  to  be  made  for  size,  though  it 
Is  of  secondary  importance  to  their  world  economy  position. 
Dependency  analysis  can  help  by  identifying  a  series  of  factors  that  explain  constraints 
to  development  and  enhance  underdevelopment.  These  include  the  examples  provided 
and  others  such  as  the  position  of  certain  classes  and  their  influence  on  the  economy.  a 
tradition  of  monoculture,  the  intermediary  function  of  the  state,  and  the  role  of  foreign 
investment,  including  aid  and  loans.  In  so  doing  Dependency  Theory  can  be  seen  to 
have  added  something  of  value  to  the  analysis  of  the  economic  constraints  facing  small 
states  (Payne  op.  cit..  :  55).  It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  study  to  repeat  analyses  which 
have  been  made  in  larger  countries,  rather  it  seeks  to  complement  such  studies  by 
highlighting  the  specific  problems  and  constraints  of  small  developing  countries  and  SIS 
In  particular. 
The  study  needs  to  adopt  an  historical  approach  in  assessing  how  the  economy  of 
Zanzibar  was  influenced  by  its  previous  history  (pre-colonial  and  colonial)  and  how  it 
evolved  from  1964  to  the  1990s.  This  provides  the  background  to  the  understanding  of 
how  the  current  problem  has  evolved  and  thus  avoiding  the  poverty  of  ahistoricism. 
Moreover,  such  an  approach  forms  one  of  the  manifestations  of  dependency  analysis. 
According  to  Palma  (1981),  the  historical  component  is  one  of  the  most  encouraging  and 
redeeming  features  of  Dependency  Theory.  The  themes  and  ideas  emanating  from  the 
dependency  literature  are  then  applied  in  making  an  assessment  of  the  Zanzibar's 
current  position  and  future  prospects.  It  is  also  appropriate  to  analyse  the  dependency 
relation  within  the  periphery  and  their  implications. 
1.6  Methods,  assumptions  and  limitations 
Three  methods  of  analysis  are  adopted  in  the  study.  The  first,  cluster  analysis,  is  made 
using  a  sample  of  26  small  and  small  island  states,  incorporating  the  five  SIS  of  the 
Western  Indian  Ocean  Region  to  ascertain  whether  there  does  exist  a  typology  of  SIS 
and  why  the  groups  are  formed.  The  second,  comparative  analysts,  is  used  to  help 11 
explain  the  membership  and  status  of  these  groups.  The  advantage  of  the  comparative 
approach  is  that  it  enables  Issues  in  the  main  study  area  (Zanzibar)  to  be  seen  in  a 
different  light,  which  might  have  not  been  seen  otherwise,  for  example.  why  is  tourism 
and  administration  so  much  better  developed  in  Seychelles,  or  manufacturing  in 
Mauritius  compared  to  Zanzibar?  The  third,  Is  a  socio-economic  survey  of  Zanzibar. 
The  purpose  of  the  survey  Is  to  ascertain  and  complement  secondary  sources  of  data,  to 
provide  an  in  depth  understanding  of  the  existing  situation  in  the  Isles,  given  the  recent 
changes  occurring  there  and  to  draw  out  and  analyse  characteristics  existing  in  the 
population  which  are  a  consequence  of  current  socio-economic  and  political 
developments.  The  survey  also  seeks  to  show  that  both  rural-urban  and  inter-island 
disparities  exist  and  that  these  are  accentuated  because  of  its  status  as  a  MIRAGE 
economy. 
1.6.2  Limitations 
SIS  are  plagued  by  the  lack  of  adequate  statistical  data  and  other  information  related  to 
development.  The  SIS  in  the  South  West  Indian  Ocean,  and  Zanzibar  in  particular.  are 
no  exception.  Moreover,  the  inherent  problem  of  insularity  that  exists  in  most  SIS  has 
affected  the  research  in  various  ways.  For  example,  despite  going  through  all  the 
relevant  and  official  channels  and  explaining  why  the  research  was  done.  there  were 
many  instances  when  the  researcher  was  treated  with  suspicion  and  was  aware  that 
some  interviewees  were  weary  of  some  questions  and  Issues. 
In  Zanzibar,  the  research  was  carried  out  at  a  time  when  considerable  political.  social 
and  economic  changes  were  occurring  and  society  was  sensitive  to  developments  (e.  g. 
removal  of  food  subsidies,  emergence  of  clandestine  dissident  groups,  emergence  of 
religious  fundamentalism.  liberalisation  and  the  influx  of  'foreigners'  and  foreign 
investments  and  the  re-emergence  of  class  interests).  1  The  researcher  is  not  indigenous 
to  the  Isles,  and  in  some  instances,  coming  from  the  Mainland  can  be  a  disadvantage. 
The  social  and  economic  problems  facing  the  island  community  were  (and  still  are) 
considerable  and  this  was  observed  during  the  research.  It  is  not  known  to  what  extent 
the  research  and  the  responses  and  quality  of  data  and  information  was  affected  by 
these  developments.  As  such  the  timing  was  perhaps  not  ideal  for  conducting  a  social 
science  research,  but  the  limitations  of  time  and  resources  dictated  that  the  work  had 
to  continue.  However,  being  aware  of  the  situation  is  advantageous  and  the  researcher 
1  The  emergence  of  fundamentalism  is  symptomatic  of  social  and  economic  dissatisfaction  and  frustration.  A  similar 
situation  occur  elsewhere,  e.  g.  in  Egypt,  Algeria  and  Tunisia.  However,  there  is  also  an  element  of  external  attempts 
aimed  at  influencing  local  political  (and  economic)  developments  through  the  influence  of  religion.  Whatever  the 
case,  this  phenomenon  merits  a  study  of  its  own  and  it  is  assumed  in  this  study  as  symptomatic  of  a  response  to 
socio-economic  and  political  development  that  have  occurred  in  the  Isles. 12 
was  able  to  adjust  to  them.  Despite  the  frustrations  they  sometimes  created  by 
(possibly)  affecting  questions  and  responses,  or  through  mere  suspicion,  they  have 
helped  broaden  and  enrich  the  understanding  of  the  situation  in  the  islands  and 
perhaps  added  more  to  the  research  findings  than  they  may  have  hindered. 
Insofar  as  the  quality  of  secondary  and  official  sources  of  data  and  information,  the 
quality  has  improved  and  mainly  because  of  current  development  needs  and  the 
requirements  of  aid  donors  who  demand  precise  information  before  extending  any 
assistance.  The  offices  of  multilateral  development  agencies  are  also  involved  in  data 
collection  and  publication.  However  there  were  restrictions  in  obtaining  access  to  some 
reports  and  it  was  diMcult  to  trace  older  ones.  The  researcher  was  informed  that  some 
reports  and  records  were  lost  or  destroyed  just  after  the  1964  Revolution,  however,  once 
the  Zanzibar  Statistics  Department  was  established  there  has  been  an  increasing 
variety  and  flow  of  published  information. 
The  main  predicament  with  official  statistics  is  that  they  report  within  the  framework  of 
the  economy,  often  presenting  it  in  aggregate  form.  As  in  many  other  countries,  the 
manipulation  and  presentation  of  official  statistics  occurs  in  the  interest  of  the 
established  power  groups  and  development  objectives.  This  study  has  had  to  depend  on 
such  statistics  considerably  and  this  is  unavoidable.  To  counteract  this  problem  a 
socio-economic  research  was  carried  out  and  the  results  are  used  to  support  the 
hypotheses  and  other  observations.  The  disaggregated  social  data  generated  Is  also 
compared  to  the  official  statistics  for  consistency.  Furthermore,  the  period  after 
1984/85  saw  an  increasing  amount  of  social  science  based  research  being  carried  out 
by  individuals,  multilateral  organisations  and  social  scientists  in  general.  Some  of  this 
data  and  information  has  been  made  available.  In  the  process,  it  is  anticipated  that  the 
micro-level  data  will  overcome  some  of  the  anomalies  created  by  the  manipulation  of 
official  statistics. 
It  is  also  hoped  that  the  data  and  information  generated  by  the  questionnaire  survey  is 
perhaps  amongst  the  most  important  contributions  in  that  quite  unlike  official  macro- 
level  statistics  is  not  implicitly  diffusionist  in  approach.  The  study  is  not  completely 
dependent  on  statistics  emanating  from  the  diffusionist  school  such  as  Keynesian 
aggregated  measures  such  as  Gross  Domestic  Product  and  Gross  National  Income.  It 
also  makes  use  of  other,  human  development  based  data,  such  as  access  to  water 
supplies,  education,  and  literacy.  This  Is  Important  as  the  study  is  critical  of  the 
excessive  use  of  such  measures  and  the  diffusionist  development  approaches  as  a 
whole. 
On  the  whole  despite  the  obstacles  presented  by  the  lack  of  adequate  official  statistics, 
it  is  assumed  that  inaccuracies  have  been  limited  by  frugal  use  of  the  existing  data  and 13 
by  complementing  them  with  other  sources.  It  is  hoped  that  in  the  long  run  the 
inaccuracies  that  result  are  not  serious  enough  to  invalidate  the  analysis. 
1.7  Organisation  of  the  thesis 
At  the  beginning  of  each  chapter  an  introduction  followed  by  the  subject  matter  of  the 
chapter  and  at  the  end  of  each  chapter  a  summary  and  conclusion  is  made.  The  first 
chapter  introduces  the  research  problem  and  the  approaches  adopted  in  making 
conducting  the  analysis.  Chapter  two  discusses  the  theoretical  perspectives  and  how 
they  apply  to  the  problem.  Chapter  three  consists  of  a  literature  review,  tracing  the 
development  of  the  literature  on  small  economies  and  small  island  states,  focusing  on 
the  problems  of  size.  The  fourth  chapter  introduces  and  discusses  the  research  design 
and  methodologies  used.  Chapter  five  attempts  a  cluster  analysis  of  a  sample  of  26  SS 
and  SIS  and  then  isolates  and  analyses  further  with  descriptive  statistics  the  five  SIS  of 
the  Western  Indian  Ocean  region.  This  is  followed  by  a  comparative  analysis  of  the  five 
SIS.  Chapter  six  provides  the  Zanzibar's  background  and  traces  and  analyses  the 
issues  which  lead  to  its  independence  and  the  1965  Revolution.  Chapter  seven 
describes  and  analyses  the  events  and  issues  occurring  during  the  First  Phase  of  the 
Revolution  (1964-1972),  Including  the  establishment  of  a  political  Union  with 
Tanganyika.  The  eighth  chapter  does  the  same  with  the  Second  Phase  (1972-1983)  and 
notes  the  gradual  (evolutionary)  changes  that  were  occurring  up  to  the  economic,  social 
and  political  crises  of  the  early  1980s.  Chapter  nine  analyses  the  Third  Phase  which  is 
identified  by  liberal  economic  and  social  policies,  quasi-prosperity  and  the  emergence  of 
new  characteristics  in  the  Zanzibari  economy.  Chapter  ten  identifies  and  analyses  the 
existence  of  MIRAGE  characteristics  and  their  implications.  The  eleventh  chapter  notes 
the  other  emerging  and  dominant  economic  characteristics,  the  demise  of  agriculture 
and  emergence  of  trade  as  the  'engine  of  growth'.  Chapter  twelve  presents  the  results  of 
an  empirical  study  through  a  socio-economic  survey,  detailing  the  spatial.  social  and 
developmental  implications  of  Zanzibar's  MIRAGE  economy.  Chapter  thirteen 
summarises  and  concludes  the  research  findings  and  identifies  issues  for  further 
research. 14 
2.0  Theoretical  Perspectives 
2.1  Introduction 
The  interest  in  the  development  of  'backward  areas'  during  the  post  war  era  (WW  II)  has 
lead  to  theoretical  and  methodological  concerns  that  have  become  an  important  part  of 
classical  social  science.  Social  scientists  from  various  fields  became  concerned  and 
involved  with  important  social  issues,  and  especially  those  related  to  development  and 
underdevelopment.  Consequently,  development  theory  contains  a  variety  of  social 
science  approaches  and  has  lead  to  an  interdisciplinary,  normative  corpus  of  Third 
World  development  theory.  Development  theory  has  thus  evolved  to  be  a  loose  body  of 
contending  approaches  that,  in  spite  of  contradicting  each  other,  also  presuppose  one 
another  (Hettne,  1990). 
The  emergence  of  such  a  theory  followed  from  the  realisation  that  the  problems  of 
development  of  the  Third  World  were  specific  and  different  from  the  original  transition 
(as  in  the  process  advocated  by  transition  thereolsts)  and  this  emerged  from  tentative 
attempts  at  understanding  the  problem  of  underdevelopment  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  developed  world.  Of  central  concern  was  that  the  conditions  in  the  less  developed 
countries  were  unsatisfactory  and  needed  to  be  improved.  Such  a  viewpoint  emanated 
from  a  Eurocentric  phase  of  development  thinking  that  prevailed  during  the  period.  It 
has  since  evolved  to  become  increasingly  complex,  multidisciplinary  and  more 
authentically  universal.  It  is  concerned  with  change  within  social,  economic.  political 
and  cultural  spheres.  Logically,  since  it  is  not  static,  there  can  be  no  fixed  nor  final 
definition  of  development.  only  suggestion  of  what  development  should  imply  in 
particular  contexts  (Hettne,  1990:  2).  As  Hettne  also  suggests,  development  should  be 
an  open-ended  concept.  constantly  re-defined  as  the  understanding  of  the  development 
process  deepens,  and  as  new  problems  to  be  solved  by  development  emerge.  Such  a 
position  is  adopted  in  the  framework  of  this  analysis. 
This  chapter  comprises  two  main  elements.  The  first  discusses  the  problems  of 
development  and  underdevelopment  and  introduces  the  theoretical  perspectives  that 
have  evolved  around  development  and  underdevelopment.  It  includes  a  discussion  of 
the  definitions  of  development  and  underdevelopment,  what  are  perceived  as  the  causes 
of  underdevelopment.  the  emergence  of  the  dtustontst-modemisation  paradigm  and  its 
solutions  to  the  development  problem.  From  there  the  chapter  discusses  the  challenges 
to  the  dlusionist-modernisation  paradigm,  and  a  number  of  alternative  approaches  to 15 
development  are  discussed.  Subsequently,  the  analysis  discusses  the  emergence  of 
dependency  analysis,  presenting  a  critique  of  it  in  an  attempt  to  reformulate  and  assess 
its  applications  in  the  analysis  of  the  research  problem.  The  focus  is  on  the  relevance  of 
a  reformulated  dependency  analysis  to  the  study  of  small  countries  and  especially 
developing  SIS. 
The  second  part  moves  from  the  theoretical  to  the  more  concrete  highlighting  practical 
experiences  of  development  and  underdevelopment  In  developing  SIS.  It  introduces  and 
discusses  the  idea  of  double  dependency.  While  formulated  within  the  case  of  land- 
locked  countries,  it  is  argued  that  if  the  premise  of  this  concept  is  accepted  -  that 
geographic  location  is  an  inhibiting  factor  in  the  development  of  such  -a  similar 
argument  can  be  applied  to  the  SIS.  It  also  consists  of  a  review  of  the  existing  literature 
and  contemporary  issues  and  debates  revolving  around  the  problems  and  prospects  of 
SIS.  The  discussions  gradually  impinge  on  the  problems  and  experiences  of  the  Islands 
of  the  Western  Indian  Ocean. 
2.2  Definition  of  Development 
The  idea  of  development  can  be  broad  and  open  to  ambiguity.  Narrowing  it,  involves 
change  and  in  development  studies,  to  change  as  it  applies  to  whole  societies  or  states 
(Dower,  1988).  However,  this  is  still  inadequate  and  there  is  a  need  to  define  the  form 
and  type  of  changes.  Within  this  context  then,  development  can  be  defined  as  a  process 
of  change  influenced  by  human  action  occurring  in  societies.  By  its  advocates  it  is 
seen  normally  as  a  positive  value.  '  Dower  (1988:  9)  adds  to  this  by  stating  that 
"development  is  a  process  which  ought  to  take  place.  " 
This  is  the  working  definition  of  development  taken  up  by  the  study.  However,  it  is  also 
recognised  that  in  the  process  of  analysing  development  theory.  different  definitions  are 
adopted  by  the  various  schools  or  paradigms  at  different  times. 
The  research  problem  is  associated  with  development.  It  questions  why,  after  nearly 
three  decades  from  the  era  of  decolonisation  acceptable  levels  of  development  have  not 
occurred  in  most  of  the  Third  World  and  attempts  to  analyse  the  development 
constraints  of  a  SIS  using  a  reformulated  dependency  not  as  a  theory,  but  as  a  method 
or  framework  of  analysis. 
1  Positive  value  does  not  necessarily  imply  economic  value.  It  can  include  good  things  of  human  life  or  relative 
priorities  in  the  elements  of  well  being.  It  also  includes  basic  rules  of  morality,  institutional  norms  for  collective 
decision-mating  and  the  role  and  extent  of  government,  justice,  human  rights  etc. 16 
2.3  Development  and  Underdevelopment 
There  is  no  single,  generally  accepted  definition  of  development  mainly  because 
development  theory  itself  is  a  diverse  body  and  open  to  various  interpretations.  As  early 
as  1963,  Dudley  Seers  in  his  article  The  Limitations  of  the  Special  Case  argued  that 
conventional  economic  theory  was  only  valid  for  Western  Industrial  capitalism  pointing 
out  that: 
Economics  seem  very  slow  in  adapting  itself  to  the  requirements  of  the  main  task  of  the 
day  -  the  elimination  of  acute  poverty  in  Africa,  Asia  and  Latin  America  -  just  as  the 
previous  generation  of  economists  failed  to  cope  realistically  with  economic 
fluctuations  until  after  the  depression  had  brought  politically  catastrophic  results 
(Seers,  1963:  77) 
Indeed  by  the  1970s  development  was  still  seen  by  some  as  a  purely  economic 
phenomenon.  A  basic  distinction  must  be  made  between  economic  growth  and 
development.  The  former  is  analysed  in  terms  of  changes  in  the  value  of  often  purely 
economic  parameters  such  as  GDP.  GNP  and  National  Income,  whilst  the  latter  is  a 
process  which  affects  not  only  purely  economic  relations  but  also  and  perhaps  more 
importantly,  the  social,  political  and  cultural  aspects  of  society.  Macro-economic 
aggregate  indices,  however,  merely  provide  a  rough  Indication  of  economic  growth, 
concealing  the  internal  distribution  of  income  and  social  welfare,  both  with  socio- 
economic  and  spatial  structures  (Brookfield,  1975).  This  includes  changes  as  they 
impinge  on  the  cultural,  psychological  and  even  spiritual  aspects  of  a  nation.  Putting  it 
mildly,  development  should  be  change  for  the  better  -a  better  quality  of  life,  standards 
of  living,  yields,  incomes,  houses,  facilities,  food,  health,  political  participation  and  so 
on  -  and  these  ought  to  be  the  wish  of  those  central  to  the  issues. 
Neo-classical  economic  theory  views  development  as  the  growth  or  expansion  of  a 
leading  sector  or  sectors  in  the  economy,  from  which  multiplier  effects  will  be  generated. 
The  export  performance  of  a  country  was  seen  as  necessary  engine  of  growth,  the 
benefits  of  which  would  be  distributed  to  other  sectors  (Viner,  1953).  This  view  was 
embraced  with  vigour  in  the  development  plans  of  newly  independent  developing 
countries,  and  the  period  between  1960  and  1970  saw  a  diffusion  of  industrial 
development  programmes  and  projects  all  over  the  developing  world  with  the  intentions 
of  diversifying  from  primary  production.  reducing  imports  and  expanding  on 
manufactured  exports.  Most  of  these  programmes  had  limited  success  since  effort  was 
concentrated  on  what  was  erroneously  thought  to  be  development,  but  was  in  actual 
fact  economic  growth.  The  two  are  totally  different  since  the  latter  does  not  necessarily 
imply  the  former. 17 
The  interest  in  development  within  the  Third  World  was  generated  in  the  post  war  era 
(WW2).  The  global  economic  system  was  being  overhauled.  The  metropolitan  economies 
were  weak  from  the  war  and  focused  their  attention  first  on  domestic  matters. 
Moreover.  one  of  the  effects  of  the  conflict  was  the  increase  in  the  demand  for 
independence  by  the  colonies.  Following  1945  there  was  a  massive  disequilibrium  in 
the  global  economic  system,  particularly  in  Europe,  which  was  in  need  of  development. 
Successful  European  reconstruction  created  an  atmosphere  of  optimism  with  the 
capabilities  of  manipulative  state-led  intervention  which  had  'enormous'  potential  to  the 
emerging  new  nations. 
For  development  to  occur  a  major  reorganisation  of  the  modes  of  production,  exchange 
and  consumption  had  to  be  implemented.  The  demand  for  independence  was  linked  to 
the  anticipation  that  the  general  socio-economic  conditions  within  the  colonies  would  be 
improved  with  self-government.  This  process  exposed  the  intensity  of 
underdevelopment  that  existed  and  the  urgent  need  for  rectifying  the  situation. 
Insofar  as  neoclassical  theory  is  concerned,  underdevelopment,  like  development,  was 
viewed  as  an  economic  phenomenon,  measured  through  a  set  of  indicators.  If  and 
when  these  did  not  approach  an  `accepted'  (Western)  levels,  which  was  more  often  the 
case,  then  a  country  was  considered  'underdeveloped'.  Needless  to  say  Third  World 
countries  failed  to  qualify  as  being  'developed'. 
The  basis  of  Western  mainstream  development  thinking,  whether  economic,  political, 
sociological  or  psychological,  has  been  rooted  in  a  basic  paradigm  which  viewed 
development  in  an  evolutionary  perspective,  the  state  of  underdevelopment  being 
defined  in  terms  of  observable  economic,  political,  social  and  cultural  differences 
between  rich  and  poor  nations.  This  paradigm  became  known  as  the  Modernisation 
Paradigm,  and  to  it,  development  was  the  process  of  bridging  these  gaps  by  an  imitative 
process  and  once  an  underdeveloped  country  assumed  qualities  similar  to  Western 
industrialised  countries,  it  became  developed. 
The  Modernisation  paradigm  is  referred  to  here  as  a  certain  development  policy  in  Third 
World  countries  (Smith,  1973).  In  summary.  the  modernisation  paradigm  sees 
development  as  a  spontaneous,  irreversible  process  in  every  society  and  implies 
structural  differentiation  and  functional  specialisation.  The  process  of  development  can 
be  divided  into  distinct  stages  showing  the  level  of  development  achieved  by  each 
society.  It  can  be  stimulated  by  external  competition  or  military  threat  and  by  internal 
measures  supporting  modem  sectors  and  modernising  traditional  ones. 
An  alternative  argument  is  put  forward  suggesting  that  development  is  more  the  process 
of  generating  wealth  and  the  siphoning  of  surplus  from  the  'peripheral  areas'  to  the 18 
metropoles  -  it  is  responsible  for  lack  of  or  the  degeneration  of  development  in  the 
periphery.  Capitalism  is  seen  to  create  the  development  of  underdevelopment  and 
imperialism  maintains  a  state  of  backwardness  by  reinforcing  economic  and  social 
structures  as  well  as  conservative  social  classes  in  the  Third  World.  The  causes  of 
continual  backwardness  is  the  maintaining  of  peripheral  economies  in  primary 
production,  and  within  them  the  transfer  of  economic  surplus  from  agriculture  to 
commercial  sectors  and  on  to  foreign  capital  (Baran,  1957;  Prebisch,  1959;  Frank. 
1967).  1  It  is  perceived  as  the  combination  of  the  economic  underdevelopment  process 
and  the  stagnation  and  even  erosion  of  social,  political  and  cultural  aspects  of  society. 
Critics  of  the  traditional  views  of  development  grew  in  numbers  and  were  challenging 
the  predominant  paradigm  of  conventional  development  theory,  and  this  led  to  a  new 
paradigm  severely  critical  of  the  capitalist  system  based  on  the  glaring  differences 
between  the  development  requirements  and  conditions  In  the  Third  World  and  the 
developed  countries  (Seers,  1963:  Foster-Carter.  1976).  Neo-classical  economics  was 
seen  to  be  obsessed  with  explaining  the  past  patterns  of  development  and  its  failure  to 
produce  sufficient  prescriptive  analyses  was  severely  criticised  (Stöhr  and  T6dtling. 
1977;  Browett.  1980).  In  line  with  the  Marshall  Plan  approach,  conventional  theory 
placed  implicit  faith  in  Development  from  Above  (Stöhr  and  Tödtling 
.  1977). 
The  post  war  era  saw  the  global  economic  system  going  through  significant  changes.  In 
fact  it  was  not  only  development  which  was  the  leading  issue  at  the  time.  but  coupled  to 
it  was  the  issue  of  reducing  or  even  eliminating  underdevelopment.  An  historical 
approach  sees  the  world  wide  development  of  capitalism  within  a  context  in  which 
Africa,  Asia,  Latin  America  and  other  LDCs  were  part  of  the  same  process  that  led  to 
development  in  Europe  and  North  America  (Griffin,  1969;  Frank,  1969;  Palma,  1981).  A 
spatial  expression  to  these  relationships  sees  the  metropoles  (core)  of  the  world 
capitalist  system  dominating  a  series  of  dependent  satellites  (the  periphery).  from  which 
the  economic  surplus  is  extracted  and  transferred  back  to  the  metropoles  (Frank,  1969). 
The  economic  structure  and  spatial  organisation  of  the  underdeveloped  countries  were 
geared  to  the  needs  of  the  core/metropoles  providing  food  and  raw  materials  and 
importing  manufactured  goods.  Their  positions  have  become  precarious  with  a 
significant  shift  in  the  terms  of  trade  in  which  the  prices  of  primary  products  for  export 
have  stagnated  or  even  diminished  while  those  of  manufactured  goods  have  risen  fast 
(Smith,  1979). 
Seers  (1963)  points  out  that  at  the  heart  of  the  problem  is  the  distinction  between  the 
development  requirements  and  conditions  in  the  developed  countries  and  those  within 
1  They  amongst  others,  form  the  basis  of  the  dependency  approach. 19 
the  LDCs  a  view  which  is  generally  accepted  by  most  analysts  (Brookfield,  1975).  Neo- 
classical  development  theory  has  been  accused  of  failure  to  redress  the  unequal 
patterns  of  development  occurring  in  the  world  and  held  responsible  for  enhancing 
disparities  at  both  the  class  and  spatial  levels.  It  has  been  accused  by  proponents  of 
the  dependencia  school  that  in  practice  it  has  done  very  little  for  most  LDCs. 
Some  writers  argue  that  development  and  underdevelopment  are  not  different  stages  or 
states  of  a  productive  system.  Instead,  they  are  functions  or  positions  that  coexist 
within  an  international  system  of  production  and  distribution  (Cardoso.  1972).  Sunkel 
(1971)  echoes  similar  views  by  stating  that  development  and  underdevelopment  are  two 
faces  of  the  same  universal  process.  Frank  views  development  and  underdevelopment 
as  parts  of  a  deformed  and  lop-sided  economic  structure  in  which  the  same  historical 
process  of  the  expansion  and  development  of  capitalism  throughout  the  world  has 
generated  and  continues  to  generate  both  economic  development  In  the  one  world  and 
structural  underdevelopment  in  the  other. 
The  basic  belief  of  the  neo-classical  approach  lie  in  the  ability  of  market  mechanisms  to 
generate  growth.  the  benefits  of  which  became  spread  through  diffusion.  It  is  from  this 
notion  that  Browett  (1980)  describes  such  an  approach  as  a  diusionist  paradigm  of 
development.  The  proponents  of  the  d(fusiontst  paradigm  believe  they  adopt  an 
ideologically  free  approach  to  development;  they  also  believe  that  as  a  result  of  this 
position,  they  are  able  to  provide  an  objective  and  value-free  transition  from 
traditionalism  to  modernity.  The  reality  of  such  an  argument  is  far  from  true.  This 
approach  has  often  exacerbated  income  inequality,  with  the  periphery  and  between  the 
periphery  and  the  core,  and  subsequent  spatial  development  has  also  been  lop-sided, 
often  leading  to  a  proliferation  of  other  social,  political  and  development  problems. 
The  Third  World  has  been  and  continues  to  be  (though  not  exclusively)  the  focus  of 
development  problems.  After  over  three  decades  of  addressing  the  development 
constraints  with  varying  degrees  of  successes  and  failures.  the  Third  World  is 
undergoing  a  process  of  differentiation  (within  it).  Some  countries  will  not  be 
underdeveloped.  others  will  find  themselves  in  new  forms  and  structures  of  dependency 
and  others  will  continue  to  be  even  more  underdeveloped.  Hettne  (1990)  argues  that 
theorists  who  hold  on  to  the  centre-periphery  model  refer  to  'semi-peripheral'  or 
'subimperialist'  states,  but  this  is  not  a  homogenous  category.  What  he  terms  as  the 
'new  influentials'  (e.  g.  NICs  of  South  East  Asia,  Mexico,  Brazil,  Argentina,  Saudi  Arabia, 
India,  South  Africa  etc.,  )  base  their  status  on  strategic  natural  resources,  others  on 
successful  industrialisation,  while  a  third  category  continues  with  one  or  both  with 
geopolitical  power  in  the  context  of  their  own  regions. 20 
This  differentiation  of  the  Third  World  is  also  reflected  in  the  efforts  to  identify  new 
problem  categories  in  the  periphery,  e.  g.,  the  Fourth  World,  The  Least-Developed 
Countries,  the  Most  Seriously  Affected  Countries,  Land-Locked  Countries  and  Island 
Developing  Countries  (see  figure  2.1).  The  concept  of  the  Fourth  World  has  varying 
meanings,  but  the  others  have  been  operationally  defined  for  the  purposes  of 
classification  within  the  UN  system  and  constitute  distinct.  although  partly  overlapping 
categories  (the  shaded  areas  in  figure  2.1).  The  shaded  areas  indicate  a  particularly 
problematic  situation,  and  a  more  systematic  categorisation  of  the  Third  World  is 
required  (Hettne,  1990).  In  this  respect,  Korany  (1986)  suggests  that  the  hierarchy 
within  the  South  is  in  search  of  a  theory.  The  position  of  this  study  recognises  and 
agrees  with  these  arguments  and  hence  the  focus  is  on  the  problems  of  one  of  the 
categories  that  appear  in  the  diagram  (figure  2.1).  that  is  the  developing  small  island 
states. 
Source:  After  Hettne  1990:  248 
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Figure  2.1  Differentiation  of  the  Third  World  showing  the  'new'  peripheries 
2.4  The  Modernisation-Diffusionist  Paradigm 
The  di  Tusionist  theory  has  three  dominant  branches  which  can  be  identified  (Browett. 
1980).  The  first  is  that  of  spatial  dierentiation.  This  branch  concentrates  on  the 
comparative  analyses  of  patterns  of  development,  and  assumes  that  development  in  less 
developed  areas  can  be  achieved  through  eliminating  the  basic  characteristic  of 
underdevelopment.  The  second  concerns  itself  with  single  regions  or  nation  stage 
models.  (Rostow.  1960).  The  last  branch  is  concerned  with  the  spatial  diffusion  of 
development.  that  is,  the  spread  of  the  attributes  and  benefits  of  growth  through  space 
and  across  sectors.  Classical  statements  within  this  idiom  include  Perroux  (1955)  and 
Hirshmann  (1958)  which  also  form  part  of  the  centre-down  paradigm. 21 
Several  major  criticisms  have  been  directed  at  the  difusionist  paradigm.  As 
development  is  seen  in  purely  economic  terms,  there  is  the  erroneous  assumption  that 
it  can  be  measured  exclusively  in  terms  of  economic  variables.  Other  dimensions  are 
neglected.  Aggregate  statistical  measures  are  used  to  reflect  levels  of  development  as 
well  as  to  provide  causal  explanations  of  the  often  backward  levels  of  development. 
The  diffusionist  paradigm  neglects  antra-areal  distributions  and  the  inequalities  that 
exist  within  national  units.  Spatial  inequalities  are  a  consequence  of  one  of  the 
weaknesses  of  the  free  market  system.  As  mentioned  earlier.  the  measures  and  criteria 
used  in  the  paradigm  are  adopted  from  a  Eurocentric  perspective.  This  approach 
presupposes  that  modern  or  western  is  superior  and  what  development  should  be. 
What  is  traditional  is  deemed  to  be  undesirable  and  even  inferior  (Foster-Carter,  1976). 
The  assumption  that  all  societies  begin  from  a  common  baseline  of  traditional 
underdevelopment,  that  is  that  today's  less  developed  countries  are  at  an  earlier 
'natural'  stage  of  development,  is  one  of  the  unjustified  assumptions  of  this  paradigm. 
Here.  Clark's  sectoral  theory  and  Rostow's  (five)  stages  of  economic  growth  are  both  of 
relevance.  1  However  such  theories  negate  the  unique  historical  development  of 
developing  countries  beside  being  historically  deterministic.  Frank  (1967:  37)  stresses 
that  Rostow's  theory  attributes  a  history  to  the  developed  countries  but  denies  all 
history  to  the  underdeveloped  countries.  In  so  doing,  Rostow  neglects  the  past  of  the 
underdeveloped  countries  but  posits  a  future  for  them  similar  to  that  of  the  wealthy 
nations.  He  fails  to  recognise  that  the  history  of  the  underdeveloped  countries  in  the 
last  five  centuries  is,  in  large,  part  the  history  of  the  consequence  of  European 
expansion  and  this  is  why  it  is  important  to  understand  it,  as  this  whole  process  led  to 
the  rapid  expansion  and  development  of  the  Western  dominated  global  economy  (Griffin, 
1969).  Rostow  chooses  to  ignores  colonialism  and  certainly  pre-colonial  economic  and 
social  systems  and  perceives  development  from  a  Eurocentric  point  of  view. 
The  division  of  the  developed  and  underdeveloped  countries  as  separate  systems  of 
spatial  organisation  is  yet  another  fault  of  the  difusionist  paradigm.  On  the  one  hand 
the  developed  economies  were  assumed  to  have  experienced  development  through  initial 
advantages  at  critical  stages  of  change.  The  less  developed  economies,  on  the  other 
hand,  were  seen  as  being  trapped  in  vicious  circles  of  poverty,  where  low  levels  of  output 
generate  low  incomes  which  in  turn  sustain  low  levels  of  demand  and  savings  which  are 
inadequate  to  sustain  new  investment  and  thus  increase  the  level  of  output.  The 
development  problem  is  then  seen  as  how  to  break  out  of  this  cycle  of  self-perpetuating 
poverty  particularly  where  such  problems  are  of  their  own  making  (Smith,  1979; 
1  That  is beginning  with  (i)  primitive  society,  to  (ii)  precondition  to  take  off,  to  (iii)  take  off.  to  (iv)  drive  to  maturity. 
and  finally  to  (v)  high  mass  consumption. 22 
Browett.  1980).  The  lack  of  linkage  between  the  two  worlds  permits  the  proposition  of 
the  existence  of  isolated  dual  economies.  The  reality  is  quite  the  contrary  and  empirical 
evidence  as  presented  by  the  dependencia  school  has  discredited  this  proposition.  The 
world  capitalist  and  non-capitalist  blocs  are  substantially  dependent  upon  one  another 
for  materials,  technology  and  markets,  though  it  is  equally  obvious  that  the  benefits 
generated  tend  to  flow  in  the  direction  of  the  metropoles. 
The  assumption  that  the  spread  and  filtering  of  growth  impulses  from  developed  to  less 
developed  areas  is  automatic  have  been  criticised  as  inaccurate  by  Stöhr  and  Taylor 
(1981).  It  was  deemed  highly  unlikely  that  reduction  of  inequalities  would  be  achieved 
by  higher  functional  integration  at  the  national  and  international  scales,  so  as  to  create 
an  efficient  mechanism  for  the  spread  of  development  from  above.  Hansen  (1981) 
echoes  this  criticism  and  emphasises  that  growth  rates  vary  from  sector  to  sector.  and 
therefore  a  balanced  approach  to  economic  growth  would  be  very  difficult  to  achieve. 
As  far  back  as  1957.  Myrdal  in  his  work  on  the  concept  of  cumulative  causation  was 
convinced  that  unbalanced  growth  strategies  would  serve  only  to  increase  inequalities. 
The  belief  that  the  centre  would  spread  wealth  to  the  periphery  was  explicitly  rejected 
by  Myrdal  (1957);  instead  he  perceived  the  centre  as  enhancing  its  own  growth  at  the 
expense  of  the  periphery.  This  approach  what  Myrdal  called,  cumulative  causation.  was 
to  be  very  influential  on  subsequent  work  in  which  a  basic  argument  came  to  be  that 
core  nations  are  dependent  upon  the  continuous  drain  of  the  periphery  for  their 
continued  prosperity. 
Particular  criticism  has  been  aimed  at  the  diffusionist  paradigm  due  to  its  attitude 
towards  the  role  of  the  state.  As  mentioned  earlier,  the  apolitical  or  non-ideological 
approach  is  naive  and  unrealistic.  It  wrongly  assumed  that  the  state  is  neutral.  In 
doing  so,  it  dismissed  the  existence  of  conflicts  and  frictions  between  countries  or  states 
(externally)  and  classes  (internally).  The  state  is  not  neutral  as  it  tends  to  serve 
particular  classes  and  interests  as  represented  by  various  power  groups.  Despite  this, 
many  of  the  development  programmes  of  developing  countries,  have  been  and  continue 
to  be  based  on  the  assumptions  of  the  diffusionist  paradigm.  They  have  often  been 
conceived  by  consultancies  in  developed  countries  and  supported  by  governments  of 
developed  countries. 
Seers  (1963)  and  Brookfield  (1975)  were  critical  of  conventional  development  theory's 
inability  to  deal  effectively  with  the  numerous  constraints  facing  development  in  most 
LDCs.  It  has  erroneously  assumed  the  existence  of  a  dynamic.  wealthy  and  healthy 
economy  as  a  base  for  development.  This  however,  has  not  quite  been  the  case.  Weaver 
(1981)  notes  that  important  or  strategic  factors  such  as  natural  resources  endowment, 
location,  political  allegiances,  boundaries,  racial,  religious,  linguistic  differences,  land 23 
tenure.  land  availability.  capital  and  entrepreneurial  activity  are  not  considered.  It  is 
only  the  two  primal  economic  forces  of  production  and  consumption  that  are  relevant. 
and  these  are  balanced  off  in  locational  terms. 
There  are  also  inherent  weaknesses  in  the  use  of  aggregate  measures  and  indices. 
Apart  from  being  rough  estimations  of  economic  growth,  they  evade  issues  of 
distribution.  The  statistical  base  for  the  plans  are  weak  and  frequently  manipulated 
(Seers.  1982).  Where  large  portions  of  production  are  marketed  outside  the  formal 
economic  or  marketing  system,  as  is  often  the  case  in  many  developing  countries,  the 
official  statistics  are  based  on  estimation.  proving  that  the  diffusionist  paradigm  suffers 
from  a  serious  problem  in  its  inability  of  dealing  with  complex  internal  structures  of 
national  and  regional  economies. 
By  the  1970s  a  substantial  transfer  of  income  from  the  poor  to  the  rich  countries  had 
occurred.  Levitt  (1970)  and  Browett  (1980).  amongst  others.  observe  that  the 
diffusionist  development  paradigm  has  induced  very  limited  economic  growth  and 
development  in  less  developed  areas.  If  anything  the  situation  has  been  worsened  with 
the  ever  increasing  dependence  of  the  LDCs  on  the  developed  metropolitan  economies 
through  food  aid.  grants  and  loans.  The  recipient  countries  became  'clientelist'  states  of 
the  'benevolent'  partner.  Implicitly  the  foreign  and  other  policies  and  even  development 
programmes  of  the  recipient  country  become  an  extension  of  the  centre.  Meanwhile 
very  little  genuine  development  takes  place. 
From  this  analysis  it  appears  that  orthodox  development  theory,  represented  by  the 
dilfusionist  paradigm,  has  been  of  limited  use  to  most  LDCs  in  the  critical  sense  of 
resulting  in  balanced  development.  if  anything,  it  has  continued  to  serve  the  interests 
of  the  developed  countries  and  at  the  expense  of  the  LDCs.  Economic,  social,  cultural 
and  political  conditions  of  many  LDCs  have  worsened  in  recent  years,  particularly  in 
Africa  deepening  underdevelopment.  The  extraction  of  resources  has  accelerated  to 
alarming  proportions,  often  leading  to  severe  imbalances  in  many  local  ecosystems. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  profit  motivation  has  continued  to  be  paramount,  even  leading 
to  the  transfer  of  the  production  and  services  processes  away  from  the  core  to  some 
peripheries.  1  These  developments  have  culminated  into  an  urgent  need  to  seek  an 
appropriate  approach  which  can  address  in  a  more  concrete  manner  the  development 
constraints  of  LDCs  and  produce  some  practical  solutions  to  their  problems  of 
development. 
1  The  transfer  of  many  US  based  manufacturing/assembly  work  to  Mexican  border  towns,  or  European  subcontracted 
manufacturing  work  in  the  Newly  Industrialising  Countries  (NICs)  of  South  East  Asia,  or  financial  services  to  the 
numerous  off-shore  banking  and  insurance  functions,  is  evidence  to  this. 24 
Although  it  may  be  argued  that  some  'development'.  whether  economic  or  otherwise. 
has  taken  place  in  certain  areas  of  the  periphery.  apart  from  the  fact  much  of  this  is  not 
sustainable  and  has  been  at  the  expense  of  large  scale  exploitation  of  the  natural 
environment,  it  has  led  to  an  increased  degree  of  dependency.  Utilising  any  measures 
of  development,  the  pace  between  developed  and  developing  countries  has  been 
disparate  to  the  extent  that  the  'development  gap'  has  actually  increased  over  time  and 
with  current  trends  any  hope  of  bridging  or  reducing  the  gap  seems  to  be  a  mere  pipe 
dream.  The  implications  of  this  for  world  political  stability  and  social  justice  are  serious 
as  evidence  in  Latin  America  and  Africa  show  (Smith,  1979).  This  leads  to  pressure  for 
increased  population  movements  away  from  the  extreme  poverty  in  the  periphery  and 
movements  aimed  at  the  removal  of  indigenous  bourgeois  elites,  which  in  turn  lead  to 
violence  and  instability,  further  perpetuating  impoverishment  of  the  majority. 
2.5  Alternative  approaches. 
In  the  last  two  decades  there  have  been  efforts  to  seek  and  attempt  alternative 
strategies  for  development.  Some  were  to  give  stronger  preference  to  rural  development 
along  with  increasing  the  national  growth  rate  and  engendering  structural  change  in  the 
economies  of  underdeveloped  countries.  Poverty,  employment  and  self-reliance  were 
key  issues  incorporated  into  development  planning.  Policies  aimed  at  raising  the 
productivity  and  incomes  of  the  poor  within  LDCs.  Following  on  this  road,  in  the  early 
1980s  the  World  Bank  and  ILO  advocated  strategies  dealing  directly  with  employment- 
oriented  development  and  redistribution  with  growth  respectively.  Development 
strategies  and  policies  increasingly  concerned  themselves  with  promoting  and 
preserving  equality  and  community,  fostering  the  evolution  of  small  scale  enterprise, 
promoting  peasant  agriculture.  engaging  the  people  in  the  development  process,  and 
removing  the  bias  towards  big  cities,  large  scale  industries  and  centralised  forms  of 
organisation  (Gore.  1984:  149).  1 
In  the  light  of  the  failures  of  most  development  strategies  and  programmes,  several 
alternative  attempts  aimed  at  bringing  about  the  elusive  goals  of  development  have 
appeared.  Self-reliance  has  become  a  key  word  featuring  prominently  in  many  post- 
colonial  and  post-independence  policies  and  specifically,  in  the  philosophies  of  some  of 
the  newly  emerging  states.  However,  three  decades  later,  the  results  have  been  far  from 
satisfactory  and  as  a  consequence  a  variety  of  alternative  approaches  have  been 
suggested. 
1  By  and  large  all  the  strategies  extended  from  an  alternative  approach  to  development  argued  for  by  Seers  (1969)  in  a 
paper  in  which  emphasis  is  placed  on  the  elimination  of  poverty,  unemployment  and  increasing  self-reliance.  See 
Seers  (1969)  "The  Meaning  of  Development". 25 
A  number  of  such  strategies  and  policies  advocating  slightly  differing  angles  to  the 
general  approach  have  appeared.  These  include,  urbanisation  for  rural  development, 
development  from  below  (Stöhr  and  Taylor.  1981),  agropolitan  development  and  others. 
These  are  referred  to  as  populist  and  neo-populist  development  strategies. 
Alternative  strategies  have  been  developed  in  the  form  of  policies  and  programmes 
aimed  at  the  interests  of  rural  populations  and  those  who  are  least  empowered  in  the 
development  process  (Friedmann.  1992).  These  attempts  or  approaches  have  been 
referred  to  generally  as  development  from  below  (Stöhr  and  Tödtling,  1977:  Stöhr  and 
Taylor,  1981).  Stöhr  and  Tödtling  (1977)  perceived  through  a  need  to  increase  the 
resilience  of  spatial  systems  by  controlling  the  negative  economic,  social  and  political 
backwash  effects.  By  and  large  these  are  seen  as  efforts  aimed  at  reversing  the  trends 
towards  functional  and  spatial  integration  which  tends  to  favour  the  prosperous  centres 
at  the  expense  of  the  periphery.  In  general  this  approach  aims  at  spatial  egalitarianism. 
However,  there  are  prerequisites  to  evening  out  patterns  of  development.  The  concept  of 
spatial  development  needs  to  be  expanded  from  the  purely  economic  to  embrace  social 
and  political  processes.  Distance  friction.  which  hitherto  had  been  perceived  as  a 
negative  aspect,  needs  to  be  considered  as  a  positive  factor  in  decision  making,  as  this 
is  one  advantage  of  decentralisation.  Non-market  and  non-institutional  based  activities 
in  the  informal  sectors  have  to  be  given  greater  attention,  and  a  shift  in  the  decision 
making  process.  away  from  the  vertical  or  functional  scale  to  the  horizontal  or  territorial 
units  at  various  levels.  The  intentions  are  to  benefit  the  population  in  the 
disadvantaged  regions  by  empowering  them  with  respect  to  their  own  development.  In 
doing  so,  dynamic  impulses  are  created  which  may  require  selective  spatial  closure  to 
avert  unacceptable  transfers  to  and  from  the  selected  areas. 
Amongst  neo"populist  strategies  appearing  within  the  last  two  decades  are  those 
proposing  to  transform  market  towns  as  rural  growth  centres,  i.  e.,  basically  what  was 
being  proposed  is  that  alternative  urban  centres  be  developed.  The  process  of 
urbanisation  itself  was  perceived  as  not  wholly  negative.  the  main  issue  was  the  spatial 
and  hierarchical  distribution  of  the  urban  population.  It  was  thought  that  the  creation 
of  small  market  towns  would  act  as  agro-urban  communities  and  which  would  also  link 
the  'ubiquitous'  villages  and  the  'parasitic'  great  cities.  However,  critics  saw  this 
approach  as  further  enhancing  the  possibilities  of  draining  surplus  from  the  rural  areas 
to  the  urban  centres. 
In  the  1970s  the  United  States  Agency  for  International  Development  (USAID)  devised 
the  Integrated  Regional  Development  Strategies  which  aimed  to  be  a  spatial  policy  for 26 
equitable  growth.  1  Proponents  of  this  strategy  include  Rondinelli  (1978).  It  bore  some 
similarities  to  Johnston's  proposed  strategy,  and  adopted  a  'transformation  approach'  in 
which  the  objective  was  to  create  an  'Integrated'  system  of  production  and  exchange 
within  a  national  economy,  but  linked  to  the  world  economy.  This  was  to  be  achieved 
through  promoting  a  variety  of  spatial  linkages  between  the  rural  areas  and  between  the 
rural  and  urban  areas.  Basically  this  was  another  attempt  based  on  the  diffusionist 
paradigm.  aiming  to  eliminate  the  symptoms  of  acute  underdevelopment  occurring 
within  the  rural  economies  and  the  lower  echelons  of  the  urban  populace.  Needless  to 
say.  It  focused  on  the  symptoms  rather  than  the  cause,  and  hence  achieved  limited 
successes.  Ironically.  the  funding  for  such  projects  often  emanated  from  loans,  which 
have  subsequently  exacerbated  the  economic  problems  of  many  a  developing  economy. 
Another  strategy  aimed  at  achieving  spatial  equity  promotes  'selective  spatial  closure' 
through  the  devolution  of  power  to  local  and  regional  communities.  Basically  it  is  a 
form  of  decentralisation.  This  approach  is  advocated  by  Stöhr  and  TSdtling  (1979)  and 
is  based  on  the  idea  that  local  and  regional  development  may  be  promoted  through 
selective  spatial  closure.  The  strategy  is  based  on  the  anti-thesis  of  the  dependent 
position  poor  countries  have  within  the  world  economy.  They  also  suggested  the 
'development  from  below'  alternative  which  rests  on  the  'bottom-up.  periphery-inward' 
development  paradigm  where  development  is  defined  as  an  integral  process  of  widening 
opportunities  for  individuals.  social  groups  and  communities  organised  on  a  territorial 
basis  at  small  and  intermediate  scale.  and  mobilising  the  full  range  of  their  capabilities 
and  resources  for  the  common  benefit  in  social.  economic  and  political  terms  (Stöhr. 
1981:  39-40).  Development  from  below  strategies  are  essentially  basic-needs  oriented, 
labour  intensive.  small  scale,  regional-resource-based,  rural  centred,  and  argue  for  the 
use  of  'appropriate'  rather  than  high  technology.  Here  again.  their  very  existence  is 
symptomatic  of  the  inherent  weaknesses  and  failure  of  orthodox  development 
economics. 
One  strategy  which  is  concerned  with  the  integrated  mobilisation  of  human  and  natural 
resources  of  specific  historically  defined  regions  is  Territorial  Regional  Planning.  It  is 
seen  as  an  endogenous  activity  conducted  within  the  regions  where  its  decisions  take 
effect.  Friedmann  and  Weaver  (1979)  point  out  that  territorial  planning  engages  the 
people  in  that  region  within  the  planning  process.  which  is  also  a  political  process, 
emphasising  equity  outcomes  through  seeking  the  general  improvement  in  the  quality  of 
life  for  all  the  people  in  the  denoted  area.  Included  here  is  the  precondition  of  a  shift  of 
the  decision  making  process  from  a  functional  to  a  territorial  orientation.  Emphasis  is 
1  Also  known  as  RIDEPS  -  Regional  Integrated  Development  Programmes  and  sometimes  Rural  Integrated 
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paid  to  the  informal  sector  and  the  whole  concept  of  economic  development  is 
broadened  to  encompass  economic.  social  and  political  processes.  -Development  from 
below  seeks  to  achieve  overall  even  development  and  is  thus  more  egalitarian  in  its 
nature. 
Agropolitan  Development  is  a  spatial  policy,  initially  was  used  as  a  strategy  for 
accelerated  rural  development  and  later  a  basic-needs  strategy  of  territorial 
development  (Friedmann  and  Weaver.  1979).  While  initially  formulated  for  the  rural 
areas  of  Asia,  some  areas  in  Africa  have  similar  characteristics.  The  changes  involved 
in  this  transformation  highlight  the  shift  in  thinking  from  'functional'  to  'territorial' 
regional  planning.  Functional  ties  are  based  on  and  concerned  with  mutual  self- 
interest,  whereas  territorial  relationships,  though  characterised  by  inequalities  of  power. 
are  tempered  by  the  mutual  rights  and  obligations  of  a  territorial  group  (Friedmann  and 
Weaver.  1979).  Stöhr  (1988)  points  out  that  when  people  react  in  this  way.  they 
challenge  the  crisis  of  the  world  economy  by  taking  their  local  space  as  their  point  of 
departure.  However.  they  will  need  to  make  a  planned  transition  towards  a  more 
sustainable  development. 
By  and  large  the  aim  of  such  efforts  has  been  to  reverse  the  trends  towards  functional 
and  spatial  integration  which  has  otherwise  favoured  the  larger  centres.  They  have 
been  applied  in  a  number  of  countries,  Tanzania  and  China  being  amongst  the  better 
known  and  documented  cases.  Under  Nyerere,  Tanzania  adopted  a  variety  of 
approaches  based  on  neopopullst  policies  and  strategies.  The  objective  behind  these 
attempts  were  to  eliminate  inequalities,  modernise  agriculture  and  raise  the  material 
standards  of  living  of  the  people.  Emphasis  was  on  agricultural  and  rural  development. 
Urbanism  was  discouraged.  The  implementation  of  these  policies  under  Nyerere's 
African  version  of  Socialism,  Ujamaa,  was  not  without  Its  difficulties.  Nyerere 
underestimated  the  difficulties  that  were  to  be  encountered  (Pratt,  1979;  1980:  Hyden, 
1980;  Kitching,  1980).  One  commentator  noted  that: 
the  decision  to  try  to  implement  Ujamaa  quickly  and  universally...,  the 
decentralisation  policies,  the  comparative  neglect  of  the  cities  and  urban  areas, 
and  especially  Dar-es-Salaam,  as  well  as  the  attempts  to  enforce  a  rigid- 
Leadership  Code  -  all  these  policies  reflect  President  Nyerere's  determination... 
that  Tanzania's  development  should  not  lead  to  widening  inequalities  between 
Tanzanians,  but  rather  should  be  accompanied  by  narrowing  differentials 
between  town  and  country,  between  regions,  between  peasants  and  workers, 
between  government  officials  and  the  rest  of  the  population  (Kitching, 
1982:  120-21). 
China  has  had  some  success  with  rural-oriented  policies  which  has  been  hailed  by 
many  who  were  sympathetic  to  populist  ideas  as  a  demonstration  of  what  such 
strategies  could  achieve,  even  though  it  is  disputed  whether  China's  development  model 
is  not  populist  per  se  (Kitching,  1982:  103).  The  relevance  to  populist  strategy  lies  in  the 28 
use  of  Schumacherian  'intermediate  and  appropriate'  technologies,  'rural  and  small 
scale'  industries  and  an  emphasis  on  agriculture  to  provide  employment  to  the  masses. 
reduce  rural-urban  migration  and  increase  self-reliance.  True.  absolute  poverty  has 
been  eliminated  but  China  has  also  developed  a  significant  industrial  sector  producing 
industrial  raw  materials  and  industrial  machinery.  Agriculture  does  not  form  the 
backbone  of  it  economy.  the  much  of  its  GDP  stemming  from  the  industrial  and  services 
sectors.  Moreover  agriculture  is  being  increasingly  mechanised  and  increasingly 
policies  have  been  systematically  aimed  at  accelerating  the  industrialisation  process. 
Kitching  (1982:  135)  comments  that  China's  overall  development  strategy  'is  simply  a 
conventional  communist  industrialisation  strategy  modified  in  subtle  and  imaginative 
ways  to  cope  with  its  particular  circumstances,  and  especially  with  a  massive 
agricultural  population  crowded  on  to  a  small  cultivated  area.  " 
Such  rural  development  strategies  are  aimed  at  breaking  out  of  the  mould  of  the 
orthodox  diffusionist  approach.  Their  success  has  been  limited,  and  this  is  explained 
by  the  influence  of  the  indigenous  elite,  often  acting  on  the  behalf  of  the  core  or  wishing 
to  replace  or  emulate  the  harsh  inequalities  of  the  core.  The  limited  success  also  shows 
that  the  economy  is  out  of  necessity  interdependent,  so  that  de-linking  is  difficult.  In 
Tanzania's  case.  although  a  form  of  selective  closure  was  attempted,  the  national 
economy  remained  part  of  the  global  capitalist  economy  and  firmly  linked  with  the 
metropoles,  engaged  in  primary  production,  extraction  of  a  few  minerals  and  a  limited 
range  of  manufactured  goods  (Hyden,  1980). 
These  observations  have  considerable  relevance  to  Zanzibar.  for  amongst  the  causes  of 
the  1964  Revolution  were  the  extreme  disparities  along  class  and  racial  divisions,  with 
the  indigenous  bourgeoisie  classes  in  direct  control  of  the  state  and  economy. 
Internally,  there  existed  pronounced  spatial  differentiation  between  urban  and  rural 
areas  and  between  the  agriculturally  more  productive  areas  and  the  marginal  ones,  and 
between  the  sister  islands  of  Unguja  and  Pemba.  After  the  Revolution,  a  form  of 
'selective  closure'  was  attempted,  between  itself  (Zanzibar)  as  a  'region'  and  the  outside 
world,  basically  seeking  self-sufficiency  and  de-linking  from  the  world  capitalist  system. 
However,  this  was  partial  since  it  remained  a  primary  producer  and  in  the  mould  of  the 
difusionist  paradigm  -  basically  a  traditional  plantation  economy  dependent  on  the 
comparative  advantages  of  clove  and  copra  production. 
The  Revolutionary  Government  in  Zanzibar  recognised  the  vulnerability  of  the  island 
economy  with  its  considerable  dependence  on  primary  production  for  export  and  the 
import  of  food  and  sources  of  energy.  Erratic  fluctuations  in  the  world  market  for  its 
main  exports  directly  affect  its  earning  ability,  while  the  small  internal  market.  and  the 
limitations  in  expertise  in  government  and  other  important  aspects  in  the  economy. 
The  logical  (and  fashionable)  solution  was  to  establish  a  centrally  planned  economy  to rý 
guide  development  and  make  optimum  use  of  the  scarce  resources  which  the  country 
possessed  and  to  do  this  under  the  umbrella  of  increased  self-reliance  and  reduced 
dependency.  In  fact  during  the  first  eight  years  (the  First  Phase).  Zanzibar's  selective 
closure  became  autarky.  a  programme  aimed  at  de-linking  from  the  capitalist 
dominated  economy.  This  was  also  in  response  to  the  dependence  paradigm  which  had 
become  popular  with  self  reliance  being  the  antithesis  to  dependence. 
This  approach  did  not  resolve  Zanzibar's  problems.  if  anything.  they  became 
exacerbated.  Contrary  to  the  recommendations  of  the  neoclassical  school  which 
advocated  comparative  advantage,  the  mainstay  crops  were  losing  value  in  the  world 
market,  while  what  was  historically  advantageous,  its  location  with  respect  to  the  East 
and  Central  African  hinterland  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Middle  East  and  Asia  on  the 
other.  were  no  longer  important  or  relevant.  Moreover,  internal  political  developments, 
including  its  instability.  were  a  disincentive  to  capitalist  investment,  whether 
indigenous  or  otherwise.  These  observations  are  supported  by  a  study  commissioned 
by  the  colonial  government  just  prior  to  independence  of  Zanzibar  protectorate.  On  the 
economic  potential  of  Zanzibar.  It  suggested  that  the  level  of  economic  viability  for 
industrial  investment  was  very  low  (Selwyn  and  Watson,  1962). 
The  conditions  of  severe  underdevelopment  for  the  majority  of  the  island's  population 
was  blamed  on  colonial  relations  and  the  local  ruling  class  and  the  relations  of 
production,  exchange  and  distribution.  This  perception  fits  into  the  mould  of 
traditional  dependency  theory  and  some  of  the  early  prescriptions  towards  the 
expansion  and  development  of  the  national  economy  included  attempts  aimed  at 
diversification  and  Import  substitution  industrialisation  (ISI). 
Zanzibar  continues  to  seek  the  elusive  objectives  of  diversification  and  of  increased  self- 
reliance,  particularly  within  recent  years.  Such  policies  may  contradict  those  suggested 
by  the  'law  of  comparative  advantage'  in  primary  production,  ideas  relating  to  the 
diffusionist  paradigm.  Zanzibar  remains  underdeveloped  and  continues  to  occupy  a 
position  at  the  extreme  periphery.  both  in  an  economic  and  a  geographical  sense.  The 
island's  economic  position  is  increasingly  precarious  with  a  possible  catastrophe 
threatening  its  main  export  crop  and  in  which  its  external  relations  have  been  governed 
by  Cold  War  politics  and  its  complex  association  with  the  mainland.  More  recently  it 
has  been  affected  by  the  aftermath  of  the  Cold  War  and  further  disequilibrium  in  the 
world  economy  as  Western  countries  have  become  increasingly  introverted. 
Zanzibar's  allegiance  with  the  Mainland  was  based  on  security  and  political 
considerations,  but  more  recently  it  has  increasingly  become  economic.  In  the  post- 
Cold  War  its  geopolitical  and  geostrategic  potential  has  become  defunct,  although  this 
also  has  the  positive  effect  of  reducing  external  threats.  Meanwhile,  as  in  other 30 
developing  SIS,  its  dependence  has  persisted.  By  the  1980s  development  policies  were 
Influenced  by  the  realisation  of  the  failure  in  de-linking,  and  the  recommendations  of 
the  dependencia  approach  has  been  abandoned  in  favour  of  neoliberal  market 
economics.  Increasing  its  dependence. 
Before  exploring  further  the  case  of  Zanzibar,  it  is  necessary  to  examine  dependency 
theory,  its  various  facets  and  relevance  to  peripheral  developing  small  island  economies. 
Contrary  to  the  belief  that  the  day  of  the  dependency  paradigm  is  over,  it  is  argued  that 
it  still  has  relevance  to  the  crisis  in  development  and  development  theory,  especially 
once  some  of  its  traditional  weaknesses  are  addressed  and  its  relevance  to  SIS  is  noted. 
2.6  Dependency  Theory 
Dependency  theory  owes  its  origins  to  the  writings  of  Marx  and  to  subsequent  literature 
forming  the  Marxist  tradition  (e.  g.,  Lenin,  Trotsky,  Bukharin  and  Luxembourg  and 
others).  These  works  provided  the  background  for  dependency  theory  by  implying  that 
capitalism  leads  to  the  domination  and  control  of  backward  regions  by  imperialist 
powers.  They  introduced  the  first  compelling  analyses  of  the  geographically 
differentiated  character  of  capitalist  advancement  focusing  on  the  uneven  penetration 
and  impact  of  capitalism  in  countries,  nationality  groups  and  geographic  areas  (Palma, 
1981;  Edel  et.  a!.  ).  The  integration  of  those  regions  into  the  world  economy, 
international  capital  movements  and  the  international  division  of  labour  resulted  in  the 
restriction  of  backward  economies  in  primary  production  and  exploitation  of  mineral 
resources. 
The  dependency  school  emerged  from  several  theoretical  strands  of  Marxism  (classical 
Marxism,  Marxism-Leninism,  neo-Marxism)  and  from  the  Latin  American  school  within 
CEPAL.  1  Neo-Marxism  reflects  a  transformation  of  traditional  Marxist  thinking  (Foster 
Carter,  1974).  It  sees  imperialism  from  the  periphery's  perspective  in  contrast  to 
Marxism,  which  views  it  from  the  centre.  The  classical  Marxist  analyses  of  classes  is 
based  on  European  experiences  emphasising  on  freeing  the  industrial  proletariat, 
whereas  neo-Marxists  accept  the  revolutionary  potential  of  other  groups  e.  g.,  the 
peasantry.  Classical  Marxists  analysis  emphasises  on  objective  conditions,  whereas 
neo-Marxists  view  the  possibilities  of  starting  a  revolution  and  emphasise  subjective 
factors.  While  Marxists  maintain  nineteenth  century  'development  optimism'.  and 
consider  scarcity  to  be  a  bourgeois  Invention  for  the  purpose  of  legitimising  economic 
inequality,  neo-Marxists  integrate  the  growing  ecological  consciousness  with  its  view  of 
development. 
1  CEPAL  is  the  Spanish  acronym  for  the  Economic  Co  mission  for  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean,  (ECLA). 31 
Despite  the  Eurocentric  bias  of  classical  Marxism,  it  has  become  increasingly  relevant 
for  understanding  the  social  reality  in  underdeveloped  economies  (Hettne.  1990). 
Entrenched  in  classical  Marxism  is  the  thought  that  capitalist  development  was  to  take 
place  everywhere  in  generally  similar  ways,  and  that  in  the  Third  World  this  was 
through  colonialism  (and  imperialism).  The  post  war  Marxist  literature  on 
underdevelopment  saw  it  more  as  a  process.  as  opposed  to  an  original  state  that  could 
be  overcome  with  development.  and  capitalist  penetration  was  identified  as  the  initiator 
of  underdevelopment  (Baran,  1957).  The  development  of  capitalism  in  such  'backward 
areas'  influenced  dependency  theorists  such  as  Cardoso.  Hettne  (1990)  suggests  that 
Baran  completed  the  revisions  in  theorising  about  imperialism  with  regard  to  its 
historical  progress,  and  could  be  seen  as  the  founder  of  neo-Marxism.  and  to  some 
extent  the  dependency  school. 
Andre  Gunder  Frank  (1966)  brought  this  neo-Marxist  line  of  thought  to  its  logical 
conclusion  in  his  thesis  on  'the  development  of  underdevelopment'.  Thus  within  a 
broader  Marxist  framework,  imperialism  has  been  a  promoter  of  imperialism  and 
creator  of  underdevelopment.  However,  Frank  is  a  reluctant  and  short  lived 
dependentista,  and  uses  the  word  dependence  temporarily  in  that  it  has  become  equally 
acceptable  to  the  reformist  bourgeoisie  and  to  revolutionary  Marxists  (Kay,  1990).  By 
1972  he  pronounced  dependence  as  dead 
.  "at  least  in  the  Latin  America  that  it  gave 
birth"  (Frank,  1977:  357).  Kay  (1990)  argues  that  although  Frank's  prolific  and  polemic 
writings  helped  popularise  the  dependency  vision,  in  retrospect,  it  would  be  a  mistake 
to  consider  Frank  as  the  dependency  writer  par  excellence.  At  best,  his  writings  can  be 
considered  as  belonging  to  the  world-system  perspective  to  which  Samir  Amin  (1980) 
and  Immanuel  Wallerstein  (1976,1979,1980)  belong. 
The  economic  crisis  of  the  1930s  and  consequently  the  depression  exposed  the 
magnitude  of  Latin  American  dependence.  This  initiated  thorough  methodical  economic 
research  and  discussions  in  various  Latin  American  countries  under  the  umbrella  of  a 
Latin  American  Economic  Commission  (CEPAL).  However,  even  before  the 
establishment  of  CEPAL,  there  were  debates  which  can  be  said  to  be  the  foundation  of 
the  "Latin  American  school  of  development  and  underdevelopment"  (Kay,  1990).  The 
Latin  American  school  has  two  major  strands,  the  structuralist-reformist  and  the 
Marxist-revolutionary.  They  both  argue  against  neoclassical  and  modernisation  theory 
and  define  underdevelopment  as  being  the  outcome  of  a  process  of  world  capitalist 
accumulation  which  reproduces  both  poles  of  the  world  system.  They  also  dismiss  the 
ability  of  neoclassical  and  modernisation  theory  to  understand  the  peculiarities  of 
underdeveloped  countries.  Moreover,  policies  derived  from  these  theories  do  not 
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The  structuralists  believe  that  by  reforming  the  international  and  national  capitalist 
systems  it  is  possible  to  overcome  underdevelopment.  The  Marxists  however.  think  that 
only  world  socialism  can  ultimately  overcome  underdevelopment  and  the  inequalities 
existing  in  the  world  capitalist  system. 
Raül  Prebisch's  ideas  were  pivotal  in  the  launching  of  the  structuralist  centre-periphery 
paradigm.  The  perspective  is  both  holistic  and  historical,  and  stresses  the  world 
dimension  in  all  economic  processes.  The  proposition  is  that  development  and 
underdevelopment  is  a  single  process  and  international  trade  reproduces  the  disparities 
between  centre  and  periphery,  so  that  the  development  problems  of  the  periphery  are 
located  within  the  context  of  the  world  economy.  In  tracing  the  origins  of  the 
integration  of  the  Latin  American  economies,  which  were  primary  producers,  into  the 
dominant  capitalist  system  gives  it  historical  perspective.  This  pattern  of  development 
in  the  periphery  is  termed  by  CEPAL  as  the  'primary  export  model'  or  the  outwards- 
oriented  development  model'.  The  solution  to  this  problem  lay  in  switching  to  an 
'inward-directed'  development  process.  i.  e.,  the  cepalista  school  advocated  import 
substitution  industrialisation  (ISI)  as  an  alternative  strategy. 
The  structuralist-reformist  school  is  characterised  by  the  writings  of  Cardoso,  Sunkel, 
Furtado.  Ferrer.  Pinto  and  others.  Their  ideas  are  a  further  development  of  the 
structuralist  school  and  an  attempt  to  reformulate  CEPAL's  position  in  the  light  of  the 
crisis  of  ISI.  The  Marxist  or  rather  neo-Marxist  dependency  group  is  characterised  by 
the  works  of  Marini.  Dos  Santos,  Frank.  Bambirra,  and  others. 
There  are  different  schools  of  thought  within  the  reformist  approach  to  dependency  and 
this  emerges  in  the  emphases  of  the  different  aspects  of  dependency.  For  example, 
Sunkel's  (1973)  analysis  focuses  on  the  way  in  which  transnational  capitalism  creates  a 
new  international  division  of  labour  leading  to  national  disintegration  in  Latin  America. 
Transnational  corporations  (TNC)  take  over  the  economy.  driving  a  wedge  into  society. 
A  minority  of  the  population  is  integrated  into  the  TNC  system  and  receives  some  spoils, 
but  at  the  cost  of  national  disintegration.  This  he  sees  as  'national  disintegration'.  He 
also  sees  the  possibility  of  development  without  dependence  and  marginalisation,  by 
reforming  the  lop-sided  nature  of  the  world  capitalist  system  through  hard  bargaining 
and  pragmatic  negotiations  (Kay,  1990). 
Furtado  (1972)  sees  the  control  of  technical  progress  and  imposition  of  consumption 
patterns  from  the  centre  as  the  key  factors  that  explain  the  perpetuation  of 
underdevelopment  and  dependence  on  the  periphery.  Hence  his  focus  on  'dependent 
patterns  of  consumption'.  The  high-income  groups  in  the  periphery  also  account  for 
diversified  industrial  consumer  goods  production  patterns  with  the  technology  coming 33 
from  the  centre  (through  multinationals)  and  this  capital-intensive  technology 
perpetuates  the  concentration  of  income  and  the  surplus  of  labour,  reproducing  the 
vicious  circle  of  underdevelopment  and  dependence. 
Cardoso  and  Faletto  (1979)  analyse  the  changing  relationship  between  internal  and 
external  factors  determining  the  development  process  in  Latin  America  from  the  early 
'outward  expansion'  of  newly  independent  nations  to  the  present  period  of 
internationalisation  of  the  market  and  the  'new  dependence'.  They  utilise  a  social  and 
political  analysis  and  their  originality  lies  in  the  manner  in  which  they  analyse  the 
changing  relationship  between  economic,  social  and  political  forces  in  post-colonial 
Latin  America,  and  the  manner  in  which  they  relate  the  changing  internal  relationships 
to  external  forces.  They  attempt  to  shed  some  light  on  how  internal  developments  link 
to  external  changes  and  how  the  world  system  impinges  differently  upon  the  various 
Latin  American  countries.  Cardoso  does  not  regard  dependency  as  being  contradictory 
to  development  and  so  utilises  the  term  'associated-dependent  development'.  Thus  he 
disagrees  with  Frank's  assertion  that  when  dependency  links  are  intensified,  growth 
falters  and  when  they  are  loosened,  domestic  growth  is  enhanced.  In  the  views  of 
Cardoso  and  Faletto  (1979)  the  transition  to  socialism  in  Latin  America  is  remote,  given 
that  some  form  of  associated-dependent  capitalist  development  exists. 
The  varied  and  complex  intellectual  origins  of  dependency  has  resulted  in  several 
conceptualisations.  These  differ  in  style,  emphases,  disciplinary  orientation  and 
Ideological  preference,  but  share  the  basic  idea  of  development  and  underdevelopment 
being  interrelated  processes,  which  represent  a  clear  break  with  the  modernisation 
paradigm  (Hettne,  1990).  This  break  is  highlighted  by  Dos  Santos'  (1970)  definition  of 
dependency  in  which  he  sees  it  as  a  conditioning  situation  in  which  the  economies  of  one 
group  of  countries  are  conditioned  by  the  development  and  expansion  of  others.  The 
relationship  of  interdependence  between  several  economies,  or  between  the  economies 
and  the  world  trading  system  becomes  a  dependent  relationship  when  some  countries 
can  expand  through  self  impulsion  while  others  can  only  expand  as  a  reflection  of  the 
expansion  of  the  dominant  countries,  which  may  have  either  positive  or  negative  effects 
on  their  immediate  development.  It  is  on  this  general  basis  that  the  various  approaches 
of  dependency  are  based  upon. 
Four  broad  schools  of  dependency  theorists  can  be  identified.  These  range  from  the 
stagnationist  group,  the  obstacles  to  development  group,  those  accepting  the  possibility 
of  capitalist  development  in  the  periphery  group  and  finally  the  empiricists,  who  believe 
that  dependency  theory  is  most  useful  when  used  as  a  framework  for  the  analysis  of 
concrete  situations  of  dependence  (Palma,  1981;  Kay,  1989,1991).  The  latter  approach 
is  useful  in  that  it  focuses  on  the  concrete  situation  through  an  empirical  data  base, 
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of  dependency  relations. 
Several  forms  of  dependence  have  been  identified,  the  main  ones  being  those  based  on 
trade  and  export  (colonial-neo-colonial  dependence),  external  capital  (financial-capital- 
multinational  dependence),  and  technological-industrial  (technological  monopoly- 
dependence).  There  continues  to  exist  the  undeniable  evidence  that  the  same  industrial 
and  financial  systems  of  capitalism  in  developing  countries  give  rise  to  unequal 
productive  structures.  a  high  concentration  of  incomes.  the  intensive  exploitation  of 
existing  markets  (urban)  and  foster  existing  rural-urban  imbalances.  The  economic  and 
technological  structures  of  the  peripheral  economies  continue  to  respond  to  the  needs 
and  requirements  of  external  interests  than  the  internal  needs  of  the  developing 
countries. 
Much  of  dependency  literature  tends  to  produce  a  chronology  of  the  effects  caused  by 
the  development  of  capitalism,  especially  in  Latin  America.  This  historical-chronological 
approach  is  quite  common  and  this  perhaps  emanates  from  both  the  Marxist  historical 
tradition  as  well  as  the  fact  that  it  is  logical  and  more  valid  than  purely  ahistorical 
spatial  or  international  comparative  analyses.  Another  advantage  of  the  dynamic 
approach  is  that  it  sees  what  is  perceived  as  the  causes  of  underdevelopment  as  the 
symptoms  or  consequences  of  the  normal  functioning  of  the  total  system  and  that 
underdevelopment.  with  all  its  characteristics,  is  a  normal  part  of  the  process  of  the 
global  capitalist  development. 
The  dependencia  approach  generally  stressed  on  the  external  factors  (exogenism).  It 
also  presented  a  formidable  challenge  to  the  Eurocentric  concepts  and  theories  of 
development  and  initiated  some  self-criticism  among  modernisation  theorists. 
Moreover.  although  it  contained  different  lines  of  thought,  it  also  expressed  a  number  of 
common  Ideas. 
2.7  A  Critique  of  Dependency  Theory 
To  summarise  a  critique  of  the  dependentistas  is  complex.  There  are  a  wide  variety  of 
theorists  and  strands  in  the  dependencia  school  who  rarely  express  identical  views  and 
often  have  critical  arguments  within  themselves.  However,  a  summary,  is  useful  for  the 
purposes  of  this  research. 
By  the  1970s  dependency  theory  had  come  under  severe  criticism.  It  tended  to  have  a 
sweeping  and  general  character  and  suffered  from  theoretical  repetition  and  stagnation, 
there  still  existed  problems  which  the  theory  could  not  solve  and  there  was  an  evident 
lack  of  practical  impact  (Legs,  1977).  Leys  points  out  that,  the  meaning  of  development 
is  obscure  and  it  falls  to  identify  whether,  it  is  the  underdeveloped  countries  or  the 35 
masses  in  these  countries  that  sufferer  from  exploitation.  Concepts  like  centre  and 
periphery  are  merely  polemical  inversions  of  the  simplistic  pairings  of  development 
theory,  e.  g.  modern-traditional  etc.,  and  the  theory  tends  to  be  overly  economistic  in  the 
sense  that  social  classes,  the  state,  politics  and  ideology  get  little  attention.  Apart  from 
the  thesis  that  underdevelopment  originates  from  the  centre,  the  ultimate  causes  of 
underdevelopment  are  not  identified. 
Lall  (1975)  argues  that  from  a  methodological  point  of  view.  the  concept  of  dependency 
had  circular  reasoning  and  limited  explanatory  value  and  that  problems  arose  when 
trying  to  distinguish  between  dependent  and  non-dependent  countries.  Circular 
arguments  creep  In  when  It  premised  that  dependent  countries  are  those  which  lack  the 
capacity  for  autonomous  growth  and  that  this  is  simply  because  their  structures  are 
weak  and  dependent.  A  further  weakness  is  that  it  suffers  from  an  inability  to  provide  a 
robust  measure  of  dependence,  leaving  the  theory  open  to  accusations  of  vague 
statements  and  value  judgement.  This,  according  to  Lall  (1975:  803).  makes  it 
impossible  to  draw  the  line  between  dependence  and  non-dependence  without  falling 
into  the  basic  error  of  defining  underdevelopment  to  constitute  dependence.  Hettne 
(1990:  93-94)  states  that.  in  reality  almost  all  countries  ... 
do  import  technology,  are 
dependent  on  exports,  have  a  tendency  to  emulate  consumption  patterns  In  other 
countries,  contain  marginalised  groups  and  regions  within  their  territory,  and  so  on". 
So  where  does  the  boundary  between  a  dependent  and  not  so  dependent  economy  lie? 
Since  the  early  1970s  there  has  been  a  substantial  rise  in  world  manufactured  output 
as  exemplified  by  the  new  economic  'tigers'  of  the  Far  East:  Taiwan,  South  Korea,  Hong 
Kong,  Indonesia  and  Malaysia.  These  newly  industrialising  countries  (NICs)  are  'living 
proof  for  the  proponents  of  the  diffusionist  paradigm  that  if  sustained  for  long  enough 
the  benefits  of  dependent  growth  can  be  spread.  They  have  acted  as  strong  attractions 
of  capital  investment  from  the  traditional  metropoles  and,  in  combination  with  Japan. 
they  effectively  represent  another  'emerging  metropole'.  The  development  of  the  NICs 
has  been  used  to  refute  the  main  case  of  dependency  theory.  Moreover,  countries 
trying  to  de-link  and  attempting  self-reliance  have  not  been  so  successful  and  these 
examples  question  the  validity  of  dependency  theory. 
However,  according  to  one  critic.  these  fast  developers,  whether  in  South  East  Asia, 
Latin  America  or  Southern  Europe  (transnational  enclaves),  are  still  indeed  dependent 
on  the  metropolitan  countries,  but  in  different  ways  (Lamb,  1981).  They  are  still 
dependent  on  the  world  capitalist  system  in  terms  of  technology.  markets  and  political 
allegiance.  There  is  much  that  can  be  learned  from  the  individual  NICs,  but  they  are 
not  necessarily  models  to  imitate.  or  models  that  can  be  imitated  (Hettne,  1990).  They 
all  experienced  different  types  of  economic  transformation.  The  transition  in  Taiwan 
and  South  Korea  is  based  on  their  Confucian  work  ethic,  radical  land  reforms 36 
(exogenous),  proximity  to  Japan,  their  geopolitical  and  geostrategic  importance  and  the 
world-economy  context  for  their  take  off  -a  phenomenon  which  Is  unlikely  to  be 
repeated  or  replicated  elsewhere.  It  must  be  remembered  that  these  `miracles'  were 
encouraged  and  positively  supported  by  the  capitalist  world  order,  while  countries 
pursuing  self-reliance  strategies  were  discouraged  or  even  destabilised  (e.  g.,  Cuba, 
Nicaragua  and  a  host  of  others).  The  NICs  accept  and  fortify  the  old  economic  order 
and  all  they  need  to  do  now  is  to  change  their  place  within  it. 
Hettne  (1990)  argues  that  the  common  denominator  of  the  NICs  Is  that  their  success 
was  a  matter  of  correct  timing  in  switching  from  one  development  strategy  to  another. 
and  that  the  strategies  were  consistent  and  based  on  a  certain  degree  of  national 
cohesion,  taking  into  account  both  internal  and  external  constraints  and  opportunities. 
This  is  difficult  to  replicate  and  so  according  to  Hettne,  the  remaining  Third  World 
countries  will  have  to  face  the  despondent  orthodox  strategy  Incorporating  stabilisation, 
readjustment  or  restructuring,  Imposing  strains  on  their  political  regimes,  threatening 
and  eroding  their  legitimacy.  What  a  despondent  but  realistic  alternative! 
Other  common  denominators  to  these  'enclaves'  (NICs)  include  regimented  societies, 
diminishing  political  freedom  and  freedom  of  expression.  They  also  exhibit  similar 
tendencies  to  the  local  elite  in  other  peripheral  economies,  only  that  ideologically.  there 
is  a  high  degree  of  nationalism.  Amin  (1974)  argues  that  their  economic  systems  are 
disarticulated  as  they  lack  linkages,  and  they  suffer  from  external  domination,  in  terms 
of  links  related  to  the  Cold  War  era. 
It  is  a  reality  that  some  dependent  countries  are  relatively  prosperous  whilst  others  are 
poor.  Dependency  theory  mainly  focused  on  the  poorer  countries  in  the  world  but  still 
has  relevance  in  explaining  the  dependency  relationships  which  exist  within  and 
between  developed  or  rapidly  developing  countries.  Movement  of  major  investments  of 
multinational  and  transnational  corporations  are  manifestations  of  a  new  mercantilism 
of  corporate  empires  which  cut  across  national  economies  and  even  undermine  the 
national  sovereignty  of  the  hinterland  countries  in  which  their  subsidiaries  and  branch 
plants  are  located  (Levitt,  1970).  This  also  contributes  to  the  lack  of  indigenous 
entrepreneurship  and  the  dependence  of  imported  technology,  precipitating 
technological  backwardness. 
Dependency  analysis  should  be  able  to  show  the  negative  effects  of  the  course  and 
patterns  of  development  of  dependent  countries,  if  it  is  to  serve  any  useful  purpose  (Lall, 
1975).  However.  logic  and  experience  have  shown  that  there  are  cases  in  which 
dependence  may  have  had  positive  effects.  Examples  such  as  the  French  'overseas 
departments',  (the  DOMS  and  TOMS).  and  the  island  states  of  Barbados,  Mauritius  and 
Malta  and  indeed  even  the  NICs  have  shown  that  there  has  perhaps  been  some  positive 37 
contributions  in  the  dependent  economic  and  implicitly  political,  relationships.  These 
are  all  cases  in  which  dependency  relationships  between  developing  countries  and  a 
metropolitan  power  have  not  been  necessarily  entirely  to  the  detriment  of  the  poorer 
country.  In  fact,  many  have  prospered  relatively  when  compared  to  countries  seeking 
autarkic  development  strategies. 
Thus  dependency  theory  can  aid  in  identifying  areas  where  negative  effects  occur.  Here 
again  examples  abound,  and  especially  so  in  Latin  America.  There  is  little  doubt  that 
the  theory  has  assisted  in  comprehending  major  constraints  and  problems  facing 
peripheral  economies.  In  contrast  to  neo-classical  economics,  dependency  theory  at 
least  asks  relevant  questions,  even  if  it  has  yet  to  provide  all  the  answers  (Seers,  1981). 
Perhaps  most  importantly  is  the  fact  that  the  theory  itself  represents  a  point  of  view 
from  the  developing  countries,  and  has  established  the  ideological  nature  of 
development  and  underdevelopment. 
Gore  (1984:  198)  notes  that  the  main  problem  with  dependency  theory  and  of  spatial 
dependency  analysis  arises  out  of  the  logic  of  the  core-periphery  model  and  the 
assumptions  made,  that  the  effects  of  the  centre's  expansion  on  the  periphery  is 
necessarily  negative.  Other  problems  and  limitations  which  are  noted  by  Gore,  include 
the  crude  application  of  the  dependency  perspective  which  focuses  upon  the  spatial 
transfer  of  surplus  as  a  cause  of  polarised  development.  The  empirical  identification  of 
surplus  flows  is  difficult,  and  such  an  analysis  requires  a  conception  of  surplus  which 
may  be  separate  from  the  production  process.  He  points  out  that  the  fundamental 
weakness  of  attempts  to  relate  the  spatial  transfer  of  surplus  to  patterns  of  polarised 
development  is  that  the  spatial  relationship  of  transfer  surplus  is  abstracted  from  the 
social  process  which  determine  both  the  relationship  and  the  development  implications" 
(Gore,  1984:  199).  In  his  criticism  of  the  dependencia  approach  and  spatial  dependency 
analysis,  Gore  identifies  'the  structuring  of  the  theory  in  a  way  which  separates  space 
from  social  processes  as  spatial  separatism  This  is  also  a  major  weakness  of  most  of 
the  alternative  approaches  and  points  out  the  'the  logical  problems  of  the  theory  are  at 
the  same  time  ideological  opportunities'  for  those  wielding  power  (ibid.  :  263). 
Dependency  and  spatial  analysis  of  underdevelopment  are  unable  to  generate  viable 
solutions  to  the  problems  of  dependence  in  developing  countries,  and  indeed  even  in 
developed  countries.  A  paradox  arises  when  a  country  with  relatively  higher  levels  of 
dependence  also  exhibit  widespread  and  substantial  improvements  in  quality  of  life, 
egalitarianism  and  positive  economic  growth  (compare  and  contrast  Zanzibar  and 
Mauritius,  or  even  Seychelles).  Dependency  theory  has  also  failed  to  prove  that 
dependence  is  universally  an  undesirable  and  debilitating  condition. 38 
The  over  generalisation  of  traditional  dependency  theory  and  its  focus  on  macro-spatial 
arguments  has  meant  that  it  has  ignored  some  important  factors,  some  of  which  have 
also  been  overlooked  by  mainstream  economics.  These  are  important  factors  governing 
dependence  and  include  a  country's  location,  size,  resource  base  (human  and  physical) 
ethnic  composition  and  differences,  structure  and  characteristics  of  the  economy. 
These  geographical,  political  and  demographic  factors  constrain  how  a  country  shapes. 
its  economic  policies. 
Kay  (1990)  agrees  that  unequal  exchange  and  the  transfer  of  the  periphery's  surplus  to 
the  centre  diminishes  the  peripher  s  capacity  for  capital  accumulation  and  growth.  but 
he  also  argues  that  a  country's  development  has  much  to  do  with  its  ability  to  generate, 
as  to  retain  its  surplus,  and  this  is  largely  determined  by  its  internal  mode  of 
production.  Traditional  dependencia  located  exploitation  solely  at  the  level  between 
nations  and  such  an  analysis  ignores  that  exploitation  is  a  class  phenomenon,  a 
country's  socio-economic  formation  is  the  outcome  of  complex  interaction  between 
economic,  social,  political  and  cultural  factors  in  which  class  struggle  assumes 
considerable  importance. 
Contrary  to  the  traditional  thesis,  recent  historical  research  shows  that  the  development 
of  the  centre  is  due  to  the  internal  creation,  appropriation  and  use  of  surplus,  and  less 
to  do  with  the  pillage  or  exploitation  of  the  peripheral  countries.  This  exploitation  came 
later  in  the  development  of  core  economies  and  with  colonialism  in  the  late  19th 
century.  The  successes  of  advanced  countries  lie  in  the  particular  economic,  social, 
political  and  cultural  framework  which  they  created  and  which  are  amenable  to  capital 
accumulation  and  innovation.  Kay  (1990)  stresses  that  development  and 
underdevelopment  are  primarily  rooted  in  social  relations  of  production  and  not  in 
relations  of  exchange.  Despite  their  overwhelming  importance.  internal  obstacles  to 
development  were  neglected.  Kay  also  argues  that,  "participation  in  the  international 
division  of  labour  can  lead  to  development,  while  autarkic  development  strategy  does 
not  ensure  development  (op.  cit.  :  23). 
The  Cepalistas  idealised  the  developmentalist  state  (in  the  hands  of  the  industrial 
bourgeoisie,  staffed  by  technocrats  and  professionals)  as  a  liberating,  equalising,  and 
modernising  force  in  society,  and  it  would  implement  development  programmes  whose 
fruits  would  be  distributed  widely  in  a  welfare  system.  1  Exploitation  and  poverty  would 
be  abolished,  a  self-reliant  and  self-sustaining  development  process  would  be  achieved 
and  underdevelopment  and  foreign  exploitation  would  be  finally  overcome.  There  have 
been  numerous  failures  in  this  respect,  so  it  is  important  to  recognise  the  state's  ability 
1  i.  e.,  those  of  the  CEPAL  school 39 
and  limitations  in  overcoming  underdevelopment  and  dependence.  Kay  (1990:  24) 
stresses  that,  "attention  needs  to  given  to  the  manifold  relationships  between  state 
interventions  and  market  mechanisms  as  in  today's  more  complex  world  the  dichotomy 
state-market  is  an  increasingly  simplistic  vision". 
There  are  also  issues  which  the  dependencia  and  structuralist  school  have  to  address  in 
its  reformulation.  For  example,  the  growth  and  spread  of  alternative  organisations  and 
social  groups,  such  as  non-governmental  organisations,  anti-authoritarian,  religious, 
ethnic,  feminist,  regional,  anti-institutional,  and  ecological  movements  are  a  testimony 
of  the  crisis  of  the  state  and  an  expression  of  society's  desire  for  alternative  forms  of 
institutional  representation.  These  are  aspects  which  dependencies  need  to  recognise 
and  assist  to  strengthen  the  social  participation  of  the  weak,  oppressed,  voiceless  and 
poor.  Cultural  and  ideological  elements  in  the  mobilisation  of  society  for  development 
and  institutionalisation  of  change  and  the  achievement  of  social  cohesion  and 
integration  also  need  to  be  highlighted. 
There  are  varied  processes  of  class  formation  and  exploitation,  which  have  sensitive 
ethnic,  gender,  and  cultural  dimensions  and  affected  by  local  forms  of  domination  and 
political  control,  such  as  patron-client  relationships.  Amongst  others,  the  problems  of 
exploitation  and  suppression  of  minority  groups  and  women  need  to  be  confronted.  The 
ecological  dimension  also  has  to  be  explored  and  given  further  Importance  in  the  light  of 
the  impending  ecological  crisis  and  lack  of  sustainable  development.  The  ecological 
dimension  is  of  particular  relevance  to  SS  and  SIS.  Ecodevelopment  or  sustainable 
development  is  an  issue  related  to  resource  scarcity,  and  it  is  a  concern  which  does  not 
fit  well  with  the  orthodox  paradigm.  The  reality  of  immediate  physical  limits  to  growth 
is  evident  in  small  vulnerable  SIS.  even  though  anti-environmental  deterministic 
doctrines  would  disagree,  mainly  because  they  simply  assume  away  the  constraints 
with  the  misplaced  assumption  that  technology  is  capable  of  confronting  the  problems 
and  is  widely  available.  Timberlake  and  Tinker  (1984)  bring  to  attention  the  role  of 
diminishing  natural  resources  in  violent  human  conflict  between  and  within  states,  and 
this  contributes  to  rural  unrest  and  migration  in  search  of  better  land  and  alternative 
economic  opportunities,  leading  to  rural-urban  and  international  migration,  and  even 
entailing  political  and  religious  issues. 
The  shift  of  emphasis  from  external  to  internal  problems  need  to  go  further  and 
analyses  have  to  be  undertaken  at  the  smaller,  micro  units  of  a  country.  and  these  have 
to  be  linked  to  macro  national  and  international  theories.  One  of  the  weaknesses  of 
dependency  theory  has  been  to  neglect  the  particular  in  the  attempt  to  justify 
generalisation,  and  in  so  doing,  many  small  and  important  experiences  are  not 
analysed.  Kay  (1990)  points  out  that  it  is  often  the  distinct  and  unassuming  small 
events  that  give  diversity  and  richness  to  a  theory  making  it  less  prone  to  dogmatic  and 40 
unidimensional  tendencies. 
As  Lall  (1975)  and  Kay  (1990)  note,  dependencia  has  to  move  away  from  simplistic 
dichotomies  such  as  capitalism-socialism,  outward  or  inward  looking  development, 
import  substitution  or  export  promotion  industrialisation  etc.,  and  consider  the 
possibility  and  feasibility  of  a  variety  of  styles  and  paths  of  development  in  today's 
highly  interlinked  and  complex  world. 
The  main  conflict  between  dependency  theorists  and  the  diffusionists  is  their  different 
perceptions  about  external  linkages.  Whilst  dependenttstas  suggest  that  external 
linkages  are  largely  responsible  for  the  obstruction  of  development,  diffusionists 
subscribe  that  external  linkages  are  a  prerequisite  to  inducing  development.  Perhaps 
the  analysis  of  dependency  links  in  the  context  of  island  economies  can  be  useful  in  the 
challenge  of  the  difusionist  paradigm  as  well  as  influence  the  views  of  traditional 
dependency  theorists  that  apart  from  external  linkages,  other  vital  geographical  and 
strategic  factors  have  to  be  taken  into  consideration,  and  that  perhaps  not  all  external 
linkages  are  necessarily  negative. 
Insofar  as  island  economies  are  concerned,  it  is  possible  to  identify  the  main  areas  and 
the  degree  in  which  their  economies  are  dependent.  Further.  it  is  also  possible  to 
identify  how  disarticulated  their  economies  are  as  a  result  of  dependency. 
Zanzibar  has  undergone  several  phases  in  its  post-Revolutionary  (1964)  development. 
First  an  autarkic  strategy  was  attempted.  The  results  were  discouraging  and  in  practice 
it  was  difficult  to  disengage  from  the  global  economy.  'De-linking'  has  merely  cultivated 
alternative  dependent  relations  or  has  condemned  the  population  to  a  lower  standard  of 
living  and  quality  of  life.  By  the  mid-1970s  Zanzibar  increasingly  adopted  strategies  in 
line  with  the  modernisation  paradigm,  and  in  the  1990s  it  has  adopted  neoliberal  free 
market.  liberalisation  policies  associated  more  with  Thatcherism  and  Reaganomics  (neo- 
liberalism).  As  it  shall  be  shown  in  chapters  nine  and  ten  this  has  more  to  do  with  its 
position  of  being  extremely  dependent  on  the  metropoles  and  having  its  path  and  rate  of 
development  (and  underdevelopment)  being  dictated  from  that  direction  through  its 
main  donors  rather  than  a  coherent  internally  originating  development  option. 
The  applicability  of  dependency  theory  in  analysing  the  spatial  and  other  aspects  of 
development  should  not  be  rejected  on  the  basis  of  the  weaknesses  discussed  above. 
For  example.  Slater's  (1975)  spatial  dependency  analysis  bears  much  relevance  in 
explaining  the  existing  spatial  structure  and  relations  of  many  LDCs.  Incorporating  the 
social,  cultural  and  political  and  historical  aspects  in  attempting  to  utilise  dependencia 
as  a  method  of  analysis  should  be  more  fruitful.  It  is  important  not  to  lose  sight  of  the 
political,  social  and  economic  dimensions  within  the  spatial  processes  and  vice  versa. 41 
There  is  a  belief  that  dependency  theory  is  reformist  and  often  historically  rooted.  It 
attempts  to  explain  the  position  of  the  contemporary  Third  World  formations  through 
core-periphery  relations.  Marxists  criticise  this  approach  as  based  on  rather  narrow 
nationalistic  beliefs.  In  their  view,  what  is  really  required  Is  an  analysis  of  material 
social  relations,  that  is  the  relations  of  production  and  consumption.  A  materialist 
dialectical  approach  is  seen  as  essential  by  the  Marxists.  However,  Palma's  (1981) 
approach  concentrating  on  the  concrete  situation  promises  to  overcome  the  problems 
facing  the  dependencia  school.  and  more  importantly  help  understand  and  explain  the 
situation  facing  most  developing  countries. 
Seers  (1981)  suggested  that  dependency  should  be  examined  in  terms  of  the 
consequences  of  de-linking.  Obviously,  such  a  strategy  cannot  be  fully  implemented 
and  entails  a  range  of  reactions  from  reduction  of  output,  exports,  technological  inputs, 
employment  levels  and  net  outflow  of  capital.  It  has  often  lead  to  a  crippling  loss  of 
confidence  in  the  economy  and  in  turn  lead  to  a  loss  a  of  investment,  the  recall  of  loans, 
restrictions  on  new  loans,  the  decline  of  tourism  and  tourism  revenues,  reduced 
emigrant's  remittances  (at  least  through  formal  channels)  and  a  foreign  exchange  crisis 
(loss  of  value  leading  to  devaluation  and  reduced  earning  capability).  Inevitably, 
governments  adopting  such  strategies  are  obliged  to  seek  assistance  from  the 
international  development  agencies,  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  the 
World  Bank.  Ironically,  the  same  institutions  prescribe  as  a  precondition  orthodox 
development  strategies  related  to  the  diffusionist  paradigm. 
Recent  history  has  shown  that  the  number  of  countries  that  attempted  self-reliance  and 
to  'de-link'  have  been  forced  to  succumb  either  to  economic  or  political-strategic 
pressures.  Most  have  ended  by  negotiating  with  world  financial  institutions  and  have 
been  put  under  pressure  to  curtail  their  de-linking  strategies  and  associated 
development  policies  (e.  g.  Tanzania,  Ghana,  Jamaica  and  Nicaragua).  1  Compared  to 
most  other  sub-Saharan  economies.  Tanzania's,  strategy  worked  fairly  well  until  the 
early  1970s  (Bienefeld.  1972).  The  problems  of  foreign  exchange  constraints  due  to 
sluggish  growth  of  primary  exports  and  expensive  imports  opposed  the  self-reliance 
strategies. 
In  the  Caribbean.  Jamaica  under  Manley  embraced  policies  aimed  at  self-reliance  and 
the  distribution  of  economic  benefits  to  the  population,  and  a  realignment  with  the 
Third  World  -  (the  Cuban  model).  This  policy  differed  from  the  pre-1970s  "Puerto-Rican 
model"  (open,  export-oriented  economy,  encouraging  foreign  investment  and  foreign 
policy  oriented  towards  the  US).  Thus  both  its  development  and  foreign  policy  were 
1  See  Bienefeld  (1972),  Hetme  (1983,1985). 42 
perceived  as  hostile  to  the  US,  and  economic  and  political  destabilisation  ensued. 
Needless  to  say,  Manley's  policies  and  strategies  did  not  succeed.  More  recently 
Jamaica  has  adopted  neo-classical  based  strategies  which  belong  to  the  diffusionist 
paradigm,  the  benefits  of  which  have  so  far  proved  to  be  elusive. 
In  Central  America,  Nicaragua  was  a  perceived  as  a  threat  by  providing  an  example  of 
an  alternative  development  strategy.  There  the  choice  of  development  strategy  had 
political  implications  both  internally  and  externally.  Attempts  at  breaking  away  from 
the  links  with  the  North  American  market  and  sphere  of  influence  and  reducing 
dependency  on  food  imports  etc.  required  structural  changes  challenging  both  internal 
and  external  interests.  The  reaction  came  in  the  form  of  covert  and  economic 
destabilisation,  exacerbating  social  problems  which  in  turn  became  ideological. 
The  failure  of  self-reliance  strategies  are  not  merely  a  result  of  economic  realism.  They 
often  challenge  superpower  hegemony  in  strategically  sensitive  areas.  Internally  they 
also  challenge  the  interests  of  certain  power  groups.  This  is  not  to  underestimate  the 
problems  of  internal  mismanagement.  Isolation  and  even  repression.  Together.  these 
forces  highlight  the  extreme  difficulty  of  breaking  away  from  dependency.  Hettne 
(1990:  144)  is  correct  in  stating  that  the  relevance  of  self-reliance  (as  a  strategy  rather 
than  a  national  ideology),  implied  in  the  dependency  approach,  should  not  be  judged 
only  by  the  setbacks  of  this  strategy  in  the  1970s.  Rather  they  should  be  seen  as 
learning  experiences". 
2.8  Relevance  of  the  dependencia  approach  in  contemporary  analysis 
The  predicament  of  development  in  the  Third  World  continues  to  exist,  and  both  the 
modernisation  and  the  dependencia  paradigms  have  fallen  short  of  providing  an 
adequate  understanding  of  their  development  problems  and  prospects.  Yet  a 
reformulated  dependencia  (structuralist)  approach  as  a  method  of  analysis,  a  framework 
and  as  a  series  of  propositions  rather  than  fully  fledged  theories  is  still  relevant  (Kay. 
1990). 
Before  embarking  on  such  a  framework,  one  other  issue  of  particular  relevance  to  SS 
and  SIS  development  needs  to  be  discussed,  the  question  of  size.  The  problem  of  size  in 
economic  development  has  been  neglected  somewhat  in  both  liberal  and  socialist 
development  theory.  Orthodox  liberal  theory  was  abstracted  from  the  reality  of  national 
boundaries,  and  presupposed  a  free  flow  of  factors  of  production.  Socialist  theory  often 
linked  Itself 
, 
to  the  single  experience  of  the  Soviet  Union,  assuming  that  it  could  be 
replicated  elsewhere.  Both  are  oblivious  of  the  direct  bearing  of  size  on  the  resource 
base  for  development.  Both  advocated  specialisation  and  the  benefits  of  comparative 
advantages  and  economies  of  scale  or  advocate  national  autarky  through  establishing 43 
heavy  industries,  making  the  maximum  use  of  the  national  market  and  domestic 
resources.  Applying  such  approaches  to,  say.  the  SIS  of  the  Caribbean  with  all  the 
market  constraints  and  problems  of  access  shows  how  irrelevant  they  are. 
Given  their  geographical  experiences  (remoteness,  isolation,  fragmentation  and 
peripheralness)  it  is  perhaps  no  surprise  that  the  discussion  on  size  and  self-reliance 
has  been  a  theoretical  field  of  special  concern  for  Caribbean  economists.  Demas.  (1965) 
saw  structural  transformation  (e.  g.  reduction  of  dualism,  between  the  productivity  of 
different  sectors,  elimination  of  subsistence  production.  establishment  of  a  national 
market  etc..  )  as  the  essential  ingredient  of  self-sustained  economic  growth.  Realising 
that  such  a  transformation  is  difficult  to  achieve,  Demas  advanced  the  notion  of 
regional  integration  in  a  common  market  (e.  g.  Caribbean  Free  Trade  Association). 
However,  this  and  subsequent  attempts  at  integration  have  failed,  largely  through 
problems  related  to  dependence  (Girvan,  1973). 
Regional  integration  under  capitalism  was  rejected  by  Thomas  (1974).  The  alternative 
was  to  try  to  develop  a  strategy  for  a  planned  transition  to  socialism  with  special 
reference  to  small  dependent  economies.  The  fundamental  objective  of  a  self-reliance 
strategy  was  to  achieve  a  convergence  of  domestic  resource  use  and  domestic  demand 
the  'first  iron  law  of  transformation'.  It  also  requires  the  establishment  of  a  worker  and 
peasant  alliance.  Thomas's  'second  iron  law  of  transformation'  requires  the 
convergence  of  needs  with  demand.  Due  to  inequalities  of  income  distribution  and  low 
levels  of  absolute  income  per  capita,  there  is  an  acute  divergence  between  the  basic 
needs  of  the  population  and  consumption  expenditure  in  underdeveloped  economies. 
Radical  economists  doubt  the  feasibility  of  Soviet  style  industrialisation  in  small 
underdeveloped  economies.  Thomas  (1974)  argues  that  a  comprehensive  planning 
strategy  requires  the  domestic  production  of  the  basic  materials  needed  as  primary 
inputs  for  the  manufacture  of  the  basic  goods  of  a  community,  and  it  is  necessary  that 
these  basic  materials  are  derived  from  domestic  resources.  This  implies  also  the 
necessary  conditions  for  the  growth  of  an  indigenous  technology.  Also  economies  of 
scale  should  be  judged  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  critical  minimum  as  opposed  to  an 
idealised  optimum  level. 
Thomas  (1974)  acknowledged  that  the  difficulty  of  achieving  this  is  not  entirely  due  to 
exogenous  factors,  the  lack  of  confidence  of  political  leaders  in  Third  World  countries  in 
the  capacity  of  the  people  to  master  the  environment  is  one  of  the  consequence  of 
underdevelopment  and  dependence  and  notes  that;  As  we  have  come  to  see  ourselves 
only  as  others  (i.  e.  European  and  American  views)  see  us,  so  we  have  moved  further 
from  our  freedom"  (op.  cit.:  305).  He  addresses  the  class  issue  and  the  possibility  of 
external  hostility,  bringing  to  the  fore  the  extreme  diMculty  of  achieving  self-reliance  in 44 
a  small  economy.  This  is  another  aspect  which  a  reformulated  dependencia  approach  it 
will  be  necessary  to  consider. 
Kay  (1990)  suggests  that  the  dependencia  approach  as  a  method  of  analysis  is  still 
relevant  once  its  shortcomings  are  identified  and  addressed.  For  example,  the  crisis  of 
the  terms  of  trade  between  North  and  South  has  once  again  come  into  the  lime  light. 
and  especially  the  drastic  deterioration  and  negative  consequences.  This  is  also 
connected  to  problems  of  debt  and  foreign  exchange  constraints.  As  a  consequence  a 
considerable  number  of  South  countries  are  dependent  on  aid  and  loans,  not  only  for 
development,  but  increasingly  as  a  means  of  subsistence,  through  means  such  as 
'import  support'.  Thus  the  structuralists  and  dependentistas  analysis  of  the  terms  of 
trade  and  unequal  exchange  retains  some  validity  here. 
Through  debt  and  aid  the  South's  financial  dependence  has  been  considerably 
aggravated  and  so  reveals  the  limited  options  open  to  debtor  countries  due  to  their 
technological  and  other  dependence.  The  rise  in  debt  servicing,  limited  foreign 
exchange  generating  capacity,  leading  to  cuts  in  imports,  especially  of  capital  goods, 
further  aggravating  the  crisis  and  constraining  appropriate  structural  transformation. 
Again  some  important  aspects  of  dependency  analysis  are  vindicated. 
Monetarist  solutions  to  the  problems  of  inflation  and  debt,  many  appearing  in  the  form 
of  IMF  Intervention  in  internal  economic  policies,  have  yet  to  achieve  acceptable  results. 
This  has  led  to  a  renewed  structuralist-monetarist  debate  on  the  IMF's  adjustment  and 
stabilisation  programmes.  Seers  (1981)  argues  that  there  are  still  relevant  lessons  for 
economists  in  developing  countries  in  the  structuralist-monetarist  debate. 
Differences  in  productivity  between  and  within  sectors  have  become  more  acute  and 
such  disparities  have  lead  to  increased  intra-  and  inter-sectoral  imbalances,  to  widening 
income  differentials,  to  limit  the  spread  of  technological  progress,  all  of  which  reflects  a 
continuing,  if  not  growing,  marginalisation.  New  investment  and  technologies  go  to  the 
most  productive  enterprises  within  each  sector.  Labour  continues  to  be  marginalised 
from  and  by  modem  technology,  and  consumption  patterns  are  'internationalised'.  The 
stabilisation  programmes  of  the  neo-conservatives  have  increased  the  mass  of  the 
structurally  unemployed,  causing  them  to  devise  survival  strategies  varying  from  petty 
to  informal  sector  activities,  to  emigrating. 
The  rise  of  ethnic  regionalism  and  the  national  question.  including  ethnic  and  regional 
autonomist  movements  reflects  the  persistence  and  gravity  of  these  problems.  One  of 
the  least  understood  aspects  of  mainstream  development  process  is  the  ethnic 
phenomenon.  There  is  some  correlation  between  growth  and  stagnation,  and  ethnic 
conflict.  Even  this  is  perhaps  rather  simplistic  given  the  manner  in  which  ethnic 45 
conflicts  and  movements  relate  to  development.  It  Is  more  complex  and  differs  in  each 
area  and  influenced  by  historical  factors.  The  conflicts  bring  about  the  concept  of 
ethnopolitics.  1  In  Fiji  for  example,  this  phenomenon  exists  between  the  indigenous 
Fijians  and  the  Indian  population  while  in  Sri  Lanka  the  economic  relations  between 
the  Sinhalese  and  the  Tamils  are  also  complex,  leaving  the  country  in  a  prolonged  civil 
war  and  stagnating  the  development  process.  From  a  class  analysis  perspective,  it  is 
possible  to  distinguish  between  subgroups  within  these  communities,  but  these  lose 
priority  when  the  interests  of  the  whole  group  are  threatened.  Stavenhagen  (1986:  77) 
pointed  out  that  the  neglect  of  the  ethnic  question  is  not  an  oversight,  but  a 
paradigmatic  blind  spot".  Hettne  (1990)  notes  that  ethnopolitics  is  related  to  conflicts 
over  access  and  control  over  natural  resources,  major  infrastructural  projects  affecting 
development,  employment  and  local  ecological  systems,  and  conflicts  stemming  from 
impersonal  and  secular,  but  uneven  trends  such  as  commodilication,  proletariansation, 
and  urbanisation.  It  also  affects  the  contents  of  national  development  strategies  and 
conflicts  of  state-controlled  redistribution. 
These  issues  are  related  to  the  concept  of  'internal  colonialism',  occurring  within  some 
Third  World  countries  (as  opposed  to  external  colonialism  which  occurs  between 
countries).  The  former  is  endogenous  and  the  latter  exogenous.  The  past  colonial 
relations  of  domination  still  exist  within  countries,  albeit  in  newer  forms  that  focus  on 
class  and  ethnic  dimensions,  while  exploiting  the  links  between  class  and  ethnicity. 
Kay  (1990)  argues  that  rural-urban  and  class  relations  cannot  be  fully  understood 
without  reference  to  internal  colonialism.  Relations  of  internal  colonialism  have  a 
different  historical  origin  and  are  based  on  discrimination;  they  cut  across  class  lines. 
Indeed,  by  maintaining  ethnic  divisions,  internal  colonialism  impedes  the  development 
of  class  relations  since  ethnic  consciousness  may  override  class  consciousness, 
affecting  the  rate  and  path  of  development.  This  Is  of  particular  relevance  to  many  SIS 
(e.  g.  Sri  Lanka,  Comoros,  Seychelles,  Fiji,  Mauritius  and  even  Zanzibar). 
The  role  of  the  state.  and  of  government  intervention,  is  of  direct  relevance. 
Neoclassical  economists  advocate  free-market  policies,  all  the  more  so  because  of  the  so 
called  successes  of  the  South  East  Asian  NICs.  However.  even  in  the  NICs  a  degree  of 
government  intervention  (albeit  selective  and  responsive)  has  been  the  norm  and 
continues  to  take  place.  The  oppressive  nature  of  regimes  in  most  NICs  are  swept 
under  the  carpet  of  success  and  the  alliance  with  the  core.  Kay  (1990)  suggests  that  a 
combination  bf  varying  degrees  and  types  of  protectionism,  export  promotion  and  state 
1  Ethnopolitics  is  defined  as  "ethnic  identity  activated  and  used  for  the  purpose  of  political  mobilisation"  (Hettne, 
1990:  190).  He  notes  that  as  a  phenomenon  it  is  not  new,  what  is  new  is  the  sudden  and  dramatic  wave  of  ethnic 
conflicts  sweeping  not  only  the  Third  World.  but  also  the  other  worlds,  e.  g.  Yugoslavia,  the  former  Soviet  Republics, 
Asia,  Europe.  etc.  this  signifies  the  rise  of  ethnonationalism,  a  factor  which  cannot  be  ignored  anymore. 46 
intervention  according  to  changing  circumstances  is  relevant,  as  suggested  by  some 
structuralists. 
2.9  Double  dependency 
Geographers  have  contributed  to  the  study  of  development  and  underdevelopment 
deriving  concepts  such  as  'core  periphery'.  'growth  pole'.  'spread  and  trickle  down 
effects'  and  others  (Reitsma,  1980).  Indeed,  most  empirical  studies  are  economic  in 
nature,  focusing  on  'unequal  exchange',  foreign  investment'.  'surplus  extraction',  and 
'integration  into  the  world  capitalist  system'.  Insofar  as  dependency  relations  are 
concerned,  these  tend  to  be  more  between  LDCs  and  the  developed  capitalist  countries. 
Little  attention  is  paid  to  dependency  relations  between  LDCs,  e.  g..  between  Bolivia  and 
Brazil.  Nepal  and  India.  Uganda  and  Kenya,  Southern  African  countries  and  South 
Africa  and  others.  According  to  Reitsma  (1980),  to  conceptualise  dependency  relations 
simply  between  core  and  periphery  and  then  particularly  from  the  point  of  view  of 
economic  relations  alone  is  partial. 
Geography  itself  may  compound  dependency  into  double  dependency  by  virtue  of  the 
constraints  which  are  imposed  on  development  through  spatial  considerations.  1  This  is 
evident  in  the  case  of  land-locked  countries  (LLCs)  whose  location  compounds  their 
dependency.  The  argument  was  developed  by  Reitsma  (1980)  for  the  case  of  Swaziland, 
though  the  constraints  of  LLCs  have  been  discussed  more  generally  by  Cervenka  (1973). 
Trade  in  Africa,  as  is  the  case  in  most  developing  SIS  is  largely  external,  the  main  links 
being  with  Britain,  France,  USA,  Japan  and  Germany,  although  more  recently  there 
have  been  growing  links  with  the  NICs.  The  bulk  of  international  trade  is  transported 
by  sea,  so  access  to  the  sea  is  synonymous  with  access  to  the  world  markets.  A 
number  of  LLCs  are  geographically  remote  to  sea  ports,  e.  g.  Chad  is  about  2050  Kms. 
away  (Cervenka,  1973). 
Although  both  CSs  and  LLCs  share  similar  economic  and  other  problems  of 
underdevelopment,  "the  Land-locked  situation  adds  another  dimension  of  difficulty  to 
economic  development  of  the  countries  concerned"  (Cervenka,  1973:  18).  If  this 
argument  is  true,  and  it  has  certainly  been  proven  so,  it  also  applies  in  a  slightly 
different  manner  to  SIS.  The  importance  of  the  double  dependency  line  of  reasoning  is 
that  similar  arguments  can  be  basically  made  in  the  case  of  SIS  -  that  geography 
compounds  dependency  and  the  problems  of  development  and  self-reliance.  How  the 
argument  needs  to  be  modified  in  the  case  of  SIS  is  introduced  in  this  section  and  taken 
1  What  I  mean  by  geography  is  how  Africa  was  carved  up  during  the  colonial  era  -  to  leave  over  a  dozen  LLCs  - 
mattered  less  during  the  colonial  period  (in  the  case  of  islands,  their  strategic  significance  to  colonisers  played  the 
analogous  role).  In  both  cases  independence  meant  that  the  newly  independent  country  had  to  overcome  a  problem 
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up  again  in  chapter  three  where  the  literature  survey  underscores  the  problems  of 
location,  distance  and  fragmentation  (and  hence  transport)  in  SIS. 
This  section  seeks  to  explore  the  dependency  relations  occurring  within  the  periphery 
and  will  attempt  to  extend  this  from  the  context  of  dependency  analysis.  Most  LLCs, 
particularly  those  in  Africa,  can  be  expected  to  face  more  difficult  development  problems 
than  coastal  states  (CSs).  This  is  due  to  their  relative  inaccessibility,  which  tends  to 
make  them  less  attractive  for  investment,  with  the  exception  of  resource  rich  countries.  1 
Following  this  argument,  land  locked  countries  (LLCs)  should  have  experienced  less 
capitalist  penetration  and  be  less  integrated  into  the  world  capitalist  economy. 
According  to  the  logic  of  traditional  dependency  theory.  LLCs  should  be  less  dependent 
and  less  exploited  than  coastal  states  (CSs),  i.  e.  there  should  be  less  poverty.  less  and 
spatial  inequality  (or  polarisation)  in  LLCs  than  in  CSs.  However.  this  is  not  quite  the 
case;  while  in  some  cases  there  may  be  less  inequality.  there  is  no  evidence  of  less 
poverty  or  less  underdevelopment  (Reitsma,  1980). 
Dependencia  models  such  as  those  expounded  by  Frank  are  unable  to  account  for  the 
particular  problems  of  the  LLCs  in  the  Third  World.  An  alternative  explanation  has  to 
be  sought  (ibid.  ).  Reitsma  (1980)  attempts  to  do  this  by  looking  into  the  geographical 
positions  occupied  by  the  LLCs  and  the  relations  that  LLCs  have  with  the  CSs.  Focus  is 
on  the  level  of  peripheral  relations. 
LLCs  by  definition  lack  ports,  the  importance  of  which  is  critical  in  (colonial  and  neo- 
colonial)  development.  Port  locations  are  well  suited  for  industrial  development  due  to 
accessibility,  lower  transport  costs,  agglomeration  economies,  and  other  factors.  For 
LLCs,  the  distance  factor  is  a  considerable  handicap,  entailing  high  costs  of 
transportation.  Production  for  export  faces  intense  competition  from  more  favourably 
placed  CSs.  This  situation  inhibits  industrial  development,  raises  overheads,  and 
retards  infrastructural  developments.  A  poor  infrastructure  in  turn  slows  down 
industrial  and  indeed  other  types  of  development,  the  net  effect  being  to  discourage 
investments.  2 
Thus  CSs  tend  to  be  more  industrialised  compared  to  LLCs,  manufactured  goods  are 
more  likely  to  flow  from  CSs  to  LLCs  and  the  opposite  for  raw  materials.  Thus  a 
peripheral  relationship  exists  between  CSs  and  LLCs,  the  latter  experiencing  the 
negative  more  effects.  The  LLCs  become  'hinterland  economies'  supplying  relatively 
I  Such  as  Zambia,  Rwanda  and  Burundi  amongst  many  others. 
2  The  existing  transport  systems  and  even  urban  centres  have  been  largely  developed  as  a  result  of  colonial  penetration, 
exploitation  and  expropriation  of  surplus  to  the  metropoles  and  continue  to  serve  the  same  purposes  (Slater,  1975). 
The  same  applies  to  island  economies,  where  sea  and  air  transport  constrain  access  to  the  global  economy  and  restrict 
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cheap  agricultural  raw  materials  and  labour  to  the  more  industrialised  CSs.  Effectively 
they  are  located  at  the  'periphery  of  the  periphery'. 
As  a  result  of  low  wages  and  limited  employment  opportunities  in  LLCs,  labour  tends  to 
migrate  to  the  more  dynamic  CSs  in  search  of  better  economic  opportunities.  LLCs 
perform  not  only  hinterland  functions  but  are  also  reservoirs  of  cheap  labour. 
This  situation  is  identified  by  Blaikie  (1981)  as  a  'double  dependent  periphery'. 
occupying  a  subordinate  and  dependent  position  both  with  regard  to  one  or  more 
neighbouring  CSs  and  in  turn  to  the  world's  capitalist  core  area.  Reitsma  (1980)  points 
out  that  some  countries  such  as  Chad,  Burundi,  Rwanda,  Zambia  and  Botswana  can  be 
said  to  perform  'triple  dependent  periphery'  functions.  1  Third  World  LLCs  find 
themselves  in  a  weak  and  vulnerable  position  vis-a-vis  the  CSs,  something  which  the 
latter  can  take  some  advantage  of.  For  example,  the  CSs  can  impose  certain 
restrictions  unfavourable  to  LLCs,  e.  g.  increased  tariffs,  fees,  storage  and  freight  rates 
and  so  on.  It  is  in  this  context  that  the  barrier  function  separating  sovereign  states 
manifests  itself  clearly  (Reitsma.  1980).  Thus  LLCs  are  at  a  double  disadvantage,  and 
these  problems  influence  not  only  economic  development,  but  also  political  and  security 
concerns.  In  effect,  they  are  vulnerable,  a  problem  which  is  further  compounded  when 
the  LLC  is  also  small  in  size. 
Ideological.  political  and  security  issues  which  affect  CSs  tend  to  reflect  themselves 
adversely  in  LLCs.  2  This  creates  a  situation  of  uncertainty,  vulnerability  and 
dependency.  The  results  of  any  negative  actions  can  be  detrimental  or  even 
catastrophic  on  the  economies  of  the  LLCs. 
Reitsma  (1980:  138)  argues  that  one  of  the  main  consequences  of  being  a  'double 
dependent  periphery'  is  having  severely  limited  development  possibilities.  Any 
substantial  economic  growth  in  an  LLC  is  likely  to  result  in  increased  dependence  due 
to  expanded  shipments  to  and  from  overseas  countries.  This  is  also  observed  and 
supported  by  others,  e.  g..  Szentes  (1973).  Hveem  (1973)  and  Glassner  (1978).  Indeed 
LLCs  find  it  difficult  to  raise  themselves  above  the  development  level  of  neighbouring 
CSs.  The  doubly  dependent  predicament  of  LLCs  offer  little  hope  for  rapid  and 
sustainable  economic  development  and  should  they  experience  considerable  economic 
growth,  the  CSs  may  well  attempt  to  benefit  from  this  (Reitsma.  1980).  Above  all  so 
long  as  LLCs  and  CSs  do  not  improve  their  socio-economic  and  political  relations  and 
cooperate  more  positively,  the  position  of  CSs  will  continue  to  be  worse  of 
1  Presumably  he  implies  that  a  second  intermediate  country  is involved  in  between  the  core  and  the  extreme  periphery. 
2  For  example  the  effects  of  the  Tanzania-Uganda  War  on  Rwanda  and  Burundi,  and  South  Africa's  influence  on 
Lesotho,  Swaziland,  Botswana,  Zimbabwe  and  Malawi. 49 
In  view  of  this  discussion  and  observations  by  various  experts.  It  has  been  suggested 
that  the  distinction  between  (dependent)  LLCs  and  (dominant)  CSs  offers  possibilities 
for  amending  and  refining  existing  core-periphery  models  and  dependency  theories  by 
making  them  more  geographically  relevant  and  at  the  same  time  by  bringing  them  more 
closely  in  line  with  the  harsh  facts  of  reality  (ibicL). 
Parallels  can  be  drawn  between  the  experiences  of  land-locked  states  and  the 
debilitating  experiences  of  developing  small  states  and  small  island  states.  What  is 
being  suggested  here  is  that  the  phenomenon  of  double  dependency  is  also  applicable  to 
some  SIS,  highlighting  the  geographical  constraints  facing  them.  It  can  also  be  used  to 
explore  the  relationships  (political  and  economic)  that  exist  within  the  periphery.  The 
relationships  and  flows  with  the  core  are  depicted  in  the  model  developed  and  based  on 
Slater's  (1975)  spatial  dependency  analysis  (figure  2.2).  The  figure  shows  the  situations 
representing  the  special  position  of  small  states  and  SIS.  There  are  the  direct  linkages 
between  the  core  and  peripheral  island  economies,  alongside  which  there  are  indirect 
linkages  which  are  usually  mainland  countries  to  peripheral  small  island  countries  and 
small  countries. 
Though  many  SIS  are  located  geographically,  economically  and  politically  at 
considerable  distances  from  the  core,  they  are  affected  considerabley  by  decisons  taken 
at  the  centre.  Doumenge  (1989)  refers  to  this  as  isolation  from  the  great  geopolitical 
centres.  He  notes  that  life  in  small  islands  is  conditioned  by  the  network  of  relations 
established  from  a  few  important  centres  holding  the  power  of  decision  and  which 
maintain  their  domination  by  controlling  the  exchange  of  merchandise,  passenger 
transport,  financial  flows,  economic  decision  in  the  market,  and  the  political  orientation 
of  a  zone  of  influence.  1 
This  is  perhaps  relevant  to  the  situation  facing  peripheral  island  economies  which  find 
themselves  in  a  double  dependent  situation.  The  model  shown  in  figure  2.2  was 
developed  to  depict  the  situation  facing  many  developing  SS  and  SIS  In  what  is  termed 
as  the  'extreme  periphery'  both  physically  (or  geographically)  and  economically  (and 
politically).  It  represents  the  manner  in  which  they  are  integrated  into  the  global 
economy.  Internal  socio-economic  policies  and  problems  compound  the  situation  so 
that  the  prospects  for  development  diminish  and  poverty  prevails. 
1  Doumenge  (1989)  identifies  three  main  'great  geopolitical'  centres  or  'poles',  these  being:  London,  Paris,  Lisbon, 
Madrid  and  Rotterdam,  for  Western  Europe;  Los  Angeles,  San  Francisco.  New  York,  Montreal  and  Miami,  for  North 
America;  Sydney,  Auckland,  Cape  Town,  Tokyo,  Singapore  and  Honolulu,  for  what  he  terms  as  the  'peripheral 
dynamic  centres'. 50 
Direction  of  flows  and  exchange  0 
Core 
Primary  commodities,  services, 
Periphery  ý  tourism,  interest  on  capital/loans, 
Extreme  periphery 
labour 
40-  Manufactured  goods,  food,  energy, 
capital,  loans,  aid 
Figure  2.2  Spatial  model  of  core-periphery  relations  and  double  dependency. 
Not  all  double  dependent  relations  are  necessarily  negative,  as  Hughes  (1983,1987)  has 
demonstrated  in  the  case  of  the  Gambia  where  British  colonial  hegemony  did  not 
develop  into  a  'full  neo-colonial  dependency'.  There  Senegal  has  emerged  as  the 
Gambia's  military  patron.  Although  the  Gambia  is  an  enclave  rather  than  a  LLC,  it 
suffers  from  similar  constraints.  It  has  had  to  'accept'  a  confederal  union  with  Senegal, 
even  though  it  benefits  little  economically  from  its  neighbour.  as  Senegal  is  itself  too 
poor  to  assist.  Meanwhile  the  Gambia  has  developed  a  diversified  multilateral 
dependency  as  a  matter  of  policy.  The  Gambia  lacks  strong  direct  links  with  any 51 
specific  metropole,  instead  it  has  spread  or  diversified  its  dependency  between 
international  development  agencies,  a  few  metropoles  and  a  neighbouring  CS. 
Of  special  interest  are  the  small  states  with  direct  access  and  connections  to  the  core. 
e.  g.  SIS  such  as  the  Bahamas  or  Bermuda,  where  relative  prosperity  is  not  purely  the 
consequence  of  internal  policies,  but  also  part  of  direct  external  linkages  to  nearby 
metropolitan  economies  (US).  Equally  Important  is  the  situation  facing  the  SS  and  SIS 
which  are  detached,  physically  or  politically  or  both,  from  the  core.  Here  the  examples 
of  SIS  such  as  Zanzibar.  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  Maldives,  apply.  Doumenge 
(1989:  49) 
More  relevant  to  the  case  of  SIS.  the  Maldives  have  cultivated  special  relations  with  its 
neighbours,  mainly  Sri  Lanka,  India  and  Middle  Eastern  countries.  A  large  proportion 
of  its  international  trade  (both  imports  and  exports)  is  with  developing  countries  as 
opposed  to  developed  countries,  contrary  to  the  common  trend  for  most  developing 
countriesll  This  also  reflects  the  degree  of  dependence  on  neighbouring  countries  for 
markets,  skilled  labour  and  access  to  specialised  services  such  as  higher  education  and 
medicine.  As  In  Gambia,  so  far  these  relations  appear  to  be  more  beneficial  rather  than 
detrimental  to  the  Maldives. 
This  brings  the  discussion  to  the  case  of  Zanzibar.  How  beneficial  and  unique  is  its 
experience?  It  has  experienced  the  effects  of  'double  dependency'.  first  through  it 
geographical  location,  in  effect  its  distancing  from  any  major  geopolitical  and  indeed 
'geoeconomic'  centre  or  pole  of  influence.  At  the  time  of  independence  it  was  prepared 
to  develop  neo-colonial  links  with  Britain.  Instead  internal  (Revolution)  and  external 
(Cold  War)  developments  nudged  it  into  a  Union  with  a  CS  (Tanganyika).  The  Union 
was  formed  on  the  basis  of  political  and  security  considerations  and  gradually 
developed  into  an  economic  relationship  with  far  reaching  implications,  which  make  up 
the  second  'double  dependency'. 
Zanzibar  emerged  from  independence  a  peripheral  colonial  economy.  With  the  1964 
Revolution  it  attempted  to  break  away  from  dependent  relations  with  Britain, 
establishing  alternative  economic  and  political  links  with  sections  of  the  Eastern  bloc 
and  Mainland  Tanzania.  Despite  this  its  internal  policies  were  autarkic.  However, 
Zanzibar's  links  with  the  Mainland  gradually  exhibited  characteristics  of  'double 
dependency,  as  its  economic  position  deteriorated  and  as  it  surrendered  some 
autonomy  in  crucial  matters  to  the  Union  (e.  g.  foreign  relations,  defence,  finance  and 
monetary  matters  etc.,  ).  The  details  of  Zanzibar's  contemporary  development 
1  More  recently,  it  has  developed  a  substantial  tourist  industry,  and  this  has  shifted  its  links  towards  the  metropoles  as 
increasing  amounts  of  foreign  exchange  earnings  are  derived  from  this  sector. 52 
experiences  are  analysed  in  detail  in  chapters  seven  to  ten.  They  shed  light  on  the 
relevance  of  peripheral  economic  and  political  relations  and  their  implications  to 
development  in  a  case  of  double  dependency. 
2.10  Conclusions 
It  follows  from  the  preceding  discussions  and  critiques  that  despite  the  shortcomings  of 
dependencia  analysis.  it  can  be  still  of  significant  importance  and  relevance  in  the 
understanding  of  the  development  problems  of  developing  SIS.  The  discussion 
recognises  the  inherent  difficulties  associated  with  orthodox  dependency  theory.  and 
attempts  to  ameliorate  these.  Once  reformulated,  dependency  analysis  is  capable  of 
providing  a  sound  background  for  the  understanding  of  the  problems  of  LDCs  and 
suggest  some  solutions.  Such  a  framework  is  essential  so  as  to  identify  both  the 
internal  and  external  problems  of  development,  which  include  the  social,  political, 
cultural  and  economic  dimensions.  In  addition,  other  important  factors,  such  as  small 
size.  being  islands  and  their  respective  geoeconomic  and  geopolitical  position  in  the 
global  economy  are  given  special  attention.  In  doing  this  the  concept  of  double 
dependency  is  'borrowed'  and  adopted  from  the  analysis  of  land-locked  countries  (LLCs) 
and  applied  to  developing  SIS  to  emphasise  amongst  others,  the  geographical  and 
political  dimensions  of  dependency,  and  the  profundity  of  the  problems  related  to  it. 
At  this  juncture,  the  study  will  proceed  to  make  a  survey  of  the  relevant  literature  and 
discussions  about  the  development  problems  and  prospects  of  SS  and  SIS  since 
decolonisation.  The  following  chapter  provides  a  review  of  the  issues  relating  to  this 
and  a  background  for  subsequent  analyses. 53 
3.0  Small  States  and  Small  Island  States  and  their  development 
constraints;  a  review  of  the  literature  and  the  issues. 
3.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  will  attempt  to  identify  and  discuss  the  problems  and  constraints 
underlying  development  which  confront  states  and  particularly  those  which  arise  from 
small  size.  The  issue  has  been  widely  discussed  amongst  social  scientists,  although 
from  a  diversity  of  perspectives.  What  is  relevant  here  is  to  identify  and  relate  the 
development  problems  of  size,  bearing  in  mind  that  it  does  not  act  on  just  one 
particular  sector:  rather  its  effects  are  multiplicative  between  socio-economic,  political 
and  cultural  factors,  compounding  the  individual  constraints. 
First  an  acceptable  definition  of  small  size  or  'smallness'  is  required  following  from 
which  there  is  debate  as  to  whether  small  islands,  which  accounts  for  many  small 
states  (SS)  should  be  regarded  as  a  separate  category  i.  e.  that  the  problems  of  small 
non-island  states  are  perhaps  distinctively  different  from  small  island  states  (SIS).  The 
chapter  will  trace  how  the  various  issues  relating  to  size  within  developing  countries 
have  been  discussed,  what  are  the  main  constraints  and  their  relevance.  The 
implications  and  cross-effects  of  smallness  will  be  identified  and  discussed  with  the 
help  of  a  model.  Finally  some  of  the  dominant  contemporary  economic,  social  and 
political  characteristics  of  developing  small  and  small  island  states  (SIS)  will  be 
discussed  in  detail  so  as  to  isolate  the  issues  relevant  to  the  research  problem. 
Although  many  of  these  issues  are  recognised  by  planners  and  others  working  in  the 
development  field,  rarely  are  they  incorporated  adequately  in  the  formulation  and 
implementation  of  development  plans  and  strategies. 
3.2  Small  size  -  problems  of  definition 
Discussions  of  'smallness'  have  been  plagued  by  the  problem  of  definition.  To  date 
there  is  no  single,  universally  accepted  definition  of  what  constitutes  a  small  country. 
To  further  complicate  matters,  small  countries  are  often  subdivided  into  small  and 
micro-states.  An  important  landmark  was  made  in  1957  by  the  International  Economic 
Association  in  a  conference  on  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Size  of  Nations.  1 
'Smallness'  began  with  a  population  of  15  million  downwards.  The  main  reasoning 
underlying  such  a  figure  was  the  size  of  the  internal  market  beyond  which  economies  of 
1  The  proceedings  are  in  Robinson,  E.  A.  C.  (1960)  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Size  of  Nations,  Macmillan, 
London. 54 
scale  would  begin  to  apply.  Focusing  purely  on  market  size,  one  weakness  of  such  a 
definition  assumes  production  and  distribution  to  be  mainly  within  an  economy. 
whereas  the  reality  is  that  states  trade  with  one  another  so  that  market  size  is 
frequently  increased.  Moreover,  it  also  assumed  a  relatively  affluent  market.  whereas 
many  developing  countries  have  large  populations  but  low  levels  of  consumer  demand 
and  purchasing  power.  1 
Nor  have  statistical  studies  on  the  economic  effects  of  size  been  unequivocal.  Chenery 
(1960)  showed  size  to  be  a  significant  determinant  of  patterns  of  industrial  development. 
However,  others  reporting  out  of  the  same  conference  showed  that  there  were  no 
significant  relationships  between  economic  size  and  other  key  variables  such  as  output 
per  head  (Robinson,  1960),  or  as  Chenery  and  Taylor  (1968)  and  Kuznets  (1971)  showed 
later  in  international  trade.  What  is  important  here  is  that,  as  most  analysts  of  the 
1960s  argued,  industrialisation  was  the  key  or  engine  to  economic  growth:  the 
economies  of  SS  in  the  developing  world,  on  the  other  hand,  were  based  on  primary 
production.  However  the  fact  that  there  was  no  significant  relationship  between 
economic  size  and  international  trade  does  indicate  that  access  to  international  trade 
through  sales  of  goods  and  services  is  an  important  and  viable  potential  for  many 
economies  and  including  small  ones? 
The  1960s  saw  the  process  of  decolonisation  speeded  up.  Again  the  issue  of  country 
size  was  to  emerge,  this  time  this  time  within  the  context  of  developing  countries.  By 
the  end  of  the  1960s  the  economic,  together  with  the  demographic,  sociological  and 
political  implications  of  size  and  development  had  been  examined  (Benedict,  1967). 
Several  major  conferences  had  been  held  focusing  on  the  effects  of  smallness  on 
developing  countries  (Selwyn,  1975a,  Lewis,  1976).  However,  there  still  was  no  firm 
definition  of  'smallness',  though  it  was  clear  that  size  affected  many  other  aspects  of 
development  apart  from  the  economic. 
The  Commonwealth  Secretariat,  which  includes  within  its  membership  SS,  also 
concerned  itself  with  the  issue.  Although  the  organisation  recognised  other  measures  of 
smallness,  it  often  tended  to  focus  on  population  as  the  simplest  and  most  accessible 
indicator  in  defining  the  SS,  as  when  it  launched  its  special  programme  for  small  and 
other  specially  disadvantaged  states  in  1979,  setting  an  upper  limit  of  around  1  million 
(Commonwealth  Secretariat,  1985). 
1  It  is  noted  that  the  focus  on  small  size  and  its  implications  to  an  economy  did  not  start  with  LDCs.  As  it  can  be  seen 
from  the  preceding  paragraph,  attention  was  on  developed  small  countries  and  as  the  issues  and  arguments  are 
brought  up  in  this  chapter,  many  of  the  implications  of  size  have  differing  implications  for  economies  in  LDCs  and 
DCs. 
2  In  recent  year  the  examples  of  Mauritius,  Botswana,  Singapore,  Macao  and  St.  Lucia  apply. 55 
With  virtually  all  the  newly  independent  countries  joining  the  United  Nations,  that 
organisation  too  became  aware  of,  and  interested  in,  the  problems  of  small  countries  in 
development  and  international  affairs.  The  United  Nations  Institute  for  Training  and 
Research  (UNITAR)  and  the  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development 
(UNCTAD)  both  concerned  themselves  with  the  problems  of  small  countries,  both  land- 
locked  and  island  states.  UNTTAR  commissioned  a  study  which  registered  96  small 
states  and  territories  with  populations  of  less  than  a  million,  half  of  which  comprised  a 
population  of  less  than  100,000  (UNrrAR,  1971).  Virtually  all  of  the  countries  were 
small  in  population,  geographical  size  and  in  the  size  of  their  economy.  In  the  UNCTAD 
(1973)  study  only  15  of  the  52  small  countries  and  territories  had  less  than  10.000  sq. 
km.  in  land  area  and  75%  of  these  had  populations  of  less  than  1  million  and  about 
52%  had  populations  of  less  than  250,000  (1970).  From  these  reports  the  threshold  for 
defining  a  small  country  was  a  population  of  a  million  and  less,  and  some  notion  (vague) 
of  a  small  land  area  (physical  size).  The  latter  aspect  was  included  in  the  observation 
that  the  general  trend,  though  not  exclusively,  was  that  a  small  physical  size  also 
Implied  a  higher  probability  of  a  lack  of  physical  resources,  the  exceptions  being 
resource  rich  countries  such  as  the  Gulf  States  and  Brunei. 
More  recently  this  cut  off  point  has  been  revised  upwards.  The  Commonwealth 
Secretariat  routinely  collects  and  publishes  international  reports  for  82  countries  with 
populations  of  less  than  5  million,  and  50  of  these  have  per  capita  incomes  of  less  than 
US  $  2,000.1  The  report  incorporates  most  small  countries  regardless  of  their 
economic  and  development  status.  It  uses  World  bank  definitions,  placing  them  into 
low,  middle  and  high  income  countries  and  OPEC  and  OECD  countries.  Their  average 
population  has  increased  from  1.5  million  in  1979  to  1.56  million  in  1988.  Their 
average  land  area  is  about  138,000  sq.  km.  Small  countries  are  thus  defined  from  some 
composite  measure  incorporating  area,  income  and  population  and  can  be  further 
categorised  according  to  development  status  such  as  developing  or  developed  countries. 
The  1979  conference  hosted  by  the  Australian  National  University  (ANU)  focused  on 
development  issues  of  the  island  states  of  the  Pacific  and  Indian  Oceans.  It  attempted 
a  definition  of  smallness  based  on  the  particularity  of  the  problems  of  SIS,  the  most 
relevant  indicators  here  being  the  size  of  population,  geographical  size,  and  gross 
domestic  product  (Shand,  1980:  7).  Thus  smallness  in  human  resources  is  an  attribute 
of  the  size  of  the  population,  while  physical  area  can  be  used  to  denote  smallness  in 
natural  resources  availability.  GDP  can  be  used  as  a  crude  measure  of  the  size  of  the 
internal  market.  The  report  by  no  means  pretends  that  these  measures  are  universal, 
1  It  is  published  annually  since  1979  and  is  entitled;  Basic  Statistical  Data  on  Selected  Countries  (with  populations  of 
less  than  5  million)  Commonwealth  Secretariat,  Marlborough  House,  London. 56 
but  it  does  provide  a  close  indication  of  the  actual  situation  affecting  most  small 
territories  although  the  levels  at  which  smallness  in  each  of  the  criteria  becomes 
effective  was  not  determined.  The  levels  were  set  arbitrarily.  It  is  noted  though,  that 
according  to  Erbo  and  Schiavo-Campo  (1969:  187)  that  `with  notable  exceptions  the 
several  possible  criteria  based  on  size  yield  the  same  broad  groupings  of  countries.  A 
territorially  small  country  usually  has  also  a  small  population,  a  limited  resource  base, 
a  small  supply  of  savings,  as  a  result,  a  small  absolute  national  income".  It  is 
interesting  that  in  broad  terms,  their  observations  still  hold  for  the  majority  of  small 
territories. 
As  economists,  Lall  and  Ghosh  (1982:  144-5)  take  the  view  that  it  may  be  more 
meaningful  to  consider  population  size  and  incomes  (GDP)  for  defining  small  countries. 
They  reject  surface  area  as  a  significant  factor  in  classification  and  point  out  that  the 
development  problems  of  resource-scarce.  poor  economies  with  small  populations  but 
large  surface  areas,  are  hardly  different  from  those  of  similar  poor  countries  but  with 
small  land  areas.  Basic  problems,  such  as  the  lack  of  shelter,  nutrition,  education  and 
employment  that  characterise  geographically  large  but  poor  countries  are  quite  often 
characteristic  of  small  ones.  However.  they  do  acknowledge  that  insofar  as  economies 
of  scale  are  concerned  (especially  with  respect  to  manufacturing),  the  options  to  large 
and  small  countries  are  bound  to  be  different.  While  a  large  country  may  practically  do 
everything  that  a  small  country  can,  the  opposite  is  not  necessarily  true.  Thus 
smallness  is  seen  more  of  a  constraint  rather  than  a  positive  factor  in  development. 
Taking  an  economic  view  point,  Kaminarides  (1989:  xvi)  suggests  that  in  theoretical 
terms  a  "small  country"  is  one  that  is  small  enough  so  that  the  quantity  of  goods  and 
services  it  produces  is  too  small  to  affect  their  prices  in  the  world  market,  implying  that 
it  will  remain  a  "price  taker"  -  forced  to  accept  what  the  market  will  dictate  for  Its  goods. 
It  appears  that  Kaminarides  had  in  mind  the  SS  that  produces  a  narrow  range  of  goods 
that  are  already  produced  widely  elsewhere  and  hence  a  glut  in  the  market.  He  goes  on 
to  note  that  the  classical  criteria  of  smallness  are  population,  area  and  the  size  of  the 
economy  measured  by  the  GDP  and  accepts  these,  but  does  not  suggest  the  limits  of 
these  measures. 
As  many  of  the  indicators  used  are  not  static  (e.  g.  population  and  GDP).  states  close  to 
the  threshold  fluctuate  as  to  whether  they  are  defined  'in'  or  'out'.  For  example  a 
decade  ago  Mauritius  had  a  population  of  under  a  million  and  a  per  capita  income  of 
less  than  US  $  1,000.  These  are  now  over  1.1  million  and  US  $  1,950  respectively 
(1989).  while  its  resource  base  has  remained  nearly  constant.  With  a  population  ceiling 
of  1  million  and  a  per  capita  income  of  US  $  2,000  (which  may  be  approached  soon) 
being  used  as  cut  off  points,  technically  Mauritius  ceases  to  become  a  small  country. 
Such  a  rigid  application  of  threshold  points  has  obvious  problems.  Mauritius  has  the 57 
similar  degrees  of  vulnerability  that  SS  continually  face.  Achievements  which  have 
taken  decades  to  realise  can  be  eroded  in  a  very  short  time.  here  again  witness  the 
concern  that  Mauritius,  and  the  banana  producing  Caribbean  countries  and  indeed 
others  have  with  the  deadlock  and  outcome  of  the  1992/93  General  Agreements  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade  talks  (GAT1y.  An  outcome  which  restricts  access  to  the  Northern 
markets,  will  have  serious  consequences  on  their  economies. 
Population  size  remains  a  persistently  used  indicator.  In  their  study  of  vulnerability  of 
SS  by  the  Commonwealth  Secretariat  (1985)  population  size  was  used  as  the  key 
indicator  of  smallness,  basing  this  on  an  earlier  study  by  UNITAR  (1971).  The 
Secretariat  concedes  that  this  Is  perhaps  too  narrow  a  conception.  It  also  points  out 
that  the  1  million  cut  off  point  appears  to  have  gained  wide  currency  for  the  pragmatic 
reason  that  almost  all  states  within  this  limit  tend  to  experience  the  special  problems 
particularly  associated  with  small  size  (Commonwealth  Secretariat,  1985:  9).  However, 
this  Is  a  bit  of  a  circular  argument  and  the  same  caution  of  using  a  dynamic  variable 
applies,  and  it  can  also  be  argued  that  there  are  countries  with  larger  populations 
facing  very  similar  problems.  It  goes  on  to  note  that  there  is  evidence  that  severely 
restricted  human  resources  can  be  a  crucial  constraint  on  a  country's  overall 
development  capacity.  It  does  recognise  that  cut-off  points  are  arbitrary  and  can  seem 
unfair  to  those  just  outside  the  limit  thus  each  case  should  be  taken  by  merit. 
Although  there  have  been  numerous  other  attempts  to  define  small,  mini  and 
microstates,  all  have  been  fraught  with  problems  (Dommen,  1985;  Hein,  1989,  Selwyn, 
1978;  Selwyn,  1980)  and  even  the  most  extensive  discussion  have  been  largely 
inconclusive  (Bray,  1987;  Connell,  1988b,  1988b).  What  is  clear  though,  is  that 
smallness  is  taken  as  a  relevant  factor  and  that  it  is  a  relative  concept.  Hein  (1989) 
states  that  it  is  generally  agreed  that  the  use  of  a  single  variable  for  this  purpose  is 
inadequate  and  that  some  other  appropriate  variables  are  needed.  There  are  also  other 
effects  on  the  development  of  small  countries  which  do  not  necessarily  arise  out  of  size 
alone  and  it  may  be  difficult  to  disentangle  the  effects  of  smallness  from  those  of 
remoteness  or  peripheralness  -  or  from  those  of  newness"  (Davies,  1985:  248). 
One  of  the  problems  of  the  analysis  is  that  small  developing  countries  have  much  in 
common  with  larger  developing  countries.  However,  as  is  discussed  later,  amongst 
other  factors,  small  size  often  serves  to  exacerbates  the  problems  of  such  territories. 
Thus,  although  many  Third  World  countriess  with  much  larger  populations  tend  to 
confront  a  similar  range  of  difficulties  as  small  countries,  there  is  little  doubt  that  these 
difficulties  become  noticeably  "more  acute  when  the  population  falls  below  the  one 
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In  spite  of  its  shortcomings  most  studies  have  resorted  to  using  population  as  a 
measure  of  size.  In  the  absence  of  a  widely  accepted  definition  of  small  size.  and 
recognising  the  difficulties  which  lie  in  defining  smallness,  this  study  adopts  a 
composite  measure  based  on  the  observations  and  experiences  of  other  studies.  It  also 
recognises  the  need  to  assess  the  specific  needs  or  experiences  of  each  country  and 
region  and  this  is  also  why  in  the  methodological  approach  a  variety  of  different 
approaches  have  been  adopted  as  a  form  of  'triangulation'  to  pin-point  the  specificity  of 
the  regional  dimension  and  the  case  study.  Basically  it  recognises  that  other  factors 
come  into  play  and  it  is  important  to  identify  and  analyses  these  (chapter  five). 
The  region  being  studied  consists  of  small  island  developing  countries.  Based  on  the 
average  size  of  small  countries,  they  are  small  in  both  physical  and  in  population  terms. 
(less  than  5  million)  and  have  very  a  limited  resource  base.  Although  there  are 
significant  variations  in  economic  indicators,  they  are  all  vulnerable  to  a  whole  score  of 
economic,  political  and  strategic  factors. 
Zanzibar  is  even  smaller  in  economic  terms  with  a  GDP  per  capita  of  less  than  US  $ 
200.  Moreover,  it  is  constrained  by  its  physical  and  human  resource  base  and  exhibits 
other  factors  typical  of  SIS  such  as  a  concentration  of  its  agricultural  production.  This 
definition  and  approach  has  been  suggested  and  applied  by  other  scholars  and  has 
become  widely  accepted  (Dolman,  1985a;  1985b:  Connell.  1988a;  Beller  et  al.;  1990). 
With  such  a  broad  definition  of  'smallness'  it  is  pertinent  to  discuss  in  depth  why  small 
size  becomes  important  and  what  are  the  implications  of  smallness  to  small  developing 
countries.  Islands  or  otherwise.  The  relevance  of  and  distinction  between  landlocked 
and  island  small  countries  will  also  be  discussed. 
3.3  Islandness  and  Small  Size 
Since  the  1960s  the  literature  on  small  states  and  their  problems  has  grown 
significantly.  Focusing  initially  on  the  question  of  economic  problems  of  small  countries 
in  the  developed  world,  later  there  emerged  a  growing  appreciation  of  other  categories 
including  developing  small  and  micro  states,  and  developing  small  island  and  small 
non-island  developing  countries.  The  reasons  for  such  categories  are  based  in  the 
specific  problems  that  each  such  country  faces. 
From  the  contributions  made  of  the  problems  and  experiences  of  small  developing 
countries  there  has  developed  what  Broold'ield  (1990)  refers  to  as  an  'island  literature', 
and  an  'anti-island'  literature.  Brookfield  (op.  cit.  :  24)  states  that;  "After  20  years  of 
island  literature,  the  utility  of  looking  at  islands  as  a  specific  political  and  economic 
case  is  in  need  of  some  re-thinking".  He  does  however,  stress  that  there  are  aspects 59 
which  compound  the  problems  faced  by  small  islands.  suggesting  that  the  common 
ground  for  the  basis  of  'islandness'  are  scale  and  location.  and  the  dependence  of  islands 
on  sea  and  air  links  to  other  places,  including  other  islands  within  a  group.  He  also 
stresses  that  scale  and  location  are  not  constant  variables  as  they  can  change  with 
technology  or  with  the  success  or  failures  of  competition. 
There  has  been  some  debate  about  the  validity  of  islands  as  a  separate  category  in 
terms  of  their  social  and  economic  analysis.  In  the  analyses  of  small  islands,  Selwyn 
(1978)  suggested  the  concept  of  the  'disadvantageous  geographical  location'.  However, 
Brookfield  (1990:  25)  argues  that  "Selwyn's  (1978)  concept  of  a  'geographically 
disadvantaged  location'  needs  to  be  allied  to  that  of  small  size",  if  it  is  to  have  any 
analytical  value.  So  the  issues  of  location  which  include  remoteness,  fragmentation  and 
proximity  are  compounded  by  size  (and  vice-versa). 
Several  aspects  help  to  define  the  character  of  SIS,  their  relative  size,  resource 
endowment,  degree  of  isolation  and  fragmentation,  economic  and  political  links,  and 
geopolitical  and  geostrategic  locations.  In  a  number  of  respects  the  opposite  of  the  SIS, 
the  small  land-locked  states  also  have  similar  problems.  Being  land-locked  entails  high 
transport  costs  and  LLCs  are  often  obliged  to  have  'friendly'  political  and  economic 
relations  with  the  countries  through  which  most  of  their  imports  and  exports  pass 
through  (e.  g.  Lesotho  and  Swaziland  with  South  Africa  or  Nepal  with  India).  This,  In  a 
way  parallels  the  transport  and  remoteness  constraints  of  SIS.  Some  analysts  have 
suggested  that  the  problems  of  small  land-locked  and  island  states  are  similar  and 
there  may  be  value  in  comparing  them  (Selwyn,  1978,  Shaw,  1982,  Clarke  and  Payne, 
1987.  Connell,  1988b). 
It  is  recognised  that  many  of  the  development  problems  of  developing  SIS  are  similar  to 
LDCs  in  general.  Indeed,  Connell  (1988b:  1)  notes  and  argues  that  island  microstates 
(IMS)  "do  not  monopolise  the  more  serious  development  problems".  Sub-Saharan 
African  states,  including  some  of  the  island  states  around  the  continent,  have  more 
substantial  problems.  However,  it  can  also  be  argues  that  many  SIS  have  developing 
country.  Third  World  or  Least  Developed  Country  status  anyway  (e.  g.,  Comoros, 
Zanzibar,  Sao  Tome  and  Principe,  Cape  Verde,  the  Maldives  etc.  etc.  ).  Similarly  in  the 
case  of  the  French  DOMs  and  TOMs  (e.  g.  ,  Reunion  and  Martinique),  were  the  economic 
support  to  be  removed,  they  would  likely  be  plunged  into  a  similar  situation  to  SIS 
elsewhere  in  the  developing  world.  Brookfield  (1988)  observes  that  what  happens  in 
many  of  these  islands  is  differentin  degree.  but  not  in  kind  from  changing  rural 
societies  elsewhere  in  the  world  and  policies  and  strategies  that  are  required  to 
stimulate  development  in  SS  and  SIS  are  just  as  likely  to  be  different  from  one  state  to 
another  just  as  in  larger  countries. 60 
Three  factors  appear  to  be  of  special  importance  to  the  development  problems  of  SIS. 
scale,  location  and  transport  problems  (UNCTAD,  1982;  Connell,  1988b;  Brookfield. 
1988,1990).  Unlike  the  land-locked  SS  (e.  g.,  Lesotho,  Swaziland  and  Nepal)  that  are 
single  geographical  unit.  SIS  often  comprise  of  a  few  to  hundreds  of  outlying  islands  -  as 
is  the  case  of  the  Comoros,  Seychelles  or  Maldives.  Moreover,  in  addition  to  marine  or 
air  transport  constraints,  many  have  road  transport  problems  too.  Land-locked  states 
are  surrounded  by  other  countries  and  despite  the  specific  problems  that  they  face, 
external  contact  is  easier  compared  to  the  remote  SIS,  which  are  surrounded  by  vast 
oceans  and  located  considerable  distances  from  any  other  country.  This,  of  course, 
entails  problems  of  transport  which  are  reflected  by  means  of  transport,  frequency, 
reliability,  distance  and  costs.  The  Seychelles,  for  example,  has  to  air  freight  fresh  fruit 
and  vegetables  and  dairy  products  from  Kenya  frequently  to  sustain  the  tourist 
Industry.  Most  of  the  problems  facing  SIS  are  related  to  scale  and  then  compounded  by 
distance  and  transport  problems,  location,  fragmentation,  and  indeed  others  which  are 
of  a  historical,  cultural,  political  and  economic  nature.  This  study  takes  the  position 
that  scale  is  but  one  of  the  fundamentals  problems  of  SIS  development. 
3.4  The  relevance  of  Small  Size 
The  debate  on  size  and  its  implications  has  dominated  the  literature  on  small  states, 
including  small  island  states  (SIS).  Though  less  attention  was  paid  initially  to  the 
LDCs,  at  this  stage  the  full  effects  of  decolonisation  had  not  occurred  (1950s).  By  the 
early  1960s,  and  following  the  rapid  spread  of  decolonisation,  there  was  growing 
concern  about  the  number  of  emerging  small  countries  and  whether  their  very  existence 
was  economically  and  politically  viable.  In  1962  a  seminar  was  held  in  London 
discussing  The  Problems  of  Smaller  Territories.  '  This  was  amongst  the  first  of  many 
attempts  that  addressed  the  problems  of  SS  and  SIS.  Over  the  next  three  decades  the 
literature  on  development  of  SS  and  SIS  expanded  significantly  and  now  a  whole  body  of 
knowledge  on  the  problems  of  SS  and  SIS  is  emerging. 
From  the  Iterature  and  meetings  that  have  since  occurred,  there  is  agreement  over 
several  issues,  the  most  basic  of  which  is  that  small  size  is  seen  as  a  hindrance  to 
development  In  SS  and  SIS,  compounding  problems  that  already  exist  and  narrows  the 
scope  for  action  in  various  ways.  Insofar  as  SIS  are  concerned,  the  'tyranny  of  distance' 
(remoteness),  isolation  and  fragmentation  compound  these  problems.  The  discussions 
point  out  various  pitfalls  that  are  related  to  small  size,  which  are  not  necessarily 
universal,  but  have  occurred  in  various  SIS  and  SS  and  can  occur  in  others.  First,  it  is 
concluded  that  so  far  there  is  only  a  relative  definition  of  small  size  and  that  any 
1  Its  proceedings  are  in  Benedict,  B  (ed.  )  1967,  Problems  of  Smaller  Territories,  Athlone  Press,  London. 61 
definition  made  has  to  be  within  the  working  context  of  a  particular  issue  or  problem. 
The  generally  accepted  working  definition  focusing  on  development  issues  of  SS  such  as 
in  the  Commonwealth  covers  populations  of  5  million  and  less.  Second,  there  is  a 
consensus  that  being  a  SS,  and  indeed  a  SIS,  entails  different  and  more  profound  sets 
of  difficulties  in  confronting  the  challenges  of  sustainable  development  and  attempting 
to  achieve  self-sufficiency  and  self-reliance  than  is  the  case  for  LDCs  in  general. 
At  this  juncture  it  is  helpful  to  list  the  types  of  economic  problems  that  most  SS,  and 
especially  SIS  face  (Dolman,  1984.1985a,  1985b;  Commonwealth  Secretariat,  1985; 
Lestrade.  1989;  Jacobs,  1989): 
a  They  suffer  from  diseconomies  of  scale,  and  these  effects  tend  to  increase 
exponentially  as  a  function  of  insularity,  dispersion  and  isolation. 
Q  They  depend  on  a  very  narrow  range  of  produce  (often  agricultural)  for  exports, 
and  have  no  influence  on  the  terms  of  trade.  This  results  in  pressure  to  produce 
more  for  less,  entailing  increasing  pressure  on  the  limited  resources  and 
environment.  Many  of  the  least  developed  SS  hardly  exhibit  sustainable 
economies. 
Q  Some  of  their  current  problems  arise  from  comparative  advantages  enjoyed  in 
the  past,  which  have  now  been  reversed.  Distance  to  and  from  markets,  high 
external  and  even  internal  transport  costs  and  the  need  for  transhipment  of 
goods  entail  considerable  costs,  low  frequencies  of  movement  and  much  time. 
Q  Most  have  serious  balance  of  payment  problems  emanating  from  stagnating  or 
falling  export  performance  and  earnings,  while  at  the  same  time  imports  of 
foods,  energy,  and  consumer  goods  are  growing.  Self-reliance  appears  to  be  more 
of  an  illusory  objective. 
They  are  restricted  by  a  very  narrow  range  of  skills  and  experience  available, 
resulting  in  critical  shortages  of  human  resources.  This  problem  is  compounded 
with  matching  skills  to  available  jobs  and  an  increasing  reliance  on  expatriates. 
They  also  lack  the  training  facilities  and  cannot  afford  to  train  them 
Many  have  severe  limitations  in  natural  resource  endowments  in  terms  of 
commercially  exploitable  minerals.  Human  resources  (skilled)  are  scarce  too.  In 
low.  atoll  islands  shortages  include  even  basic  resources  such  as  soil,  water  and 
vegetation.  They  generally  suffer  from  narrow  resources  bases. 62 
Q  They  tend  to  have  extensive  government  administrative  and  state  sectors  which 
are  disproportionate  to  the  size  of  the  economy.  entailing  substantial  operational 
costs  whilst  yielding  less  than  is  expected.  There  are  broad  diseconomies  of  scale 
in  the  administration  of  SS.  Most  inherited  administrations  from  the  departing 
colonial  powers  and  there  have  been  little  changes  since.  Colonial 
administrations  were  less  concerned  with  administrative  costs,  however.  the  new 
administrations  have  continued  to  grow  as  a  result  of  social,  political  and 
development  pressures. 
O  Some  small  economies  are  dependent  on  the  operations  of  a  few,  often  foreign 
owned,  companies  which  often  tend  to  be  the  linchpin  of  economic  activities  (e.  g. 
mining,  tourism,  financial  services  etc.  ),  and  which  wield  considerable  influence 
on  governments  and  operate  on  highly  privileged  terms.  In  some  situation  the 
companies  even  encroach  on  the  sovereignty  of  the  SS. 
a  Those  which  are  island  states  and  lie  in  cyclone,  hurricane  and  typhoon  zones 
are  prone  to  natural  disasters.  However.  even  those  outside  these  areas  tend  to 
suffer  more  from  other  disasters  such  as  crop  diseases,  which  if  devastated  can 
have  long  lasting  effects  on  their  economies  and  food  security. 
Q  Because  populations  are  relatively  small,  the  public  service  clientele  is  also 
small.  This  means  that  specialist  services,  such  as  higher  education,  health  or 
certain  repairs  and  maintenance  cannot  be  justified  or  afforded. 
Q  There  tends  to  be  a  high  degree  of  'intimacy',  so  that  the  rewards  offered  by  the 
state  are  visible  e.  g.,  problems  arise  when  governments  attempt  to  staff  the 
public  services,  or  send  people  for  training  based  on  merit. 
Q  Related  to  the  above.  individuals  can  influence  small  administrations  in  a 
manner  less  likely  in  larger  states,  through  the  greater  influence  on  and  access 
to  highly  placed  civil  servants  and  to  political  leaders.  Politicians  tend  to  oversee 
administrative  details  which  elsewhere  would  be  left  to  administrative  discretion. 
This  is  the  so-called  interference  phenomenon  which  is  quite  common  in  many 
SS. 
Q  Although  the  administrations  are  large  by  small  country  standards,  in 
comparison  to  larger  countries  they  are  still  small  and  this  often  also  means 
spare  capacity  and  in  small  and  socially  closely  knitted  societies  has  important 
training  implications.  They  have  less  opportunities  for  a  life-time  career,  a 
situation  which  is  exacerbated  by,  inter  alia,  the  common  profusion  of  cadres. 63 
Q  Sovereign  SS  tend  to  have  higher  external  assistance  per  capita.  This  situation 
partly  arises  from  the  fact  that  for  donor  countries,  the  gross  amounts  are  very 
small,  but  there  are  also  important  geopolitical,  geostrategic  and  economic 
reasons  or  benefits  for  the  donors.  The  SS  that  have  deliberately  sought  to 
exploit  this  potential  have  done  quite  well  (e.  g.  Guam,  Bermuda  and  Mauritius). 
3.5  The  implications  and  interrelationships  of  problems  of  Small  Size 
The  implications  of  small  size  have  been  introduced  and  discussed.  However,  they 
rarely  act  alone  since  they  are  inter-connected  and  intertwined  in  a  complex  manner. 
For  example,  fragmented  SIS  such  as  the  Maldives,  Comoros  and  Seychelles  entail 
higher  transport  and  communications  costs,  which  in  turn  constrain  the  establishment 
of  manufacturing,  other  economic  activities  and  provision  of  social  services.  This 
means  that  investment  priorities  are  concentrated  in  a  few  urban  areas,  enticing 
movement  of  populations  (rural-urban)  towards  them  and  leading  to  demographic  and 
social  implications. 
This  process  does  not  end  there.  The  agricultural  and  fisheries  sectors  are  deprived  of 
the  younger  population  leading  to  shortages  of  labour  in  rural  areas,  eroding  the 
subsistence  safety  net  by  decreasing  domestic  food  production.  Falling  cash  crop 
production  reduces  the  capacity  of  the  SIS  to  import  essential  goods  and  services  and 
attempt  capital  investments.  There  are  several  knock  on  effects,  such  that  the  physical 
implications  of  smallness  lead  to  economic  ones,  which  have  social  and  cultural 
Implications  and  so  on.  In  the  final  analysis  leading  to  serious  political  implications  and 
vulnerability. 
Social  interrelationships  are  important  in  small  communities.  For  example,  Lowenthal 
(1987)  notes  that  political  and  economic  behaviour  is  subsumed  within  social 
structures,  and  along  with  environmental  circumstances  both  ensue  from  and  shape 
social  and  cultural  traits  and  these  aspects  of  small-state  life  are  inseparable. 
Economic.  political,  religious,  kinship,  and  other  cleavages  in  SS  tend  to  overlap;  people 
expect  every  social  act  to  have  economic  and  political  consequences,  and  vice  versa 
(Benedict,  1967).  This  situation  is  central  to  the  understanding  of  the  problems  and 
prospects  of  development  in  SS.  A  model  of  these  functions  and  their  effects  Is 
constructed  and  shown  in  figure  3.2.  It  shows  these  interrelationships  as  they  operate 
in  SIS  and  SS.  The  model  represents  the  various  interrelationships  (cause  and  effect) 
and  their  broad  implications.  For  example  an  economic  decision  has  political,  social 
and  cultural  and  physical/geographical  implications  which  are  amplified  by  smallness. 
The  following  discussions  expand  on  the  various  parts  the  model. 64 
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Figure  3.2  A  model  of  the  interrelationship  between  aspects  of  development  in 
SIS  and  SS. 65 
3.5 
.1  Social  and  Cultural  implications 
Insularity  is  one  unequivocal  geopolitical  feature  of  most  developing  small  and  small 
island  communities/states.  '  More  recently  developing  SS  have  had  to  increase  their 
external  ties  and  this  often  implies  the  arrival  of  foreign  expatriate  workers  and 
investors,  and  where  tourism  has  been  encouraged  the  mass  arrival  of  foreigners 
exhibiting  strange  dress,  beliefs,  and  behaviour.  This  can  be  a  cause  of  tensions. 
Conservatism  and  adherence  to  tradition  often  feature  high  in  SS  with  the  maintenance 
of  continuity  often  being  regarded  as  important.  Lowenthal  (1987:  35)  suggests  that  this 
stems  from  a  caution  born  of  long  experience  with  resources  whose  exploitation  is 
severely  limited  by  scale.  Isolation,  physical  and  economic  hazards  beyond  their  own 
control.  The  inhabitants  of  small-states  are  aware  of  the  fragility  of  their  economic  and 
social  fabric  and  are  therefore  conscious  that  any  change  may  entail  the  risk  of 
cataclysmic  loss.  The  enormity  of  losses  are  relative  to  the  local  scale  and  limited 
alternatives.  Innovations  are  thus  viewed  with  suspicion  and  any  major  decision  is 
dealt  with  from  a  conservative  stand  point.  They  are  even  willing  to  forego  pecuniary 
gains  and  nurture  traditional  ways.  Progress  or  development  often  threatens  to  upset 
the  traditional  equilibrium  underwriting  community  interdependency. 
The  small  size  of  their  social  world  together  with  an  awareness  of  their  ecological  and 
social  fragility  foster  what  Lowenthal  (1987:  39)  terms  as  `the  management  of  intimacy'. 
Inhabitants  learn  to  get  along  with  one  another,  though  not  necessarily  always  in 
harmony.  The  focus  of  life  is  stability  and  compromise.  It  is  partly  because  of  the 
awareness  that  within  the  small  space  they  are  contained  in  and  the  damaging 
consequences  of  factional  differences,  that  they  often  go  to  greater  lengths  to  conceal  or 
mute  hostilities. 
Although  smallness  promotes  social  cohesion  (Boissevian,  1974),  it  is  also  a  cause  of 
intense  factionalism  in  other  small  communities  which  can  be  detrimental  to  'good 
government'  and  development  (Benedict,  1967:  49).  Lowenthal  (1987:  40)  also  notes 
that;  "Two  opposing  ethnic  groups  of  equivalent  size  or  power  especially  aggravate  such 
tensions,  as  Cyprus,  Guyana,  and  Sri  Lanka  variously  illustrate.  "  The  long  term  effects 
are  that  a  substantial  amount  of  scarce  resources  are  absorbed  in  such  conflicts  and 
tensions,  much  to  the  detriment  of  overall  development  objectives.  In  other  areas 
considerable  amounts  of  the  limited  resources  available  are  absorbed  in  appeasing  or 
1  Insularity  is  defined  as  or  refers  to  being  separated  or  isolated,  being  remote,  detached  or  aloof,  illiberal,  closed  or 
inward  looking.  It  is  an  attitude  which  is  quite  suspicious  and  distrustful  of  outsiders  or  those  who  do  not  belong. 
Considering  the  histories  of  many  island  communities  this  is  hardly  surprising.  The  interests  of  local  power  groups 
are  also  included. 66 
coercing  groups  or  areas  which  are  in  opposition  to  the  government  of  the  day,  thus 
constraining  the  development  process  elsewhere. 
Societies  in  small  countries,  often  numerically  small,  are  tight-knitted  and  there  is  a 
tendency  to  use  informal  means  of  communications  and  this  is  quite  normal.  However 
this  entails  some  negative  effects.  For  example,  some  of  the  repercussions  include  the 
failure  to  record  decisions  and  the  reasoning  on  which  they  were  based  upon.  The 
resulting  discontinuities  are  inimical  to  efficient  and  reliable  administration  yet  this  is 
because  most  people  tend  to  know  one  another  or  are  related.  Administrative  problems 
also  arise  which  adversely  affect  recruitment  and  promotion  based  on  merit.  May  and 
Tupouniua  (1980:  420)  note  that  the  size  of  a  community  affects  the  quality  of  the 
relationships  between  its  members,  and  in  turn  its  political  institutions.  "  Lowenthal 
(1987:  40)  points  out  that  bonds  of  family  underpin  small-state  intimacies  and  where, 
everyone  is  related  personal  involvement  in  public  affairs  is  inevitable  and  nepotism 
unavoidable.  Family  or  kin  favouritism  becomes  a  fact  of  life  and  this  is  what 
Lowenthal  (1987:  40)  terms  as  farnilism,  which  is  generally  unacceptable  elsewhere  but 
is  a  fact  of  normal  life  in  small  communities. 
Another  dimension  of  the  same  problem  is  manifested  in  personalism,  or  what  Sutton 
(1987:  15)  terms  as  'exaggerated  personalism'.  The  role  of  the  individual  assumes 
greater  importance  and  he  or  she  is  more  susceptible  to  pressure  internally  and 
externally.  Patron-client  relations  are  common,  and  the  combination  of  familism  and 
personalism  have  implications  in  both  a  political  and  an  economic  sense.  For  example. 
a  high  ranking  government  official  is  also  often  a  party  official  and  can  also  be  a  group 
and  religious  leader  as  well  and  the  line  separating  these  functions  is  very  thin.  So  the 
leader  of  an  ethnic  group  is  also  a  religious  elder  and  a  senior  government  official  and 
will  defend  local  or  group  interests.  thus  influencing  socio-economic  development  to 
that  group  or  area. 
Emigration  has  become  a  common  feature  of  life  in  most  SIS,  particularly  since 
independence.  Its  effects  have  negative  and  positive  impacts.  Migration  takes  away  the 
younger,  energetic,  more  skilled  and  innovative  individuals,  reducing  rural  bargaining 
power  and  business  potential  (Connell,  1980,1982,1983.1987).  It  is  not  the  poorest 
who  migrate  first,  it  is  the  most  educated,  so  contributing  to  the  brain  and  skills  drain, 
for  example,  most  qualified  Comorians  seek  employment  abroad  and  tend  not  to  return 
to  the  poverty  and  lack  of  prospects  in  the  islands  (Newitt,  1984:  9  1).  In  compensation, 
remittances  and  other  unrequited  transfers  such  as  food,  consumer  and  capital  goods 
cushion  their  departure.  In  many  SIS,  remittances  are  the  largest  single  source  of 
foreign  exchange,  sometimes  greater  than  exports  or  aid  and  in  the  Caribbean,  for 
example,  this  pattern  has  been  long  established  (Rubenstein,  1983;  Connell,  1980, 
1983).  In  Cape  Verde  remittances  accounted  for  about  48%  of  the  GDP  in  1980 67 
(UNCTAD,  1985).  Making  reference  to  Western  Samoa,  Shankman  (1976:  28)  stated  that 
migrants  have  been  the  most  valuable  export".  The  compensations  of  remittances  are 
not  necessarily  always  adequate.  and  may  In  fact  encourage  further  depopulation  of  the 
rural  areas  of  the  young  leaving  behind  an  aged  and  less  capable  population. 
Emigration  and  return  can  become  an  established  routine  becoming  a  normal  part  of 
the  cycle  of  life.  Although  the  amount  and  regularity  of  remittances  tends  to  fall  over 
time,  the  decline  affects  more  rural-urban  migration  than  international  migration, 
where  the  probability  of  return  migration  is  considered  to  be  higher  (Connell,  1983, 
1988b).  The  periodic  return  of  the  absent  contributes  to  continuity  and  community 
participation.  Successful  emigrants  may  be  followed  by  other  members  of  their  families. 
Emigrants  also  often  return  home  to  reshape  society  with  their  investments,  their 
metropolitan  or  continental  contacts  and  modern  concepts,  and  their  cosmopolitan 
energy  and  dynamism  (Connell,  1980;  Doumenge,  1985). 
There  is  a  tendency  towards  autonomism  in  many  states,  large  or  small.  In  small  states 
however  the  demand  for  autonomy  assumes  particular  importance  stemming  from  the 
desire  to  protect  their  statehood.  Doumenge  (1985)  points  out  that  islanders  often  tend 
to  assert  their  difference  from  their  neighbours.  This  partly  explains  the  "ritual 
emphasis  on  endemic  parliamentary  and  other  institutions  and  their  exaggerated  claims 
to  cultural  unanimity"  (Lowenthal,  1987:  44).  There  is  often  suspicion  of  external 
interference  and  hence:  "Little  wonder  that  small  states  sometimes  seem  paranoid 
about  external  subversion"  (Lowenthal,  1987:  loc.  cit).  Thus  anything  external  can 
easily  be  interpreted  as  interference,  including  external  assistance  which  impinge  on 
many  important  issues.  Keeping  outsiders  at  a  distance  through  immigration 
regulations  and  from  owning  local  land  and  other  resources  is  quite  common. 
The  quest  for  autonomy  is  safeguarded  vigorously  and  the  attempts  to  uphold  and 
enhance  it  can  lead  to  bloated  government  infrastructures.  Self-government  is 
expensive  and  the  smaller  the  government  the  higher  the  per  capita  costs  as  SS  and 
SIS  duplicate  the  range  of  services  offered  in  larger  states  (Commonwealth  Secretariat, 
1985;  Sutton,  1987:  Lowenthal,  1987).  Sutton  (1987)  argues  that  it  is  not  size  per  se 
that  contributes  to  this  situation:  the  colonial  heritage  of  SS  plays  a  part  as  well. 
Although  there  is  scope  for  the  reduction  in  the  bloated  size  of  governments,  the 
existing  governmental  pervasiveness  of  most  SS  restricts  any  such  possibility.  This 
'obsession'  helps  to  explain  the  difficulties  that  SS  tend  to  have  when  attempting  to 
establish  regional  co-operation,  since  none  is  willing  to  surrender  any  aspect  of  their 
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3.5.2  Economic  implications 
A  small  domestic  market  is  a  consequence  of  both  a  small  population  and  a  small 
income  generating  capacity.  This  militates  against  establishing  manufacturing  leaving 
small  scale  manufacturing  or  EPZs  as  among  the  only  possibility.  There  are  also 
problems  on  the  supply  side  in  terms  of  employment  and  investment.  Bhaduri  et.  aL 
(1982:  60)  postulate  the  hypothesis  that  there  is  a  critical  minimum  size  of  economies  in 
terms  of  employment  (population)  and  investment  (income  levels),  below  which  it  is  not 
feasible  to  maintain  a  positive  growth  rate  in  labour  productivity  in  manufacturing.  So 
manufacturing  is  not  a  feasible  alternative  for  many  SS  and  SIS,  therefore  limiting 
employment  and  income  generating  possibilities.  Unemployment  and 
underemployment  narrows  governments'  tax  base  which  in  turn  restricts  development 
potentials. 
The  'concentration  phenomenon',  in  which  the  lion's  share  of  national  output  is  derived 
from  one  or  two  sectors,  makes  SIS  and  SS  extremely  vulnerable  to  economic  shocks 
(Lloyd  and  Sundrum,  1982).  Domestic  production  is  small  and  imports  encompass  a 
very  wide  range  of  goods  and  services,  especially  food,  energy,  and  most  consumer 
goods.  There  is  a  high  degree  of  dependence  on  imports  and  Shaw  (1982:  98)  argues 
that  this  is  responsible  for  the  greater  economic  instability  common  in  SS.  Small 
countries  are  subject  to  greater  pressures  from  external  sources  because  they  are 
closely  integrated  into  external  markets  for  goods.  capital  and  labour,  their  transactions 
with  the  international  economy  are  subject  to  greater  fluctuations  and  they  have  a 
narrow  range  of  trading  partners  (Garnaut,  1980:  314). 
Contributing  more  from  the  point  of  view  of  dependency  analysis,  Ward  (1975:  129) 
concluded  that  small  countries  face  these  problems  because  of  the  distortions  and 
rigidities  built  into  their  economies  as  a  result  of  their  integration  into  a  world  market. 
They  are  subjected  to  external  political  influence  through  trading  and  service  links,  and 
increasingly  through  aid  and  security  assistance.  Economic  aspects  have  considerable 
political  implications  through  dependency,  international  relations,  geopolitical  and 
geostrategic  interests  (Espindola,  1987;  Hughes,  1987;  Lemon,  1987;  Thorndike,  1987). 
Aid  has  become  a  prominent  feature  for  most  SS  and  SIS.  It  is  an  essential  input  for 
both  their  development  efforts  and  import  capacity.  Indeed,  it  has  become  an  essential 
form  of  subsidy  to  SS  and  SIS  economies.  Persaud  (1985:  21)  expresses  concern  about 
the  future  of  SS  and  especially  with  the  evolution  of  policies  governing  resource 
transfers,  in  that  many  have  become  so  dependent  on  resource  transfers  from  developed 
countries  such  that  events  in  the  metropoles  influence  the  situation  in  the  periphery. 
Such  developments  reflects  the  weak  political  position  of  SS  rather  than  the  extent  of 69 
their  needs  (Persaud,  loc.  cit). 
3.5.3  Geographical/Physical  implications 
The  geographical  structure  of  many  SS  and  SIS  and  the  manner  in  which  the 
population  is  distributed  affects  their  development  in  a  number  of  ways.  Population 
may  be  unevenly  distributed  through  a  large  number  of  islands,  often  at  considerable 
distance  from  the  main  administrative  centres.  In  the  Maldives  the  provision  of  health 
and  other  services  to  outlying  areas  is  problematic.  Isolation  makes  communication 
difficult  and  costly  for  higher  social  and  economic  costs  and  few  SIS  governments  have 
the  resources  to  do  this. 
The  global  location  of  the  SIS  is  also  frequently  of  importance.  Those  in  the  Caribbean 
region,  for  example,  which  are  relatively  close  to  the  US  but  historically  have  been 
under  the  economic  influence  or  patronage  of  the  UK,  France  and  the  Netherlands  have 
been  affected  by  economic  interests  emerging  from  their  both  their  geographic  and 
economic-political  closeness.  The  same  applies  to  the  SIS  with  proximity  to  Australia 
and  New  Zealand.  In  contrast,  those  with  close  proximity  to  the  relatively  less 
developed  African  continent  have  fared  far  worse  (e.  g.  Comoros,  Cape  Verde,  Sao  Tome 
and  Principe  and  Zanzibar).  Clearly,  for  the  SIS  proximity  to  the  economic  metropoles 
has  generated  higher  incomes  for  them. 
Remoteness  entails  difficulties  in  transport  and  communications.  It  is  difficult  and  slow 
to  transport  equipment  and  development  projects  tend  to  be  stalled  or  even  abandoned 
as  a  result  of  rising  costs  and  delays.  The  infrequency  of  movement  also  restricts 
economic  and  social  activities,  creating  a  periphery  within  the  periphery,  in  turn  fuelling 
secessionist  movements. 
3.5.4  Political  and  Security  implications 
A  large  proportion  of  the  newly  emerging  SS  were  part  of  the  British  Commonwealth, 
and  at  independence  adopted  governmental  structures  based  on  the 
Westminster/Whitehall  model  (Jacobs,  1975:  135).  Thereafter  a  variety  of  other 
governmental  systems  ranging  from  single  to  multi-party  political  systems  appeared, 
but  generally  the  civil  service  structure  remained  the  same  even  though  their 
requirements  were  different  from  those  of  the  colonies,  protectorates  and  dependencies. 
Their  development  needs  of  economic  growth,  diversification,  self-reliance  and  the 
provision  of  basic  needs  have  resulted  in  the  expansion  of  agencies,  departments  and 
functions.  This  in  turn  has  caused  a  high  staff  turnover  which  in  the  light  of  departing 
expatriate  workers  required  rapid  promotions,  low  degrees  of  specialisation  and 
experience,  eventually  resulting  in  bloated  administrative  structures.  In  SIS  the  state 70 
has  become  the  largest  and  most  important  employer  despite  the  financial  costs  to  the 
economy. 
There  are  significant  political,  social  and  economic  implications  resulting  from  this.  For 
some  being  in  power  (government)  gave  them  virtually  absolute  control  and  often  led  to 
abuse  of  the  state  for  personal  gains,  as  occurred  in  Grenada  under  Gairy.  What  is 
important  is  that  significant  employment  was  also  created  regardless  of  the  economic 
justifications  often  as  a  means  of  placating  a  large  part  of  the  population  and 
maintaining  patronage.  However,  as  noted  earlier,  this  also  means  the  concentration  of 
a  large  part  of  public  investment  in  urban  areas  and  further  urbanisation,  at  the 
expense  of  rural  development. 
On  the  functional  side,  the  shortage  of  skilled  personnel  means  that  less  qualified 
workers  are  employed  and  even  promoted  into  responsible  decision  making  positions. 
This  has  an  impact  on  the  provision  and  quality  of  services  and  development 
programmes.  Some  have  adopted  decentralised  local  government  systems  which  have 
resulted  in  problems  in  co-ordination  between  central  and  local  governments,  but  which 
have  accounted  for  large  budgetary  outlays.  Worse,  at  the  end  of  the  day,  despite  such 
expenditures,  there  is  little  to  show  in  terms  of  development  achievements. 
The  effects  of  personalism,  familism  and  kinship  are  particularly  strong  in  many  SS. 
Personal  relations  and  kinship  are  important  and  an  accepted  way  of  life  in  the  social 
and  political  life  of  many  SIS  in  a  manner  which  may  be  viewed  with  apprehension  in 
larger  states.  There  is  a  tendency  for  the  traditional  elite  to  exercise  their  influence  in 
electoral  politics  in  favour  of  candidates  based  on  aspects  other  than  ideology.  For 
example,  in  the  Pacific  island  states  and  the  Maldives  formal  political  party  based 
systems  have  not  emerged  and  this  is  attributable  partly  to  traditional  systems  based 
on  personalism,  familism  and  kinship.  In  the  Comoros,  the  influence  of  the  local  elites 
have  corrupted  and  set  back  the  political  and  economic  development  of  the  country. 
A  particularly  sensitive  area  is  the  tendency  for  relations  to  develop  between  the 
legislature  and  the  executive.  Whilst  this  can  contribute  to  flexibility,  it  is  also  open  to 
nepotism  and  corruption.  Individuals  tend  to  assume  multiple  roles  within  government, 
the  traditional  social  structures,  religious  institutions  and  other  indigenous  and  non- 
indigenous  social  organisations,  in  business  and  economic  spheres. 
Political  instability  -  coups,  uprisings  and  invasions  each  being  relatively  commonplace 
-  have  profound  effects  on  SS  and  SIS  drastically  reducing  their  economic  viability.  At 
worst  their  people  become  subordinate  to  cliques  or  external  powers  and  this  often 
implies  use  of  scarce  resources  to  suppress  dissidence.  It  has  been  noted  that 
legitimacy  of  the  political  process  as  a  security  resource  is  crucial  for  small  state 71 
stability  (Clarke  and  Payne,  1987:  227).  All  these  factors  in  various  combinations  and 
under  different  historical  experiences  and  economic  systems  make  up  different 
variations  of  SS  and  SIS  but  they  are  essentially  the  product  of  smallness. 
3.6  Size,  Self-reliance,  Dependence,  and  interdependence 
While  following  independence  many  of  the  new  states  attempted  to  be  more  self-reliant. 
it  would  be  more  accurate  to  say  that  they  became  more  interdependent  within  the 
global  political  and  economic  structure.  The  Cold  War  struggle  between  the  US  and 
former  USSR  for  securing  strategic  locations  around  the  world  had  economic  and 
political  implications  to  SIS,  which  is  the  first  feature  of  interdependence.  This  was 
followed  by  'development  and  aid'  programmes  as  a  means  of  maintaining  'spheres'  of 
influence  of  the  core  powers,  so  that  SIS  became  'theatres'  for  superpower  rivalries  (e.  g. 
Caribbean,  Indian  Ocean  and  Pacific  SIS).  Some  (such  as  the  micro-SIS  of  Guam  in  the 
Pacific)  have  benefited  significantly  in  terms  of  their  'rentier'  status  through  leasing 
their  strategic  locations  in  exchange  for  preferences  in  aid,  trade,  security  and 
contractual  work  associated  with  military  and  research  installations  although  this 
renders  them  to  a  situation  of  subordination  to  the  metropoles  (Daly  and  Connell.  1987. 
Connell,  1988). 
Post-independence  development  strategies  have  been  evolutionary,  often  stressing  self- 
reliance  through  the  development  and  exploitation  of  domestic  resources  such  as 
agriculture,  fisheries  and  minerals,  depending  on  the  individual  circumstances.  Forty 
years  later  domestic  development  in  most  SIS  has  stagnated,  and  emphasis  has  shifted 
to  tertiary  sector  activities  such  as  tourism  and  international  financial  services.  Within 
a  few  SIS  Export  Processing  Zones  (EPZs)  have  been  implemented,  but  even  these  have 
limited  benefits.  Pressures  on  limited  resources  have  meant  that  policies  aimed  at 
diversification  have  been  sought  over-ambitiously.  The  global  economic  problems  of  the 
1980s  and  the  early  1990s  have  had  greater  impacts  on  SS  and  SIS  dependent  on 
primary  export  earnings  and  services,  concessional  capital  flows  and  overseas 
remittances  and  in  response  they  have  encouraged  policies  striving  for  economic 
diversification  and  even  'diversification  of  dependency'.  1 
The  central  problem  confronting  SIS  is  how  to  break  away  from  conventional  trajectories 
of  dependent  development  and  achieve  self-reliance.  External  links,  aid  and 
remittances  have  created  'illusionary  needs'  that  are  impossible  to  satisfy  with  the 
resources  available  in  most  small  and  small  island  states  (Mientel,  1983).  Meanwhile 
many  still  strive  to  achieve  modernity  and  what  it  entails  (Petersen,  1979).  The  opposite 
1 
e.  g.  recent  development  strategies  in  the  Maldives,  Comoros,  Mauritius  and  Zanzibar. 72 
direction  would  be  to  select  autarkic  policies,  though  this  often  implies  imposing  lower 
standards  of  living  (Payne  1987),  as  the  examples  of  Sao  Tome  and  early  post- 
Revolution  Zanzibar  demonstrate.  There  is  no  straightforward  alternative  and  the  most 
obvious  one  is  paradoxical.  Connell  (1988b:  15-16)  sums  up  the  situation  by  pointing 
out  that; 
Not  surprisingly  then  the  self-sufficiency  and  economic  nationalism,  that 
continues  to  be  widely  recommended  as  a  solution  to  dependence  or  even 
'collective  self-reliance',  is  steadily  being  eroded.  At  the  same  time  the 
alternative,  a  more  adequate  interdependence  (for  example  through  better 
terms  of  trade  for  Third  World  produce  or  employment  opportunities  in  the  rich 
world),  is  no  more  likely. 
Parallels  can  be  drawn  here  between  Zanzibar  and  Sao  Tome;  both  have  consistently 
sought  self-reliance  and  yet  are  highly  oriented  to  external  markets.  1  Both  are 
dependent  on  crops  which  have  crashed  in  the  world  market.  In  such  circumstances, 
the  only  practical  approach  appears  to  be  to  use  dependency  to  achieve  self-suff1ciency, 
strange  as  this  may  sound.  This  implies  pursuing  greater  integration  into  the  global 
economic  system  through  increasing  dependency  links  such  as  aid  and  loans.  SS  and 
SIS  have  become  profoundly  dependent  on  the  external  environment  for  capital 
including  aid,  loans.  remittances,  private  investment,  expertise,  technology, 
commodities,  and  even  cultural  change.  This  is  noted  in  Micronesia  (Tokelau  and  the 
Cook  islands)  by  Peoples  (1985)  and  Connell  (1987).  Here  the  subsistence  economy  has 
been  rapidly  eroded  and  the  paucity  of  resources  may  have  theoretically  and  perhaps 
even  effectively  affected  the  criterion  of  independence  (Harden,  1985).  Growing 
dependency  has  also  meant  erosion  of  autonomy  and  self-reliance.  even  if  there  has 
been  a  'negotiated  dependence'  albeit  on  unequal  terms  (Townsend.  1980;  Connell, 
1980b:  80). 
A  commitment  to  self-reliance  programmes  continues  to  exist  at  various  levels.  Kiribati 
follows  this  closely  by  ending  budgetary  aid,  restricting  government  expenditure  and 
committing  local  funds  to  projects  which  prioritise  resource  development  (Pollard, 
1987:  19).  However,  this  is  more  the  exception  and  it  is  only  achieving  greater  self- 
reliance  through  the  sacrifices  made  by  its  population.  Its  strengths  lie  in  cultural 
cohesion,  social  organisation,  political  stability  and  a  subsistence  sector,  a  combination 
which  Is  not  available  in  other  SIS.  Elsewhere  such  policies  are  lacking  and  practice  is 
deficient,  making  movement  towards  self-reliance  difficult.  Overall,  the  prospects  for 
greater  self-reliance  for  many  SS  and  SIS  are  small  and  it  has  remained  a  nominal 
political  objective  featuring  prominently  in  development  plans,  but  not  a  genuine 
economic  objective.  One  expert  argues  that  recent  experience  would  suggest  that  any 
1  Cocoa  realises  80%  of  Sao  Tome's  export  earnings,  and  cloves  account  for  97%  of  Zanzibar's  export  earnings  from 
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discussion  of  increased  self-reliance  is  an  exercise  of  self-deception  (Dolman,  1990:  100). 
Connell  (1988b:  16)  argues  that  it  is  improbable  that  most  Island  micro-states  can  ever 
achieve  a  significant  degree  of  self  reliance  (unless  they  discover  new  sources  of  oil  or 
mineral  wealth),  yet  all  are  capable  of  moving  away  from  the  massive  dependence  on  aid 
and  all  have  some  room  for  manoeuvre  should  they  wish  to  do  so.  However,  this 
involves  major  economic  restructuring  and  policy  shifts  as  well  as  political  will.  Thus, 
self-reliance  means  reducing  dependence  on  imported  'necessities'  including  food,  oil 
products,  capital  equipment  and  expertise.  This  requires  changing  consumption 
patterns  and  increasing  local  productive  capacity.  However,  islanders  demand 
'academic'  education,  wage-employment  and  the  material  benefits  of  modern  industrial 
type  of  development  and  these  'demands'  often  contradict  the  national  aspirations  for 
self-reliance.  Moreover  island  economies  are  increasingly  open  and  subsistence 
agriculture  has  disintegrated  (Marshall.  1982).  It  appears  that  strengths  of  external  ties 
in  aid.  trade,  tourism.  financial  services,  and  diversity  of  links  are  the  greatest 
contributors  to  current  growth  and  development  (Marshall,  1982:  Fairburn.  1985). 
Increasingly  dependence  on  foreign  aid  seems  to  be  necessary  if  living  conditions  are  to 
be  maintained  at  tolerable  levels.  Thus  in  Fairburn's  (1985:  57)  view.  In  the  longer  term 
the  only  meaningful  course  against  the  threat  of  low-level  poverty  calls  for  further 
population  control  and  measures  to  restrain  material  aspirations  to  levels  that  can  be 
sustained  without  undue  dependency  on  international  charity. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  would  appear  then  that  the  future  of  SS  and  SIS  is 
increasingly  one  of  interdependence  within  the  global  economy.  The  comment  that: 
"Though  self-reliance  will  continue  to  be  emphasised  in  development  plans,  and  is  an 
important  strategy  for  food  production  in  many  IMS,  the  key  elements  to  domestic 
economic  growth  are  increasingly  to  be  found  outside  the  IMS",  remains  valid  (Connell, 
1988b:  17).  The  desperate  situation  is  reflected  in  Fairburn's  (1985:  97)  comment,  that 
"hopes  of  achieving  a  level  of  economic  development  capable  of  producing  cumulative 
growth  seems  nothing  more  than  a  pipe  dream".  Indeed  the  prospects  seem  to  be  so 
dismal  that  official  development  assistance  to  many  small  and  small  island  states  are 
deemed  necessary  to  enable  them  to  simply  sustain  basic  standards.  It  is  improbable 
that  aid.  especially  in  most  of  its  current  forms,  will  be  able  to  stimulate  economic 
growth  at  a  rate  that  will  meet  local  demands  for  income  and  employment.  Thus 
emigration  is  likely  to  remain  an  important  option. 
More  recently  fears  for  falling  aid  commitments  have  stemmed  from  a  variety  of  global 
changes.  The  implications  of  a  single  European  market,  the  world-wide  recession  and 
the  'peace  dividend'  appear  to  have  resulted  in  loss  of  jobs  in  the  developed  world 
consequently  restricting  resource  flows  to  developing  countries.  Traditional  recipient 
areas  for  emigration  are  rejecting  migrants  as  immigration  policies  are  being  tightened 74 
up  with  major  implication  for  those  islanders  who  have  tended  to  head  for  European 
and  American  destinations  (e.  g..  Haitians  to  the  US).  However.  Connell  (1988a)  argues 
that  fears  about  declining  aid  commitments  in  the  future  are  unlikely  for  island  micro- 
states  because  of  their  strategic  significance  and  because  the  actual  volume  of  aid  is 
quite  small.  But  the  global  strategic  situation  is  not  static.  and  nor  do  all  islands  retain 
strategic  significance.  partly  due  to  technological  developments  in  the  military  sphere 
and  also  because  of  the  changing  significance  of  different  location.  It  appears  that 
regional  powers  will  gradually  step  in  to  fill  the  vacuum.  though  not  necessarily  with  the 
same  benefits. 
In  the  analysis  of  the  literature  it  is  evident  that  there  are  common  characteristics 
shared  by  many  of  the  poorer  developing  SIS.  Zanzibar  no  doubt  is  one  of  them,  and 
yet  its  social  and  economic  characteristics  have  not  been  fully  identified  nor 
understood.  The  study  will  attempt  to  do  this  basing  the  analysis  on  the  experiences  of 
other  SIS,  comparing  the  similarities  and  differences.  For  example,  many  SIS  are 
characterised  by  high  Migration  (internal  and  international)  which  acts  as  a  pressure 
valve  for  internal  socio-economic  problems.  Migration  entails  Remittances  which  help 
sustain  the  local  and  often  urban  economy.  The  are  dependent  on  external  Aid  for 
development  and  to  sustain  the  economy,  and  these  in  combination  sustain  the 
Bureaucracy.  Bertram  and  Watters  (1985,1986)  called  economies  exhibiting  these 
characteristics  MIRAB  economies.  Such  characteristics  lead  to  an  urban  bias  working 
against  agriculture  and  fisheries,  which  for  many  SIS  are  the  most  productive  sectors 
and  form  the  core  of  their  economies,  and  MURAB  is  suggested  as  a  better  acronym 
(Connell,  1988b:  81). 
Brookfield  (1990)  suggests  that  since  it  is  Government  Employment  that 
predominates  in  the  Bureaucracy.  such  economies  might  best  be  perceived  as  a 
MIRAGE  (Migration,  Remittances.  Aid  which  sustains  Government  Employment),  that  is 
a  scarcely  sustainable  economy  at  all.  These  characteristics  have  been  observed  by 
other  experts  (Tisdell  and  Fairburn,  1984,  Bertram  and  Watters,  1985).  One 
implications  of  Mirage  economies  is  that  despite  the  physical  areas  being  small,  and 
even  if  the  degree  of  fragmentation  or  isolation  is  small,  uneven  spatial  development 
occurs  and  becomes  exaggerated.  This  is  accentuated  by  urban  primacy,  with 
concentration  of  production  and  service  activities  and  sectoral  bias  in  the  allocation  of 
resources,  contributing  to  rural-urban  differentiation,  stagnation  of  the  rural  sector, 
weakening  of  the  economic  base  and  increasing  dependence  on  the  external 
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Such  economies  cannot  be  expected  to  bring  about  sustainable  development  and  in  the 
light  of  their  circumstances  this  is  a  disturbing  phenomena.  Bertram  (1986:  809) 
however,  offers  an  alternative  insight  by  arguing  that  "aid,  philately  and  migrant 
remittances  are  not  merely  supplements  to  local  incomes,  they  are  the  foundation  of  the 
modern  economy"  (my  emphases).  Insofar  as  he  is  concerned,  the  thrust  of 
development  planning  in  many  developing  SIS  has  focused  on  production,  and  in  the 
light  of  the  existing  situation,  this  is  misplaced.  Little  wonder  then,  that  SIS  have 
increased  their  ties  with  metropolitan  economies  and  moved  from  productive  towards 
rentier  status  and  metropolitan  governments  have  colluded,  by  being  willing  to 
construct  a  new  form  of  bureaucratic  dependency  (Connell.  1988b:  82). 
Under  these  circumstances  it  is  clear  that  bold  measures  and  greater  political  will  are 
required.  Self  empowerment  is  important  including  the  need  to  attempt  untried 
alternatives  -  choosing  to  do  what  has  not  been  tried.  This  situation  is  described  by 
Galtung  (1980)  as  a  mental  state  of  independence.  Clearly  there  is  an  urgent  need  to 
critically  assess  development  thinking  and  strategy  that  has  become  so  orthodox  that  it 
is  no  longer  questioned  despite  not  fuMlling  the  objectives  set  out.  Dolman  (1990) 
states  that  at  present  there  are  few  signs  in  the  world's  islands  regions,  (or  indeed  in 
many  others)  to  suggest  that  governments  are  ready  to  declare  intellectual  and 
psychological  independence  or  to  critically  evaluate  the  development  strategies  that 
have  been  used  so  far  to  guide  national  development.  But  this  too  may  be  more  difficult 
than  imagined  as  evidence  from  many  SIS  shows  that  people  are  not  dependant  upon 
themselves  and  those  around  them,  but  increasingly  upon  the  state  (internally)  and  the 
benevolence  of  other  states  (externally),  and  yet  -  to  quote  Dolman  (1990:  100);  -  "Self- 
reliance  is  becoming  reliance  on  others".  The  current  global  circumstances  are  not  very 
optimistic  and  the  signs  are  bleak  and  so  SS  and  SIS  may  be  compelled  to  take 
measures  aimed  at  greater  self-reliance  by  sheer  force  of  circumstances  and  the  failure 
of  existing  development  strategies  (Dolman,  1990). 
3.7  Is  there  room  to  manoeuvre? 
Is  the  situation  then  really  so  dire  for  SS  and  SIS?  The  overwhelming  evidence  seems  to 
suggest  this  but  there  are  examples  of  bold  manoeuvres  that  have  shown  some  signs  of 
success.  Grenada  under  the  People's  Revolutionary  Government  (PRG)  between  1979 
and  1983  achieved  sustained  economic  growth  during  the  difficult  global  economic 
period  and  reduced  (a  little)  dependent  development,  increased  levels  of  self-reliance 
and  some  diversification  of  the  economy.  Social  and  economic  development 
programmes  were  successful  and  it  even  achieved  a  degree  of  decentralisation  of 
decision-making  (O'Keefe  et.  al.,  1984;  Thorndike,  1985,  ).  Credit  was  extended  to 
farmers,  food  imports  were  reduced,  inflation  slowed,  land  reform  implemented  ,  and 76 
the  importation  of  certain  basic  goods,  including  basic  foods  such  as  sugar,  rice  and 
flour.  and  fertilisers  was  carefully  controlled  (Brierley,  1985:  Sunshine,  1985; 
Thompson,  1985).  However,  pluralism  and  dissent  were  not  tolerated  (Clarke,  1987) 
and  the  social  and  economic  achievements  were  marred  by  the  repression  that  followed 
the  PRG  revolution.  Despite  this,  it  is  argued  that  in  the  Caribbean  region,  perhaps  no 
other  small  island  state  has  advanced  so  rapidly  in  a  variety  of  social  and  economic 
issues  than  Grenada  did  under  Maurice  Bishop  and  the  PRG  (Brierley,  1985:  51). 
Its  undoing  Is  that  it  also  presented  a  geopolitical  problem  in  the  United  States  'back 
yard'  with  its  solidarity  with  Cuba  and  the  East  a  situation  which  was  unlikely  to  be 
tolerated.  The  PRG  government  was  forcibly  removed  by  the  US  military  and  the  New 
National  Party  installed.  It  was  supported  by  US  but  could  not  confront  Grenada's 
problems  of  dependence  and  social  inequality.  rooted  as  they  are  in  smallness  (Clarke, 
1987:  94).  The  case  of  Grenada  typically  demonstrates  the  difficulties  of  breaking  away 
from  the  conventional  trajectories  of  dependent  development,  achieving  self-reliance  and 
maintaining  sovereignty. 
The  Seychelles  has  achieved  some  success  in  restructuring  its  economy  from  one  based 
on  agriculture  and  limited  fisheries  to  one  which  is  based  on  high  class  tourism  and 
industrial  fisheries.  It  has  spread  the  benefits  of  the  wealth  created,  although  some 
observers  argue  that  rapidly  rising  expectations  have  nurtured  equally  high  demands 
and  that  while  the  conditions  of  the  people  have  improved  in  absolute  terms,  in  relative 
terms  they  have  not  i.  e..  the  majority  of  the  people  have  not  prospered  (Benedict  and 
Benedict,  1982).  In  this  case  it  appears  that  the  yardstick  applied  in  measuring 
development  is  the  same  as  that  in  the  metropole.  in  which  case  then  development  in 
the  Seychelles  is  still  a  far  cry. 
In  the  enclave  of  Gambia,  political  manoeuvring  has  provided  it  with  security,  through 
the  protection  of  its  larger  neighbour,  Senegal.  Through  this  and  the  democratisation  of 
the  political  process,  it  has  created  an  atmosphere  of  stability,  and  has  been  attractive 
to  development  and  aid  agencies.  Consequently  Gambia  has  cultivated  a  culture  of 
'multilateral  dependency'  which  according  to  Hughes  (1987:  155),  seems  "to  be  the  most 
the  country  can  expect  under  present  circumstances".  However,  through  this  it  has 
managed  to  develop  a  tourist  industry  as  well  as  consolidate  its  agricultural  sector  and 
reduce  the  dangers  of  bilateral  dependency. 
At  independence  the  economy  of  Mauritius  was  based  on  sugar  production  and  export. 
It  was  locked  into  the  world  system  of  commodity  control  which  determines  both  the 
price  and  profitability  of  sugar.  The  ownership  and  control  of  capital  was  mostly 
indigenous.  The  local  "sugar  barons"  had  the  propensity  to  invest  the  profits  locally. 
contributing  to  a  modest  level  of  diversification.  industrialisation  (import  substitution 77 
and  export  processing)  and  international  trade.  The  island  has  enjoyed  a  series  of 
pragmatic  governments  which  have  been  sensitive  to  the  needs  of  the  population  in  the 
recognition  of  the  importance  of  political  and  economic  stability  as  a  prerequisite  for 
further  development  and  economic  growth.  However,  class  forces  are  emerging  and  this 
may  have  other  consequences  in  the  near  future. 
Mauritius  has  also  exploited  its  strategic  location  by  forfeiting  its  sovereignty  over  the 
islands  of  Diego  Garcia  and  accepting  the  negative  (political  and  moral)  and  positive 
(financial  and  trade)  consequences  of  that  decision.  The  island  has  also  benefited  from 
French  patronage  linked  to  France's  regional,  economic,  cultural,  political  and  strategic 
interests.  These  factors  are  responsible  for  French  and  indeed  European  concessions 
for  Mauritian  sugar  and  other  exports  favourable  access  to  European  markets.  In  some 
ways  as  Minogue  (1987:  139)  points  out  in  this  case,  the  "core-periphery  relationship  is 
not,  in  this  instance,  a  one-way  exploitation".  To  restate  this  more  accurately,  the 
balance  of  the  core-periphery  relations  has  a  more  positive  (or  less  negative)  degree  or 
leaning  of  interdependence  in  Mauritius'  favour. 
3.8  Summary  and  Conclusions 
Much  of  the  literature  has  appeared  quite  recently  and  the  various  experiences  have  yet 
to  be  disseminated  to  other  SS  and  SIS.  The  discussions  generally  echo  Benedict's 
(1967:  8)  conclusion  that  there  is  no  overall  formula  or  single  conclusion  on  their 
development  problems  and  prospects  or  future  development  strategies.  The  growing 
complexity  of  the  global  economy  and  of  the  SS  and  SIS  themselves  make  this 
conclusion  even  more  appropriate  (Connell.  1988b:  79). 
Clearly  small  size  is  an  additional  constraint  to  SS  and  SIS  development  and  serves  to 
exacerbate  their  existing  problems  though  It  is  not  necessarily  a  problem  itself. 
Smallness  is  neither  intrinsically  ugly  nor  beautiful;  'It  simply  represents  an  additional 
set  of  factors  which  have  to  be  considered"  (Clarke  and  Payne,  1987:  228).  There  are  a 
few  economic  advantages  attached  to  smallness  as  the  review  testifies.  It  merely 
imposes  a  complex  weave  of  influences  on  various  sectors  of  a  small  economy 
amplifying  development  constraints.  Yet,  as  Jalan  (1982a:  2)  noted,  there  has  not 
emerged  a  plausible  theory  of  small  size  as  an  independent  factor  in  development, 
perhaps  this  is  so  because,  small  size  in  itself  may  not  be  a  problem  as  much  as  a 
catalyst.  Noting  the  complexities  of  the  issue  involved  in  attempting  to  establish  a 
theory  of  small  size,  Sutton  (1987:  23)  stated  that,  `It  is  clear  that  we  are  not  going  to 
develop  a  theory  of  the  small  state  in  politics  equivalent  to  the  theory  of  the  firm  in 
economics".  Payne  (1987:  61)  suggests  that  a  more  realistic  approach  is  required  stating 
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what  is  needed,  as  we  proceed,  is  not  so  much  the  further  refinement  of 
economics  of  smallness,  but  the  emergence  of  a  genuine  political  economy  of 
small  size,  a  body  of  analysis  that  is  more  closely  in  touch  with  the  realities  of 
the  world  in  which  small  states  have  to  exist  and  survive. 
Where  there  has  been  success  in  economic  development.  this  has  been  due  to  the 
quality  of  economic  management  and  the  application  of  unique  approaches.  The 
converse  leads  to  situations  such  as  in  Antigua  and  Barbuda  (Thomdike,  1987).  where 
there  is  a  lack  of  innovation,  or  in  Swaziland  where  a  choice  was  made  of  economic 
growth  under  reinforced  dependency  on  South  Africa  (Lemon,  1987).  Grenada  and 
Gambia  have  shown  that  it  is  possible  to  pursue  a  path  of  multilateralism  (multilateral 
dependency)  which  has  the  advantage  of  reduced  external  control  by  a  single 
organisation  or  state.  The  cases  of  Fiji.  Malta  and  Mauritius  (Sutherland,  1987;  Craig, 
1987;  Minogue,  1987),  show  that  geopolitical  location  backed  by  skilful  bargaining  can 
extract  financial  support  from  a  regional  or  superpower  patron.  These  are  some  of  the 
few  choices  available,  but  are  far  from  adequate  in  eliminating  the  immense 
disadvantages  that  they  face. 
Generalisations  about  SS  and  SIS  are  only  partially  applicable  and  have  limited  value. 
It  essential  to  go  into  the  historical.  regional,  economic,  cultural  and  geopolitical  context 
of  each  case  to  obtain  an  adequate  understanding  of  its  workings  and  problems.  This 
approach  has  been  suggested  by  others  too  (Clarke  and  Payne,  1987:  227). 
Finally,  it  has  been  suggested  that  perhaps  it  is  time  to  review  conventional 
development  theories  and  strategies.  Shaw  (1982:  97)  called  for  the  "need  for  more 
thorough  empirical  basis  for  existing  theories  in  relation  to  small  states,  as  well  as  a 
careful  assessment  of  existing  theories  and  their  relevance.  "Many  SS  and  SIS  have 
undertaken  strategies  such  as  EPZs,  tax-havens,  tourism,  migration,  strategic  bases, 
flags  of  convenience,  overseas  investment,  all  of  which  are  against  the  prescriptions  of 
the  apologists  of  self-reliant,  grass-roots  development  (Dommen  and  Hein.  1985:  180; 
Dommen,  1990).  Unconventional  approaches  such  as  diversification  of  dependency, 
greater  Integration  with  the  metropoles,  negotiated  dependency,  aid  with  dignity, 
multilateral  dependency,  greater  interdependence,  need  to  be  studied  and  assessed. 
Also  how  these  can  be  applied  will  vary  according  to  each  case  and  to  a  multiplicity  of 
other  factors  other  than  size  (Clarke  and  Payne,  1987:  228;  Connell,  1988a:  Dommen, 
1990).  This  may  be  the  only  solution  whilst  the  major  economic  powers  continue  to 
resist  the  fundamental  changes  required  in  the  global  economic  system. 79 
4.0  Research  methodolo  jj 
4.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  discusses  the  research  methodologies  employed  in  the  execution  of  this 
study.  As  mentioned  in  chapter  one,  the  nature  of  the  research  is  multidisciplinary  in 
approach.  A  continuing  problem  in  LDC  research  is  the  paucity  of  reliable  information 
required  for  testing  the  hypotheses  and  hence  for  making  an  adequate  analysis  of  the 
development  status  of  Zanzibar. 
Both  qualitative  and  quantitative  methods  are  employed.  The  former  is  used  extensively 
in  the  assessment  of  the  policies  adopted  by  successive  administrations  in  Zanzibar. 
The  latter  is  utilised  to  supplement  and  complement  the  qualitative  analyses.  In  the 
socio-economic  survey  and  in  the  attempt  to  arrive  at  a  typology  of  small  developing 
SIS,  quantitative  methods  are  applied  extensively  and  then  supplemented  and 
complemented  by  qualitative  analyses. 
This  chapter  comprises  two  parts,  the  first  introduces  and  discusses  the  qualitative 
methods  employed  how  and  why  they  are  employed,  their  strengths,  weaknesses,  and 
relevance  to  the  study.  The  second  discusses  the  quantitative  methods.  Each  method  is 
discussed  in  the  order  in  which  they  are  introduced  in  the  research. 
The  qualitative  methods  include  comparative  analysis,  a  technique  which  has  been 
extensively  used  in  social  research,  particularly  in  sociological  and  anthropological 
studies.  In  this  case  it  used  to  attempt  comparisons  between  a  number  of  SIS  within 
the  Western  Indian  Ocean  region.  It  is  followed  by  an  historical  approach  in  analysing 
the  contemporary  development  problems  of  Zanzibar. 
The  quantitative  methods  include  the  use  of  an  exploratory  statistical  method:  cluster 
analysis,  in  the  search  for  a  typology  of  developing  SIS,  and  particularly  those  which  are 
in  the  Western  Indian  Ocean  region.  A  questionnaire  survey  is  carried  out  to  collect 
socio-economic  data  about  households  in  rural  and  urban  areas  and  in  the  two  sister 
Islands  of  Unguja  and  Pemba.  The  data  is  used  to  verify  discussions  and  observations 
made  in  chapters  10  and  11  and  support  some  of  the  hypotheses.  The  analyses  of  the 
micro-level  socio-economic  data  collected  by  the  survey  is  carried  out  with  descriptive 
statistics,  cross-tabulations  and  measures  of  association. 80 
4.2  Research  Design 
The  research  design  is  based  on  the  premise  that  the  development  problems  of  Zanzibar 
are  in  part  those  common  to  other  SIS  and  in  part  unique  to  the  island  itself.  The 
development  problems  have  a  variety  of  implications,  both  Immediate  and  long  term  and 
these  need  to  be  identified.  There  are  also  implications  to  development  theory  and  the 
research  seeks  to  address  these  too.  In  the  final  analysis  the  research  seeks  to  provide 
some  answers  to  the  issues  raised.  The  research  design  (flow)  is  depicted  in  figure  4.1. 
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4.3  Qualitative  Methods 
Comparative  analysis  is  Is  utilised  to  assist  in  providing  explanations  for  certain 
phenomena  which  exist  In  some  SIS  and  not  in  others.  It  also  assists  to  explain  why 
some  SIS  are  less  developed  than  others  and  vice  versa.  This  method  has  frequently 
been  used  by  sociologists  and  anthropologists,  (though  less  by  geographers)  mainly  in 
recognition  of  the  power  that  It  holds  in  social  and  behavioural  research.  I  As  a  method, 
Comparative  analysts  is  quite  similar  to  statistical  and  experimental  methods  all  of 
which.  to  some  degree,  use  the  logic  of  comparison.  One  of  its  strengths  is  that  it  can 
be  employed  to  social  units  of  varying  scale,  e.  g..  the  firm,  nations,  institutions  and 
even  regions  of  the  world.  In  applying  it  to  spatially  different  units  the  advantage  of  the 
method  lies  in  being  able  to  say  not  only  that  area  a  is  different  from  areas  b,  c.  d.  but 
rather  in  helping  to  pin-point  in  an  area  a  feature  which  might  otherwise  have  not  been 
identified.  However,  there  are  areas  in  which  it  is  difficult  to  attempt  this  approach 
because  of  the  unique  conditions  characterising  each  area  direct  comparison  -  for 
example  direct  transfer  of  policies  is  often  inappropriate.  However,  in  terms  of  their 
basic  context,  in  this  case  their  common  identity  as  SIS,  the  strengths  of  comparative 
analysis  lies  in  being  able  to  identify  factors  which  might  otherwise  have  gone 
unheeded. 
There  are  several  purposes  for  making  use  of  comparative  analysis  in  social  science 
research,  and  some  of  these  apply  to  this  study.  Most  of  the  existing  theories  of 
development  and  underdevelopment  and  indeed  even  alternative  development 
approaches  have  been  based  on  larger  countries,  and  often  continental  ones.  Though 
their  essentials  apply  to  SS  and  SIS,  how  this  is  apparent  is  often  overlooked  In  the  case 
of  the  special  problems  of  developing  SS  and  SIS.  Comparative  analysis  can  be  used  to 
test  the  validity  of  the  generalisations  implicit  within  development  arguments  For 
example  it  is  argued,  that  simply  because  of  distance,  mid-oceanic  developing  SIS  have 
greater  development  constraints  compared  to  those  whose  geographical  position  places 
them  In  closer  proximity  to  continents.  In  this  case  factual  evidence  is  used  to  validate 
this  statement  and  to  check  whether  such  an  argument  is  correct.  If  it  is  not,  then  it 
may  help  in  suggesting  explanations  for  this,  and  in  doing  so  it  may  generate  a  concept 
from  the  fact.  In  the  long  term  this  may  assist  in  generating  or  modifying  existing 
theory. 
1  Comparative  Analysis  has  its  origins  in  sociology  and  social  anthropology  and  was  developed  and  used  by  Weber, 
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Comparative  studies  can  be  used  to  establish  the  generality  of  a  theory.  According  to 
Glaser  and  Strauss  (1968:  24)  the  generation  of  theory  subsumes  the  establishment  of 
empirical  generalisations,  for  the  generalisations  not  only  help  delimit  a  grounded 
theory's  boundaries  of  applicability,  but  more  importantly,  they  help  researchers 
broaden  the  theory  so  that  it  is  more  generally  applicable  and  has  greater  exploratory 
and  predictive  power. 
The  verification  of  theory  is  another  use  of  comparative  analysis.  In  doing  so  collection 
of  evidence  is  important  and  is  used  to  test  the  hypotheses  postulated  and  the  relevance 
of  categories.  Comparative  data  provides  the  best  test  for  this.  Focus  is  on  verifying 
theory,  and  if  any  theory  is  generated,  it  is  only  in  the  service  of  modifying  the  original 
theory  as  a  result  of  the  tests  and  most  of  the  work  is  done  with  existing  theories-I  By 
comparing  the  similarities  and  differences  between  the  facts,  researchers  can  generate 
properties  of  categories  that  increase  the  categories'  generality  and  exploratory  power. 
If  this  study  highlights  areas  of  difference  or  similarities  with  existing  theories  a 
measure  of  success  would  have  been  achieved  in  terms  of  modifying  existing  theories. 
Another  value  of  comparative  analysis  stems  from  the  specification  of  the  concepts 
being  analysed.  This  is  usually  a  detailed  and  painstaking  process.  A  unit  of  analysis 
(e.  g.  an  area  or  size)  for  a  case  study  is  specified  and  the  unit  is  compared  with  others. 
In  doing  so,  it  is  possible  to  establish  the  'deviant'  case  study.  One  advantage  is  that  no 
ambiguity  of  similarity  is  permitted  between  them.  This  is  particularly  useful  in  the 
comparison  of  the  selected  SIS.  They  have  numerous  underlying  factors  in  common, 
such  as  small  size,  occur  in  the  same  region,  obtained  independence  and  aspired  for 
similar  development  objectives  and  so  on  and  yet  about  three  decades  later  achieved 
diverging  achievements.  Focus  is  therefore  on  the  deviations  between  them  and  this 
may  yield  some  interesting  explanations. 
In  this  thesis  a  comparative  analysis  of  development  experiences  of  the  SIS  of  the 
Western  Indian  Ocean  is  made.  These  consist  of  the  main  study  area:  Zanzibar,  and 
Seychelles,  Comoros,  Mauritius  and  the  Maldives  as  a  group.  The  similarities  are  that 
these  SIS  are  in  the  same  region,  attained  their  independence  during  the  1960s,  share 
broadly  similar  development  objectives,  such  as  seeking  economic  growth,  diversifying 
their  economies,  improving  the  quality  of  life  of  their  populations  and  reducing 
dependency.  Despite  similar  development  objectives  after  independence,  currently 
substantial  development  gaps  have  occurred  between  them.  It  is  anticipated  that 
through  comparative  analysis  additional  explanations  for  this  phenomena  will  be 
identified.  More  importantly,  there  may  be  a  contribution  to  development  theory  with 
1  An  example  of  this  is  such  as  in  Blauner's  work  with  Marxian  Theory.  Blauher.  R.  (1964)  Alienation  and  Freedom. 
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respect  to  the  situation  of  developing  SS  and  especially  SIS. 
4.3 
.2  Historical  Approach 
The  research  is  a  study  of  the  development  process  in  SIS  in  the  developing  world,  and 
implicitly  it  is  concerned  with  change  over  space  and  time.  It  also  involves  cultural 
political.  social  and  economic  transformations  and  thus  there  is  a  need  to  provide, 
analyse  and  understand  the  necessary  background  to  current  development  problems. 
An  historical  approach  is  relevant  for  two  reasons.  First,  where  the  theoretical 
framework  is  based  on  dependency  analysis  and  confronts  the  research  problem  from  a 
world  system  approach,  both  utilise  an  historical  appreciation  of  development.  Second, 
it  is  important  to  be  able  to  trace  the  various  stages  in  Zanzibar's  contemporary 
development  processes.  Changing  policies  and  strategies  are  in  response  to  changing 
internal  and  external  conditions  influencing  the  development  processes  (and  crises)  in 
the  SIS  and  it  is  the  understanding  of  the  causes,  effects  and  alternatives  allied  to  such 
processes  over  time  that  this  study  in  interested  In.  ' 
4.3.3  Field  research 
The  scantiness  of  information  related  to  the  subject  matter  necessitated  the  use  of  other 
qualitative  techniques.  This  was  partly  to  fill  in  the  gaps  and  partly  to  check  on  and 
seek  elaboration  on  other  data/information,  particularly  quantitative  ones. 
Qualitative  techniques  were  used  extensively  in  the  field  work.  Both  observation  and 
participatory  research  methods  were  used  in  the  field  and  data  was  unobtrusively  and 
systematically  collected.  The  strengths  and  limitations  of  the  different  field  work 
approaches  were  studied  and  the  appropriate  techniques  selected  and  applied  (Punch, 
1986;  Pons,  1988).  An  overt  approach  was  adopted  and  both  unstructured  and 
structured  interviewing  techniques  were  applied  -  the  former  in  personal  interviews  and 
in  discussions,  and  the  latter  in  the  collection  of  household  information.  Where 
possible  the  information  was  recorded  in  note  form,  tape  recordings  were  not  used 
because  of  their  sensitivity.  On  occasions,  note  taking  itself  was  not  possible  as  some 
interviewees  appeared  to  be  nervous  or  unhappy  about  it.  Thus  appropriate  field  tactics 
were  employed  to  probe  for  information  that  was  difficult  to  obtain.  As  a  matter  of 
research  ethics,  and  where  it  was  requested,  anonymity  has  been  kept. 
1  In  this  respect  Hettne  (1990:  8)  quotes  Marc  Bloc  -  "Just  as  the  progress  of  a  disease  shows  a  doctor  the  secret  life  of 
a  body,  so  to  the  historian  the  progress  of  a  great  calamity  yields  valuable  information  about  the  nature  of  the  society 
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4.4  Quantitative  methods 
4.4.1  Cluster  Analysis 
Classification  is  a  commonly  sought  objective  in  social  science  research.  Comparing  the 
development  experiences  of  SS  and  SIS  the  problem  is  that  there  is  a  considerable 
variety.  It  is  desirable  that  this  'noise'  is  reduced  to  identify  certain  patterns  and 
trends,  hence  the  relevance  of  classification  analysis.  In  this  case  Cluster  Analysis  is 
deemed  to  be  an  ideal  method  of  exploratory  analysis  and  is  therefore  applied. 
As  a  form  of  numerical  taxonomy  Cluster  Analysts  is  a  method  that  is  ideally  suited  for 
researchers  seeking  to  structure  samples  in  terms  of  homogeneous  sub-groups.  The 
general  robustness  of  the  method  has  already  been  demonstrated  in  a  wide  variety  of 
situations  including  tribal  classifications  of  Australian  aborigines,  rural  poverty 
patterns  in  townships,  storm  cycles  and  beach  erosion,  wild  plant  communities  and 
corporate  decision  strategies  using  social  preferences  etc.  Wishart  (1978  defines  Cluster 
Analysts  as  an  exploratory  method  designed  to  help  solve  classification  problems;  its  use 
is  appropriate  when  little  or  nothing  is  known  about  the  category  structure  in  a  body  of 
data.  For  example,  data  about  a  particular  group  can  be  obtained  while  little  is  known 
about  the  component  parts  or  the  number  of  categories  that  exist  in  the  group. 
Cluster  analysis  is  basically  a  tool  of  discovery.  The  method  sorts  a  sample  of  cases, 
such  as  specimens,  into  groups  such  that  the  degree  of  association  is  high  between 
members  of  the  same  group  and  low  between  members  of  different  groups.  Once 
generated,  the  groups  or  clusters  need  to  be  characterised  as  would  any  other  group. 
More  importantly  is  the  need  to  validate  the  classifications,  as  they  can  be  highly 
sample  or  method  dependent.  However.  care  and  caution  in  ascertaining  the  precise 
objective  of  the  analysis  will  usually  indicate  whether  the  pattern  sought  is  not  in  the 
variables,  but  in  the  cases. 
Generally,  classifications  based  on  a  single  characteristic  such  as  GNP  or  GDP  are  of 
limited  value.  When  additional  variables  or  measures  are  introduced,  the  number  of 
possible  combinations  increases  exponentially.  Cluster  analysis  enables  entities  to  be 
classified  on  the  basis  of  a  large  number  of  measures.  Early  applications  of  this  method 
tended  to  feature  prominently  in  biological  problems  where  taxonomy  has  always 
featured  prominently.  More  recently,  the  method  has  been  extended  to  social  research 
where  the  complexity  of  the  domain  of  relevant  variables  is  suited  to  it. 85 
Several  attempts  have  been  made  aimed  at  classifying  small  states  and  these  range 
from  very  simple  general  types,  such  as  simple  tabular  classifications  based  on  3  or  4 
variables  to  complex  ones  that  include  composite  indices.  These  have  been  for  a  variety 
of  purposes  including  groupings  based  on  development  problems  and  potential  (Auty, 
1979;  Ward,  1975;  Jalan,  1982c;  Doumenge,  1989;  Nissan  and  Cveny,  1989). 
There  exists  a  variety  of  cluster  classification  techniques.  Despite  the  various 
procedures  that  exist,  it  has  been  cautioned  that  if  care  is  not  exercised,  arriving  at  a 
correct  analysis  can  be  something  of  a  hit-and-miss  affair  (Youngman,  1979).  Power 
and  Campbell  (1992)  caution  that  there  is  an  inherent  danger  that  the  groups  thus 
defined  may  be  as  much  a  product  of  the  particular  clustering  technique  used  as  of  any 
intrinsic  grouping  within  the  data,  and  so  much  hinges  upon  the  proximity  measures  in 
the  definition  of  the  inter-case  differences  since  it  is  these  that  form  the  primary  input 
for  most  clustering  techniques.  They  also  note  that  different  clustering  techniques 
define  group  membership  in  different  ways  and  are  sensitive  to  different  types  and 
shapes  of  pattern  within  the  data. 
The  quality  of  any  solution  provided  by  cluster  analysis  is  only  as  good  as  the 
appropriateness  of  the  techniques  applied  and  procedures  followed.  It  is  important  that 
at  least  more  than  one  clustering  techniques  should  be  used  since  it  is  only  by 
comparison  of  the  results  that  the  consistency  of  the  solutions  may  be  evaluated  and 
the  areas  of  common  ground  identified  and  defined.  Power  and  Campbell  (1992:  229) 
note  that;  "Where  consistent  results  emerge  from  different  methods  it  is  plausible  to 
assume  that  they  are  less  a  statistical  artefact  than  a  product  of  genuine  configurations 
within  the  data".  They  also  note  that  no  two  techniques  will  yield  identical 
classifications,  but  they  can  provide  a  valuable  guide  to  the  optimum  number  of  groups 
present  and  focus  attention  on  the  characteristics  of  'core'  cases  common  to  all 
solutions.  In  this  manner  the  most  typical  groups  are  identified.  In  reality  the  situation 
is  much  more  optimistic,  since  the  differences  between  procedures  often  have  little 
effect  on  the  final  results  and  interpretation  (Youngman,  1979:  126).  Using  more  than 
one  technique  is  mainly  for  validating  the  results. 
In  the  study,  two  straight  forward  methods  are  selected,  which  are  ideal  for  the  type  of 
data  that  is  available.  The  data  that  is  selected  represents  as  much  as  possible  the 
basic  social  and  economic  development  criteria  affecting  small  countries.  However,  with 
only  26  countries,  the  sample  size  is  small,  but  both  clustering  techniques  are  suited 
for  sample  sizes  which  are  less  than  40  (Wishart,  1978)  Another  factor  which 
contributed  to  the  small  sample  is  the  availability  of  comparable  and  reliable  data. 86 
The  strengths  of  an  exploratory  data  analysis  method  such  as  Cluster  Analysis  lies  in  its 
ability  to  assist  in  generating  ideas  and  explanations  for  the  hypotheses  since  it  starts 
with  fewer  preconditions  about  the  expected  findings.  It  is  particularly  useful  in 
geography  because  quite  often  the  theory  used  In  direct  geographical  enquiry  can  be 
weak  and  the  empirical  expectations  imprecise.  Moreover  it  is  still  valid  even  if  the  data 
sets  used  were  not  explicitly  collected  for  testing  the  hypotheses  under  'laboratoy 
conditions,  as  It  has  happened  in  this  case.  The  data  sets  may  reveal  very  little  as  it 
stands.  but  exploratory  data  analysis.  with  emphasis  on  graphical  and  tabular  display. 
allows  the  penetration  of  the  data  sets  and  appreciate  their  peculiarities  and  draw 
conclusions  which  are  not  constrained  by  prior  expectations  and  the  limitations  of 
inferential  statistical  techniques.  The  results  also  permit  further  tests  to  assess  and 
validate  the  findings. 
4.4  .2  Descriptive  Statistics:  Cross-tabulations  and  measures  of  association 
It  has  long  been  recognised  that  amongst  the  major  weaknesses  of  planning,  and  indeed 
research,  in  developing  SIS,  is  the  lack  of  adequate,  relevant  and  reliable  data.  Much  of 
the  data  is  usually  collected,  collated  and  presented  for  the  objectives  of  governments 
and  can  often  be  biased  in  terms  of  collation  and  presentation.  In  spite  of  the  size  of 
the  SIS  the  need  for  spatially  disaggregated  data  is  real.  It  emerged  that  there  is  a  need 
to  generate  original  primary  data  through  a  socio-economic  survey  to  provide  a  more 
accurate  profile  of  the  dominant  features  of  the  island  economy.  Apart  from  filling  in 
gaps  due  to  the  dearth  of  relevant  information,  counter-checking  secondary  sources  and 
official  sources,  it  also  seeks  to  provide  a  more  updated  socio-economic  profile  of  the 
Zanzibari  economy.  In  the  final  analysis  it  validates  the  arguments,  hypotheses  and 
findings  of  the  study. 
A  substantial  amount  of  data  was  generated  by  the  questionnaire-based  socio-economic 
survey  (Appendix  2).  A  total  of  306  households  were  interviewed  and  specific 
information  was  sought  about  the  head  of  household  and  the  household  as  a  whole., 
The  information  ranged  from  profile  data  (of  interviewees)  and  their  household,  their 
main  socio-economic  activities  to  opinions  on  developments  around  their  society.  The 
selection  of  the  sample  population  represented  a  cross-section  of  the  islands' 
population,  rural  and  urban,  those  residing  in  coral  and  non-coral  areas  and  those 
engaged  in  agriculture,  fishing  and  urban  activities  such  as  commerce  and  services. 
The  reason  for  using  such  a  sample  design  was  to  avoid  making  the  common  error  of 
assuming  that  because  islands  and  SIS  are  small,  that  the  structure  and  characteristics 
1  The  306  households  approximate  to  a  population  coverage  of  1433. 87 
of  the  population  Is  fairly  homogeneous.  In  Zanzibar,  the  reality  is  far  from  this,  there 
is  a  substantial  degree  of  variations  within  and  between  the  two  main  islands.  The 
sample  populations  generally  correspond  to  the  proportions  of  the  island  populations, 
that  is  about  60%  in  Unguja  and  40%  In  Pemba. 
The  analysis  of  the  data  makes  use  of  parametric  statistics,  mainly  contingency 
analysis.  The  intention  is  to  compare  the  two  main  populations  representing  the  sister 
islands  of  Unguja  and  Pemba,  looking  for  differences  in  their  basic  socio-economic 
characteristics  and  to  aid  in  explaining  them  and  their  consequences.  Cross- 
tabulations  are  made  for  the  main  variables  which  provide  a  profile  of  the  island 
populations,  and  chi-square  (x2)  statistics  are  generated  to  test  the  degree  of  association 
between  the  populations  representing  the  sister  islands  of  Unguja  and  Pemba.  The 
scaled  responses  from  the  questionnaire  survey  are  predominantly  categorical.  These 
are  tabulated  into  contingency  tables  and  where  relevant  the  responses  are  also 
depicted  graphically. 
The  x2  test  is  the  most  useful  for  categorical  data  and  has  therefore  been  selected.  x2  is 
a  measure  of  the  amount  of  deviation  from  random  expectation  in  a  table,  and  should 
the  obtained  value  be  sufficiently  high  for  the  null  hypothesis  to  be  rejected,  it  would 
follow  that  the  data  exhibited  tendencies  for  certain  joint  responses  to  predominate. 
The  size  of  x2  cannot  be  interpreted  as  an  indication  of  the  degree  of  association, 
instead  it  shows  that  a  relationship  exists.  The  strength  of  association  can  be  assessed 
by  comparing  the  responses  through  the  Contingency  Coefficient  C  or  Cramer's  V. 
The  Continuity  Coefficient  is  given  as: 
C= 
x2+iv 
(N  =  Number  of  cases) 
The  coefficient  ranges  from  0  to  1.  High  values  indicate  strong  relationships.  C  can 
never  achieve  the  value  of  1  for  a  given  table  and  the  maximum  possible  value  is  given 
as: 
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Cramer's  V  overcomes  the  limitation  of  C  and  it  ranges  from  0  to  1  regardless  of  table 
size.  Cramer's  C  is  given  as: 
V=  C=  Nxm 
where:  m  is  the  smaller  of  (NR  -  1)  OR  (NC-1). 
The  contingency  tables  provide  a  useful  summary  of  the  responses  and  these  can  be 
compared  directly  through  row  and  column  percentages,  but  in  order  to  arrive  at  fairly 
accurate  comparisons,  the  x2  statistic  provides  acceptably  accurate  measures  of 
association  between  the  responses  of  the  populations  being  compared.  The  column 
variables  are  the  two  sister  islands.  Unguja  and  Pemba,  and  the  rows  are  occupied  by 
the  variables  selected  to  compare  the  socio-economic  status  of  the  two  populations,  and 
the  island  population  as  a  whole. 
One  other  advantage  of  the  use  of  x2  is  that  few  restrictions  apply  to  the  test.  The  data 
need  not  be  normally  distributed,  which  is  the  case  in  many  of  the  tests  here.  Efforts 
were  made  to  reduce  cell  sizes  and  thus  many  responses  were  collapsed  as  a  result  of 
this.  This  follows  a  general  recommendation  that  no  more  than  200/6  of  the  cells  should 
have  expected  frequencies  of  less  than  5  and  none  less  than  1  (Selgal,  1956).  However, 
this  has  occurred  a  number  of  times,  and  particularly  in  2X2  tables,  Yate's  Correction 
for  Continuity  was  calculated. 
Because  of  the  nature  of  the  responses  and  the  sensitivity  of  social  science  research,  it 
was  felt  that  the  alpha  level  (significance  level)  for  the  tests  would  be  determined  at  .  05. 
This  is  the  rejection  level  for  the  null  hypotheses  (Ho).  The  general  Ho  is  that  there  is  no 
difference  between  the  socio-economic  variables  between  the  two  population 
representing  the  islands  of  Unguja  and  Pemba.  This  is  then  broken  down  further  for 
each  of  the  variables  to  determine  where  similarities  and  differences  occur  and  they  are 
then  subsequently  analysed  and  discussed  in  detail.  The  overall  result  should 
determine  whether  there  do  exist  significant  spatial  disparities  between  the  two  islands. 
In  the  final  analysis  the  implications  of  the  analysis  are  discussed  with  reference  to  the 
islands'  current  and  prospective  socio-economic.  cultural  and  political  development. 
Where  relevant,  data  and  information  from  other  surveys  such  as  the  1990  Household 
Budget  Survey  for  Zanzibar  are  incorporated  to  assess  the  degree  of  representation  of 
the  survey  and  to  support  the  findings  of  the  primary  data.  1  This  is  particularly  useful, 
since  the  sample  size  of  the  survey  though  sufficient,  is  not  large.  Finally,  the  results  of 
I  The  1990  Household  Budget  Survey  is  conducted  and  published  by  the  Government  of  Zanzibar. 89 
the  socio-economic  survey  complement  to  a  large  degree  the  survey  using  secondary 
sources  and  personal  interviews,  thereby  providing  an  in  depth  understanding  of  the 
situation  in  Zanzibar. 
4.5  Sampling 
The  sampling  design  needed  certain  information  about  the  selected  households  in  the 
major  geographical  areas  existing  in  Zanzibar.  This  is  because  of  the  need  to  establish 
the  degree  of  spatial  variability  in  household  characteristics  and  activities  between 
different  areas.  The  results  should  highlight  the  existence  of  spatial  differentiation 
which  in  turn  reflects  the  underlying  development  problems  of  different  areas,  for 
example  between  Unguja  and  Pemba  islands  and  between  rural  and  urban  areas.  This 
also  aids  in  explaining  the  motivations  and  directions  of  migration  and  emigration, 
while  at  the  same  time  identifying  the  inherent  problems  existing  in  different  areas  and 
linking  these  with  observations  and  evidence  seen  at  the  macro  level.  There  are  some 
distinct  spatial  characteristics  existing  in  the  Isles  that  partly  explain  the  nature  of 
economic  activities  taking  place  in  different  areas  -  for  example  cash  crop  production  in 
soil  rich  areas  and  root  crop  production  in  soil  poor  areas.  So  in  selecting  the  study 
areas  the  sampling  framework  took  such  factors  into  account  and  so  a  systematic  and 
random  sampling  technique  was  used. 
Both  islands  are  generally  divided  between  a  'coral  rag'  area  and  a  fertile'  area.  Unguja 
island  has  a  larger  tract  of  the  'coral  rag'  compared  to  Pemba.  This  also  explains  the 
spatial  variation  of  agricultural  (and  economic)  activities.  So  in  the  first  instance  the 
sampling  areas  were  selected  to  represent  the  major'geoeconomic'  areas,  e.  g.  the  'coral 
rag'  and  'fertile'  areas  in  both  islands.  The  third  category  is  the  urban,  and  so  one 
urban  area  was  selected  for  each  island.  The  areas,  which  were  'wards'  were  randomly 
selected.  To  the  rural  areas,  another  dimension  was  added,  and  this  was  an  area  that 
was  engaged  in  both  agriculture  and  fishing.  In  the  final  analysis  seven  sample  areas 
were  selected  (further  elaborations  are  in  chapter  12). 
The  sampling  unit  is  the  household  and  the  household  is  defined  as  the  family  (and 
extended  members)  unit,  or  even  one  individual.  Thus  there  can  be  more  than  one 
household  in  one  house.  Not  all  the  population  needed  to  be  interviewed  as  one 
member  could  provide  the  necessary  information  regarding  a  household.  To  obtain 
acceptable  quality  of  results  for  each  area,  about  30%  of  the  ward  household  population 
was  selected.  1  The  households  were  selected  randomly,  and  if  an  interview  was  not 
possible,  then  the  interviewers  proceeded  to  the  next  house. 
1A  30%  sample  size  as  a  'rule  of  thumb'  is  considered  acceptable  and  valid  for  most  social  statistical  analyses. 90 
4.6  Limitations 
The  research  had  to  make  extensive  use  of  secondary  sources  of  data  and  information 
available,  both  in  the  cases  of  the  comparative  analysis  and  cluster  analysis  and  in  the 
case  study  of  Zanzibar.  Quite  often,  obtaining  recent  and  reliable  information  sufficient 
for  comparing  across  countries  at  similar  time  scale  has  been  difficult.  Also,  although 
government  departments  generate  data  pertaining  to  development  planning  and 
evaluation  of  various  plans  and  programmes.  much  of  this  information  has  a  very 
limited  circulation  and  in  many  instances  access  to  them  is  restricted.  The  situation  is 
further  complicated  when  there  exist  gaps  at  certain  time  periods,  as  this  makes 
historical  and  time  series  analyses  difficult.  Considerable  time  and  effort  was  spent 
tracing  and  obtaining  access  to  important  documents  a  problem  characteristic  to  much 
research  conducted  in  LDCs. 
Apart  from  official  documents,  contact  was  made  with  other  researchers  conducting  a 
variety  of  socio-economic  surveys.  Information  was  also  sought  from  multilateral  and 
other  development  organisations  operating  in  the  islands.  To  fill  in  gaps  and  obtain  an 
in-depth  understanding  of  the  past  and  current  problems  and  prospects  several 
interviews,  formal  and  informal,  were  conducted  with  officials  and  experts  working  in 
the  various  fields  of  development  in  the  islands.  Many  of  these  were  useful  and 
complemented  the  other  primary  and  secondary  data  sources.  However,  such  interview 
approaches  are  'open'  to  a  considerable  degree  of  subjectivity  where  much  depends  on 
the  interviewees'  personal  perceptions  and  positions  on  the  issues  and  topics.  This 
approach  required  a  certain  degree  of  tact  in  interviewing  to  avoid  'official  bias'  in 
providing  explanations.  Thus  the  question  of  objectivity  had  to  be  kept  in  mind.  The 
researcher  can  not  pretend  that  the  study  is  wholly  objective,  though  considerable 
efforts  were  made  in  that  direction. 
Cross  cultural  research  is  difficult,  '  and  what  may  be  perceived  as  obvious  may  not  be 
so.  Zanzibar  is  predominantly  Islamic,  and  the  influences  of  Arab  and  Islamic  culture 
touch  on  many  aspects  and  conduct  of  people's  lives,  and  is  therefore  also  inherent  in 
the  country's  development.  The  cultural  background  was  taken  into  account  when 
conducting  the  research,  and  efforts  were  made  to  understand  the  local  norms  and 
values.  For  example,  both  male  and  female  interviewers  were  used  in  case  the 
respondents  would  object  to  be  interviewed  by  a  someone  of  the  opposite  sex.  In  case  of 
any  potential  clashes,  interviewers  were  instructed  to  proceed  to  the  next  household. 
Given  the  geographical  spread  of  the  sample  areas  and  the  difficulties  of  transport 
communications,  the  researcher  could  not  be  with  the  field  interviewers  all  of  the  time. 
Thus  there  does  arise  the  possibility,  no  matter  how  small,  that  some  responses  may 91 
have  not  been  recorded  accurately.  However,  the  degree  of  error  is  reduced  by  a 
training  session  which  was  held  for  the  interviewers,  each  of  them  was  experienced 
having  already  worked  in  various  census  surveys  (e.  g.  household  budget  survey  and 
population  census).  Being  Zanzibaris  they  compensated  for  the  researcher's  'alien' 
status. 92 
5.0  Cluster  and  Comparative  analyses  of  five  small  islandstates 
in  the  Western  Indian  Ocean  region 
5.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  has  two  aims.  The  first  section  (5.2)  uses  cluster  analysts  in  an  attempt  to 
classify  small  states  and  to  support  the  contention  that  some  of  the  islands  discussed 
share  similar  characteristics  and  yet  have  others  that  are  unique.  The  second  objective 
(section  5.3)  is  to  present  a  detailed  discussion  and  comparative  analysis  of  the 
development  perspectives  of  five  SIS  in  the  Western  Indian  Ocean  region.  The  intention 
is  to  highlight  some  relevant  and  specific  features  of  the  islands  under  discussion  as 
well  as  to  assess  their  similarities  and  differences. 
5.2  Exploring  island  characteristics  with  Cluster  Analysis 
5.2.1  Data  selection  and  Input 
Cluster  analysis  techniques  are  valuable  tools  in  exploratory  data  analysis.  The  aim  of 
an  exploratory  technique  such  as  cluster  analysis  is  to  provide  information-rich 
summaries  of  the  data  that  can  be  used  to  explain  why  they  share  certain  similarities 
and  differences  (Sibson,  1972).  In  this  study  the  aim  is  to  identify,  describe  and  explain 
a  distinct  structure  in  a  complex  mass  of  multivariate  data.  Subgroups  or  clusters  of 
similar  cases  or  individuals  are  then  distinguished.  Twenty-six  small  states  (SS)  and 
small  island  states  (SIS)  were  selected  randomly  from  the  most  recent  data  source 
available  (Commonwealth  Secretariat,  1991)  to  determine  through  clustering  techniques 
how  the  individual  cases  fall  into  distinct  groups  and  what  comprises  their 
membership.  The  countries  selected  comprise  small  countries  at  various  stages  of 
development  as  defined  by  standard  economic  measures.  Nineteen  variables  were 
selected  to  describe  and  represent  each  of  the  26  countries  (table  5.1). 
The  criteria  for  selecting  the  countries  are  small  size  (population),  and  the  availability  of 
data  that  allows  cross  comparison  and  is  also  representative  and  reliable.  The  type  of 
data  that  is  used  reflects  the  limitations  of  size,  development  policies  and  strategies, 
and  the  dominant  as  well  as  weak  sectors  in  their  economies  and  should  provide  a 
number  of  distinct  clusters. 
The  26  countries  comprise  of  both  DCs  and  LDCs.  There  are  three  reasons  why  both 
DCs  and  LDCs  are  included  in  the  sample.  First,  it  highlights  the  differences  that  exist 
due  to  their  respective  positions  in  the  global  economic  system,  i.  e.  those  that  are  close 93 
to  or  form  part  of  the  core,  e.  g.  Ireland  and  New  Zealand  versus  Comoros  or  Maldives. 
The  second  reason  is  related  to  the  availability  of  data  for  SS  and  SIS  that  allows  for  the 
cluster  Analysis  to  take  place.  The  selected  countries  are:  1)  St.  Vincent  and 
Grenadines  (St.  Vin  and  Gren.  ),  2)  St.  Lucia,  3)  The  Bahamas,  4)  Qatar,  5)  The  United 
Arab  Emirates  (UAE),  6)  Kuwait,  7)  Oman,  8)  Malta,  9)  Iceland,  10)  Ireland,  11)  New 
Zealand,  12)  Costa  Rica,  13)  Fiji,  14)  Mauritius,  15)  Jamaica,  16)  Grenada,  17) 
Seychelles,  18)  Cyprus,  19)  Barbados,  20)  Zanzibar,  21)  Comoros,  22)  Solomon 
Islands,  23)  Papua  New  Guinea  (PNG),  24)  Western  Samoa,  25)  Kiribati  and  26)  the 
Maldives. 
The  variables  represent  demographic  characteristics,  basic  needs  fulfilment,  economic 
and  dominant  dependency  characteristics.  The  data  is  in  ratios  and  percentages  to 
allow  more  accurate  cross  comparisons.  The  variables  are: 
Demographic:  (1986) 
1)  Crude  Birth  Rates  (CBR) 
2)  Crude  Death  Rates  (CDR) 
3)  Total  Fertility  Rate  (TFR) 
4)  Infant  Mortality  Rate  (IMR); 
5)  Life  Expectancy  (Lifex) 
6)  Percent  of  urban  population  (PcUrb) 
Basic  Needs:  (1988) 
7)  Percentage  population  with  access  to  safe  water  (PcWat) 
8)  Population  per  `000  per  Physician  (PcDoc) 
9)  Percentage  of  age  group  in  primary  education  (PcPriEd) 
10)  Percentage  of  age  group  in  secondary  education  (PcSecEd) 
Economic:  (1988) 
11)  Percentage  contribution  of  agriculture  to  GDP  (PcAgric) 
12)  Percentage  contribution  of  industry  to  GDP  (Pclnd) 
13)  Percentage  contribution  of  services  to  GDP  (PcSer) 
14)  Tourist  earnings  as  a  percentage  of  total  export  earnings  (PcTour) 
15)  Merchandise  Exports  as  percentage  of  GDP  (PcExp) 
16)  Merchandise  Imports  as  percentage  of  GDP  (Pclmp) 
Import  Dependencii:  (1988) 
17)  Food  imports  as  a  percentage  of  total  imports  (PcFood) 
18)  Net  imports  of  total  energy  as  a  percentage  of  total  energy  consumption 
(Energy) 
19)  Per  capita  overseas  development  assistance  (ODA/cap) 94 
Two  clustering  techniques  were  used  to  produce  dendograms.  The  first  is  the  single 
linkage  or  'nearest  neighbour'  method  in  which  at  every  step,  the  distance  between  two 
clusters  is  the  distance  between  their  two  closest  points.  The  second  clustering 
technique  is  the  complete  linkages  or  furthest  neighbour'.  Here,  in  contrast,  the 
distance  between  two  clusters  is  calculated  between  their  furthest  points. 
In  the  first  step  all  cases  are  considered  as  separate  clusters.  At  the  second  step.  two  of 
the  cases  are  combined  into  a  single  cluster  and  at  the  third,  either  a  third  or  two  or 
more  additional  cases  are  merged  to  form  a  new  cluster,  etc.  Ultimately  all  cases 
become  members  of  a  single  cluster. 
The  type  of  clustering  is  agglomerative  hierarchical  clustering.  The  results  for  both 
clusters  are  analysed  and  compared.  The  objective  is  to  identify  the  number  of  clusters 
that  exist  and  their  members.  The  selection  of  the  groups  or  clusters  can  be  quite 
subjective.  Too  many  or  two  few  groups  can  make  the  analyses  meaningless,  though 
much  depends  on  the  nature  and  purpose  of  study. 
COUNTRY  CBR  CDR  TFR  IMR  Lifex  PcUrb  Pt%M1  PtiDoc  PriEd 
COMOROS  49  12  6.8  95  57  27.2  28  123  92 
ZANZIBAR  53  17  8.2  130  55  353  44  12.8  91 
MALDIVES  44  10  63  73  60  20.5  24  15.0  65 
SOLOMON  IS  41  8  6.5  50  64  10.4  50  73  60 
KIRIBATI  34  12  43  59  55  35.5  44  2.0  84 
PNG  35  12  5.1  60  54  153  25  6.1  70 
COSTA  RICA  27  4  3.1  17  75  44.5  93  1.0  98 
FIJI  25  5  3.1  20  71  43.4  77  2.0  129 
GRENADA  28  7  3.2  32  69  63.0  85  2.1  100 
W.  SAMOA  33  7  4.7  47  66  22.7  69  3.6  76 
St.  VIN.  &  GREN.  24  6  2.7  23  70  20.2  95  4.0  81 
MAURITIUS  18  7  1.9  22  67  423  100  1.9  106 
St.  LUCIA  27  6  33  20  71  45.9  67  3.8  95 
SEYCHELLES  26  7  3.1  18  70  58.1  97  2.2  99 
THE  BAHAMAS  20  6  2.3  26  68  58.8  65  1.1  60 
JAMAICA  23  6  23  10  73  51.7  96  2.0  105 
MALTA  5  9  2.0  9  73  86.6  100  0.9  107 
CYPRUS  18  8  23  11  76  52.1  100  0.7  106 
ICELAND  17  7  2.1  7  78  903  100  0.4  99 
IRELAND  16  9  13  7  74  58.7  100  0.7  100 
NEW  ZEALAND  16  8  1.9  9  75  84.1  100  0.6  107 
BARBADOS  16  8  1.8  16  75  44.2  100  1.1  110 
QATAR  30  4  5.5  29  70  89.2  95  0.6  121 
OMAN  44  7  7.0  36  65  10.2  58  1.1  97 
UAE  23  4  4.7  24  71  77.8  71  1.0  99 
KUWAIT  25,  3  3.6  15,  74,  95.2  00,  0.6  94, 
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Table  15_1  (Gmtinnwi  fm*n  nrpo:.,,,  ý  .,  e,..  % 
CC  MIRY  SecEd  Itic  PcSer  Pclnd  PGar  PcEzp  Pclmp  Food  Energ 
COMOROS  36  34  50.7  13  8  13.6  32.5  26.9  100  393.4  ZANZIBAR  25  57  42.2  37  0.5  15.6  43.4  41.9  100  30.4 
MALDIVES  35  26  84.2  16  52  68.8  150.0  8.3  100  120.2 
SOLOMON  IS  18  44  73.6  5  2  60.2  88.6  10.4  104  79.4 
KIRIBATI  15  16  613  5  9  31.4  68.6  29.2  100  720.9 
PNG  12  34  64.2  31  1  39.7  39.6  15.2  99  1.6 
COSTA  RICA  41  18  75.7  27  10  26.8  303  9.9  86  3.5 
FM  56  21  632  19  28  29.0  42.2  19.4  169  11.4 
GRENADA  18  21  50  18  34  19.9  60.8  19.8  106  59.4 
W.  SAMOA  51  34  69.5  20  23  13.2  60.  203  96  2773 
St  VIN.  &  GREN.  17  17  703  24  38  64.7  71.4  253  89  963 
MAURITIUS  51  13  593  27  12  62.6  81.2  12.8  155  7.5 
St.  LUCIA  13  19  48.0  20  62  76.5  96.8  24.9  100  59.7 
SEYCHELLES  37  5  53.3  15  44  26.5  44.9  22.8  357  1955 
THE  BAHAMAS  40  12  46.8  37  70  22.1  823  8.4  623  0.1 
JAMAICA  65  6  70  42  24  23.4  45.0  18.2  107  6.8 
MALTA  77  3  72.6  40  25  37.9  73.4  11.9  118  4.6 
CYPRUS  87  7  71.8  28  34  16.7  43.8  11.1  114  5.0 
ICELAND  92  9  81.2  15  5  24.1  26.9  8.6  65  0.0 
IRELAND  98  10  77.6  29  5  67.4  56.1  12.0  72  0.0 
NEW  ZEALAND  85  10  813  27  9  22.2  18.5  7.0  28  0.0 
BARBADOS  93  7  68.6  18  57  10.9  36.4  17.6  123  12.7 
QATAR  75  1  38  61  0  363  24.1  17.7  1  0.0 
OMAN  38  3  43  54  1  41.4  27.0  19.5  1  0.0 
UAE  60  2  54  44  0  57.8  35.7  14.8  1  0.0 
KUWAIT  82,  1  47  52,  1  43.1  30.6  175  24  0.0 
oource.  ý-ommonweann  secretariat  (1991),  Zanzibar  Government  (1988a),  (1988b),  (1989). 
Table  5.1  Data  Input  for  Cluster  Analysis 
5.2.2  Analysis  of  Clusters 
Single  Linkage  Clustering:  The  dendogram  that  is  produced  after  using  this  technique  is 
displayed  in  figure  5.1.  The  results  show  a  large  number  of  groups  at  the  initial  stage. 
Starting  from  the  left  side  of  the  dendogram,  each  of  the  26  countries  forms  a  group  on 
its  own.  The  first  fusion  begins  with  New  Zealand  and  Iceland  and  these  are  followed  by 
Jamaica,  Cyprus  and  Barbados  and  they  In  turn  fuse  to  create  a  larger  group.  Malta, 
Costa  Rica,  Ireland  and  Fiji  fuse  separately  into  the  preceding  group  in  a  step-wise 
manner.  Before  the  fusion  of  the  first  two  groups,  Qatar,  the  United  Arab  Emirates  and 
Kuwait  also  fuse  to  create  a  separate  group.  The  Seychelles  and  Grenada  fuse  at  a  later 
stage  and  in  turn  join  the  first  group  which  already  contains  a  membership  of  9 
countries/cases.  These  In  turn  are  joined  by  Mauritius  creating  a  group  membership  of 
12  countries  (46%  of  the  sample).  At  the  point  where  the  first  dotted  line  is 
superimposed  15  groups  are  classified,  this  is  also  known  as  the  15  group  solution.  At 
the  10  group  stage  of  fusion,  the  Seychelles  and  Mauritius  are  fused  into  one  large 
group  comprising  18  cases/countries,  and  the  other  three  SIS  in  the  Indian  Ocean 
analysis  are  still  'outliers'.  Following  the  fusions  any  further  means  approaching  the 
threshold  of  greater  error,  since  the  length  of  each  horizontal  branch  is  proportional  to 
the  increase  in  error  associated  with  the  subsequent  fusion. 96 
An  interesting  observation  is  that  the  five  SIS  of  the  Western  Indian  Ocean  appear  in 
different  groups.  Seychelles  is  fused  with  Grenada,  while  Mauritius,  the  Comoros, 
Zanzibar  and  the  Maldives  each  appear  on  their  own.  The  Comoros  and  Zanzibar  finally 
fuse  but  only  at  a  much  later  stage  and  one  which  is  open  to  a  greater  degree  of  error. 
One  plausible  explanation  is  that  the  islands  are  at  very  different  stages  of  development 
which  reflects  their  different  development  experience  and  the  diversity  of  problems  that 
they  each  face.  In  terms  of  similarities,  Mauritius  and  Seychelles  are  closer  to  one 
another  as  are  Zanzibar  and  the  Comoros,  while  the  Maldives  are  more  separate.  1  It 
appears  then  that  insofar  as  the  Indian  Ocean  islands  are  concerned,  at  least  three 
broad  groups  in  terms  of  similarities  in  development  status  can  be  Identified. 
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Figure  5.1  Single  Linkage  Clustering  of  a  selection  of  small  states 
Complete  Linkage  Clustering:  The  dendogram  ensuing  from  this  technique  is  shown  in 
figure  5.2.  In  the  diagram  the  groups  or  clusters  are  much  clearer  and  the  fusions 
appear  earlier  (on  the  left  side  of  the  diagram).  Many  small  groups  are  formed  at  the 
initial  stages.  It  can  be  observed  from  a  casual  glance  at  the  cluster  membership  that 
many  of  the  countries  are  members  of  groups  which  appear  to  share  broadly  similar 
economic  development  status.  For  example  the  following  cases  share  certain  similar 
characteristics  and  therefore  appear  in  the  same  groups;  the  Gulf  oil  exporting  states  of 
Qatar,  the  UAE,  Kuwait  and  Oman;  the  developed  countries  of  Iceland  and  New 
Zealand;  the  tourism  dependent  countries  of  St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines;  tourism 
1  For  purposes  of  clarity  they  are  shaded  according  to  the  groups  they  belong  to  within  the  South-West  Indian  Ocean 
Region. 97 
dependent,  agricultural  (and  some  with)  manufacturing  export  countries  of  Costa  Rica, 
Fiji  and  Mauritius;  Grenada  and  Seychelles;  Cyprus  and  Barbados.  At  the  15  group 
solution  the  following  clusters  are  formed:  1)  St.  Vincent  and  Grenadines  and  St.  Lucia: 
2)  The  Bahamas;  3)  Qatar.  UAE  and  Kuwait:  4)  Oman;  5)  Malta.  Iceland.  Ireland  and 
New  Zealand;  6)  Costa  Rica,  Fiji,  Mauritius  and  Jamaica;  7)  Grenada,  Seychelles;  8) 
Cyprus  and  Barbados:  9)  Zanzibar:  10)  Comoros;  11)  Solomon  Islands;  12)  Papua 
New  Guinea:  13)  Western  Samoa:  14)  Kiribati  and  15)  the  Maldives. 
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Figure  5.2  Complete  Linkage  Clustering  of  a  selection  of  small  states 
Zanzibar  and  the  Comoros  islands  are  fused  at  the  10  group  solution  (superimposed 
line).  The  Seychelles,  and  Mauritius  are  fused  as  part  of  two  large  groups,  whilst  the 
Maldives  remain  as  an  `outlier'  until  the  four  group  solution  where  they  become  fused 
with  the  Solomon  islands,  Papua  New  Guinea  and  Kiribati.  At  the  three  group  solution 
Zanzibar,  Seychelles  and  the  Comoros  become  fused.  However,  since  the  degree  of  error 
is  greater  at  this  stage,  there  is  little  validity  in  this  grouping.  The  degree  of  accuracy  is 
greater  starting  from  the  individual  cases,  so  at  least  the  10  group  solution  should  be 
sufficient  in  assisting  the  analysis  to  arrive  at  a  reliable  conclusion. 
Both  techniques  group  the  cases  at  slightly  differing  stages,  although  most  cases  tend 
to  belong  to  the  same  groups  suggesting  that  there  are  characteristics  which  are  similar 
for  most  of  the  SIS.  Both  techniques  isolate  the  'Oriental'  islands  (Zanzibar,  Comoros 
and  the  Maldives)  from  the  'Occidental'  islands  (Seychelles  and  Mauritius),  supporting 
the  contention  that  there  is  a  distinct  difference  between  the  two  groups'  development 
status  and  backgrounds.  What  is  also  interesting  is  that  the  single  linkage  technique 98 
distinguishes  clearly  between  the  'Oriental'  countries  in  the  region,  that  is  each  of  them 
remains  separate  until  towards  the  end  (right  side)  of  the  horizontal  axis  where  Zanzibar 
and  the  Comoros  merge.  This  suggests  that  inspite  of  certain  perceived  similarities, 
there  are  other  important  differences  which  account  for  their  individual  membership. 
The  complete  linkage  technique  distinguishes  between  the  Maldives  as  a  member  of 
another  group  and  Zanzibar  and  the  Comoros  as  a  group  of  their  own,  suggesting  that 
the  latter  have  more  in  common  to  each  other  compared  to  the  Maldives. 
The  overall  results  reveal  associations  and  structure  in  the  data  which  are  useful  in  the 
understanding  of  the  development  experiences  and  processes  of  the  SIS.  They  have 
confirmed  the  existence  of  different  categories  of  SIS  generally,  and  more  specifically 
this  also  applies  to  the  SIS  of  the  Western  Indian  Ocean. 
The  assessment  of  cluster  validity  remains  a  difficult  problem  given  the  possibility  of 
subjectivity  in  making  the  analyses.  One  way  of  overcoming  these  difficulties  is 
suggested  by  Everitt  (1983:  252)  in  which  a  number  of  ad  hoc  measures  might  be 
considered.  For  example,  it  could  be  asked  of  the  results,  whether  the  same  clusters 
appear  when  other  variables  are  used.  If  the  answer  is  in  the  affirmative,  then  it  implies 
that  the  clusters  may  have  general  validity  in  terms  of  a  large  number  of  variables  and 
this  is  desirable.  In  this  case,  before  recent  (1991  source)  data  became  available,  two 
preliminary  tests  using  both  methods  (single  and  complete  linkages)  were  carried  out. 
They  used  a  different  combination  of  variables  and  data  sets  from  different  sources 
(1978  and  1980  data)  and  similar  clusters  were  obtained.  This  encouraged  the 
researcher  to  include  variables  other  than  purely  economic  ones  and  increase  the 
number  of  countries  in  the  sample.  Thus  the  answer  to  Everitt's  suggestion  is  in  the 
affirmative,  implying  that  the  clusters  arrived  at  are  valid. 
It  might  also  be  asked  whether  the  same  clusters  emerge  when  a  different  clustering 
technique  is  applied.  If  the  response  is  des'  then  it  would  support  the  validity  of  the 
groupings.  In  this  case,  using  the  two  techniques,  similar  cluster  groups  surface  at  the 
ten  cluster  solutions  thereby  lending  support  to  the  validity  of  the  groups. 
One  other  method  of  exploring  the  data  further  is  through  comparing  the  means, 
standard  deviations,  minima  and  maxima  of  the  different  groups.  They  provide  an 
insight  into  the  differences  within  and  between  groups  and  help  identify  which 
parameters  or  variables  are  similar  and  which  are  different.  Clusters  for  each  of  the  SIS 
of  the  Western  Indian  Ocean  are  taken  and  descriptive  statistics  calculated  and  tabled. 
The  first  group  (table  5.2)  comprises  the  Maldives,  the  Solomon  Islands,  Kiribati,  and 
Western  Samoa  -  this  is  the  Maldives  group.  The  second  group  -  the  Mauritius  group 
-consists  of  Mauritius,  Costa  Rica,  Fiji  and  Jamaica  (table  5.3).  Grenada  and  the 
Seychelles  make  up  the  third  group  (table  5.4)  -the  Seychelles  group,  and  the  last  group 99 
consists  of  Zanzibar  and  the  Comoros  (table  5.5).  In  all  cases,  there  is  a  considerable 
degree  of  homogeneity  between  variables  within  the  same  group  (as  expected)  but  these 
differ  when  compared  across  the  tables  confirming  the  differences  between  the  groups 
(tables  5.2,5.3,5.4,5.5). 
In  spite  of  the  large  number  of  variables,  the  tables  show  a  greater  degree  of 
homogeneity  in  each  group.  Comparing  between  the  tables  (and  groups),  variables  in 
which  large  differences  exist  (with  high  standard  deviations)  are  PcWat,  PcPriEd, 
PcSecEd,  PcSer,  PcExp,  Pclmp,  PcTour.  Food,  Energy,  ODA  per  capita.  This  suggests 
that  perhaps  these  variables  are  the  ones  which  account  for  the  differentials  in  the 
development  status  of  the  SIS  under  analysis. 
Variables  Means  Std.  Devs  Minima  Maxima 
CBR  38  5.35  33  44 
CDR  9.25  2.22  7  12 
TFR  5.45  1.11  4.30  6.50 
IMR  57.25  11.67  47  73 
Lifex  61.25  4.86  55  66 
PcUrb  22.27  10.32  10.40  35.50 
PopWat  46.75  18.54  24  69 
PopDoc  7.03  5.80  2  15 
PriEd  71.25  10.81  60  84 
SecEd  29.75  16.68  15  51 
PcInd  30  11.89  16  44 
PcAgric  72.15  9.52  61.30  84.20 
PcSer  11.50  7.68  5  20 
PcTour  21.50  22.13  2  52 
PcExp  43.40  25.71  13.20  68.80 
PcImp  91.93  40.48  60.50  150 
PcFood  17.05  9.64  8.30  29.20 
Energy  100  3.27  96  104 
ODA/cap  299.50  293.63  79.40  720.90 
Table  5.2  Cluster  characteristics  for  the  Maldives  group 100 
Variables  Means  Std.  Devs  Minima  Maxima 
CBR  23.25  3.86  18  27 
CDR  5.50  1.29  4  7 
TFR  2.65  0.57  1.9  3.1 
IMR  17.25  5.25  10  22 
Lifex  71.50  3.42  67  75 
PcUrb  45.48  4.25  42.3  51.7 
PcWat  91.50  10.08  77  100 
PopDoc  1.73  0.49  1  2 
PriEd  109.50  13.48  98  129 
SecEd  53.25  10.01  41  65 
PCInd  14.50  6.56  6  21 
PcAgric  67.10  7.20  59.5  75.7 
PcSer  28.75  9.60  19  42 
PcTour  18.50  8.85  10  28 
PxExp  35.45  18.25  23.4  62.6 
Pclmp  49.68  21.96  30.3  81.2 
PcFood  15.08  4.49  9.9  19.4 
Energy  129.25  39.19  86  169 
ODA/cap  7.30  3.24  3.5  11.4 
Table  5.3  Cluster  characteristics  for  the  Mauritius  group 
Variables  Means  Std.  Devs  Minima  Maxima 
CBR  27  1.41  26  28 
CDR  7  0  7  7 
TFR  3.15  0.07  3.10  3.20 
IMR  25  9.90  18  32 
Lifex  69.50  0.71  69  70 
PcUrb  60.55  3.46  58.10  63 
PcWat  91  8.48  85  97 
PopDoc  2.15  0.07  2.10  2.20 
PriEd  99.50  0.71  99  100 
SecEd  27.50  13.43  18  37 
PcInd  13  11.31  5  21 
PcAgr  51.65  2.33  50  53.30 
PcSer  16.50  2.12  15  18 
PcTour  39  7.07  34  44 
PcExp  23.20  4.67  19.90  26.50 
Pclmp  52.85  11.24  44.90  60.80 
PcFood  21.30  2.12  19.80  22.80 
Energy  231.50  177.48  106  357 
ODA/cap  127.45  96.24  59.40  195.50 
Table  5.4  Cluster  characteristics  for  the  Seychelles  group 101 
Variables  Means  Std.  Devs  Minima  Maxima 
CBR  51  2.83  49  53 
CDR  14.50  3.54  12  17 
TFR  7.50  0.99  6.80  8.20 
IMR  112.50  24.75  95  130 
Lifex  56  1.41  55  57 
PcUrb  31.25  5.73  27.20  35.30 
PcWat  36  11.31  28  44 
PopDoc  12.55  0.35  12.30  12.80 
PriEd  9150  0.71  91  92 
SecEd  30.50  7.78  25  36 
PcInd  45.50  16.26  34  57 
PcAgric  46.45  6.01  42.20  50.70 
PcSer  25  16.97  13  37 
PcTour  425  5.30  0.50  8 
PcExp  14.60  1.41  13.60  15.60 
Pclmp  37.95  7.71  32.50  43.40 
PcFood  34.40  10.61  26.90  41.90 
Energy  100  0  100  100 
ODA/cap  211.90  256.68  30.400  393.40 
Table  5.5  Cluster  characteristics  of  the  Zanzibar  /Comoros  group 
Within  each  group  explanations  are  found  for  both  the  common  and  the  divergent 
characteristics.  Most  tend  to  be  similar  and  it  is  the  divergent  ones  that  underline  the 
distinctiveness  within  each  group.  To  make  the  analysis  and  arrive  at  valid 
explanations  requires  an  interpretation  of  the  results  of  tables  5.2  to  5.5  and  checking 
the  actual  'raw'  data  in  table  5.1. 
Taking  the  Maldives  group  for  example,  there  are  high  standard  deviations  (about  and 
greater  than  10  standard  deviations)  in  certain  economic  (ODA/cap,  Pclmp,  PcExp, 
PcTour,  PcInd,  PcAgric),  social  (PriEd,  SecEd,  PcWat),  demographic  (IMR,  PcUrb)  and 
import  dependency  (PcFood)  characteristics  .  There  is  a  considerable  difference  in 
receipt  of  per  capita  official  development  assistance,  the  percentage  of  merchandise 
Imports  and  exports  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  and  tourist  earnings  as  a  percentage  of 
total  export  earnings  between  the  countries.  Other  differences  include  the  proportion  of 
food  imports  to  total  imports  and  the  percentage  contribution  of  manufactures  to  GDP. 
In  the  Mauritius  group  high  standard  deviations  exist  in  economic  (Pclmp,  PcExp)  social 
(PriEd,  SecEd,  PcWat)  and  dependency  (Energy)  characteristics.  The  low  standard 
deviations  in  all  demographic  variables,  population  per  physician,  percentage 
contribution  of  agriculture  and  services  to  GDP,  tourist  earnings  as  a  percentage  of 
export  earnings,  food  imports  as  a  percentage  of  total  imports,  per  capita  official 
development  assistance  and  degrees  of  urbanisation  suggest  that  there  are  many 
common  economic  and  structural  characteristics  between  the  SIS  in  the  group. 102 
In  the  Seychelles  group  high  standard  deviations  exist  only  in  dependency  (Energy), 
economic  (ODA/cap.  Pcimp  and  PcAgric)  and  demographic  (IMR)  characteristics.  Of  the 
two  countries  Seychelles  has  a  disproportionately  high  energy  demand  reflecting  the 
needs  of  tourism  and  the  fishing  industry  while  Grenada  receives  a  greater  share  of  per 
capita  official  development  assistance.  The  two  countries  in  the  group  share  similar 
demographic  and  other  economic  social  and  dependency  (food)  characteristics.  They 
also  have  almost  a  similar  degree  of  urbanisation. 
In  the  Zanzibar  and  Comoros  group  high  standard  deviations  occur  in  dependency 
(PcFood),  economic  (ODA/cap,  PcSer,  Pclnd),  social  (PcWat)  and  some  demographic  (IMR) 
characteristics.  There  are  many  similarities  in  the  remaining  demographic.  and 
economic  characteristics.  The  Comoros  have  disproportionately  high  per  capita  official 
development  assistance,  infant  mortality  rates,  percentage  contributions  of  services  and 
agriculture  to  GDP  compared  to  Zanzibar's.  Zanzibar  has  a  lesser  proportion  of  its 
population  with  access  to  clean  water  and  the  proportion  of  food  imports  to  total 
Imports  is  higher. 
The  countries  that  share  generally  similar  characteristics  are  those  which  exhibit 
smaller  deviations.  So  for  example  in  the  Maldives  group  there  are  broad  similarities  in 
demographic  characteristics  (table  5.2)  and  hence  the  standard  deviations  and  ranges 
within  each  of  the  demographic  variables  are  relatively  small.  There  are  common 
characteristics  in  the  structure  of  skilled  personnel  and  provision  of  health  services, 
with  an  average  ratio  of  one  physician  to  about  7,000  people.  There  are  also 
similarities  in  the  contributions  of  manufacturing  and  services  to  GDP,  with 
manufacturing  accounting  for  an  average  of  11.5%  to  GDP  and  services  72%.  However, 
the  Maldives  shows  a  deviation  from  the  rest  with  a  higher  contribution  from 
manufacturing.  All  the  countries  in  the  group  are  highly  dependent  on  imported  fuel. 
The  Zanzibar  and  Comoros  group  share  similarities  in  demographic  characteristics  such 
as  fertility  rates  and  life  expectancy.  They  also  share  similarities  in  food  and  energy 
import  dependency  (hence  their  shortages  of  foreign  exchange),  in  the  percentage 
contribution  of  tourism  in  export  earnings  (low  because  tourism  is  underdeveloped), 
services  to  the  economy  (indicative  of  a  high  component  of  public  sector  employment 
that  refects  limited  opportunities),  and  the  merchandise  export  as  a  percentage  of  GDP 
(mainly  very  few  cash  crops  and  very  low  compared  to  imports  and  hence  a  balance  of 
payments  crisis).  Others  include  provision  of  basic  needs  such  as  primary  and 
secondary  education  (a  high  proportion  in  primary  schools  and  less  than  a  third  in 
secondary  education)  and  the  population  per  physician  (an  average  of  one  physician  to 
twelve  and  a  half  thousand  people,  reflecting  a  big  shortage  of  skilled  personnel). 103 
In  the  final  analysis,  clustering  techniques  supported  by  other  measures  used  to 
validate  the  clusters,  confirm  the  existence  of  distinct  groups  of  SS  and  SIS  sharing 
similar  characteristics.  These  groupings  are  based  on  their  individual  experiences  and 
characteristics  which  in  turn  determine  the  options  available  to  them  for  their 
development  potential.  More  precisely  they  determine  the  degrees  of  flexibility  and 
possibilities  for  alternatives  in  the  search  for  economic  viability  and  socio-economic 
development. 
Clearly.  each  country  or  cluster  of  countries  will  require  a  unique  set  of  solutions  or 
strategies  appropriate  to  their  specific  development  objectives  and  constraints,  their 
political  inclinations  so  as  to  achieve  successful  socio-economic  development  and  also 
the  less  developed  SIS  can  learn  valuable  lessons  from  those  that  are  more  successful. 
It  is  Important  to  identify  the  main  development  constraints  as  well  as  the  short  and 
long  term  options/advantages  that  are  available  to  each  country  and  how  they  act  on 
these.  Adopting  blanket  recommendations  or  'copy  cat'  solutions  that  have  been 
applied  elsewhere  arbitrarily  will  have  limited  success  because  of  the  many  inherent 
differences  that  exist  within  the  SIS  and  small  countries. 
5.3  Comparative  Analysis 
The  Indian  Ocean  islands  of  the  Comoros,  Seychelles,  Mauritius  and  the  Maldives  have 
a  number  of  strong  similarities  as  well  as  differences.  A  study  of  these  provides 
important  lessons  in  the  development  experiences  of  SIS.  Apart  from  Zanzibar  all  the 
SIS  are  independent  and  autonomous  states.  Zanzibar  is  different  in  that  it  forms  part 
of  the  United  Republic  of  Tanzania,  through  a  federal  Union  that  it  has  with  mainland 
Tanzania.  However,  it  maintains  a  government  which  is  in  charge  of  its  domestic 
affairs,  a  political  relationship  which  reflects  the  different  nature  of  the  development 
problems  of  Zanzibar. 
Small  island  economies  share  a  number  of  specific  social  economic.  cultural,  political 
and  geographic  problems.  Many  of  these  act  as  constraints  on  development  (chapter 
three).  However,  the  problem  in  discussing  SIS  as  a  collective  group  sharing  a  number 
of  common  disadvantages  or  advantages,  obscures  the  individual  and  sometimes  more 
Important  problems  of  particular  groups  of  islands  in  different  geographic  areas  and  at 
different  levels  of  socio-economic  development,  and  even  more  the  individual 
experiences  of  island  countries. 
Referring  to  the  island  states  of  the  South-West  Indian  Ocean,  one  commentator 
pointed  out  that  the  economies  of  those  countries  provide  a  good  case  study  of  the 
problems  of  transition  from  colonial  to  post-colonial  institutions  and  the  nature  of  the 104 
development  processes  in  islands  as  a  whole  (Sheth,  1987).  He  goes  on  to  make  general 
observations  about  the  small  countries  in  the  region  such  as  the  influence  of  Europe 
and  colonialism  on  them,  their  structural  dependence  and  the  absence  of  economic  co- 
operation  between  them  as  a  group  and  within  the  group  in  the  region. 
Appleyard  and  Ghosh  (1988)  focus  specifically  on  four  independent  developing  SIS, 
namely  the  Maldives,  Seychelles,  Comoros  and  Mauritius.  They  note  that  the  four, 
while  sharing  some  characteristics  common  to  all  such  SIS.  also  differ  to  some  extent  in 
important  economic  and  other  factors.  These  differences  Include  population  size  and 
growth.  'colonial  legacies,  resource  bases,  per  capita  incomes,  political  and  social 
institutions,  religion  and  culture.  Such  differences  are  of  significance  to  the  levels  of 
development  which  the  SIS  have  achieved,  and  to  the  conditions  under  which 
development  takes  place. 
Interestingly.  the  above  approach  bears  some  similarity  to  that  suggested  by  Shaw 
(1982)  and  responds  to  the  plea  made  by  Demas  (1965)  for  a  'relevant  analytical 
framework'  that  avoids  making  over-generalised  statements  about  SIS.  Thus,  while 
specific  analyses  are  made  for  the  individual  countries,  there  is  also  an  attempt  to  make 
comparisons  between  them.  Appleyard  and  Ghosh  (1988)  generally  concentrate  on  the 
economic  aspects  of  development. 
The  approach  adopted  here  looks  at  the  characteristics  of  different  SS  and  SIS  within 
the  Western  Indian  Ocean  region  in  a  holistic  manner.  Thus  it  extends  beyond  the 
purely  economic  aspects,  to  incorporate  social,  political  and  cultural  factors. 
Comparative  analysis  has  been  used  to  explain  the  development  problems  and 
prospects  in  different  SIS  and  suggests  that  the  experiences  of  one  area  can  be  utilised 
in  others.  Recent  work  in  the  Indian  Ocean  region  has  tended  to  focus  on  specific 
issues  and  table  5.6  summarises  the  contents  and  subjects  under  analysis  and 
discussion  In  the  works  cited. 105 
Shand  (1980a)  Shaw  (1982).  Appleyard,  et.  al.  (1988) 
Size/smallness  Level  of  income/development  Human  resources 
Agricultural,  fisheries  and  Size/smallness  Macroeconomic  policies 
remoteness 
Remoteness  Resources/Economic  sectors 
Population  and  Migration  Islandness/'Landlockedness' 
Trade,  transport  and  tourism  Internal  fragmentation/dispersion 
Finance  and  economic  Post  independence  experience 
stability 
Health  and  education  Resources  per  Capita  (human  and  Physical) 
Administration,  law  and 
politics 
Development  strategies 
and  Aid 
Sources:  Shand  (1980a),  Shaw  (1982)  Appleyard  et.  al.  (1988a). 
Table  6.6  Alternative  analytical  Issues  and  approaches  for  Small  Island  States. 
Shaw  (1982)  suggests  slightly  different  headings  from  those  used  by  Appleyard  and 
Ghosh  (1988)  and  the  study  edited  by  Shand  (1980a).  1  The  latter  study  covers  a  larger 
geographical  area,  incorporating  the  island  states  of  the  Pacific  and  Indian  Oceans, 
resulting  in  the  need  to  compromise  on  detailed  analyses  and  focus  on  a  more 
circumscribed  interpretation  of  SIS  characteristics.  The  table  (5.6)  summarises  the 
different  topics/approaches  under  which  small  island  countries  have  been  discussed 
usually  within  a  regional  basis.  Shaw's  (op.  cit.  )  proposed  approach  is  applicable  at 
both  the  individual  country  level  as  well  as  on  a  regional  basis.  It  is  also  noted  that 
although  the  works  edited  by  Shand  (1980a)  were  not  specifically  meant  for  cross 
country  comparative  analysis,  to  some  extent  they  permitted  it,  and  in  so  doing 
provided  significant  insights  into  the  problems  associated  with  SIS  development.  As  the 
title  suggested,  it  attempted  to  'dissect'  and  analyse  the  anatomy  of  development  of  SIS 
in  the  Pacific  and  Indian  Ocean  regions. 
The  works  in  Appleyard  and  Ghosh  (1988)  attempted  to  draw  out  a  comparative 
analysis  of  the  economic  and  human  resources  associated  with  the  development  of  the 
four  South-West  Indian  Ocean  island  countries,  looking  specifically  at  the  main 
economic  sectors:  agriculture.  industry,  fisheries  and  tourism,  human  resources,  and 
macroeconomic  policies.  Interesting  and,  for  current  purposes,  relevant  aspects  of 
1  It  is  not  being  suggested  that  they  have  deliberately  followed  Shaw's  suggested  analytical  framework,  instead  their 
approach  bear  some  similarities  to  Shaw's  suggestion  with  the  additional  benefit  of  aspects  of  comparative  analysis. 106 
development  related  to  the  four  case  studies  are  revealed  and  what  is  shown  clearly  are 
the  significant  differences  between  the  countries  in  terms  of  their  respective  general 
development  patterns,  trends  and  potentials.  Differences  in  their  pre-colonial  and 
colonial  history  certainly  contribute  to  their  current  relationships  within  the  world 
economy.  However,  their  post-independence  experiences  (neo-colonial),  development 
policies  and  strategies,  culture,  technological  development  and  links  with  the  global 
economy  have  also  moulded  their  respective  development  paths  and  lead  to  differing 
levels  of  achievements. 
5.4  Location,  physical  features  and  fragmentation 
The  islands  under  discussion  are  located  in  the  Western  Indian  Ocean  region  and  are 
spread  over  a  very  large  area  (figure  5.3).  The  Maldives  are  located  in  the  north  Oust  off 
the  south-western  tip  of  India).  Zanzibar  and  the  Comoros  are  found  just  off  the  mid- 
eastern  side  of  the  African  continent.  The  Seychelles  are  located  near  the  middle  of  the 
western  Indian  Ocean  region  and  Mauritius  is  in  the  south. 
Zanzibar  consists  of  two  large  islands.  Unguja  and  Pemba  and  a  number  of  tiny  islets 
around  the  two  main  islands  occupying  1640  square  Km2.  They  are  some  40 
kilometres  from  the  coast  of  Tanzania  and  lie  some  6°  south  of  the  Equator.  The  relief 
is  low  and  undulating.  The  eastern  part  of  the  islands  is  comprised  of  coral  rag.  The 
highest  parts  are  in  the  west  averaging  50  metres  and  are  mainly  comprised  of 
limestone  with  ample  supplies  of  ground  water.  The  vegetation  is  luxuriant,  mainly 
coconut  palms,  clove  and  a  variety  of  tropical  vegetation.  The  climate  is  tropical, 
dominated  by  the  monsoon  wind  system.  From  November  to  March  the  north-east 
monsoon  blows  bringing  with  it  the  rainy  season.  Between  April  and  October  the  south- 
east  monsoon  dominates  the  weather  and  brings  with  it  less  rain.  Temperatures  range 
from  19-33°C  throughout  the  year.  The  monsoon  winds  encouraged  the  mercantile 
system  which  developed  along  the  western  Indian  Ocean  and  the  islands  of  the  south- 
west  Indian  Ocean  (Sheriff,  1987).  Of  the  islands  discussed  here.  Zanzibar  is  the 
closest  to  the  largest  land  mass,  being  only  40  Kms.  away,  making  it  more  of  a  'coastal' 
island  and  significantly  different  to  the  rest.  1 
1  The  terms  'coastal'.  'oceanic'  and  'mid-oceanic'  are  used  in  terms  of  relative  distances  of  the  main  centres  of  the 
respective  island  states  to  the  nearest  main  land  mass. 107 
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Figure  5.3  The  SIS  of  the  Western  Indian  Ocean  Region 
The  Comoros  consist  of  an  archipelago  of  four  islands  located  in  the  Mozambique 
channel  between  Mozambique  and  the  northern  tip  of  Madagascar.  They  lie  about  12° 
south  of  the  equator  and  consist  of  a  land  mass  covering  2236  Km2.  The  main  islands 
are  Grand  Comore  (1148  Km2).  Anjouan  (424  Km2),  Mayotte  (374  Km2)  and  Moleli  (290 
Km2).  1  The  islands  are  volcanic  and  the  terrain  hilly,  which  constrains  agricultural 
land  use.  The  climate  is  predominantly  tropical,  though  there  are  considerable 
variations  in  rainfall  and  temperature  as  a  result  of  location  and  elevation.  The  Comoro 
islands  are  400  kilometres  from  the  African  continent,  which  is  the  nearest  large  land 
mass,  and  are  the  second  closest  of  the  Indian  Ocean  SIS  to  the  African  continent. 
They  are  'oceanic'  islands.  and  located  between  the  African  continent  and  Madagascar. 
The  Maldives  are  an  archipelago  comprising  of  26  natural  atolls  which  in  turn  comprise 
1900  tiny  islands,  of  which  less  than  17%  are  inhabited.  They  are  situated  south-west 
of  India  and  Sri  Lanka.  The  islands  are  small,  low  lying  surrounded  by  reefs,  and  are 
spread  over  an  extensive  area  from  the  equator  to  about  70  north.  The  dominant 
vegetation  is  the  coconut  palm  and  the  total  land  area  covers  about  298  Km2.  Indeed 
most  of  the  islands  cover  very  small  areas,  making  the  scope  for  commercial  agriculture 
limited.  Distance  to  the  nearest  continent  is  646  kilometres. 
1  The  island  of  Mayotte  rejected  independence  and  continues  to  retain  its  colonial  links  with  France. 108 
Mauritius  consists  of  one  main  island  and  several  smaller  ones  which  include  Rodrigues 
(20°S),  Agalega  (10°S),  and  the  Cargodos  Carajos  (16°S)  groups  of  islands.  They  are 
known  as  the  Mascarene  islands.  Diego  Garcia,  formally  part  of  Mauritius,  was 
acquired  by  Britain  and  is  currently  occupied  by  the  United  States  as  a  strategic 
military  base.  The  total  land  area  is  2045  Km2.  The  country  is  mainly  volcanic  and 
consists  of  a  plain  rising  from  the  north-east  to  the  south-west  with  volcanic  peaks  and 
gorges  that  rise  abruptly.  The  islands  are  surrounded  by  corals  and  enjoy  a  sub- 
tropical  maritime  climate  with  a  wet  and  dry  season.  The  coast  is  warm  and  dry,  while 
the  hinterland  is  cool  and  rainy.  Quite  different  from  the  others,  between  September 
and  May  the  islands  of  Mauritius  are  vulnerable  to  cyclones.  Mauritius  is  800  Kms.  to 
the  nearest  large  land  mass  making  it  an  'oceanic'  island  group. 
The  Seychelles  comprises  115  widely  scattered  islands,  of  which  nearly  a  third  are 
granitic  and  the  rest  coralline.  The  total  land  area  is  454  Km2  and  the  main  island  is 
Mahe  (144  Km2).  The  total  land  and  sea  are  covers  1  million  Km2.  Despite  its  vast 
marine  territory  and  numerous  islands,  the  population  land  ratio  is  high,  such  that 
reclamation  of  land  from  the  sea  is  taking  place  in  Mahe  (Plate  1).  The  islands,  rising 
fairly  steeply  from  the  sea,  are  just  outside  the  cyclone  belt.  There  are  two  distinct 
seasons:  the  hot  season  from  December  to  May  and  the  cool  from  June  to  November. 
The  island  enjoys  a  mean  average  temperature  of  around  27°C.  Vegetation  is  typically 
tropical,  and  land  for  cultivation  is  severely  limited.  The  distance  to  the  nearest  large 
land  mass  is  about  1700  Kms,  making  Seychelles  `mid-oceanic'  islands. 
Plate  I  View  of  an  area  in  Seychelles  being  reclaimed  from  the  sea 109 
All  the  islands  described  above  share  good  climatic,  scenic  and  natural  attractions  for 
tourism.  They  have  varying  degrees  of  marine  resource  potential.  Their  physical 
characteristics  differ  substantially  in  physical  size,  dispersion/fragmentation,  terrain, 
water  resources,  cultivable  land.  Population  size  and  natural  vegetation  vary 
considerably.  The  southern  most  islands,  Mauritius  and  even  the  Comoros,  are 
vulnerable  to  periodic  cyclones  as  they  are  located  within  the  southern  Indian  Ocean 
cyclone  belt.  The  islands  closer  to,  and  north  of  the  equator  are  largely  immune  from 
this  phenomenon. 
They  also  differ  in  terms  of  their  cultural  composition  and  levels  of  economic  and  social 
development.  Although  they  have  each  embarked  upon  generally  similar  post- 
independence  development  objectives,  their  strategies  have  differed  considerably  and 
hence  they  have  attained  different  levels  of  achievement.  Their  pre-independence 
experiences  and  characteristics  are  partly  responsible  for  the  strategies  chosen  to  lead 
them  towards  their  respective  objectives.  These  are  discussed  and  analysed  in  some 
depth  in  the  following  part. 
Clearly  fragmentation  is  a  problem  affecting  most  of  the  SIS,  even  those  with  a  few 
islands.  Fragmentation  can  lead  to  centre-periphery  problems  and  SIS  are  bedevilled  by 
such  problems  -  e.  g.,  Malta-Gozo,  St.  Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla,  Tuvalu  and  many  others. 
Fragmentation  has  many  negative  development  implications  in  terms  of  administrative 
difficulties,  favouritism  towards  certain  areas,  political  allegiances  and  all  these  are 
expressible  in  centre-periphery  terms. 
Location  of  the  SIS  is  of  continuing  significance  in  terms  of  how  external  powers  have 
viewed  them.  Some  were  perceived  as  of  strategic  or  commercial  Importance  while 
others  were  not.  The  proximity  of  Zanzibar  to  the  East  African  mainland  was  a  critical 
factor  in  the  pre-European  Arab  economy.  Within  the  European  period,  and  especially 
during  decolonisation,  the  relative  economic  importance  of  some  places,  such  as 
Zanzibar  declined.  However,  their  strategic  potential  increased  and  especially  so  with 
the  mounting  Cold  War  tensions.  Most  SIS  were  of  strategic  importance  and  some, 
such  as  Mauritius  and  the  Comoros,  have  exploited  this  potential  economically,  whilst 
others,  such  as  Zanzibar,  have  preferred  not  to  do  so.  Location  was  affected  not  only  by 
superpower  rivalries;  regional  political  interests  also  apply  and  within  that  context  the 
case  of  Zanzibar  and  its  Union  to  the  Mainland  is  one  example.  Similarly  economic  and 
security  co-operation  has  developed  between  the  Maldives  and  India. 110 
5.5  Pre-independence  Characteristics 
Some  of  the  SIS  under  discussion  had  pre-European  influences  which  affected  their 
development.  For  example.  Zanzibar  and  the  Comoros  experienced  Arab  imperialism 
while  the  Maldives  also  experienced  a  mixture  of  Arab  and  Asiatic  influences.  As  a 
result  the  dominant  religions  and  cultures  in  these  islands  have  tended  to  be  Islamic. 
Although  Arab  'explorers'  and  traders  came  across  the  other  islands.  it  was  the 
European  influence.  and  with  it  Christianity,  which  dominated.  It  is  also  interesting 
that  the  pre-European  influences  were  responsible  for  the  establishment  of  the 
plantation  economies  in  Zanzibar,  the  Maldives  and  in  the  Comoros.  The  economies 
that  developed  were  part  of  a  larger  economic  system  encompassing  the  Middle  East 
and  Asia  and  then  linked  to  Europe.  What  is  significant  here  is  that  the  trading  centres 
were  based  in  the  Middle  Eastern-Asian  axis. 
Colonial  aspirations  within  the  region  brought  explorers  and  by  around  the  sixteenth 
century  Europeans  arrived  in  the  Western  Indian  Ocean  region.  European  domination 
and  economic  influence  effectively  began  in  the  Maldives  in  1558,  Mauritius  in  1598, 
Reunion  in  1638,  Seychelles  in  1744,  the  Comoros  in  1850  and  in  Zanzibar  in  1890. 
The  European  powers  comprised  the  Portuguese,  Dutch,  French  and  British.  They 
either  expanded  existing  plantation  economies  or  introduced  them  where  none  existed 
before  e.  g.,  in  Seychelles,  Mauritius  and  the  Maldives.  Free  labour  was  available 
through  slavery,  but  with  its  abolition  it  became  necessary  to  'import'  indentured  labour 
much  of  which  came  from  India  (especially  in  the  case  of  Mauritius).  Colonial 
penetration  enhanced  the  movement  of  populations  adding  to  the  multi-ethnic  and 
multi-religious  societies  in  the  islands,  though  the  contemporary  sociocultural 
characteristics  of  some  of  the  islands,  such  as  the  Comoros  and  Zanzibar,  were  shaped 
as  much  in  the  pre-European  era.  The  success  of  European  domination  severed  non- 
European  links  and  direct  traditional  dependency  links  were  established  in  their  place. 
Zanzibar  was  ruled  as  a  Sultanate  between  1830  and  1890  at  which  time  it  became  a 
British  protectorate.  Arab  colonisation  and  expansionism  and  later  the  scramble  for 
Africa,  gave  the  island  state  an  important  position  not  only  in  the  region  but  also  with 
respect  to  the  role  it  played  in  relation  to  the  expansion  of  international  capital  and 
trade-1  Trade  dominated  the  economy  from  the  1800s,  particularly  the  notorious  slave 
trade,  while  a  plantation  economy  was  established.  Both  Arab  and  British  colonial  rule 
moulded  the  socio-economic  and  cultural  fabric  of  Zanzibari  society.  Islamic  religion 
1  One  famous  saying  portraying  the  importance  and  influence  of  the  islands  between  the  1800s  and  1900s  states  that 
"when  they  play  the  flute  in  the  islands,  they  dance  at  the  Lakes",  implying  the  great  lakes  of  Eastern  and  Central 
Africa. 111 
and  cultural  influences  came  with  the  arrival  and  settlement  of  the  Arabs,  and  despite 
the  influence  of  Christianity  and  anti-slave  trade  movement  and  British  colonial  rule, 
Zanzibar  has  remained  a  society  with  a  strong  Islamic  religious  and  cultural  identity. 
The  Islamic  Federal  Republic  of  Comoros  consists  of  early  immigrants  from  the  African 
mainland,  and  the  Far  East.  The  Arabs  also  arrived  before  the  Europeans  and  some 
settled.  The  Portuguese  came  in  1499.  Dutch  and  French  colonisation  introduced 
Chinese  and  Indian  labour.  As  in  Zanzibar,  Arab  influence  on  religion  and  culture 
persisted  despite  Christian  and  European  influence.  Another  similar  characteristic  to 
Zanzibar  is  the  multi-ethnic  composition  of  the  population.  Both  settlers  and  colonial 
influence  are  responsible  for  the  establishment  of  a  plantation  economy,  the  main  crops 
being  coconuts,  cloves,  vanilla,  ylang  ylang.  I 
The  Republic  of  Maldives  had  numerous  'visitors'  influencing  the  features  of  today's 
inhabitants  who  display  Aryan,  Arab,  Negroid  and  Mongoloid  features,  but  despite  its 
strategic  location  on  trade  and  sailing  routes  to  the  Far  East,  quite  unlike  all  the  other 
islands  in  this  discussion,  it  has  been  remarkably  free  from  a  multiplicity  of  foreign 
domination  (Appleyard,  1988).  Britain  was  the  country's  main  external  political  contact 
until  independence  in  1965.  It  is  a  Republic  and  retains  a  traditional  form  of  leadership 
through  the  Sultan.  As  in  the  Comoros  and  Zanzibar,  the  influence  of  Islam  is  very 
strong.  The  main  economic  activities  in  the  pre-independence  period  included  trade, 
small  scale  fishing,  providing  a  port  and  supplies  to  passing  vessels  and  as  a  strategic 
military  base  for  the  Royal  Air  Force.  The  economy  is  largely  a  subsistence  one,  though 
more  recently  tourism  is  being  aggressively  exploited. 
Mauritius  was  influenced  by  the  Portuguese  (1510).  Dutch  (1652),  French  (1715)  and 
British  (1810).  Slave  labour  was  brought  in  from  Madagascar  and  later  indentured 
Indian  labour  was  introduced  by  the  British  (1834).  The  French  established  the  basic 
infrastructure  and  developed  the  sugar-cane  plantations.  Colonisation  by  the  different 
European  powers  and  the  introduction  of  slave  and  indentured  labour  produced  a 
varied  mixture  of  races,  cultures  and  religion.  The  main  groups  are  Hindus  and 
Moslems  of  Indian  descent,  Creoles  of  mixed  descent,  Europeans  and  Chinese.  Just 
over  one  half  of  the  population  are  Hindus  and  16%  are  Moslems.  A  significant 
plantation  economy  was  developed  based  primarily  on  a  single  crop  -  sugar  cane.  Some 
agricultural  processing  industries  were  developed.  The  early  post-independence 
economy  continued  to  be  dependent  on  sugar-cane  growing  and  exports. 
1  Ylang  ylang  is  a  tree  whose  flowers  are  picked  and  distilled  for  a  perfume  base. 112 
Amongst  the  first  visitors  to  what  is  now  the  Republic  of  Seychelles  were  the  Arabs  in  the 
Middle  ages  and  the  Portuguese  (1505).  It  was  colonised  by  the  French  (1756)  and  later 
possessed  by  the  British  following  the  Napoleonic  wars  (1810).  In  1903  Seychelles 
became  a  British  crown  colony.  The  French  brought  in  slave  labour  and  agricultural 
plantations  were  established  producing  mainly  coconut  (copra)  and  food.  Small  scale 
fishing  was  also  carried  out.  The  population  consists  of  Creoles,  Indians,  Chinese  and 
Europeans,  and  Christianity,  particularly  a  largely  European  based  culture,  and 
Catholicism  are  dominant. 
15.6  Economic  legacies  of  the  SIS 
With  the  exception  of  the  Maldives,  all  the  SIS  inherited  plantation  dominated 
economies.  Amounts  of  cultivable  land  determined  the  extent  to  which  the  plantation 
economies  were  developed.  Thus  in  the  Seychelles  and  Maldives  where  labour  was 
available  but  cultivable  land  was  limited,  the  plantation  economy  was  less  important. 
In  both  cases  it  was  not  only  the  quality  and  quantity  of  land,  but  also  the  high  degree 
of  fragmentation  and  dispersion  of  tiny  islands  which  constrained  the  expansion  of  cash 
crop  agriculture.  Distance  and  transport  costs  reduce  the  economic  viability  of  such 
enterprises.  In  the  Comoros,  where  the  land  mass  is  about  the  same  size  as  Zanzibar  a 
high  degree  of  land  fragmentation  exists.  This  is  caused  by  land  ownership  and  tenure. 
In  addition  the  hilly  terrain  restricts  medium  and  large  scale  agriculture  while  poor  land 
quality  determines  that  cultivable  land  area  is  small. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  for  most  of  the  SIS  under  discussion,  the  legacy  of  the 
plantation  economy  persists  to  dominate  the  island  economies,  despite  the  general 
decline  in  produce  prices  over  the  last  decade  (Table  5.7).  Those  countries  where  the 
contribution  of  agriculture  is  relatively  small  or  has  declined,  such  as  Seychelles  and 
Mauritius,  have  successfully  diversified  their  economies  into  other  sectors  such  as 
tourism  and  manufacturing.  They  have  strong  trade  and  marketing  links  with  the 
former  colonial  powers  and  the  Western  countries  as  a  whole  and  as  such  maintain  a 
closer  position  to  the  core  in  the  model  outlined  In  chapter  two  (Figure  2.2). 
More  recently  the  SIS  attempting  diversification  have  established  important  trading 
links  elsewhere,  e.  g.,  Japan  and  the  NICs.  Because  of  the  limitations  of  land  resources, 
the  Maldives  have  resorted  to  exploiting  marine  resources  and  some  manufacturing. 
With  the  exception  of  tourism,  its  trade  links  (imports  and  exports)  are  predominantly 
with  nearby  developing  countries  (see  tables  5.7  and  5.8).  Zanzibar's  trading  links  are 
also  mainly  with  developing  countries,  though  predominantly  with  mainland  Tanzania. 
This  has  been  facilitated  through  what  is  termed  as  'inter-state  trade'.  an  off  shoot  of 
the  political  union  that  exists  between  the  two  countries.  More  recently,  the  volume  of 113 
Imports  and  exports  between  the  two  countries  has  been  growing.  especially  since  the 
mid-1980s.  The  agricultural  legacy  of  Arab  imperialism  and  the  European  colonialism 
that  followed  continues  to  exist  in  Zanzibar  and  the  Comoro  islands.  In  the  latter. 
trading  links  are  predominantly  with  the  developed  countries,  the  main  partners  being 
South  Africa  and  France. 
Those  islands  with  larger  cultivable  land  areas,  -  in  particular  Zanzibar  and  Mauritius  - 
have  relatively  large  plantation  economies  upon  which  their  economies  had  become 
dependent  by  the  time  of  independence.  Zanzibar  relied  on  cloves  and  coconut  (copra), 
the  Comoros  on  cloves,  copra,  vanilla  and  ylang  ylang,  Mauritius  on  sugar-cane, 
Seychelles  on  coconut  (copra)  and  the  Maldives  on  a  very  small  amount  of  coconut 
(copra).  Subsistence  agriculture  played  an  important  role  for  a  large  part  of  the 
population  and  there  has  also  been  a  small  proportion  of  agriculture  mainly  for  the 
provision  of  food  to  the  urban  sectors.  Table  5.7  summarises  the  general 
characteristics  of  the  SIS,  which  also  show  that,  for  the  most  part,  their  economic 
legacies  have  yet  to  change. 
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Comoros  225  44  34  13  53  83 
Maldives  693  10  26  16  58  54 
Seychelles  239  21  7  8  85  11 
Mauritius  587  57  13  22  65  28 
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1986-1  988 
66.5 
Commod  ity 
Re-exports 
19  86-1988 
43.4 
Comoros  Vanilla  55.8  Copra  19.5 
Maldives  Marine  products  47.0  Clothing  &  accessories  47.0 
Seychelles  Copra  2.4  Cinnamon  bark  13 
Mauritius  Sugar  43.8  Clothing  22.0 
Sources:  Commonwealth  Secretariat  (1991),  Zanzibar  Government  (1981,1984,1989) 
Table  5.7  Comparison  of  selected  basic  economic  indicators 
One  sector  in  which  most  of  the  countries  are  well  endowed,  is  marine  resources. 
However,  it  is  only  the  Seychelles  which  has  managed  to  exploit  this  sector  effectively, 
though  the  industry  is  dominated  by  foreign  enterprises.  Technological  capacities  and 
capabilities,  capital  and  entrepreneurial  constraints  have  militated  against  the 
successful  large  scale  exploitation  of  fisheries.  Although  comparative  figures  are  not 
easily  available,  individual  reports  stress  that  subsistence  fishing  plays  an  important 
part  in  the  provision  of  food  and  nutrition  and  generating  some  income  for  small 
fishermen. 114 
6.7  Post-Independence  Development 
The  immediate  post-independence  social  and  economic  development  policies  are  to  a 
large  extent  responsible  for  the  position  in  which  some  of  the  island  states  discussed 
find  themselves  today.  They  adopted  widely  diverging  policies,  usually  influenced  by  the 
historical  processes  prior  to  independence,  their  political  and  economic  choices, 
physical  limitations  which  have  been  exaggerated  by  the  lack  of  appropriate  technology 
and  the  manner  in  which  they  have  become  integrated  into  the  global  economic  system. 
Many  sought  to  reverse  the  adverse  social  problems  while  building  on  the  existing 
foundations,  a  procedure  that  has  not  always  been  appropriate  or  successful. 
Table  5.8  uses  a  broadly  defined  set  of  economic  and  social  indicators  to  show  the 
current  status  of  development  of  the  SIS  under  analysis.  The  figures  show  the 
variations  and  similarities  in  different  aspects  of  development  in  the  islands.  By  and 
large  they  reflect  their  respective  historical  backgrounds,  external  linkages  and 
development  policies  and  the  repercussions  that  these  have  on  aspects  such  as  their 
demography,  economic  structures  and  potentials,  health  and  education.  Comparisons 
between  the  SIS  show  the  extent  to  which  the  countries  share  similarities  and 
differences.  Some  of  the  similarities  arise  from  the  pre-  and  colonial  legacies,  but  also 
important  are  the  differences,  many  of  which  reflect  post-colonial  development 
strategies  and  linkages  with  the  external  world.  The  table  highlights  the  similarities 
and  differences  between  the  SIS. 
5.7.1  Zanzibar 
Immediately  after  the  revolution,  Zanzibar  adopted  radical  social  development  policies 
aimed  at  transforming  the  existing  ethnic,  class  and  economic  relations.  Its  social  and 
economic  development  policies  were  basically  'populist  socialist'.  1  Diversification  of  the 
economy  did  not  succeed  mainly  because  of  problems  of  implementation.  It  lacked  a 
concrete  plan  of  action  or  strategy  to  approach  the  problems  facing  the  SIS  and  during 
the  early  post-Revolution  years,  programmes  were  formed  on  the  basis  of  annual 
objectives,  lacking  long  term  perspectives,  and  were  disjointed.  For  example,  to 
increase  domestic  food  production  a  programme  which  required  resources  to  be 
concentrated  in  food  and  cash  crop  production  was  introduced.  However,  important 
and  interrelated  aspects  such  as  credit,  producer  price  incentives  and  appropriate 
technology  did  not  match  up  to  this.  Diversification  within  and  outwith  agriculture 
failed  to  take  place  and  so  the  Zanzibari  economy  continues  to  be  dependent  on  cash 
1  Although  the  period  after  the  1964  Revolution  was  lacking  in  any  declared  political  philosophy  the  speeches  made  by 
the  leadership  advocated  self-reliance  and  a  form  of  socialist  philosophy  quite  similar  to  that  advocated  by  Julius 
Nyerere  on  mainland  Tanzania. 115 
crop  production. 
In  the  attempt  to  restructure  the  relations  of  production  and  exchange,  the 
mercantile/commercial  sector  was  nationalised  and  trade  ceased  to  be  an  important 
aspect  in  the  economy.  It  was  confined  to  the  export  of  a  few  agricultural  commodities 
and  the  imports  of  food,  fuel,  textiles  and  capital  goods.  Zanzibar  lost  its  position  of 
prominence  in  trade  within  the  region.  However,  a  moot  question  arises,  and  that  is 
whether  this  position  could  have  still  been  retained  with  each  of  the  East  African 
countries  becoming  independent  and  Tanganyika  and  Uganda  increasingly  adopting 
centralised  control  over  their  respective  economies.  The  pattern  and  characteristics  of 
international  trade  were  changing,  as  the  neo-colonial  mode  developed.  Inter-state 
trade  and  exchange  within  the  peripheral  economies  was  hardly  likely  to  develop.  as 
most  countries  were  producing  similar  products.  Prospects  for  trade/commerce  and 
even  some  limited  manufacturing  existed  through  the  East  African  Community,  but 
even  these  vanished  with  the  collapse  of  that  organisation. 
Both  the  growing  demand  for  cloves  and  increases  in  its  price  in  the  1970s 
strengthened  the  existing  regime's  economic  capabilities  allowing  several  ambitious 
projects  aimed  at  economic  diversification  and  social  development  to  take  place.  These 
included  ambitious  public  investment  programmes  including  education,  health  and 
housing.  Other  sectors  such  as  transport  and  communications  (roads  and  marine)  were 
also  given  prominence. 
The  need  to  be  self-sufficient  in  food  production  became  a  priority  and  a  crude  attempt 
followed  to  increase  domestic  rice  production  to  offset  increasingly  expensive  rice 
imports.  The  logic  behind  this  was  that  cultivable  land  and  water  were  available,  and  to 
some  degree  irrigation  was  possible.  Agricultural  mechanisation  was  introduced  and 
rice  imports  were  restricted  in  the  anticipation  that  local  production  would  increase 
since  the  factors  of  production  were  in  place.  Although  domestic  production  increased 
slightly,  it  did  not  remain  for  long.  The  combination  of  inadequate  incentives,  shortages 
of  input,  marketing  problems,  the  problems  associated  with  subsidies  and  land  tenure 
all  worked  against  that  attempt  (an  in  depth  analysis  on  agriculture  is  made  in  chapter 
11).  Food  shortages  and  price  hikes  brought  about  by  import  restrictions  contributed  to 
public  discontent.  In  other  areas  'draconian'  measures  employed  by  the  state  to 
'encourage'  people  to  increase  food  production  were  resented. 116 
Variables  Zanzibar  Comoros  Maldives 
_Seychelles 
Mauritius 
Demo  ra  hic 
Population  640,578  502000  208,000  67000  1090000 
Population  growth  rates  (9'0)  3.0  3.7  3.4  2.4  1.0 
1980-1989: 
%  population  in  urban  areas  35.3  27.2  20.5  58.1  42.3 
(m.  r.  e.  ) 
%  population  of  working  (15-  53.6  50.1  53.3  58.0  66.8 
64  ears  ms.  e. 
Crude  birth  rate  per  '000  53  49  44  26  18 
m.  r.  e. 
Crude  death  rate  (per  '000)  17  12  10  7  7 
m.  r.  e. 
Infant  mortality  rate  per  '000  130  95  73  18  22 
m.  r.  e. 
Life  expectancy  at  birth  -years-  55  57  60  70  67 
m.  r.  e. 
Total  fertility  rate  (no.  of  8.2  6.8  6.3  3.1  1.9 
children  who  would  be  born 
per  female) 
Economic 
GNP  per  capita  at  market  460  420  4,170  1,950 
ices  US  $  1989 
Arable  &  cropped  land  as  %  of  58.0  44.4  10.0  21.4  56.9 
total  land  1988 
Agriculture  as  %  of  GDP  57  34  26  5  13 
1988 
Industry  as  %  of  GDP  (1988)  6  13  16  15  27 
Services  as  %  of  GDP  (1988)  37  53  58  80  60 
Merchandise  Exports  as  %  of  15.6  13.6  68.8  26.5  62.6 
GDP  1988 
Merchandise  Imports  as  %  of  43.4  32.5  150.0  44.9  81.2 
GDP  (1988) 
Destination  and  Highest  %  45.7  3.9  69.8  53.6  92.0 
merchandise  exports  (1989)''  MIND  ICs  NODCs  ICs  ICs 
Source  of  and  Highest  %  21.5  75.3  77.7  73.0  51.4 
merchandise  imports  (1989)'  MLND  ICs  NODCs  ICs  ICs 
Food  imports  as  a  of  total  48.8  26.9  8.3  22.8  12.8 
im  rts  1988 
Fuel  imports  as  a  of  total  8.4  21.0  2.5  23.1  8.1 
im  rts  1988 
Manufactured  goods  imports  as  42.2  54.3  53.3  59.5 
a  of  total  im  its  1988 
Tourist  earnings  as  a%  of  total  0.5  8  52  44  12 
export  earning  (1988) 
Per  capita  net  resource  flows  17.0  89.4  284.1  155.2  80.5 
from  all  sources  -US  $-  1988 
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Variables  Zanzibar  Comoros  Maldives  Seychelles  Mauritius 
Labour  distribution 
"  engaged  in  agriculture  65  80  30  9  23 
"  engaged  in  industry  8  3  29  27  64 
"  engaged  in  services  27  17  41  64  64 
Health 
Population  per  physician  '000  12.8  12.3  15.0  2.2  1.9 
m.  r.  e. 
%  of  population  with  access  to  44.4  28.0  24.0  97.0  100.0 
safe  water,  m.  r.  e. 
Education 
Primary  school  enrolment  91  92  65  93  106 
m.  r.  e. 
Secondary  school  enrolment  25  36  35  37  51 
m.  r.  e. 
Communications 
No.  of  radio  receivers  per  '000  74  113  114  448  264 
population  1988 
No.  of  TV  receivers  per  '000  8  0.2  23  48  188 
ulation  1988 
P  LI  (m.  r.  e.  )  78  57  73  84  86 
Notes:  *  MLND  =  Mainland  Tanzania;  ICs  =  Industrial  countries;  NODCs  =  Non-oil  developing  countries. 
m.  r.  e.  =  most  recent  estimates.  PQLI  =  each  country's  physical  quality  of  life  and  is  based  on  average  life 
expectancy  at  age  one,  infant  mortality  and  literacy  rates.  It  measures  the  level  of  progress  achieved  by  a 
country  in  meeting  basic  human  needs. 
Sources:  Commonwealth  Secretariat  (1991),  Government  of  Seychelles  (1988),  Mukonoweshuro  (1990),  Zanzibar 
Government  (1981,1982,1984,1988a,  1989a,  1989b),  Zanzibar  People's  Bank  (1989). 
Table  5.8  Comparative  data  on  the  socio-economic  and  development  status  of 
the  SIS  of  the  Western  Indian  Ocean 
By  the  mid-1980s  both  clove  prices  and  production  continued  to  fall.  The  same  was 
true  for  copra  prices  and  demand.  It  was  essentially  a  buyer's  market  for  cloves. 
Meanwhile  Zanzibar  was  heavily  dependent  on  cash  crop  agriculture.  The  commercial 
sector,  now  under  state  control,  was  inefficient  resulting  in  chronic  shortages  of 
essential  inputs  and  consumer  goods.  Falling  export  earnings  implied  foreign  exchange 
shortages  and  reduced  government  revenues.  The  informal  sector  attempted  to  fill  in 
the  gaps,  though  with  considerable  difficulty.  Meanwhile  government  expenditure 
increased  having  to  provide  basic  needs  for  an  ever  growing  and  demanding  population. 
Increasing  public  discontent  forced  the  government  to  embark  on  stop-gap  measures  to 
reduce  dissatisfaction  and,  as  is  generally  the  case  in  most  other  developing  SIS, 
substantial  resources  were  expended  on  a  bloated  public  service,  making  it  the  largest 
employer  in  the  islands. 
Insofar  as  the  provision  of  basic  needs  is  concerned,  some  success  was  achieved, 
though  this  has  subsequently  been  set  back  by  the  inability  of  government  to  sustain  it. 
On  the  economic  side,  the  private  sector  had  all  but  collapsed  or  slid  into  a  small  scale 
informal  sector.  In  rural  areas  there  were  ever  dwindling  prospects  in  agriculture, 118 
essential  services  depreciated,  alternative  economic  opportunities  were  limited,  general 
conditions  deteriorated  rapidly  and  rural-urban  population  movement  was  inevitable, 
converging  on  the  islands'  primate  town.  Emigration  was  constrained  by  low  skills  and 
education  attainment,  though  a  limited  volume  of  movement  has  been  traced  to  the 
Gulf  States  and  the  Mainland  -  in  the  former  especially  during  the  oil  price  boom. 
By  the  mid-1980s  there  was  an  important  change  of  leadership  and  new  economic  and 
social  policies  were  introduced  to  check  and  reverse  the  deteriorating  economic 
situation.  This  also  included  a  fresh  attempt  to  diversify  the  economy.  The  private 
sector  was  permitted  to  participate  freely  in  the  economy,  agricultural  policies  aimed  at 
increased  domestic  food  production  and  exploiting  'dormant'  sectors  such  as  marine 
resources,  tourism  and  related  services,  manufacturing,  trade  and  commerce,  while 
seeking  the  possibility  of  implementing  other  economic  alternatives  such  as  off-shore 
banking  and  establishing  an  Export  Processing  Zone  (EPZ). 
Private  sector  involvement  and  foreign  investment  have  been  attracted  through 
incentive  packages  and  an  investment  protection  act  (1986).  1  These  form  part  of  the 
economic  liberalisation  programme.  Many  stringent  regulations  have  been  eased  or 
removed,  Including  prohibitive  foreign  banking  and  exchange  regulations  and 
repatriation  of  profits.  Expansion  of  public  investment  has  been  slowed,  and  in  some 
cases  frozen  with  emphasis  on  maintaining  and  strengthening  existing  facilities. 
Facilitating  sectors  such  as  transport,  energy  and  water  supplies  will  continue  to  be 
expanded  as  and  when  resources  become  available,  and  the  public  sector  work  force  is 
being  reduced.  Incentives  have  been  increased  in  the  agricultural  sector  and  state 
subsidies  removed  on  most  goods. 
Politically,  a  greater  degree  of  democratisation  has  been  permitted,  which  includes 
extension  of  human  rights,  freedom  of  expression  and  movement.  These  new 
development  have  been  followed  by  an  expansion  in  economic  activities  in  Zanzibar, 
such  that  in  recent  years  movement  to  and  from  there  has  increased  considerably. 
Indeed  fast  boats  are  replacing  the  dhows  and  slower  ships  (see  plate  2).  Arguably  there 
is  still  considerable  room  for  improvement,  but  it  cannot  be  denied  that  there  have  been 
marked  improvements  since  the  early  post-Revolution  years.  Othman  and  Mlimuka 
(1989b)  assess  the  recent  changes  and  point  out  how  the  government  and  country  has 
been  transforming  from  an  autocracy  to  one  in  which  the  seeds  of  democracy  have  been 
sowed.  The  country  Is  at  a  political  cross-roads.  If  anything,  between  1984  and  the 
present,  the  country  has  undergone  a  major  economic  and  political  transformation 
which  has  repercussions  for  its  Mainland  partner. 
1  This  has  been  done  through  the  Investments  Protection  Act  No.  2  of  1986. 119 
Plate  2  Modern  and  fast  marine  transport  vessel  connecting  Zanzibar  and  the 
Mainland 
Amongst  the  main  issues  on  Zanzibar's  development  agenda  that  still  have  to  be 
addressed,  though  sensitive,  is  the  nature  of  the  political  Union  with  the  Mainland,  i.  e. 
whether  there  is  a  need  for  it  to  continue  or  whether  it  has  served  its  purposes. 
Continuing  or  terminating  it  will  have  major  strategic,  security,  economic,  political  and 
social  implications  for  a  considerable  time  to  come.  On  a  positive  note,  what  has 
emerged  clearly  are  the  increasingly  important  economic  aspects.  such  as  trade.  i.  e., 
access  to  a  larger  market,  possibilities  of  emigration  and  remittances,  that  can  also  be 
beneficial  to  the  islands.  Table  5.8  shows  that  the  island's  largest  trading  partner  in 
terms  of  imports  and  exports  is  the  Mainland.  Since  the  mid-1980s.  the  volume  of 
interstate  trade  has  increased  substantially  and  a  GoZ  report  declared  that  'now 
Zanzibar  is  enjoying  a  comfortable  access  to  the  mainland  market..  .  not  withstanding 
the  fact  that  Zanzibar's  overall  balance  of  trade  remains  in  deficit"  (GoZ,  1989:  9). 
Between  1985  and  1988  exports  from  Zanzibar  to  the  Mainland  rose  from  US  $  100.000 
to  US  $5  million.  However,  there  remains  a  contentious  question  insofar  as  its 
Mainland  partner  is  concerned.  What  are  the  economic  benefits  of  the  interstate  trade 
to  the  Mainland?  It  appears  that  Zanzibar  is  playing  a  new  role  in  the  global  economy. 
that  of  a  facilitator  in  establishing  a  market  for  the  NICs. 120 
5.7.2  Comoros 
Independence  in  the  Comoro  islands  came  in  the  form  of  a  controversial  Unilateral 
Declaration  of  Independence  (UDI)  from  France  in  1975.  Despite  the  UDI  and  the 
existence  of  some  five  small  political  parties,  they  lacked  a  concrete  post-independence 
programme  of  action  or  a  clearly  defined  national  mass  movement  (Mukonoweshuro, 
1990).  The  Comoros  basically  achieved  independence  on  a  highly  underdeveloped 
political  terrain,  marked  by  political  division  based  on  personalised  political  interests 
and  divisions  between  local  elites,  or  'notables',  and  this  situation  has  contributed 
towards  the  dire  consequences  in  the  soclo-economic  development  of  the  islands. 
Within  six  months  of  the  UDI,  the  Comoros  had  three  heads  of  state,  and  up  to  the 
present  time  there  have  been  as  least  five  coups.  These  changes  have  not  really  been 
inspired  by  any  ideological  convictions  or  genuine  attempts  at  introducing  more  effective 
and  appropriate  socio-economic  and  political  alternatives  to  the  Comoros.  They  are  the 
results  of  local  rivalries  between  leaders  out  to  capture  the  spoils  of  office.  As  history 
would  show,  they  are  simply  crude  means  of  taking  over  the  state  by  individuals  with 
the  express  aims  of  enjoying  material  benefits.  Mukonoweshuro  (1990:  555) 
summarises  this  situation  aptly  by  stating  that,  "the  Comorian  state  was  probably  one 
of  the  most  telling  examples  of  the  privatisation  of  the  state  through  a  joint  functional 
alliance  between  local  elites  and  their  free-floating  international  partners.  "  Apart  from 
confirming  the  susceptibility  of  SIS  to  seizure  or  control  by  different  interest  groups,  it 
also  highlights  the  complexities  that  the  local  oligarchies  add  to  the  country's 
development  problems  and  prospects. 
The  Comorian  economy  was  extremely  underdeveloped  and  the  infrastructure  was  very 
limited.  with  all  means  of  transport  poorly  developed.  Unemployment  and 
underemployment  were  high  while  many  jobs  were  held  by  expatriates  where  Comorians 
lacked  the  necessary  skills.  The  paradox  is  that  the  lack  of  economic  prospects, 
instability  and  political  cohesion  forced  many  Comorians  to  migrate  to  East  Africa, 
Madagascar  and  South  Africa  in  search  of  work,  contributing  to  a  skilled  labour 
shortage  at  home.  After  the  1975  UDI,  many  French  workers  departed  leaving  a 
vacuum  in  the  important  sections  of  the  civil  service.  It  has  been  difficult  to  fill  the 
places  as  there  is  a  lack  of  indigenous  people  with  the  skills  and  experience  to  do  so, 
making  the  business  of  efficient  governance  even  more  difficult. 
It  is  estimated  that  in  1966  while  the  island's  population  was  approximately  200,000  a 
further  90,000  Comorians  lived  in  Madagascar  and  30,000  in  East  Africa.  More 
recently  it  is  estimated  that  about  40,000  Comorians  live  in  France  and  numerous 121 
others  in  Rtunion  and  Mauritius.  Many  of  those  living  in  East  Africa  have  gone  on  to 
apply  for  or  accept  Tanzanian  citizenship  (Appleyard,  1988).  The  current  resident 
population  is  about  502,000  with  at  least  20%  of  the  population  living  outside  the 
country.  Internal  political  malaise,  personality  clashes  amongst  the  leadership 
(notables),  persistent  instability  and  destabilisation  and  lack  of  opportunity  for  the 
burgeoning  young  population  will  continue  to  force  many  to  emigrate.  Clearly  high 
emigration  softens  the  impact  of  the  high  population  growth  rate  (3.7%  per  annum), 
though  it  also  means  that  the  country  loses  its  'best'.  The  Comoros  has  the  highest 
population  growth  rates  compared  to  the  other  SIS  (table  5.8).  It  is  estimated  that  the 
100,000  or  so  Comorians  living  abroad  are  an  important  source  of  foreign  exchange  for 
the  government  and  although  it  is  difficult  to  quantify  how  much  Is  remitted,  evidence 
of  its  impact  can  be  seen  in  the  numerous  construction  projects  around  Moroni 
(Courier,  November-December,  1991).  The  government  seeks  to  tap  this  resource  by 
providing  Incentives  for  residents  living  abroad  to  invest  in  the  islands.  However  the 
folly  of  local  'notables'  has  reduced  the  Comoro  islands  to  virtual  bankruptcy  and  does 
little  to  encourage  or  attract  investments  to  the  country.  The  persistent  Instability  does 
enormous  damage  to  prospects  for  the  development  of  tourism  and  other  economic 
activities. 
Instability  has  become  the  hallmark  of  the  Comoros.  In  1978  the  SIS  was  virtually 
taken  over  by  a  group  of  mercenaries  who  came  to  overthrow  one  regime  and  replace  it 
with  another.  They  continued  to  stay  and  have  since  acted  as  'king  makers'  to  the 
various  factions  of  'notables'.  The  geopolitical  and  geostrategic  developments  in  the 
region  during  the  1970s  included  France's  wish  to  reaffirm  its  influence  in  the  region. 
South  Africa's  interests  lay  with  the  need  to  destabilise  Mozambique  and  other  African 
Front  Line  countries,  obtain  control  of  the  Mozambique  channel  and  alternative  landing 
rights  and  refuelling  points  for  its  airline  which  was  facing  an  international  embargo. 
The  Comoros  served  as  an  'off-shore  warehouse'  to  re-export  boycotted  South  African 
goods  and  provided  landing  rights  to  South  African  Airlines  for  eastern  air  routes. 
Mukonoweshuro  (1990)  provides  some  very  interesting  and  detailed  insights  into  the 
geostrategic  and  geopolitical  contrivance  occurring  in  the  region  and  indeed  the  role 
that  the  Comoros  played  and  how  it  has  suffered  by  being  a  client  state  of  questionable 
external  interests.  There  has  been  much  South  African,  French  and  mercenary 
involvement  in  the  Comoros,  including  South  African  influence  in  the  economy, 
education,  tourism  and  the  military.  Other  interests  include  dubious  business  ventures 
in  which  the  Comoroian  people  benefit  little. 
The  Comoros  presents  a  classic  example  of  the  vulnerability  that  many  SIS  face  when 
local  elites  are  co-opted  by  external  interests.  The  country  is  faced  with  severe  resource 
limitations,  and  development  prospects  are  further  limited  with  the  state  being  taken 122 
over  by  egotistical  mercenary  groups  and  local  elites  lacking  nationalist  loyalties.  This 
has  invariably  lead  to  the  marginalisation  of  Comorian  society. 
At  Independence  (1975).  the  economy  of  the  Comoros  was  highly  dependent  on 
agricultural  exports  and  budgetary  subsidies  from  France.  In  1966  the  recurrent 
budget  expenditure  was  CFA  8  billion  while  revenues  were  only  CFA  1  billion,  leaving  a 
deficit  of  CFA  8  billion.  France  was  the  country's  main  trading  partner  absorbing  two 
thirds  of  its  exports  and  providing  nearly  40%  of  its  imports.  As  is  the  case  in  many 
other  SIS,  the  colonial  administration  encouraged  the  expansion  of  cash  crops  and 
neglected  food  production.  The  post-UDI  agricultural  sector  was  developed  along  the 
same  lines  with  cash  crop  production  increased  at  the  expense  of  food  crops,  which 
meant  that  large  quantities  of  food  had  to  be  imported.  Manufacturing  was  limited  to 
wood  and  metal  working,  a  soft-drinks  plant  and  agricultural  processing  factories. 
There  was  some  pozzolana  mining  and  although  tourism  potential  existed,  this  was 
hardly  exploited.  Fisheries  is  artisanal  and  remained  at  a  subsistence  level.  Prior  to 
independence,  much  of  the  export  trade  was  in  the  hands  of  French  companies  and 
consequently  a  large  share  of  profits  was  repatriated  overseas  with  very  little  re-invested 
in  the  country.  Its  export  earning  potential  fell  and  the  UDI  further  aggravated  this 
situation.  Following  the  1975  UDI  France  withdrew  its  'benevolence',  contributing  to  a 
budget  deficit  of  87.5  %  by  the  end  of  the  following  year  (1976). 
About  400/6  of  GDP  and  80%  of  employment  is  generated  by  agriculture  (table  5.8).  Over 
76%  of  the  population  depend  on  subsistence  agriculture.  About  35%  of  the  land  is 
monopolised  by  foreign  landowners  or  companies  and  a  handful  of  wealthy  Comorians. 
The  land  is  of  volcanic  origin  characterised  by  steep  slopes,  severely  limiting  the  amount 
of  cultivable  land.  Although  about  44%  of  the  land  is  designated  as  amble,  59%  is 
cultivated  and  27%  (51,000  Ha.  )  is  available  for  food  cropping  (vanden  Driesen:  1988a). 
This  indicates  a  fairly  high  degree  of  pressure  on  the  land  resources.  Small  scale 
agriculture  forms  the  basis  of  the  agricultural  sector  though  this  is  set  back  by  an 
e±tremely  lop-sided  land  tenure  system  akin  to  serfdom.  Crop  production  is  still 
traditional  with  productivity  very  low,  and  therefore  there  has  continued  to  exist  a  large 
gap  between  food  requirements  and  production. 
The  pressure  on  land  has  resulted  in  disturbing  environmental  signs  such  as  the 
lowering  of  the  water  table  and  deforestation.  The  limited  natural  resources  are  under 
extreme  pressure.  Wood  is  the  main  source  of  domestic  energy  and  a  high  population 
growth  rate  means  that  deforestation  has  been  rapid.  Wood  for  energy,  building  and 
other  uses  is  in  short  supply  and  consequently  the  archipelago  has  been  importing 
wood.  Human  and  livestock  population  pressure  threaten  the  land  carrying  capacity  in 
many  areas.  With  a  population  growth  rate  of  3.7%  per  annum  and  with  over  51%  of 
the  population  being  under  20  years  of  age,  the  population  is  expected  to  double  by 123 
2010.  Land-use  and  agricultural  techniques  have  been  described  as  'archaic'  (Courier. 
November-December,  1991)  and  under  existing  trends  there  is  little  doubt  that  the 
islands  are  on  the  verge  of  an  ecological  disaster. 
Land  ownership  and  use  has  meant  that  a  large  part  of  the  population  is  condemned  to 
a  life  of  virtual  serfdom  and  destitution.  Like  many  other  SIS  the  islands  produce  only  a 
small  amount  of  their  food  requirements  with  rice  being  the  preferred  food  though  very 
little  land  is  suitable  for  rice  production.  Rice  imports  accounted  for  30%  of  its  1974 
total  import  bill,  and  astonishingly,  even  fish  had  to  be  imported  since  local  catch 
amounted  to  just  3,000  tons  a  year.  This  is  indicative  of  the  underdeveloped  artisanal 
fisheries.  Of  the  total  imports  in  1981,  rice  took  up  16%,  meat,  sugar,  milk,  cooking  oil, 
flour  14%  and  fish  21%  (African  Business:  1981).  Compared  to  1980  the  value  of 
exports  accounted  for  just  44%  of  imports,  implying  a  huge  trade  deficit.  Throughout 
the  1980s  the  Comoros  relied  heavily  on  foreign  aid  for  its  recurrent  and  development 
budgets.  About  81%  of  the  1981  development  and  50°x6  of  the  recurrent  budgets  were 
externally  financed.  This  situation  has  prevailed  and  by  1988  external  borrowing 
reached  critical  levels  with  50%  of  its  export  earnings  being  used  to  service  debts.  The 
1988  foreign  debt  was  US  $  150  million  (Africa  Report,  1988).  Under  such  conditions, 
the  Comorian  economy  has  become  extremely  dependent  on  external  assistance  for  both 
subsistence  and  development. 
At  independence  it  had  one  of  the  highest  infant  mortality  rates  with  almost  one-half  of 
all  children  dying  before  reaching  the  age  of  four  (Appleyard,  1988:  39).  Malnutrition 
and  general  morbidity  rates  are  high.  The  implementation  of  development  programmes 
is  constrained  by  a  dearth  of  skilled  labour,  middle  and  senior  management  and 
professionals.  Training  facilities  and  opportunities  are  rare  and  tertiary-level  education 
is  almost  non-existent.  '  Many  who  go  to  study  overseas  fail  to  return  and  only  between 
3%  to  5%  ever  get  post-baccalaureate  education,  usually  overseas  -  and  these  tend  to 
come  from  the  more  privileged  section  of  society.  Education  at  primary  level  is 
universal,  though  the  quality  of  teachers  and  facilities  is  low  (Appleyard,  1988:  43) 
Mukonoweshuro  (1990)  notes  that  the  education  system  remains  extremely  backward, 
hardly  improved  from  1974  when  the  school  enrolment  rate  was  23%  of  the  total  school 
age  population. 
Internal  training  continues  to  churn  out  'substandard'  personnel  for  the  purposes  of 
development.  A  recent  report  on  tourism  development  highlights  this  by  noting  that 
"the  government  had  little  idea  about  tourism  or  how  to  go  about  it...  nor  did  they  have 
the  financial  means  or  political  will  to  make  a  large  investment  in  it"  (World 
1  In  1983  only  417  persons  were  enrolled  for  technical  and  vocational  training  in  a  population  of  nearly  half  a  million. 124 
Development,  November,  1989:  16).  Such  a  situation  leads  to  resignation  and  apathy  in 
the  search  for  development  alternatives. 
Development  strategies  since  independence  have  been  erratic.  The  various  regimes 
have  attempted  what  may  be  termed  as  populist  policies  which  they  have  failed  to 
implement  adequately  since  they  have  been  preoccupied  with  personal  interests.  The 
consequences  of  this  were  half  a  dozen  coups  real,  threatened  and  'Imaginary'  -  the 
leadership  exists  in  a  state  of  perpetual  paranoia  and  this  clashes  against  fundamental 
developmental  aspirations.  Indeed,  most  of  the  regimes  are  characterised  by  chaotic 
and  absurd  governance,  which  at  various  points  has  included  extremities  such  as  the 
dismissal  of  the  entire  civil  service,  banning  religion,  detaining  scores  of  civilians  (some 
of  whom  have  disappeared  entirely),  and  the  virtual  regimentation  of  Comorian  society. 
Indeed  the  Comoros  are  in  many  respects  synonymous  to  Haiti  under  the  Duvalier 
regimes.  Focus  on  prestigious,  high  profile,  capital  intensive,  inappropriate  and 
expensive  projects  have  run  up  huge  debts  much  to  the  detriment  of  more  meaningful 
programmes  in  agriculture,  tourism,  services,  education  and  health.  The  regimes  have 
remained  singularly  lacking  in  ideas  insofar  as  economic  management  is  concerned  and 
economic  planning  and  policy  formation  have  remained  largely  synonymous  with 
strategies  appealing  for  aid  from  the  international  community,  the  so-called  'begging- 
bowl  approach'  to  economic  management  (Mukonoweshuro,  1990:  563). 
By  the  end  of  the  1980s  the  Comoros  exhibited  all  the  characteristics  of  a  neo-colonial 
economy  run  by  an  oligarchy,  backed  and  even  directed  by  external  interests.  Public 
administration  and  business  were  controlled  by  the  'notables'  and  corruption  rife.  In 
comparison  with  the  common  development  constraints  facing  many  SIS,  the  Comoros 
face  other,  more  unusual  and  perhaps  even  more  strenuous  constraints  which  have 
persistently  set  the  country  back. 
As  is  the  case  in  many  LDCs  countries,  the  1990s  have  unleashed  an  unprecedented 
appetite  for  multi-party  democracy  and  the  existing  Comorian  government  is  no 
exception.  However,  there  are  complications,  for  example,  resentment  in  the  island  of 
Moheli  which  has  fared  poorly  in  development  terms  over  the  years  has  resulted  in 
moves  for  greater  autonomy  from  the  Federal  Government,  without  which  it  has 
threatened  to  call  for  a  referendum  for  self-determination  and  even  secede.  A  report  on 
the  Comoros  points  out  that  with  about  16  competing  political  parties,  a  long  period  of 
instability  could  easily  ensue  unless  a  system  is  found  to  stabilise  the  situation. 
Indeed,  democracy  may  prove  to  be  an  unwieldy  price  to  pay  for  an  archipelago  as  poor 
as  the  Comoros.  However,  in  the  light  of  the  country's  woeful  political  and 
developmental  experience,  perhaps  democracy  itself  begs  the  question  as  to  what  it 
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5.7.3  Maldives 
The  Maldives  present  an  interesting  case  because  of  their  remarkable  attempts  to 
modernise  while  retaining  traditions  and  culture.  Even  the  existing  constitution  is  a 
modification  versions  based  on  an  indigenous  early  one  modified  slightly  to  suit  modern 
requirements  (Appleyard:  1988). 
At  independence  the  country  had  a  population  of  just  over  100,000  and  was 
characterised  by  high  crude  birth  rates  and  lower  death  rates  (12  per  thousand) 
resulting  in  rates  of  natural  increase  of  around  3%  per  annum.  More  recently  the 
natural  increase  has  been  put  at  3.4%  (table  5.8).  The  islands  have  amongst  the 
highest  population  growth  rates  and  between  20-25%  of  the  population  live  in  the 
capital  city  (Sathiendrakumar,  et.  aL,  1989).  Declining  infant  mortality  rates,  high 
fertility  and  an  increasingly  young  population  facilitated  rapid  population  growth  rate 
(Appleyard,  op.  cit.  ).  1  In  the  early  1980s  it  was  projected  that  by  1990  the  population 
would  be  about  210,000,  representing  a  doubling  of  the  population  within  23  years. 
The  government  recognises  the  fact  that  high  population  growth,  and  its  high 
dependency  ratio  will  place  increasing  demands  on  health  and  other  social  sectors 
(Republic  of  Maldives,  1986). 
With  limited  natural  resources  and  a  population  distributed  over  202  islands  out  of 
about  1910,  a  very  high  degree  of  fragmentation  and  dispersion  exists,  imposing  major 
difficulties  on  the  government  in  its  development  efforts.  As  is  the  case  in  many  of  the 
least  developed  SIS,  the  main  problems  facing  the  islanders  are  health-related,  which 
Include  nutritional  deficiencies,  immunisable  diseases  and  other  treatable  or 
preventable  diseases  such  as  diarrhoea  and  antenatal  and  postnatal  complications 
amongst  women.  Most  of  the  resources  available  are  concentrated  in  one  main  hospital 
on  the  main  island  of  Male  which  takes  up  over  50%  of  health  expenditure.  Extension 
of  health  services  to  other  atolls  has  been  mainly  through  external  assistance.  The 
extent  of  the  problems  of  operating  a  health  system  and  other  services  in  such  a 
fragmented  country  is  considerable  (United  Nations,  1982). 
There  is  comparatively  little  emigration  by  Maldivians,  though  internal  migration  from 
outer  islands  to  Male  (the  capital)  has  been  a  common  trend.  In  1977  out-migration 
rates  from  other  islands  to  Male  stood  at  87  per  thousand,  with  more  males  than 
females  migrating  (Republic  of  Maldives,  1986;  Appleyard:  1988).  There  is  insignificant 
inter-atoll  migration  apart  from  those  heading  towards  larger  islands  and  especially  the 
capital.  Most  of  the  migrants  are  young  and  with  little  or  no  education  and  return 
1  (from  1  in  1978  to 
, 
26-  in  1982  and  3  in  1988). 
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migration  is  rare.  The  flows  towards  Male  have  led  to  pressure  on  services,  housing  and 
infrastructure  to  the  extent  that  the  government  has  considered  relocating  both 
population  and  economic  activities  to  nearby  islands  and  encouraging  alternative  urban 
areas.  There  exists  a  significant  disparity  in  socio-economic  progress  between  Male  and 
the  atolls,  mainly  because  of  the  better  quality  of  life  and  economic  prospects  in  the 
former. 
Fisheries  contributes  160/6,  tourism  13%,  agriculture  10%  and  manufacturing  4%  to 
GDP  (1986).  They  also  employ  36%,  5%,  10%  and  2%  of  the  labour  force  respectively. 
Currently  fishing  and  tourism  sectors  are  the  main  contributors  towards  the  recent 
growth  in  the  economy  -  though  largely  financed  by  foreign  aid  (Wong,  1988).  Despite 
the  economy's  relative  buoyancy  since  the  early  to  mid-1980s,  basic  imported  items 
such  as  rice,  flour  and  textiles  have  brought  about  inflationary  pressures  in  the 
economy.  The  country  is  aggressively  exploiting  its  marine  resources,  including  marine 
based  tourism.  Tourism  is  generating  increased  revenues,  apart  from  a  period  in  which 
a  recession  was  prevailing  in  Europe,  during  the  early  1980s  and  perhaps  this  will  be 
the  case  in  the  early  1990s  too.  Tourism  sources  continue  to  be  Western  economies, 
though  there  are  some  flows  from  affluent  Middle-Eastern  countries.  Generally,  the 
development  of  tourism  and  the  services  sectors  has  begun  to  pay  economic  dividends 
(see  table  5.8). 
The  external  sector  is  relatively  large  with  the  value  of  imports  exceeding  exports. 
Although  the  balance  of  trade  has  often  been  negative  it  has  decreased  in  recent  years, 
mainly  as  a  result  of  increased  exports  from  the  growing  manufacturing  sector.  The 
development  budget  is  to  a  large  degree  dependent  on  foreign  financing.  Between  1980 
and  1984  an  average  of  65%  of  the  budget  was  externally  financed,  with  the  ranges 
being  99.6%  in  1981  and  50.8%  in  1983  (IMF,  1986;  Republic  of  Maldives,  1986). 
Compared  to  the  other  SIS,  the  Maldives  have  the  highest  per  capita  resource  flows  (aid 
and  loans).  The  main  domestic  sources  of  government  revenue  are  taxes.  Non-tax 
sources,  such  as  those  emanating  from  public  owned  corporations,  account  for  35%  of 
state  revenues  (1985). 
Dependency  on  external  financing  of  its  capital  expenditure  is  very  high  and  the  same  is 
true  in  international  trade.  What  is  interesting  is  that  trade  links  with  developing 
countries  (India,  Middle-East  .  Sri  Lanka  etc.  )  are  reasonably  strong  and  to  some  degree 
this  resembles  the  situation  between  Zanzibar  and  the  Mainland. 
One  of  the  main  constraints  identified  in  developing  agriculture,  fishing,  tourism  and 
shipping  is  the  lack  of  trained  and  experienced  personnel  (Republic  of  Maldives,  1986). 
The  government  has  sought  to  improve  both  the  quantity  and  quality  of  education  and 
vocational  training  in  order  to  generate  the  levels  of  skills  required  to  launch  the 127 
country  into  its  next  phase  of  development.  Investments  on  education  began  in  1976 
with  expansion  of  facilities.  Teachers  were  brought  in  from  other  countries,  mainly  Sri 
Lanka  and  India  to  assist  in  the  programme.  Universal  primary  education  is  enforced. 
but  only  about  20%  continue  to  secondary  education.  Vocational  training  is 
Implemented  though  output  has  been  low.  It  was  estimated  that  by  1984  the  country 
would  have  just  over  80  with  university  education  (Appleyard,  1988b). 
Shortages  of  unskilled  labour  also  threaten  to  afflict  the  economy.  Indigenous  labour  is 
too  thinly  spread  out  and  many  are  reluctant  to  work  for  the  low  wages  being  paid. 
Because  of  the  shortage  of  skilled  labour,  the  country  is  dependent  on  imported  skilled 
labour.  Its  garment  factories  are  currently  staffed  with  low  paid  labour  from  Sri  Lanka. 
There  is  also  a  shortage  of  indigenous  personnel  for  administrative  and  managerial 
functions. 
The  monetary  and  financial  system  is  underdeveloped,  with  fiscal  policy  generally 
geared  towards  maximising  government  revenues  and  expenditure.  There  is  very 
limited  capital  investment,  reflecting  the  paucity  of  domestic  resources.  Monetary 
institutions  have  been  unable  to  make  use  of  fiscal  and  monetary  policies/instruments, 
but  this  is  more  due  to  the  inherent  limitations  of  monetary  control  in  small  open 
economies,  the  underdeveloped  nature  of  the  financial  systems,  and  the  dependent 
nature  of  the  economy  -a  problem  common  to  most  developing  SIS  (Wong,  1988). 
The  increased  contacts  with  the  outside  world,  such  as  through  the  training  of 
Maldivian  abroad  and  influence  of  foreign  workers,  have  resulted  in  the  government 
being  increasingly  tolerant  and  allowing  greater  participation  of  its  citizens  in  the 
political  process  (Appleyard.  1988).  Devolution  of  power  has  evolved  as  have  ideas  of 
social  equality  and  democracy. 
5.7.4  Seychelles 
At  independence  (1976)  the  SeycheUes  inherited  what  Mukonoweshuro  (1991)  termed  as 
-a  fragile,  acutely  distorted  and  extremely  underdeveloped  economy.  Land,  short  as  it 
is,  was  in  the  hands  of  a  few  individuals.  Agricultural  production  was  based  on  cash 
crops  -  copra  and  cinnamon  -  and  as  in  the  preceding  cases,  was  at  the  expense  of  food 
crop  production,  so  a  substantial  proportion  of  foodstuffs  had  to  be  imported.  Copra, 
cinnamon  and  palm  oil  prices  gradually  fell  and  with  them  the  economics  of  cash  crop 
agriculture.  By  the  mid-1970s  agriculture  became  less  significant,  land  speculation 
was  rife  such  that  about  30%  of  private  land  was  in  the  hands  of  foreign  proprietors. 
Infant  and  child  mortality  rates  were  relatively  high  and  malnutrition  was  widespread 
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In  the  absence  of  other  options,  tourism  was  developed  as  an  alternative  sector.  Local 
manufacturing  was  severely  limited  by  the  size  of  the  market  and  the  resources  required 
to  make  it  viable.  Most  of  it  was  of  the  Import  substitution  type.  producing  beer,  soft 
drinks,  and  concrete  products.  The  first  post-independence  government  embarked  on  a 
socio-economic  development  policy  which  aimed  at  developing  agriculture,  tourism  and 
fisheries.  There  were  programmes  that  aimed  at  fragmenting  large  estates  to  make 
productive  use  of  the  archipelago's  limited  arable  land,  encouraging  labour  intensive 
construction  projects  and  light  industry.  International  finance  was  attracted  through 
liberal  tax  and  exchange  controls,  off-shore  banking,  inter-oceanic  bunkering  facilities, 
free-port  transferring  and  flag  of  convenience  registration  of  ships.  These  programmes 
and  strategies  were  included  in  the  First  Five  Year  National  Development  Plan  (1977). 
However,  such  ambitious  programmes  suffered  a  set-back  through  a  worsening  balance 
of  trade  situation  which  in  turn  necessitated  import  restrictions.  Most  of  the 
development  programmes  incorporated  in  the  plan  were  dependent  on  external  funding, 
much  of  which  did  not  become  available.  Moreover,  economic  reality  dictated  that  the 
most  viable  option  was  the  development  of  tourism,  and  this  soon  formed  the  backbone 
of  the  Seychelles  economy. 
A  coup  in  1977  ushered  in  the  second  government,  which  broadly  continued  with  the 
same  development  policies,  but  with  an  additional  populist  vision  of  society.  According 
to  Mukonoweshuro  (1991:  147)  the  new  regime's  development  objectives  hardly  differed 
from  the  previous  one.  If  anything,  the  regime  change  was  one  of  dramatis  personae. 
Politically,  the  new  government  proposed  to  develop  a  Socialist  system  appropriate  to 
the  Seychelles  and  began  to  confront  the  islands'  underdevelopment  with  a  series  of 
radical  social  and  economic  measures.  Food,  shelter/housing  and  employment  were 
given  priority  as  these  touched  a  large  section  of  the  population.  This  was  followed  by 
the  social  development  of  the  individual  in  terms  of  education  and  health.  This 
contrasted  with  the  previous  regime  which  was  merely  content  with  liberal  economic 
solutions  to  the  country's  development  problems  and  lacked  a  sense  of  urgency  with  the 
more  pressing  and  immediate  needs  of  the  population. 
However,  it  was  difficult  for  the  new  government  to  translate  into  reality  the  above 
objectives.  The  immediate  post-coup  period  saw  a  flight  of  capital  causing  a  liquidity 
crisis.  In  the  light  of  the  uncertainties  following  the  coup  -  especially  with  its  Socialist 
inclinations,  and  geostrategic  developments  in  the  Indian  ocean,  foreign  investment  was 
held  back.  Despite  the  regime's  "sometimes  stringently  left-wing  pronouncements.  its 
practical  actions  began  to  be  characterised  by  caution,  an  apparent  desire  for  continuity 
and  political  moderation"  (Mukonoweshuro,  1991.148).  Subsequently  very  liberal  sets 
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These  included  the  abolition  of  income  tax  from  externally  derived  income,  the  creation 
of  an  international  ofd  shore  centre.  and  exemption  of  tax  on  dividends  in  line  with  the 
need  to  encourage  capital  investment  in  the  economy.  By  all  accounts  this  was  a 
unique  coexistence  of  radical  political  rhetoric  with  liberal  economic  policies  and  so 
foreign  capital  was  largely  left  untouched  (Kaplinsky.  1983).  What  is  relevant  and 
important  is  that  the  strategy  worked  and  gradually  confidence  in  the  new  regime  grew 
and  foreign  investment  trickled  in.  Receipts  from  tourism  grew  by  about  10%  over  the 
previous  two  years. 
The  declaration  of  an  Exclusive  Economic  Zone  (EEZ)  was  formally  made  in  1978,  giving 
the  Seychelles  a  total  surface  (land  and  sea)  area  of  1  million  Km2.  This  gave  the 
country  legal  rights  over  undetermined  marine  resources  and  the  right  to  levy  licensing 
fees  on  foreign  fishing  fleets  in  its  territorial  waters.  It  also  embarked  on  a  programme 
to  develop  domestic  fishing  potential,  both  at  the  artisanal  and  industrial  levels. 
In  line  with  the  government's  populist  programmes,  land  reform  was  gradually  and 
judiciously  implemented.  Those  losing  land  were  compensated  and  private  developers 
developing  their  land  for  what  was  deemed  to  be  uses  beneficial  to  the  national 
economy,  were  assured  of  the  security  of  their  land.  Emphasis  was  given  to  the 
development  of  social  welfare  programmes  for  the  lower  echelons  of  society.  These 
included  subsidised  transport,  low-cost  housing.  low  interest  mortgages,  free  and 
compulsory  universal  nine  year  education  and  a  variety  of  others  such  as  a  social 
welfare  system. 
The  post-coup  period  was  also  characterised  by  external  intervention  and  internal 
dissent  in  the  form  of  attempted  coups  and  mercenary  invasions.  The  combination  of 
local  opposition  driven  underground  with  the  proclamation  of  a  one  party  state,  external 
interests,  geopolitical  and  geostrategic  factors  operating  in  the  region  at  the  time  all 
interfered  with  and  affected  social  and  political  developments  through  creating  a  feeling 
of  insecurity.  Countering  this  entailed  high  costs,  which  meant  resources  were  diverted 
from  other  pressing  needs  to  establish  and  maintain  security. 
The  post-Revolution  government  (1977)  suffered  from  vulnerability:  this  stemmed  from 
endogenous  factors  such  as  a  distorted  and  weak  economy  and  an  internal  opposition 
which  was  largely  of  a  bourgeoisie  nature  and  had  the  means  to  constantly  challenge 
the  government,  usually  covertly.  Exogenous  factors  included  being  in  the  lime  light  of 
the  militarisation  of  the  Indian  Ocean  including  the  spill  over  effects  of  the  Middle  East 
conflicts,  the  decolonisation  process  in  Africa  and  the  desire  for  South  Africa  to  expand 
its  regional  economic  and  military  power.  To  counteract  these,  the  government  cleverly 
adopted  a  position  of  non-alignment  from  where  it  could  bargain  and  negotiate  its 
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from  them.  So  while  the  United  States  were  permitted  to  maintain  a  satellite  tracking 
station,  the  Soviet  Navy  was  given  access  to  port  facilities  and  fuel  bunkers  and  both 
the  French  and  British  air-forces  were  given  landing  and  refuelling  facilities.  All  these 
were  paid  for  directly  and  indirectly  and  exhibit  a  classic  manner  in  which  a  geographic 
or  military  strategic  location  is  translated  into  a  source  of  revenue  for  a  SIS.  1  As  an 
added  security  measure  and  to  expand  its  defence  capabilities,  the  regime  established  a 
defence  treaty  with  Tanzania. 
However,  all  these  measures  did  not  render  the  islands  immune  to  external  influences 
and  this  was  highlighted  when  the  effects  of  an  attempted  coup,  a  mercenary  invasion 
and  a  recession  in  Europe  affected  tourism  leading  in  turn  to  a  extensive  loss  of 
revenue.  This  was  particularly  detrimental  to  the  Seychelles  being  dependent  on 
tourism.  Tourism  is  sensitive  to  economic  conditions  in  the  developed  countries  as  well 
as  the  political  climate  within  the  Seychelles  and  internal  political  tension  affects  the 
performance  of  the  industry  (Kaplinsky,  1983:  211).  External  political  and  economic 
interests  from  time  to  time  affected  tourism  such  as  when  foreign  airlines  withdrew 
their  services.  introducing  a  severe  transport  constraint  to  the  islands.  2 
The  economy  of  the  SIS  was  highly  centralised  and  parastatal  organisations  were 
created  to  control  import  and  export  trade,  fisheries  and  tourism.  However,  as 
elsewhere,  state  control  proved  to  be  expensive  and  cumbersome  to  manage  efficiently, 
and  the  private  sector  was  left  with  little  to  venture  into.  Moreover,  the  extensive 
welfare  system  that  developed  meant  that  there  was  a  drain  on  budgetary  resources, 
and  proceeds  from  state-controlled  enterprises  made  a  limited  contribution  to  this. 
During  its  tenure,  an  average  of  30%  of  the  country's  development  budget  went  on 
social  services.  Efforts  were  made  towards  expanding  and  improving  the  quality  of 
education  and  health.  By  the  end  of  the  1980s,  the  infant  mortality  rate  was  amongst 
the  lowest  In  the  developing  world.  Population  growth  rates  have  been  low  due  to  lower 
birth  rates  and  net  emigration.  The  natural  annual  population  growth  rate  Is  2.1°x6,  but 
emigration  has  reduced  this  to  0.6%  per  year  (Appleyard,  1988b;  Republic  of  Seychelles, 
1988a;  UNDP,  1988).  This  has  also  been  beneficial  in  terms  of  the  improvement  of 
social  and  economic  conditions.  A  significant  proportion  (about  43%)  of  the  population 
live  overseas  mainly  in  East  Africa,  Australia,  and  Europe  (Kaplinsky,  1983;  Appleyard, 
1988b). 
1  The  American  tracking  station  netted  the  Seychelles  government  about  US  $  500,000  per  year.  It  is believed  that  this 
is  the  same  station  that  was  initially  located  in  Zanzibar  and  following  political  developments  there,  was  relocated  to 
the  Seychelles. 
2  In  1983  Lufthansa  and  British  Airways  the  main  carrier  to  Europe  cancelled  flights  to  the  islands  on  what  was 
claimed  to  be  economic  grounds  -  falling  demand.  This  did  not  auger  well  with  the  government  and  resulted  in  the 
wet-leasing  of  an  aircraft  to  fly  as  Air  Seychelles.  Losses  through  termination  of  the  big  carriers  were  not  only 
passengers  but  also  some  essential  imports  such  as  medicines  and  spares.  Air  Seychelles  has  subsequently  grown 
and  is  being  supported  by  government  despite  the  economic  burden  of  operating  the  airline. 131 
Compared  to  most  other  developing  SIS  and  indeed  LDCs,  by  the  1990s  the  Seychelles 
had  made  outstanding  achievements  both  in  the  economic  and  social  sectors,  and  all 
this  despite  the  recession  of  the  late  1970s  and  the  adverse  economic  problems  faced  in 
the  early  1980s.  At  the  end  of  1989  the  Seychelles  had  a  GNP  per  capita  approaching 
US  $4170  (table  5.8).  By  World  Bank  definitions  and  economistic  measures  the  country 
now  fits  into  the  middle  income  bracket.  Seychelles  is  a  relatively  wealthy,  though 
'vulnerable',  country  with  modest  living  standards  reflected  on  impressive  set  of  social 
and  economic  indicators  (Table  5.8).  Moreover  socio-economic  inequalities  are  less 
pronounced  than  elsewhere  in  the  Indian  Ocean.  These  gains  have  been  through  a 
rational  balance  between  radical  political  rhetoric  and  economic  pragmatism,  counter 
balancing  the  opposing  sides  during  the  Cold  War  era,  maintaining  a  position  of  non- 
alignment  and  internal  political  consolidation. 
However,  its  relative  wealth  has  meant  that  the  country  has  experienced  difficulties  in 
obtaining  access  to  external  assistance.  Thus  much  of  this  development  is  based  on 
borrowing  on  stringent  commercial  terms  and  foreign  aid.  1  It  has  the  second  highest 
per  capita  flow  of  resources  (loans  and  aid)  of  the  SIS  in  the  region.  2  However,  given  the 
limited  scope  for  financing  local  investment  from  domestic  resources,  reliance  will 
continue  to  be  on  external  sources  (Nacholl,  1988).  This  may  result  in  some  economic 
difficulties  in  the  near  future  as  most  of  the  loans  are  due  for  repayment,  while  a  global 
recession  is  occurring  which  may  reduce  the  country's  earning  capacity  from  tourism 
and  fisheries.  By  1989  the  proportion  of  aid  in  the  development  budget  was  about  57% 
and  the  proportion  of  loans  25.5%.  Although  this  appears  to  be  relatively  high,  it  is 
much  lower  compared  to  the  1970s  and  early  1980s  (Republic  of  Seychelles,  1988). 
Following  its  experiences  in  the  early  1980s,  the  SIS  has  adopted  a  more  responsive 
form  of  socio-economic  planning.  This  is  a  form  of  strategic  planning  in  which  the 
planning  and  implementing  institutions  can  respond  to  the  changing  global  economic 
and  political  environment.  This  is  also  in  recognition  of  the  degree  of  external 
dependency  that  the  island  economy  is  experiencing.  Such  an  approach  is  fairly 
unique  within  the  SIS  in  the  region  and  has  suited  it  particularly  well. 
Politically  there  are  newer  developments.  Following  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  the 
government  of  Albert  Rene  has  accepted  the  call  for  multi-party  democracy  and  politics, 
and  multi-party  elections  are  now  due,  ushering  in  a  new  phase  in  its  political  and 
1  Between  1978-82  about  90%  of  the  Development  Budget  was  financed  by  overseas  aid.  (Republic  of  Seychelles, 
1980). 
2  When  considering  these  figures  we  have  to  consider  the  fact  the  two  countries  enjoying  these  relatively  high  flows 
(Maldives  and  Seychelles)  also  have  very  small  populations.  It  is  also  true  however,  that  it  is  those  countries  with 
adequate  and  convincing  capacities  to  utilise  these  resources  efficiently  which  will  continue  to  receive  and  enjoy 
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socio-economic  development. 
5.7.5  Mauritius 
Mauritius  became  independent  in  1968  and  like  most  other  SIS  it  is  small,  remote, 
though  relatively  poor  (Minogue,  1983).  It  has  a  population  of  just  over  1  million 
inhabiting  some  1860  square  kilometres  and  has  a  considerably  high  population 
density  587  persons  per  km..  Its  relatively  high  per  capita  income  differentiates  it  from 
the  other  SIS  in  the  region,  with  the  exception  of  the  Seychelles.  Indeed  the  two  islands 
do  not  belong  to  the  category  of  the  poorest  SIS,  yet  their  economies  remain  open, 
vulnerable,  and  erratic  in  their  performance  (Minogue.  1987). 
Until  the  early  1980s  Mauritius  was  an  exporter  of  cash  crops,  mainly  sugar,  and 
agriculture  played  a  vital  role  in  the  economy.  Current  contributions  by  the  various 
sectors  reflect  the  structural  shift  that  has  occurred  since  (table  5.8).  In  1979  the 
government  embarked  on  a  major  drive  aimed  at  diversification,  both  within  agriculture 
and  towards  other  sectors.  In  agriculture  it  aimed  to  move  away  from  being  dependent 
on  a  single  export  crop  -  until  then  sugar  occupied  87%  of  the  country's  cultivable  land 
and  accounted  for  almost  58%  of  export  earnings  and  contributed  16%  to  the  GDP  (van 
den  Driesen,  1988b).  This  lop-sided  structure  of  the  economy  was  not  desirable  given 
the  lessons  learnt  from  other  countries  and  the  future  of  sugar  in  the  world  market-1 
With  over  75%  of  its  food  requirements  imported,  it  was  imperative  that  the  food- 
growing  sector  should  be  developed  and  in  doing  so  reduce  the  high  dependency  on 
imported  food.  Food  imports  have  contributed  to  its  adverse  balance  of  payments 
situation.  Major  subsidies  on  rice  and  flour,  though  adding  a  burden  to  public 
expenditure,  at  least  has  the  political  effect  of  buying  off  economic  discontent  (Minogue, 
1987:  127-8).  In  the  non-agricultural  sector  emphasis  was  on  the  development  of 
Industry  and  tourism. 
It  Is  reported  by  van  den  Driesen  (1988a:  115)  that  by  1985  the  new  policies  appeared  to 
be  working,  showing  significant  changes  in  contribution  to  GDP  by  the  various  sectors. 
There  was  a  decline  of  more  than  4.5%  in  sugar  and  associated  industries  and  a 
concomitant  increase  in  non-sugar  manufacturing  of  2.3%.  Non-sugar  manufacturing 
was  employing  more  than  the  sugar  industry  and  the  proportion  of  export  earnings  from 
sugar  fell  by  12.9%  from  1981. 
Between  1979  and  1985  food  production  increased  by  30°x6.  contributing  immensely 
towards  self-sufficiency  in  food.  The  incentives  for  food  production  included 
1  This  includes  increased  production  by  competitors  as  well  as  introduction  of  sugar  substitutes.  It  appeared  that 
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guaranteeing  producer  prices  for  a  wide  range  of  food  crops.  Contrary  to  the  situation 
in  the  other  SIS,  producers  were  not  bound  to  sell  to  the  Agricultural  Marketing  Board, 
If  they  could  realise  better  prices  elsewhere.  As  in  most  other  SIS,  rice  is  a  major  staple 
and  accounts  for  a  large  import  bill.  Local  production  is  insignificant.  though  price 
incentives  and  provision  of  Irrigation  have  stimulated  interest  in  the  crop.  It  is  small- 
holders  and  part-time  farmers  who  are  predominantly  engaged  in  food  production.  The 
foods  with  substantial  increased  production  are  potatoes,  maize.  groundnuts,  spices 
and  vegetables.  Many  of  these  are  grown  in  the  interlines  of  sugar  plantations,  thus 
maximising  on  available  space  in  the  farms.  Tourism  development  has  also  led  to 
significant  increase  in  demand  for  both  local  and  imported  foods.  The  vulnerability  of 
the  agricultural  sector  is  gradually  being  decreased  through  diversification  but  its 
importance  remains. 
The  structural  changes  mentioned  above  do  not  imply  that  sugar  was  earning  less  -  in 
fact  quite  the  contrary;  through  privileged  access  to  the  European  Economic 
Community,  earnings  from  sugar  rarely  fell,  though  its  relative  contribution  and 
importance  to  the  Mauritian  economy  was  decreasing.  Following  the  Lome  Convention. 
it  was  guaranteed  a  high  price  for  sugar  and  a  fixed  demand,  500,000  tonnes  annually 
since  1978,  which  is  more  than  a  third  of  the  total  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  quota 
for  the  EEC  (Minogue,  1987).  All  these  were  impressive  results  over  so  short  a  period. 
Fisheries  comprise  a  subsistence  and  a  modem  sector.  Modem  fishing  involves  mainly 
purse  seining  and  accounts  for  38%  of  the  total  annual  catch  (1983).  Mauritius  has  a 
5000  tons  capacity  tuna  fish  canning  factory  processing  about  4000  tons  annually  and 
exporting  95%  of  its  output  (1984).  Artisanal  fishing  provides  a  substantial  amount  of 
the  protein  required  and  accounts  for  about  62%  of  total  catch  (1984).  However. 
intense  fishing  pressure  has  been  detrimental  to  the  stocks  and  environment  (Ardill, 
1983;  Harris,  1988).  Recent  developments  in  fisheries  include  a  fishing  port  and  a 
research  centre.  Moreover,  Mauritius,  like  Seychelles,  is  considering  increasing  its 
participation  in  the  intensive  foreign  dominated  purse  seining  activities  taking  place  in 
the  region.  Meanwhile  industrial  and  artisanal  activities  are  being  given  attention  by 
government  policies. 
Apart  from  sugar  related  manufacturing,  industrial  development  in  Mauritius  is  a  fairly 
recent  phenomenon  following  specific  policy  measures  taken  to  encourage  and  attract  it 
in  the  mid-1970s.  A  considerable  amount  of  the  industrial  investment  is  a  result  of 
capital  surplus  from  sugar  reinvested  locally  (22%).  By  1985  manufacturing  accounted 
for  47%  of  export  earnings  and  employed  approximately  29%  of  the  formal  work  force. 
The  structure  of  manufacturing  consists  of  three  sub-sectors;  these  are:  small  scale 
industries,  manufacturing  firms  producing  for  the  domestic  market  and  the  Export 
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Manufacturing  industries  for  the  domestic  market  stem  from  the  import-substitution 
industrialisation  policies  of  the  mid-1960s.  The  successes  of  this  strategy  were  limited 
and  in  the  1970s  export-based  industrialisation  replaced  it.  The  EPZ  consists  of 
assembly  production,  diamond  cutting  and  polishing,  plastic  products,  toys  and  leather 
goods.  Textile  manufacture  and  exports  play  a  dominant  role  in  EPZ  manufacturing. 
Small  scale  industries  promotion  is  a  very  recent  aspect  (1985/86)  and  apart  from  being 
involved  in  producing  furniture,  garments  and  processing  food,  it  also  contributes  to 
import-substitution  industrialisation  and  supplies  accessories  to  the  EPZ. 
The  European  Economic  Community  (EEC)  is  the  main  market  for  EPZ  exports  from 
Mauritius,  and  nearly  a  half  of  the  investors  in  the  EPZ  are  from  overseas.  Investment 
in  other  industries  is  predominantly  Mauritian.  Industrial  development  policy  alms  at 
expanding  export  oriented  industries  by  the  private  sector  while  government 
concentrates  on  providing  infrastructure  and  adequate  incentives  to  attract  private 
investment.  Export  manufacturing  is  based  on  imported  raw  materials  and  value  is 
added  in  Mauritius.  Attractive  features  for  investing  in  Mauritius  include,  a  large 
labour  pool  of  well  educated,  bilingual  (English  and  French)  young  people,  lower  wage 
scales  competing  with  those  in  the  Far-East,  and  a  well-developed  infrastructure, 
including  roads,  telecommunications  and  harbour  facilities  (van  den  Driesen,  1988b). 
The  relatively  successful  development  of  manufacturing,  especially  in  clothing  and 
apparel,  has  earned  the  island  economy  the  reputation  of  being  a  'pyjama  republic' 
(Jones,  1989). 
There  are  however  some  drawbacks  to  EPZ  industrialisation.  Apart  from  restriction  in 
wage  negotiations  and  strikes,  which  can  lead  to  severe  exploitation  of  workers,  the 
dependency  on  foreign  capital  by  government  and  employers  alike  pressures  labour  to 
accept  a  highly  subordinate  role.  The  transfer  of  technology  is  limited  since  the 
manufacturing  process  is  based  on  assembly  production.  The  design  and  development 
of  the  products  tend  to  take  place  elsewhere,  thus  imparting  little  in  the  way  of 
technology  transfer.  The  local  economy  benefits  from  wages,  profits  of  local  investors, 
licensing  and  fees.  However,  a  large  share  of  the  surplus  generated  by  foreign  investors 
is  dispatched  overseas.  '  Despite  these  impediments  the  programme  has  developed 
successfully  in  the  sense  of  increasing  manufacture.  However,  in  recent  years  fewer 
new  establishments  have  been  initiated. 
Attracting  foreign  investors  and  diversification  of  export  markets  remains  a  priority  for 
industrial  development.  This  holds  true  for  the  other  sectors  too,  as  the  markets  for 
1  Local  investors  tend  to  accrue  less  than  external  investors  and  license  and  other  fees  tend  to  be  very  small  in  order  to 
attract  foreign  investors  in  the  first  place.  More  recently  the  number  of  countries  adopting  similar  strategies  imply 
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fisheries,  tourism  and  agriculture  are  on  the  whole  concentrated  in  Europe. 
Diversification  within  the  industrial  sector  is  also  important  given  that  by  1985  about 
80%  of  EPZ  export  earnings  came  from  textiles  alone.  Even  though  Mauritius  has 
achieved  considerable  diversification  from  being  a  primary  producer.  past  lessons  have 
shown  the  dangers  of  being  dependent  on  a  single  sector  or  a  single  crop  and  where 
possible  wider  diversification  is  important. 
There  is  also  the  obvious  question,  why  is  it  that  only  Mauritius  among  the  Indian 
Ocean  SIS  has  established  a  successful  EPZ?  Mauritius  quickly  came  to  terms  with  its 
limitations  and  capacity  to  embark  on  industrial  development.  Lessons  were  learnt 
from  the  limited  successes  of  import  substitution  industrialisation.  Moreover,  the 
economy  was  dominated  by  cash  crop  agriculture  and  the  prospects  of  sugar  in  the 
world  market  could  not  be  guaranteed.  The  country  has  a  relatively  large  population.  a 
factor  which  was  transformed  into  a  viable  resource.  EPZs  are  part  of  the  country's 
export  philosophy  that  alms  at  greater  participation  in  foreign  trade.  In  addition  they 
provide  employment  to  a  fairly  large  population  of  more  than  a  million. 
The  maximisation  of  resources  -  effectively  seeking  whatever  room  there  was  to 
manoeuvre  -  has  always  been  a  priority,  even  if  at  times  this  meant  surrendering  moral 
principles,  such  as  in  dealing  with  apartheid  South  Africa  or  the  manner  in  which  parts 
of  the  islands  were  offered  to  the  major  powers  (e.  g.,  Diego  Garcia).  In  the  same  light, 
medium  and  long  term  personnel  development  programmes  in  other  sectors  such  as 
services  and  industry  were  given  prominence.  However,  as  existing  sectors  seem  to 
approach  their  upper  thresholds,  newer  ideas  are  constantly  being  searched  for  to 
expand  the  country's  economic  capabilities.  It  is  the  'manipulable'  factors,  such  as 
creating  a  conducive  environment  for  indigenous  and  external  investments,  that  seem 
to  provide  short  and  medium  term  option.  The  reverse  is  the  case  for  many  of  the  other 
SIS  under  analysis. 
Tourism  development  started  in  the  1960s  and  although  growth  in  the  sector  has  been 
steady  there  was  a  sudden  fall  in  arrivals  between  1981  and  1982  as  a  result  of  the 
1979  oil  crisis  and  the  global  recession  of  the  early  1980s.  The  main  sources  of  tourism 
are  Western  Europe,  Reunion.  South  Africa  and  Madagascar.  In  recent  years  focus  has 
been  on  promoting  tourism  in  the  Far  East  and  Japan.  The  types  of  tourist  arriving  are 
a  combination  of  up-market  tourists  (33%)  and  those  from  lower  ranges  of  the  scale. 
Hotel  types  vary  from  small  ones  to  large  ones  owned  or  managed  by  multinational 
companies.  The  ownership  pattern  reflects  fewer  foreign  owned  large  hotels  against 
many  Mauritian  (private)  owned  hotels.  Between  1981-85  the  rate  of  growth  in  gross 
earnings  through  tourism  (compounded  annually)  was  18%  (Gabby,  1988:  210).  Net 
earnings  from  tourism  compare  favourably  with  those  from  the  EPZ.  Tourism  generates 136 
about  36%  of  employment.  However,  distance  and  remoteness  from  the  metropoles 
tend  to  work  against  tourism  and  this  pushes  up  transport  and  marketing/promotional 
costs. 
The  benefits  of  a  relatively  strong  economy  have  meant  that  the  country  could  embark 
on  a  series  of  welfare  and  social  development  policies,  which  in  the  long  run  have  had 
remarkable  effects  on  the  quality  of  labour,  affected  population  dynamics  and  quality  of 
life  (Jones,  1990).  In  its  development  policies  and  strategies,  Mauritius  adopted  a  style 
of  development  emphasising  public  sector  investment  and  institutions  in  the  context  of 
a  so-called  mixed  economy,  together  with  the  growth  of  a  welfare  state.  However, 
although  the  welfare  elements  of  Mauritian  policy  appear  egalitarian,  built-in 
weaknesses  allowed  for  the  better  off  sections  of  society  to  benefit  most.  Meanwhile 
class  forces  are  emerging  in  the  island  state  and  the  logic  of  uneven  capitalist 
development  may  assert  itself  (Minogue,  1987). 
One  of  the  most  interesting  changes  that  has  occurred  in  the  islands  is  the  dramatic 
change  in  fertility  and  consequently  size  of  family,  particularly  since  the  1960s  (table 
5.8).  Although  the  exact  causes  of  the  decline  in  fertility  in  the  early  1960s  are  not 
ascertained,  it  is  probably  a  result  of  family  planning  campaigns,  educational,  economic 
and  social  advancement  and  changes.  More  recently,  Jones  (1990)  notes  the  interesting 
pattern  of  fertility  changes  in  the  country  as  perhaps  indicative  of  the  demographic 
distinctiveness  of  small  plantation  economy  islands.  He  attributes  these  changes  to  the 
concordance  between  the  private  costs  and  the  social  costs  of  high  fertility  that  are 
absent  in  larger  societies  where  external  diseconomies  can  be  disregarded  more  readily, 
and  the  highly  monetised  nature  of  the  Mauritian  economy,  stemming  from  the  early 
development  of  a  cash-crop  and  wage  economy,  depresses  fertility  at  times  of  economic 
hardship.  l 
There  is  no  doubt  that  slower  population  growth  has  eased  the  pressure  on  resources 
from  government.  The  advantages  of  having  smaller  families  are  appreciated  and 
accepted,  and  most  parents  are  eager  to  have  their  children  move  onto  a  higher  social 
standing  than  their  own  -  this  is  easier  to  achieve  if  they  have  fewer  children.  The 
educational  expansion  from  the  1960s  meant  that  more  children  went  onto  secondary 
and  tertiary  level  education  and  in  doing  so  this  postponed  age  of  marriage  and  passed 
on  the  new  found  desire  for  a  smaller  family  size.  Postponed  female  marriage  is 
acknowledged  as  a  contributor  to  decline  in  fertility  in  the  country  (Caldwell  et.  al., 
1980:  131).  The  Mauritian  experience  reflects  a  contrasting  experience  to  the  other  SIS 
1  In  contrast,  Zanzibar  and  the  Comoros  have  undergone  what  is  perhaps  their  most  difficult  decade  in  their 
contemporary  period  (1980s  to  1990s)  and  have  registered  relatively  high  fertility  and  population  growth  rates.  Total 
Fertility  Rates  (TFR)  in  the  Comoros  and  Zanzibar  are  7.0  and  8.6  respectively.  There  has  been  a  slight  fall  in 
Zanzibar  where  by  1988  this  was  estimated  to  be  8.2. 137 
discussed. 
Despite  the  relative  harmony  between  the  various  ethnic  groups.  Mauritius  is  not 
exempt  from  the  complexities  of  political  control,  economic  dominance,  ethnicity  and 
class.  The  concept  of  ethnicity  is  as  powerful  as  the  concept  of  class  and  politics,  and  is 
characterised  by  intense  interests  and  factionalism.  Political  networks  are  formed  on  a 
patron-client  basis,  but  within  factions  that  tie  personal  networks  to  ethnic  identity  and 
as  such  Mauritian  politics  have  been  described  as  "a  complex  weave  in  which  the 
threads  are  clear  but  the  ultimate  shape  of  the  garment  indeterminate".  (Minogue, 
1987:  138).  However,  its  free  trade  unions,  active  and  free  press,  skilled  and  educated 
work  force,  democracy  and  balance  of  ethnic  forces  lie  behind  the  calm  in  the  political 
economy  of  the  SIS. 
The  Mauritian  economy  exhibits  pronounced  dependency,  though  this  is  essentially 
part  of  its  development  strategy.  Minogue  (1987:  137)  notes  this  unique  situation  and 
states  that  it  "would  appear  to  fit  very  easily  into  the  dependency  view  of  metropolitan- 
periphery  relations,  yet  it  does  not".  He  goes  on  to  note  that  in  this  instance  the  core- 
periphery  relationship  is  not  a  one-way  exploitation.  The  role  of  indigenous  capital  to 
the  SIS  economy  is  more  pronounced  than  in  other  SIS  and  is  partially  responsible  for 
its  successes.  Basically,  the  ownership  and  control  of  capital  is  not  primarily 
external/foreign:  it  is  domestic,  and  has  contributed  to  the  modest  level  of 
diversification  and  Industrialisation.  If  anything,  Mauritius  has  deliberately  sought  to 
strengthen  its  external  links  and  enhance  its  dependency  links  and  transform  them  into 
relations  of  positive  interdependence.  However,  the  economy  remains  externally 
dependent  and  locked  into  a  world  system  of  commodity  control  that  determines  both 
the  market  and  profitability  of  sugar,  and  Mauritius  has  so  far  managed  to  negotiate 
and  manoeuvre  Itself  Into  an  advantageous  position  compared  to  other  LDCs  and  SIS. 
In  terms  of  economic  policy  and  strategies.  the  1960s-1970s  were  dominated  by  the 
Keynesian  approach  to  development  and  by  the  1980s  liberal  and  pragmatic  economic 
thinking  took  over.  In  recognition  of  its  vulnerable  and  dependent  position,  the 
government  has  been  aggressive  in  establishing  direct  external  links  and  seeking 
markets  for  locally  produced  goods.  and  especially  with  the  EEC  through  former 
colonial  links.  The  strategy  is  to  create  a  greater  degree  of  interdependence  between 
itself  and  its  trading  partners.  The  island  has  secured  favourable  access  for  its  produce 
to  European  markets  and  through  this  its  core-periphery  relations  are  less  exploitative 
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5.8  A  synopsis  of  the  main  characteristics  of  the  Western  Indian  Ocean  SIS 
Although  the  islands  under  analysis  have  some  common  experiences  in  their  colonial 
legacies  and  suffer  many  similar  effects  of  externalities  and  geographical  characteristics 
such  as  distance  and  fragmentation,  there  are  big  differences  in  their  respective 
development  status.  This  is  due  to  their  historical  experiences  and  the  nature  of  post- 
colonial  links  that  were  established  and  maintained.  The  physical  (land  quality  and 
availability)  and  human  resources,  economic,  political,  social,  cultural,  demographic 
and  geographic  factors  have  also  influenced  their  present  development  status.  The 
comparisons  provide  a  meaningful  insight  into  their  specific  conditions  and  distinguish 
between  the  socially  and  economically  better  off  SIS  and  those  less  developed.  The 
main  features  that  affect  them  and  which  explain  their  respective  development  positions 
or  achievements  are  discussed  and  summarised  as  follows: 
5.8.1  Cultural.  Social  and  Economic  characteristics 
The  unique  social,  cultural  and  historical  experiences  of  each  of  the  SIS  are  important 
and  help  to  explain  why  certain  strategies  have  been  successful  in  some  SIS  and  not 
others.  Purely  economic  measures  and  interpretations  of  development  and 
underdevelopment  can  rarely  explain  this.  The  bases  of  the  current  characteristics  of 
some  Islands  (e.  g.  Maldives,  Comoros  and  Zanzibar)  were  moulded  before  European 
colonialism,  while  in  the  Seychelles  and  Mauritius  it  was  European  colonialism  that 
moulded  many  of  their  current  characteristics.  For  example,  the  former  group  has  a 
strong  Islamic  influence  and  orientation,  whereas  the  Seychelles  has  a  Christian- 
European  based  culture  and  influence.  Mauritius  has  a  mixed  culture,  but  with 
significant  European  orientation. 
The  effects  of  pre-  and  post-colonial  links  play  a  subtle  but  nevertheless  important  role, 
and  this  comes  out  quite  clearly  culturally,  economically  and  from  the  geopolitical 
perspectives.  Western  and  Christian  influences  have  been  strong  in  Mauritius  and 
Seychelles,  mainly  through  indentured  labour.  Hinduism  is  also  important  in  the  latter. 
Despite  their  experiences  with  radical  politics,  both  countries  retained  strong  economic, 
social  and  political  ties  with  Western  Europe  and  as  such  they  are  oriented  towards  the 
'Occident'. 
The  Influence  of  the  Islamic  religion  and  culture  are  significant  in  Zanzibar,  Comoros 
and  the  Maldives.  Paradoxically.  apart  from  the  Maldives,  the  rest  have  at  some  point, 
applied  different  degrees  of  autarky,  especially  in  relation  to  the  West.  Zanzibar  and  the 
Maldives  have  strong  trading  links  with  other  developing  countries  within  their 
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and  economic  activities.  The  post-colonial  (neo-colonial)  period  is  characterised  by  a 
greater  influence  from  the  metropoles  which  are  the  main  markets  for  their  commodities 
and  sources  of  their  imports,  technology,  loans,  grants  and  aid.  The  1980s  have  seen 
some  disbursements  of  loans  and  aid  from  the  Middle-East  to  the  Maldives,  Comoros 
and  Zanzibar. 
From  independence,  the  'Occidental'  SIS  encouraged  wider  external  contacts,  primarily 
with  their  former  colonial  links.  Consequently  they  were  able  to  manoeuvre  into 
relatively  favourable  or  advantageous  positions  within  the  core-periphery  model.  They 
enjoyed  'preferential'  access  and  treatment  from  Britain  and  France  and  maintain  fairly 
strong  economic  and  cultural  links.  Cultural  linkages  and  a  European  heritage  also 
exist  and  have  been  exploited.  Many  islanders  from  the  'Occidental'  SIS  speak  more 
than  one  Western  European  language  and  there  is  a  considerable  influence  of 
Christian-European  culture  and  values.  These  factors  have  considerable  influence  on 
the  development  processes  of  their  economies. 
In  contrast,  after  independence  the  'Oriental'  economies  reduced  or  terminated  links 
with  the  colonial  countries.  European  and  western  cultural  influence  with  language, 
religion  or  behaviour,  did  not  establish  themselves.  Yet  economic  linkages  continued 
through  the  various  roles  they  played  as  colonies  and  continued  with  them  in  their  neo- 
colonial  roles.  The  dominance  of  Islamic  culture  and  religion  remain  paramount.  It  is 
important  to  acknowledge  this  difference  and  its  effects  on  the  development  of  the 
'oriental'  economies.  It  is  only  quite  recently  (post-oil  boom)  that  they  received  some 
economic  support  from  the  Middle  Eastern  economies,  with  which  they  retain  links. 
However,  the  nature  and  volume  of  support  are  small,  inappropriate  and  inadequate  to 
contribute  towards  any  serious  transformation  of  the  oriental  SIS  economies. 
The  gain  from  such  a  relationship  appears  to  be  acquiring  political  influence  in  the 
arena  of  international  affairs.  Moreover.  Middle-Eastern  economies  are  themselves 
firmly  tied  to  the  Western  dominated  global  economic  system  and  the  foci  of  their 
interests  lie  there.  Many  of  the  Middle  Eastern  economies  suffer  from  similar 
constraints  to  those  which  face  the  SIS,  such  as  a  lack  of  trained  personnel,  appropriate 
technology  and  even  small  size.  Despite  this  there  is  room  for  establishing  more 
worthwhile  economic  relations  with  a  greater  degree  of  interdependence,  but  only  if 
there  is  genuine  interest  from  both  sides,  and  at  the  moment  this  Is  not  too  evident. 
The  outright  rejection  and  condemnation  of  colonial  links  in  Zanzibar  and  the  Comoros 
limited  the  possibility  of  further  economic  linkages  with  the  West,  though  in  recent 
years  this  situation  has  been  reversed.  The  Comoros  declared  unilateral  independence 
(UDI)  from  France  and  since  then  it  has  suffered  from  continuous  internal  and  external 
political  intrigue.  Its  post-UDI  experience  is  characterised  by  a  series  of  disastrous  and 140 
embarrassing  economic  and  political  links  with  the  South  African  regime  and  dubious 
external  and  internal  private  interests,  all  of  which  have  been  extremely  detrimental  to 
its  development  objectives  and  external  image. 
The  Maldives  adopted  a  more  pragmatic  approach  and  maintained  congenial  economic 
and  political  relationship  with  Britain  and  Europe  despite  the  religious  and  cultural 
differences.  Within  the  region,  it  has  established  special  economic  and  political 
relations  with  Sri  Lanka,  India  and  the  Middle  East.  This  has  facilitated  continued 
trade,  revenue,  human  resources  and  security.  The  economy  continues  to  be  based  on 
primary  exports  with  greater  trading  links  with  developing  countries  than  developed 
countries.  Through  the  links  it  has  maintained  with  the  West,  it  has  managed  to 
develop  tourism,  which  has  now  become  one  of  the  important  sectors  in  the  economy. 
The  links  with  the  Middle-East  facilitated  some  financing  and  investment  for  important 
development  programmes.  Compared  to  the  other  SIS,  the  Maldives  obtained 
'independence'  quite  late  and  it  too  faces  a  plethora  of  economic,  human  and  physical 
resource  constraints.  However,  in  contrast  to  the  other  SIS,  adopting  liberal  economic 
policies  while  putting  a  fine  grasp  on  local  traditions  and  values,  it  has  managed  to 
exploit  both  'East'  and  'West',  thus  extending  its  economic  potential. 
Notwithstanding  their  socio-economic,  political  and  cultural  differences  and  successes, 
the  SIS  in  the  analysis  share  some  common  features  -  their  economies  are  open, 
vulnerable  and  erratic  in  performance.  Those  which  have  embarked  earlier  onto 
successful  diversification  programmes  secured  a  considerable  edge  over  the  rest,  but 
generally  they  all  remain  highly  dependent  economies  whatever  the  political  and 
economic  options  they  chose  at  independence.  Those  that  attempted  to  'de-link'  became 
worse  off  in  their  socio-economic  development  While  the  Cold  War  lasted,  the 
'Occidental'  SIS  were  successful  in  consolidating  and  exploiting  their  links  through 
transforming  their  dependent  relations  into  one  of  more  positive  dependence  or 
interdependence  between  themselves  and  the  core. 
5.8.2  Development  Strategies 
In  both  the  'Occidental'  and  'Oriental'  SIS,  the  development  of  human  resources  was 
given  priority.  In  the  former  group  emphasis  was  on  qualitative  primary  and  secondary 
education  complemented  by  vocational  training,  while  in  the  latter  there  was  a 
considerably  lower  level  of  achievement,  with  the  largest  percentage  of  children 
obtaining  primary  school  education.  1  Tertiary  training,  which  is  mainly  done  overseas, 
is  growing  as  there  is  an  'upward  mobility'  in  society  taking  pace.  For  example,  this  has 
1  In  the  'Occidental'  SIS  approximately  7096'  of  school  children  enter  secondary  education  and  ratio  between  boys  and 
girls  is  almost  balanced  (Selwyn,  1983;  Appleyard,  1988). 141 
enabled  Mauritius  to  have  a  considerable  trained  and  skilled  labour  market  within  a 
decade.  Such  conditions  facilitated  the  expansions  in  the  'new'  exploited  sectors 
(tourism,  services,  manufactures  and  fisheries),  enabling  the  SIS  to  embark  on 
ambitious  programmes  in  manufacturing  for  export,  tourism  and  services.  A  proportion 
of  these  skills  is  'lost'  or  'exported'  through  emigration  and  flow  back  of  remittances.  I 
The  Seychelles  has  experienced  the  same  though  to  a  different  degree  and  emigration 
there  is  higher  with  'access'  to  Western  destinations,  including  Australia.  This  causes  a 
shortage  of  skilled  personnel,  as  many  who  obtain  such  skills  tend  to  leave  the  islands. 
Many  of  those  involved  in  managing  the  development  in  the  'Occidental'  SIS  are 
Indigenous  and  expatriates  are  brought  in  to  fill  in  gaps. 
The  'Oriental'  economies  experienced  different  levels  of  success  in  providing  education 
and  in  achieving  self-sufficiency  in  trained  personnel.  In  'Oriental'  SIS  a  much  smaller 
proportion  of  children  in  their  age  groups  were  enrolled  in  primary  schools  (average  = 
83%)  compared  to  the  'Occidental'  SIS  (average  =  100°x6).  The  proportions  are  even 
smaller  at  secondary  level  where  the  average  for  'oriental'  SIS  is  32%  compared  to  44% 
in  'occidental"  SIS.  Despite  a  greater  proportion  of  the  population  obtaining  primary 
and  secondary  education,  because  of  the  shortage  and  lower  quality  of  staff  and  lack  of 
material  the  standards  of  education  are  low.  Tertiary  level  education  achievement  is 
very  small  indeed.  That  a  smaller  proportion  of  females  obtains  education  -  especially 
secondary  education  -  in  the  'oriental'  SIS  is  relevant  as  it  entails  consequences  on 
issues  such  as  nutrition,  Infant  mortality  rates,  and  fertility. 
In  all  the  SIS  seeking  the  diversification  of  their  economies  was  Important  and  given 
priority  in  their  development  objectives.  However,  in  the  'Oriental'  economies,  this  is 
constrained  by  the  type  of  external  linkages  they  established  and  maintained  and  the 
skills  required  to  achieve  it.  In  contrast,  in  the  'Occidental'  SIS  tourism  was  promoted 
successfully  as  part  of  an  economic  diversification  programme  and  has  since  provided  a 
viable  and  much  needed  economic  alternative.  In  contrast,  in  the  'Oriental'  SIS 
governments  were  uneasy  about  promoting  tourism  for  three  main  reasons  (The 
exception  is  the  Maldives.  where  tourism  development  has  been  more  successful).  The 
first  is  the  cultural  barrier  and  conservatism  that  exists  within  them,  since  most 
tourists  originate  from  a  culturally  different  area  and  may  bring  in  undesirable  norms 
and  behaviour.  The  second  originates  from  the  lack  of  infrastructure,  capital 
investments,  expertise  and  contact  with  the  source  areas.  The  third  is  related  to  the 
concern  about  attempts  aimed  at  destabilising  the  regimes,  and  this  particularly 
1  Figures  are  not  available,  but  it  is  known  that  in  recent  years  Mauritian  investments  have  been  made  externally  in 
Europe,  the  Far  East  and  South  Africa.  Also  some  Mauritians  have  emigrated  to  Europe,  and  Australia  seeking 
alternative  economic  opportunities  and  those  with  strong  family  ties  have  remittances  sent. 142 
concerns  Zanzibar  and  the  Comoros.  1 
In  'Occidental'  SIS  diversification  was  attempted  also  within  the  agricultural  sector  by 
encouraging  the  growing  of  alternative  cash  crops  and  increasing  domestic  food 
production  to  offset  an  over-dependence  on  a  single  cash  crop  and  growing  food  imports 
as  well  as  supplying  the  increasing  visitor  population  in  the  tourist  sector.  The  alms 
are  to  reduce  dependency  on  imported  foods  such  as  rice,  wheat  and  sugar. 
Considerable  achievements  have  been  recorded  although  the  availability  of  cultivable 
land  restricts  this  possibility  in  the  Seychelles. 
Though  largely  foreign  dominated,  diversification  towards  industrial  fishing  achieved 
some  success  in  the  Seychelles.  In  Mauritius  it  operates  at  a  smaller  scale  and  is  more 
successful  than  in  the  'Oriental'  SIS.  In  contrast,  the  'Oriental'  economies  have  been 
less  successful  in  exploiting  their  marine  resources  and  diversification  within  the 
fisheries  sector.  The  marine  sector  is  characterised  by  artisanal  fishing.  Generally,  the 
factors  inhibiting  industrial  fishing  include  technological,  financial,  managerial  and 
marketing  problems.  Fisheries  and  the  marine  sector  contribute  a  growing  proportion 
to  their  national  incomes.  In  the  'Oriental'  SIS  fishing  Is  very  Important  as  a  source  of 
protein  and  subsistence  income. 
In  Zanzibar  and  the  Comoros  agricultural  and  economic  diversification  strategies  and 
policies  were  less  successful,  leading  to  increased  dependency  on  imported  food,  energy, 
and  consumer  goods.  They  remain  exporters  of  a  very  limited  range  of  cash  crops  with 
other  sectors  making  a  diminutive  contribution  to  the  economy.  Exploiting  potential 
sectors  such  as  tourism  and  related  services,  fisheries,  production  for  export  has 
achieved  limited  success  so  far. 
Development  policies  and  strategies  differ  considerably  between  the  'Occidental'  and 
'Oriental'  SIS.  In  the  'Occidental'  SIS  more  prudent  and  liberal  development  policies 
and  strategies  were  adopted  with  varying  degrees  of  success.  This  was  based  on  the 
realisation  that  the  island  economies  were  dependent  on  the  metropoles  and  any  post- 
independence  development  would  have  to  continue  from  there,  rather  than  attempt  to 
terminate  the  existing  links.  There  has  also  been  a  reasonable  degree  of  continuity  and 
stability,  allowing  programmes  to  span  their  planning  life.  A  small  but  important  degree 
of  restructuring  of  their  economies  has  taken  place,  allowing  them  to  exploit  their  small 
potential  much  more.  For  example,  the  average  percentage  of  the  working  population 
employed  in  services  is  63.5%  (1988)  while  in  the  'Oriental'  economies  the  average  is 
27.6%  (1988). 
1  Such  threats  have  became  a  reality  in  the  Seychelles,  the  Maldives,  the  Comoros  and  Zanzibar  with  mercenaries  invasions  and  /or  coups  plots. 143 
The  experiences  of  the  'Oriental'  SIS  are  different.  They  adopted  inconsistent  and 
inappropriate  development  policies  and  programmes  that  contributed  to  high  public 
expenditures  on  non-productive  sectors  while  achieving  little  in  the  way  of  restructuring 
their  economies.  The  instability,  uncertainty  and  inconsistency  in  the  Comoros  and 
Zanzibar  caused  the  lack  of  continuity  and  limited  life-span  of  many  projects. 
Moreover,  emphasis  was  on  productive  investments  as  well  as  on  welfare  and  social 
ones.  This  partly  explains  why  there  is  a  significant  difference  in  the  proportions  of 
official  development  assistance  (ODA)  and  loans  between  the  two  groups  in  recent  years. 
The  'Oriental'  economies  receive  a  greater  amount  in  the  way  of  per  capita  official 
development  assistance,  while  the  'Occidental'  economies  receive  a  greater  proportion  in 
the  way  of  loans.  The  greater  per  capita  total  external  debt  outstanding  of  'Occidental' 
SIS  is  US  $  1,243  (1988),  compared  to  US  $  861  for  'Oriental'  SIS  (1988).  The 
proportion  of  loans  in  total  ODA  in  the  Seychelles  is  73.7%,  in  Mauritius  36.6%,  the 
Comoros  7.8%  and  Zanzibar  about  10°x6  (1988).  This  reflects  their  differing  economic 
structures,  with  the  less  successful  'Oriental'  SIS  being  dependent  on  grants  and  aid, 
and  the  more  successful  'Occidental'  SIS  on  loans. 
Although  the  Maldives  share  many  similarities  with  the  'Oriental'  SIS,  there  are  a  few 
Important  differences  between  itself  and  the  other  SIS  in  the  group.  After  independence 
it  adopted  a  series  of  more  liberal  and  prudent  development  policies  and  strategies.  The 
Maldives  share  common  problems  and  prospects  to  Pacific  Polynesian  island  countries 
(Appleyard.  et.  al.  1988a)  compared  to  the  other  islands  in  the  region.  This  refers  to  the 
high  degree  of  fragmentation  because  of  it  being  an  atoll  and  the  greater  constraints 
that  atolls  entail,  implying  that  different  approaches  to  confront  their  problems  are 
required. 
The  increased  external  contacts  that  the  Maldives  experienced  in  recent  years  have 
introduced  new  ideas  and  attitudes  which  have  become  important  agents  of  socio- 
economic  change  in  a  conservative,  homogeneous  society  (Appleyard,  1988b).  This 
process  was  constrained  by  more  conservative  conditions  in  Zanzibar  and  the  Comoros. 
Generally  the  'Oriental'  SIS  have  sociocultural  barriers  which  question  many  aspects  of 
'modern'  (foreign  and  Western)  development,  especially  when  they  conflict  with 
traditions  and  local  values.  This  has  economic  repercussions.  For  example,  although 
tourism  may  be  desirable  with  the  monetary  and  other  benefits  that  it  engenders,  it  is 
often  treated  with  suspicion.  This  also  explains  the  'isolationist'  tourism  strategy  that 
the  Maldives  practices,  where  tourism  is  developed  in  areas  that  are  restricted  for  the 
local  populace.  1  However,  the  geography  of  Zanzibar  and  the  Comoros  restrict  this 
possibility. 
1  See  Sathiendrakumar,  et.  al.  (1985,1989). 144 
Some  aspects  of  Western  norms  and  behaviour  are  not  acceptable  in  a  largely  culturally 
Islamic  society  and  they  are  genuinely  concerned  about  the  long  term  consequences  to 
local  customs.  This  is  understandable;  for  example,  studies  in  Islamic  areas  of  East 
Africa  where  commercial  tourism  is  prevalent  have  shown  some  negative  and 
undesirable  effects  (see  Peake,  1989).  The  Comoros  have  experienced  shifts  from  a 
'revolutionary'  regime,  to  a  quasi-Cultural  Revolutionary  period  (anti-religious),  to  a 
quasi-Islamic  Republic  (Grifn,  1988;  Mukonoweshuro,  1991).  There  are  parallels  with 
Zanzibar  where  society  is  mostly  conservative  and  until  recently  was  'closed'.  However, 
recent  economic  policies  implied  that  they  open  up  to  tourism,  and  attempt  strategies 
such  as  oil-shore  havens  and  export  processing  and  the  'evils'  that  they  entail. 
The  Western  values  and  culture  built  into  'Occidental'  SIS.  and  the  closer  strategic  and 
economic  links  appear  to  have  been  beneficial  to  them.  Communications  with 
developed  countries  are  easier  and  'imported'  values  embedded  in  development  policies 
and  strategies  generate  less  friction  compared  to  the  'Oriental'  countries.  In  contrast.  It 
has  been  shown  that  modernisation  and  local  traditions  often  conflict.  While  it  is 
Important  that  development  approaches  In  the  'Oriental'  SIS  need  to  be  sensitive  to,  and 
incorporate.  traditional  values  and  norms,  the  situation  remains  considerably  different 
to  that  in  the  'Occidental'  SIS.  Their  'Oriental'  characteristics  and  links  have  put  them 
at  a  disadvantage,  further  constraining  their  development  prospects  and  this  issue  will 
need  to  be  addressed  in  their  development  planning. 
5.8.3  The  changing  role  of  the  SIS  in  the  South  West  Indian  Ocean 
The  SIS  are  a  product  of  the  combination  of  their  respective  colonial  legacies  and  post- 
colonial  experiences.  They  are  historical  products  of  their  specific  economic  and 
strategic  usefulness  to  the  metropoles.  The  scramble  for  Empire  and  'spheres  of 
influence'  were  followed  by  the  post-war  (WW  II)  East-West  struggle  for  geostrategic  and 
geopolitical  advantages.  In  the  light  of  the  post-glasnost  era  such  strategic  needs  have 
diminished,  In  response  to  this,  Mauritius  and  Seychelles  have  reacted  through  recent 
economic  strategies  by  seeking  to  expand  tourism  markets  and  attracting  foreign  capital 
from  alternative  geographical  sources  such  as  the  Far  East  and  Japan.  Such  changes 
have  also  affected  all  SIS  to  introduce  economic  liberalisation  and  allow  for  greater 
political  tolerance  and  participation.  Moreover,  donor  countries  and  organisations  are 
becoming  increasingly  reluctant  to  assist  regimes  and  economies  which  do  not  show 
development  prospects  and  that  have  autocratic  regimes,  whatever  their  past  political  or 
strategic  allegiance  may  have  been. 145 
The  SIS  are  increasingly  seeking  to  form  a  potent  regional  organisation  highlighting 
their  special  position  and  needs.  For  example,  Mauritian  links  with  Reunion  and 
Madagascar  are  Important  insofar  as  tourism  is  concerned  and  increasingly  efforts  are 
being  made  to  strengthen  the  regional  body,  the  Indian  Ocean  Commission  (IOC)  to 
empower  the  member  states  in  seeking  and  achieving  viable  economic  and  development 
alternatives.  There  are  many  benefits  which  include  aspects  such  as  regional  trading, 
joint  marketing,  transport  and  communications  development  and  defence.  The 
motivation  behind  such  thinking  is  to  reduce  some  of  the  constraints  of  small  size. 
However.  active  participation  has  been  limited  and  it  would  appear  that  the  regional 
body  is  facing  similar  problems  to  other  regional  co-operation  ventures  such  as 
CARICOM.  where  the  political  will  has  been  limited  and  regional  unity  remains  a 
rhetoric  while  divided  and  dependent  development  is  the  reality. 
The  'Occidental'  SIS  remain  at  the  forefront  in  strengthening  their  economic  and 
political  links  with  the  metropoles  redesigning  this  relationship  into  one  of  more  positive 
interdependence,  or  'negotiated  dependency'.  The  fast  changing  global  and  regional 
strategic  and  economic  situation  encourages  both  groups  of  SIS  to  aggressively  pursue 
this  strategy.  It  is  no  accident  that  with  the  changing  status  of  Hong  Kong,  Mauritius  is 
seeking  to  become  the  'Hong  Kong'  of  the  Western  Indian  Ocean. 
Zanzibar  has  been  transforming  its  mainly  political  Union  with  Mainland  Tanzania  to 
one  of  greater  economic  significance  (chapters  9  and  10).  though  it  also  needs  to 
establish  other,  perhaps  more  direct  links  with  regions  that  are  perhaps  more 
appropriate  to  its  special  situation.  For  example.  it  has  a  historical  legacy  with  the  Gulf 
and  is  beginning  to  exploit  that,  though  the  question  remains  about  what  type  of 
relationship  will  develop,  and  what  are  the  motivations  and  moral  obligations  of  the  Gulf 
states  and  particularly  Oman.  Recently  there  has  been  some  economic  assistance  in 
the  form  of  funding  some  development  projects  from  the  region  and  direct  air  routes 
have  also  been  established.  There  is  potential  for  trade,  investments  with  the  region. 
However,  these  positive  aspects  are  clouded  by  the  reality  of  bilateral  economic  relations 
which  have  embedded  political  and  strategic  interests. 
The  establishment  and  strengthening  of  external  economic  and  political  linkages  is 
important  for  many  reasons,  including  the  fact  that  they  help  offset  the  severity  of 
smallness  and  isolation  that  have  beleaguered  small  states  in  a  multipolar  world. 
Mauritius  has  reduced  the  disadvantages  of  size  and  remoteness  and  expanded  its 
market  and  increased  possibilities  for  economic  growth  and  development  through 
positive  external  links.  Similar  approaches  are  currently  advocated  in  all  the  other  SIS, 
such  that  the  1990s  are  witnessing  considerable  attempts  to  incorporate  SIS  economies 
to  the  metropoles.  However,  this  is  occurring  when  the  global  conditions  affecting  SIS 146 
have  changed  again  and  they  also  have  to  'compete'  with  other  LDCs  and  the  newly 
emerging  democracies  of  Eastern  Europe.  Under  such  conditions  the  successes  of  such 
a  strategy  may  be  limited. 
5.8.4  Demographic  assts 
Although  most  developing  SIS  exhibit  the  following  demographic  characteristics;  falling 
fertility.  infant  and  child  mortality  rates,  higher  emigration  rates,  changes  in  marriage 
rates  and  increasing  age  at  first  marriage  for  women  -  the  'Oriental'  SIS  do  not. 
Caldwell,  eL  al.  (1980)  and  Lucas  (1980)  observed  that  micro-states  tend  to  have  lower 
death  and  birth  rates  and  a  higher  propensity  of  their  populations  to  migrate  to  the 
developed  world.  They  acknowledge  that  most  of  the  island  micro  states  were  generally 
more  'Westernised'  and  retained  their  colonial  (and  cultural)  links  longer.  They  also 
acknowledged,  and  quite  rightly,  that  because  of  their  different  socio-economic 
backgrounds,  a  few  island  micro  states  do  not  conform  to  this  general  model.  The 
Maldives,  Comoros  and  Zanzibar  belong  to  the  non-conforming  category.  They  have 
experienced  high  birth  rates  (about  50  per  '000)  have  lower  levels  of  socio-economic 
development  and  a  Middle  Eastern  version  of  the  Moslem  family  (Caldwell  et.  al. 
1980:  133).  1  No  doubt  some  post-independence  development  strategies  that  were  weak 
in  health.  education  and  family  planning  also  account  for  this  phenomenon. 
They  have  an  Islamic  cultural  influence  (pro-natalist)  and  experience  a  poorer  economic 
base,  have  significantly  lower  qualities  of  life  (see  PQLI  in  table  5.8),  higher  levels  of 
illiteracy  with  implications  for  nutrition  and  health.  They  generally  have  higher  death, 
morbidity,  marriage  and  re-marriage  rates.  Migration  is  affected  by  colonial  legacies 
and  lack  of  skills  and  is  predominantly  internal  or  restricted  to  nearby  LDCs  and  the 
Middle-East.  The  latter  is  especially  important  as  an  'alternative  core'  to  the  'Oriental 
periphery'. 
Because  of  longer  colonial  links,  inter-marriage  and  cultural  assimilation,  the 
populations  of  'Occidental'  SIS  tend  to  emigrate  to  the  metropoles.  However, 
considering  current  developments  in  sending  and  receiving  countries  such  as  ethnic 
conflicts,  the  creation  of  new  national  minorities,  increasing  numbers  of  refugees,  the 
creation  of  'Fortress  Europe',  rising  levels  of  xenophobia  and  racism,  the  existence  of  a 
large  number  of  migrants  denied  citizenship,  international  migration  from  periphery  to 
the  metropoles  is  increasingly  uncertain  and  restricted.  This  will  have  considerable 
positive  and  negative  implications  for  many  SIS  -  with  population  changes,  benefits 
through  remittances  and  flow  of  innovation  and  ideas,  slowing  of  the  brain  drain,  and 
others. 
1  This  has  recently  been  reduced  to  44  per  thousand  in  the  Maldives  (table  53). 147 
5.8.5  Structural  characteristics 
Aid,  emigration,  remittances,  food  and  fuel  imports,  urbanisation  and  employment  by 
government  are  distinct  characteristics  in  the  SIS  and  are  of  increasing  importance  to 
the  'Oriental'  economies.  They  are  highly  dependent  on  aid,  emigration  and 
remittances.  Rural-urban  migration  is  high  and  hence  urbanisation  and  with  the 
narrow  range  of  economic  opportunities,  the  governments  have  become  the  largest 
employers.  They  have  become  MIRAGE  economies  (Bertram,  et.  aL  ,  1985,1986). 
Their  debilitating  economic  situation  is  seeing  a  transformation  occurring  from 
'economies  of  subsistence'  towards  'economies  of  subsidy'.  The  subsistence  and 
agricultural  export  economies  are  very  weak  and  in  the  absence  of  other  practical 
alternatives  the  SIS  are  depending  on  aid  and  to  a  lesser  extent  loans  for  development 
and  even  recurrent  expenditure.  In  so  doing  some  are  moving  from  productive 
(agriculture  and  fishing)  to  rentier  status  (licensing  of  fishing  rights,  tourism  and 
services)  or  to  'subsidy  economies'  -  dependent  on  aid  and  grants.  Access  to  aid  and 
loans  is  important  and  given  their  smaller  populations  and  exchange  rates,  the  absolute 
amounts  are  perceived  as  very  small  by  donor  countries,  much  to  the  advantage  of  the 
SIS.  However,  this  hardly  forms  the  basis  of  sustainable  economies. 
Migration  and  emigration  are  important  as  large  numbers  of  the  younger  population 
leave  rural  areas  to  seek  economic  opportunities  in  urban  areas  or  abroad,  hence  the 
higher  rates  of  urbanisation  in  SIS.  The  motivations  for  migration  are  linked  to  access 
to  land.  falling  crop  prices  and  agricultural  incomes,  the  neglect  of  the  rural  sector, 
attractions  of  urban  life,  and  the  general  failure  of  development  programmes. 
Population  pressure  also  contributes  to  this  phenomenon. 
Remittances  are  an  important  source  of  income  for  many  families  and  especially  under 
conditions  of  limited  alternatives  and  abject  poverty.  Some  households  have  become 
dependent  on  remitted  incomes.  However,  remitted  incomes  also  act  as  a  disincentive  to 
agricultural  production  and  become  a  form  of  subsidy.  In  other  instances,  remittances 
are  an  important  source  of  capital  investment,  making  substantial  contributions  to  the 
local  economy. 
The  limited  amount  of  cultivable  land,  continued  emphasis  on  cash  crops  with  declining 
incomes  and  the  reluctance  of  the  young  population  to  remain  and  work  in  rural  areas 
have  compounded  the  problem  of  domestic  production  of  food.  The  agricultural  led  SIS 
economies  continue  to  be  major  importers  of  food,  draining  a  substantial  part  of  their 
foreign  exchange  earnings  and  leading  to  a  situation  of  perpetual  food  insecurity. 148 
Increasingly  expensive  imports  of  capital  goods  and  fuel  make  the  island  economies 
desperate  for  external  assistance.  Indeed  many  of  their  development  programmes  have 
been  shelved  for  lack  of  resources  and  their  balance  of  payments  situation  worsens. 
This  has  a  bearing  on  the  importation  of  essential  drugs,  spare  parts  and  raw  materials 
for  domestic  import  substitution  manufactures. 
These  structural  characteristics  with  the  combined  effects  of  their  respective  historical 
legacies.  losses  of  comparative  advantages,  and  inept  contemporary  development 
policies  and  strategies  have  constrained  particularly  the  development  process  and 
prospects  of  the  'Oriental'  SIS.  The  lack  of  success  in  development  suggests  that  a 
different  set  of  solutions  or  prescriptions  are  required  in  the  desperate  quest  for  'room 
to  manoeuvre'.  It  is  clear  that  within  the  plethora  of  SIS  and  SS  there  are  distinct 
categories  and  it  is  important  to  recognise  this  in  the  analyses  of  their  respective 
development  problems  and  prospects  and  in  seeking  appropriate  and  sustainable 
development  alternatives. 
5.8.6  Security.  economic  instability  and  dependency 
Political  and  economic  stability  is  of  profound  importance  to  SIS  (Commonwealth 
Secretariat.  1985).  For  example,  the  mercenary  invasions  in  the  Seychelles  and  the 
Maldives  affected  tourism  arrivals  and  revenues,  while  the  Comoros  have  been 
plundered  and  further  underdeveloped  by  criminal  elements  and  corrupt  leaders. 
Social,  political  and  economic  stability  are  essential  for  attracting  investments  such  as 
tourism,  services  and  manufacturing.  The  SIS  which  have  been  able  to  maintain 
stability  and  law  and  order  have  been  able  to  focus  on  the  development  process,  whilst 
others  have  had  to  grapple  with  insecurity  expending  scarce  resources.  This  is  why  with 
the  advent  of  multi-party  democracy  in  Seychelles,  the  opposing  political  groups  agreed 
on  the  Importance  of  tourism  and  the  need  to  proceed  peacefully  and  that  violence  will 
not  be  tolerated  (The  Guardian,  January  20,1992).  In  Mauritius  where  it  has  been 
relatively  peaceful,  economic  and  social  development  policies  have  been  allowed  to  take 
root  and  develop.  In  other  SIS  a  considerable  amount  of  resources.  International 
relations  and  political  alliances  have  had  to  be  formed  to  guarantee  stability. 
The  maintenance  of  security  has  often  implied  that  the  SIS  establish  certain  alliances. 
Mauritius  did  this  through  NATO  member  countries  and  taking  the  side  of  the  Western 
Bloc  during  the  Cold  War.  This  had  substantial  economic  rewards.  The  Seychelles  took 
the  middle  path.  playing  off  East  against  West,  and  belonging  to  the  Non-Aligned 
Movement  while  also  establishing  defence  pacts  with  nearby  mainland  states.  The 
Maldives  remained  under  the  umbrella  of  the  Commonwealth  while  also  establishing 
defence  pacts  with  India.  Zanzibar  established  a  Union  with  Tanganyika  to  become  part 
of  Tanzania  (a  further  discussion  and  analysis  of  this  is  made  in  chapter  seven).  The 149 
Comoros  have  suffered  the  most  in  terms  of  political  and  economic  insecurity  and 
became  a  victim  of  various  interest  groups  within  and  outwith  the  islands.  Under  these 
conditions  the  SIS  are  dependent  on  other  larger  countries  for  some  degree  of  stability 
and  some,  such  as  the  Comoros  and  Mauritius  compromised  on  their  political  morality 
through  economic  and  other  co-operation  with  the  worst  of  the  Apartheid  regime  in 
South  Africa. 
5.8.7  Accessibility  and  proximity 
Location  has  affected  differently  the  development  process  and  prospects  of  the  SIS.  For 
example.  those  closer  to  the  African  continent  tend  to  be  less  healthy  because  of  the 
easier  transmission  of  disease  and  pests  facilitated  through  shorter  distances  and 
greater  frequency  of  contact  between  the  continent  and  the  islands  (Caldwell,  et.  al. 
1980).  Health  indicators  support  this  observation  and  it  is  reflected  in  the  Comparative 
Analysis  when  comparing  the  'Oriental'  and  'Occidental'  SIS.  For  example,  Mauritius 
and  Seychelles  are  relatively  free  from  the  ravages  of  malaria  and  other  infectious 
diseases,  since  they  are  further  away  and  more  isolated  and  infectious  diseases  are  less 
endemic  and  relatively  easier  to  control.  Also  the  provision  of  health  care  is  more 
advanced.  However,  the  price  for  the  better  health  situation  is  high  transport  and  travel 
costs,  which  are  reflected  in  the  costs  of  living  and  production  of  goods  and  services. 
In  the  'Oriental'  SIS  and  especially  in  the  Maldives  the  high  degree  of  fragmentation  has 
acted  against  efforts  aimed  at  improving  health  and  education  standards.  It  requires 
considerable  effort  and  resources  to  achieve  levels  similar  to  'Occidental'  SIS.  Although 
closer  proximity  has  its  advantages  in  terms  of  transport  and  travel  costs  and  access  to 
other  areas,  the  constant  movement  between  the  islands  and  continents  militate  against 
health  control  programmes.  This  affects  even  agriculture;  for  example,  in  Zanzibar  the 
'mealy  bug'  which  came  from  the  Mainland,  has  devastated  large  areas  of  cassava 
seriously  threatening  the  subsistence  safety  net  of  the  population  in  the  islands. 
On  the  whole,  it  appears  that  closer  proximity  to  tropical  continental  areas  has  not 
assisted  much  the  development  aspirations  of  the  'Oriental'  SIS.  Although  proximity 
has  its  advantages  regarding  access  to  larger  markets,  'Oriental'  SIS  have  failed  to 
exploit  this  effectively  and  have  tended  to  suffer  the  costs  rather  than  enjoy  the  benefits. 
Conversely,  the  'Occidental'  SIS  have  benefited  to  some  extent  from  isolation  through 
Improved  health  conditions  and  this  is  also  a  bonus  to  tourism  (i.  e.  relatively  disease 
free  destinations).  This  is  another  factor  widening  the  development  the  gap  between 
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5.9  Conclusions 
Insofar  as  the  five  SIS  of  the  Western  Indian  Ocean  SIS  are  concerned.  Cluster  Analysis 
has  identified  three  types  of  SIS  based  on  their  social,  economic,  demographic  and 
dependency  characteristics.  In  a  wider  context,  other  groups  exist  within  the  sample  of 
26  SS  and  SIS.  Clearly,  although  developing  SS  and  SIS  are  categorised  in  a  single 
category  based  on  GNP,  GDP  and  population  size,  there  are  significant  differentials 
between  them.  This  tends  to  hide  those  facing  particularly  difficult  development 
problems  which  may  require  a  different  set  of  solutions.  Certain  historic,  political. 
social  and  economic  mechanisms  propel  and  direct  their  development  at  different 
momentum  and  in  different  directions,  leading  to  diverging  socio-economic  status.  The 
relevance  of  this  observation  to  development  theory  analysis  (and  planning)  is  that  it  is 
important  that  each  SIS  is  analysed  on  the  basis  of  its  specific  development  conditions 
and  in  so  doing  the  endogenous  and  exogenous  factors  that  influence  them  are 
identified  and  addressed. 
Comparative  Analysis  has  allowed  a  qualitative,  in  depth  comparison  and  analysis  of 
the  differences  and  similarities  between  the  SIS  in  the  South  West  Indian  Ocean.  The 
findings  explain  and  support  the  emerging  clusters.  Economic,  demographic  social  and 
dependency  characteristics  can  explain  more  recent  development,  but  equally  important 
are  the  historical  processes,  geographical,  geopolitical  and  geostrategic  links.  The 
understanding  of  the  historical,  cultural,  ethnic,  political,  social  and  economic 
development  within  the  SIS  has  a  direct  bearing  on  the  appropriateness  of  development 
policies  and  strategies.  They  provide  a  better  explanation  and  understanding  of  the 
similarities  and  differences  between  the  SIS  in  the  region  and  the  reasons  for  them. 
It  was  mentioned  in  chapter  two  that  in  the  discussion  about  development  theory, 
Korany  (1986)  and  Hettne  (1988)  suggested  the  existence  of  the  'new  peripheries'  in  the 
Third  World.  The  categories  identified  within  the  SIS  identify  and  confirm  the  existence 
of  such  a  hierarchy.  What  is  of  particular  Importance  and  concern  is  that  it  is  agreed 
that  LDC  and  SIS  are  distinct  categories  of  states  with  severe  development  problems, 
and  this  analysis  has  shown  that  some  SIS  fall  within  both  categories,  implying  that 
they  face  a  particularly  problematic  situation  that  will  require  special  attention  if  they 
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6.0  Background  to  Developments  in  Contemporary  Zanzibar 
6.1  Introduction 
Two  main  periods  can  be  distinguished  in  Zanzibar's  pre-Revolution  history.  the  first  in 
which  it  became  colonised  by  people  from  the  Middle  East,  and  the  second  following  the 
expansion  of  European  Imperialism.  Chapter  six  discusses  and  analyses  the  social, 
political  and  economic  developments  that  occurred  in  Zanzibar  up  to  the  1964 
Revolution  leading  to  the  establishment  of  a  'Revolutionary  State'. 
The  chapter  traces  the  pre-European  social  and  political  developments  and  the  economic 
relations  that  developed,  namely  the  role  that  Zanzibar  played  as  an  entrep6t  to  the 
African  mainland.  It  traces  the  changing  relations  of  production  beginning  with  the 
slave  trade,  merchant  and  colonial  capitalism  and  imperialism.  1  These  processes 
moulded  the  ethnic  content,  shaped  the  internal  social  and  political  developments,  and 
determined  the  internal  spatial  development  In  the  islands. 
A  detailed  analysis  of  internal  political  developments  is  made  for  the  period 
immediately  prior  to  independence  (1957-1963),  the  emergence  of  formal  political 
organisation  and  the  role  of  'ethnopolitics'  played  during  the  British  colonial  rule  of  the 
protectorate  of  Zanzibar.  Finally  it  analyses  the  events  and  forces  which  lead  to  the 
establishment  of  a  'Revolutionary  State'  and  the  beginning  of  the  'First  Phase'  of 
Zanzibar's  attempt  at  development  (Chapter  Seven). 
6.2  Pre-European  Colonial  Developments 
The  modern  history  of  Zanzibar  is  divided  between  the  establishment  of  Arab  rule  in 
1832,  followed  by  the  imposition  of  a  British  protectorate  in  1890  (Othman  and 
Mlimuka,  1989).  However,  there  were  indigenous  people  on  the  islands  with  their  own 
forms  government.  The  first  settlements  on  the  islands  were  established  by  immigrants 
from  numerous  sections  of  the  African  mainland  (Lofchie,  1965:  23).  Separate  village 
communities  were  created  and  governed  by  chiefs.  There  was  a  lack  of  any  overall  unity 
amongst  the  village  communities  making  them  vulnerable  to  alien  intervention  and 
1  Entrepots  are  one  of  the  three  transoceanic  rim  settlements  that  developed  as  a  result  of  merchant  capitalism. 
Haggett  (1983)  identifies  these  as  (i)  the  trading  station  e.  g.  Canton  and  Madras.  (ii)  Entrepöts  and  colonial 
headquarters  for  tropical  plantations,  e.  g.  Port  of  Spain,  Lagos,  Penang,  Rio  de  Janeiro  and,  of  course,  Zanzibar, 
and  (iii)  the  gateway  Ports  e.  g.,  the  Tidewater  Colonial  of  Virginia,  the  New  Towns  of  New  England,  the  Colonial 
Towns  of  the  Carolinas  and  others  which  were  established  in  South  Africa,  Australia  and  new  Zealand.  They  were 
peopled  by  West  Europeans  and  oriented  to  their  homelands  as  opposed  to  the  hinterland. 152 
settlement. 
The  Persians  arrived  in  Zanzibar  in  about  the  tenth  century.  They  came  from  the 
principality  of  Shiraz  in  Persia  (latter  day  Iran).  They  settled  permanently  mainly  in 
Pemba  island  and  became  absorbed  into  the  local  population.  According  to  Lofchie 
(1965:  25),  one  considerable  impact  of  the  Persian's  arrival  and  settlement  in  Zanzibar 
was  that  they  began  to  unify  the  previously  disparate  village  communities  into  more 
consolidated  and  cohesive  political  communities.  This  led  to  the  existence  of  ruling 
dynasties  of  mixed  Afro-Persian  descent.  Several  aspects  of  Persian  culture  were  passed 
onto  the  indigenous  population,  in  particular  Islam  which  in  turn  would  have  long  term 
implications  for  the  island  community.  The  mixture  of  the  Persian  and  indigenous 
African  communities  led  to  the  existence  of  the  Shirazi  community  in  Zanzibar. 
Arab  traders  and  explorers  came  to  Zanzibar  long  before  the  Christian  era  and  an  early 
reference  is  made  to  an  island  known  as  ganba.  lu4  believed  to  be  Pemba,  in  the  writings 
of  a  prominent  Moslem  traveller/geographer,  al  Masudi  (died  c.  945)  (Bennett.  1978:  5). 
Another  of  the  earliest  records  of  the  existence  of  the  maritime  commerce  is  found  in  the 
Periplus  of  the  Erythrean  Sea  it  details  the  ventures  undertaken  to  amass  merchant 
wealth  in  the  Western  Indian  Ocean  around  the  First  century  AD  (Bader,  1991).  With  the 
spread  of  Islam  from  the  seventeenth  century.  came  a  significant  increase  in  Arab 
contact  with  the  East  African  coast  and  Zanzibar.  The  Arabs  who  came  from  Oman 
began  to  establish  colonies  in  places  where  hitherto  they  had  only  traded  (Lofchie.  196  1). 
"The  development  of  sea  routes  led  to  the  establishments  of  settlements  of  appropriating 
classes  -  Indian,  Arab  and  Persian  merchants  -  along  the  east  coast  of  Africa"  (Bader, 
1991:  63).  Geographically,  Zanzibar  was  ideally  placed  in  that  it  offered  a  spacious  and 
protected  harbour  with  adequate  supplies  of  fresh  water,  timber  and  food.  With  the  Arab 
colonisation  of  Zanzibar  it  became  an  important  and  strategic  staging  point  in  trade 
with  the  East  African  coast  and  hinterland,  from  where  there  was  an  abundant  supply  of 
ivory,  slaves,  food  grains  and  mangroves.  As  a  result,  a  number  of  Arab  backed 
settlements  emerged  along  the  East  African  coast,  including  Mogadishu,  Malindi, 
Mombasa  and  Zanzibar.  The  pre-European  colonial  coastal  points  established  and 
developed  extensive  connections  with  the  hinterland  and  were  later  to  form  the  basis  for 
the  European  colonial  transport  network.  However,  each  one  remained  more  or  less  a 
self-contained  urban  polity  and  not  part  of  an  integrated  Arab  Empire  (Lofchie,  1965: 
Sheriff,  1987). 
Asian  immigrants  followed  later,  mainly  from  India.  They  remained  tight  knit  groups 
separated  culturally  from  the  indigenous  population.  They  did,  however,  develop 
significant  business  relations  with  the  Arab  colonists  to  the  extent  that  they  became  a 
major  economic  force  in  East  Africa  and  indeed  in  the  Indian  Ocean  by  the  fifteenth  and 
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The  arrival  of  the  Arabs  was  by  and  large  for  trade,  and  thousands  migrated  from  Arabia 
to  Zanzibar  and  East  Africa.  The  influence  of  the  Arabs  increased  and  culminated  with 
Sultan  Seyyid  Said  establishing  a  plantation  economy  in  addition  to  the  slave  and  ivory 
trade  which  already  existed.  The  peak  of  the  Arab  influence  saw  the  transfer  of  the 
Omani  capital  from  Muscat  to  Zanzibar.  In  1880  Zanzibar  became  an  'independent' 
Arab  state  under  an  Arab  sovereign.  It  was  also  an  imperial  state,  since  the  Sultan  of 
Zanzibar  exercised  sovereignty  over  areas  of  the  coast  of  the  opposite  mainland.  Indeed 
Zanzibar  remained  an  independent  Arab  state  until  Great  Britain,  extending  its  own 
empire  in  East  Africa,  made  Zanzibar  a  Protectorate. 
6.3  The  ethnic  composition  of  the  population. 
It  is  important  to  understand  the  ethnic  make  up  of  the  Isles  since  it  forms  the  basis  of 
much  contemporary  social,  political  and  economic  developments.  There  are  three  broad 
ethnic/racial  groups  in  Zanzibar  and  these  are  the  Africans,  Arabs,  Shirazi  and  Asians. 
Within  the  Africans  there  are  two  main  groups:  the  indigenous  Zanzibar  Africans  and 
the  mainland  Africans.  The  former  comprises  the  Hadimu,  Tlumbatu,  and  Pemba  and 
are  generally  located  on  Unguja,  Tumbatu  and  Pemba  islands  respectively.  The  latter 
are  comparatively  recent  immigrants  through  slavery  or  in  search  of  waged  labour.  The 
Hadimu  are  off-shoots  of  mainland  tribes  of  many  different  origins,  arriving  in 
Zanzibar  at  very  different  dates  (Sir  John  Gray.  1962:  159).  Bennett  (1978:  53)  notes  that 
the  main  mainland  tribes  contributing  to  the  early  African  immigrants  as  the  Segeju, 
Zigua  and  Digo.  The  Hadimu  form  a  large  part  of  the  population  of  Unguja  and  occupy 
mainly  the  south,  south-east  and  eastern  parts  of  the  island.  Prior  to  the  colonisation  of 
Unguja  by  the  Arabs,  they  were  ruled  by  a  Mwinyi  Mkuu  (the  great  lord).  A  number  of 
Masheha  assisted  him  in  the  administration  of  his  dominion.  The  Arabs  under  Seyyid 
Said  coerced  the  Mwinyi  Mkuu  into  giving  recognition  over  his  claim  to  Zanzibar,  and 
Zanzibar  was  taken  over  by  the  Arabs  of  Oman. 
The  Tumbatu  are  said  to  be  descendants  of  a  combination  of  immigrants  from  Basra  (in 
AD  1204)  and  mainland  Africans  who  arrived  around  the  same  time.  The  former  centred 
themselves  around  a  town  they  built  called  Makutani  and  the  latter  at  a  place  called 
Chongowe.  Makutani  was  later  invaded  by  Arabs  who  killed  or  enslaved  its  inhabitants. 
The  survivors  joined  forces  with  the  Africans  and  their  descendants  became  the  present 
people  of  Tumbatu.  The  Tumbatu  were  ruled  by  their  own  people  known  as  the  Shehas. 
By  the  1880s  the  Arabs  also  succeeded  in  bringing  the  Tumbatu  under  their  rule. 154 
The  Pemba  are  also  of  African  and  Asiatic  origins.  At  the  beginning  of  the  12th  century 
immigrants  arrived  from  Shiraz  in  Persia  (latter  day  Iran).  They  settled  mainly  in 
Pemba.  A  Bantu  speaking  people,  mainly  from  the  Segeju  group,  also  arrived  from  the 
African  mainland.  There  was  a  high  degree  of  intermarriage  between  the  early  Persian 
immigrants  and  the  indigenous  African  people.  This  was,  in  part  due  to  the  curtailment 
of  new  immigrants  from  Arabia  and  Asia  which  was  caused  by  the  Portuguese  rule  of  the 
islands  of  Zanzibar  and  Pemba  (1498-1668).  The  intermarriage  produced  a  group  who 
called  themselves  Shiraz(.  Like  the  Tumbatu  and  Hadimu,  the  Pemba  Shirazi  also  had 
their  own  rulers  and  exhibited  a  high  degree  of  centralisation  in  the  form  of  their 
political  and  administrative  structure  (Mosare.  197:  221).  A  Diwans  ruled  at  the  top. 
assisted  by  a  number  of  Shehas. 
The  composition  of  the  Pemba  was  modified  further  when  a  large  contingent  of  Arab 
soldiers  came  to  assist  the  Pemba  drive  out  the  Mazrui  dynasty  of  Mombasa.  They  were 
sent  by  Seyyid  Said,  the  Sultan  of  Oman,  at  the  request  of  the  Pemba  and  some  settled 
and  intermarried.  The  new  settlers  also  acquired  land  for  cultivation  and  some  of  the 
indigenous  population  were  driven  out  by  the  newcomers  into  the  less  fertile  eastern 
regions  of  Pemba  (Khamis,  1972).  Land  ownership  was  thus  gradually  being  distributed 
along  ethnic  lines.  The  Hadimu,  Tumbatu  and  Pemba  make  up  the  Shirazi  group  and 
without  the  three  there  is  no  such  thing  as  the  "Shirazi"  (Mosare,  197-:  221). 
The  later  immigrants  from  Eastern  and  Central  Africa  are  referred  to  as  the  mainland 
Africans.  Given  their  humiliating  and  pitiful  past  during  and  even  after  slavery  many  of 
the  Shirazi  avoided  being  associated  with  them.  This  impoverished  group  occupied  the 
lowest  position  in  the  ethnic  structure  in  the  islands. 
The  Shirazi  frequently  appeared  to  be  the  'doubtful  element'  In  early  Zanzibar  politics. 
One  section  identified  themselves  with  the  Arabs  (the  Tumbatu  and  Pemba  Shirazi)  and 
thus  with  the  Sultan,  and  the  other  (the  Hadimu  Shirazi  of  Zanzibar)  with  the  non- 
Shirazi  Africans  -  those  of  mainland  origin,  while  a  third  group  sought  to  preserve  its 
specific  Shirazi  Identity,  (Okello,  1967:  78). 
The  mainland  Africans  came  from  diverse  parts  of  Eastern  Africa,  the  main  source 
being:  Tanganyika  (Mainland),  Nyasaland  (Malawi),  Kenya,  Uganda  and  Mozambique 
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Country  of 
Origin 
Zanzibar  Pemba  Total 
Zanzibar  68.4  82.9  73.3 
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10.2  6.2  8.6 
Not  Stated  0.1  -  - 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
source:  Zanzibar  and  Pemba  Census,  (1945) 
Table  6.1  Ethnic  distribution  by  source  countries 
Most  of  the  African  immigrants  arrived  later  as  plantation  workers  and  labourers. 
Some  returned  to  their  places  of  origin  after  the  clove-picking  season  was  over  and 
others  settled  and  intermarried.  Some  brought  over  their  families  from  the  mainland. 
This  group  generally  retains  some  affinity  to  the  mainland.  Most  mainland  Africans 
arrived  as  a  result  of  the  slave  trade  and  the  slave  mode  of  production  and  occupied  the 
lowest  ethnic  and  class  position  in  pre-revolution  Zanzibar. 
There  are  four  main  groups  among  the  Arabs,  these  are  the  Shihiri  (the  petty  traders  who 
originated  from  Shehr  on  the  Hadhrami  Coast).  The  second  groups  consists  of  the 
Omani  Arabs  who  arrived  before  the  Portuguese  came  to  East  Africa.  They  include  the 
Mazrui  clan  who  had  long-standing  connections  with  the  former  ruling  Yarubi  dynasty 
which  ended  in  1741.  The  last  group  are  the  Swahilis  and  Shtrazt,  who  are  of  Arab 
origin  and  mixed  Arab  and  local  groups.  They  have  generally  adopted  the  Arab  culture. 
6.4  Emergence  of  ethnic  based  political  organisations. 
With  the  prospect  of  decolonisation  the  momentum  for  the  formation  of  political 
organisations  in  Zanzibar  grew.  A  number  of  ethnic  based  'Associations'  were  formed, 
i.  e.,  the  Arab  Association,  the  African  Association.  the  Shirazi  Association  and  the 
Indian  Association.  With  the  imminent  arrival  of  independence  the  associations 
became  the  rallying  points  of  the  various  groups  and  their  political  aspirations. 
1)  The  Arab  Association  was  originally  formed  to  fight  for  compensation  for  former 
Arab  slave  owners  who  were  affected  by  the  abolition  of  the  slave  trade  in  1873  (Mosare, 
1969:  226).  It  began  as  an  anti-British  movement  mainly  against  the  anti-slave  trade 
policy  and  later  extended  its  scope  to  represent  wider  Arab  interests  in  Zanzibar.  The 
wealthiest  and  the  most  long  established  Arab  families  in  Zanzibar  formed  the  core 
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In  the  early  1950s  the  colonial  government  introduced  some  constitutional  reforms  and 
a  commitment  to  lead  the  Protectorate  of  Zanzibar  to  independence.  The 
recommendations  are  contained  in  Sir  Walter  Coutts  Commission  Report.  which 
basically  suggested  that  more  democratic  methods  of  choosing  representatives  to  the 
Zanzibar  Legislative  Council  from  the  different  racial  or  ethnic  communities  should  be 
accomplished  in  the  processes  leading  to  independence.  However,  the  implications  to 
the  Arab  oligarchy  was  that,  "the  elite  status  of  their  community  could  be  preserved 
either  through  an  indefinite  postponement  of  independence  or  through  the  creation  of  a 
policy  which  was  other  than  egalitarian"  (Lofchie,  1965:  130). 
The  intentions  of  the  colonial  government  troubled  the  Arab  oligarchy  generating  the 
need  to  take  a  firm  hold  of  political  power  in  Zanzibar.  However,  this  objective  was 
threatened  by  the  Africans,  and  later  African  nationalism.  To  counter  this  force,  the 
Arab  Association  merged  with  other  smaller  Arab  based  associations  or  groups  to  form  a 
political  party.  There  was  need  for  gaining  a  broader  base  of  support,  if  possible 
extending  to  sympathetic  Africans.  Sheikh  All  Muhsin  Barwant  and  Amour  Zahor,  who 
later  became  prominent  Arab  leaders  were  of  this  opinion  (Mosare,  198  .  227).  The  new 
political  party  was  called  the  Zanzibar  Nationalist  Party  (ZNP). 
The  ZNP  operated  as  a  territorial  party,  chiefly  under  Arab  leadership.  It  was  to  be  the 
vehicle  that  the  Arab  oligarchy  expected  to  dominate  Zanzibar  politics  and  establish  an 
Arab  state  of  Zanzibar.  Despite  this,  its  leadership  campaigned  on  the  popular  platform 
of  "Africa  for  the  Africans".  ZNP  appealed  for  mass  nationalism  in  the  attempt  to  gain 
independence  for  Zanzibar.  The  Africans  were  the  majority,  and  Barwani  and  his 
supporters  allied  with  African  nationalists.  although  the  Arab  oligarchy  sought  to 
perpetuate  a  socio-economic,  political,  cultural,  class  and  ethnic  structure  In  which 
Arabs  would  hold  key  positions  in  Zanzibar  politics,  commerce,  land-ownership  and  the 
judiciary  (Mosare,  1969).  The  problem  was  that  Zanzibar  was  about  to  establish 
democratic  Institutions  and  there  was  a  need  for  the  ZNP  to  gain  a  broad  based  support 
and  so  it  "preached  multi-racialism  but  practised  racialism"  (Mosare,  1969:  231). 
Naturally,  overtly  racial  or  ethnic  politics  would  be  disadvantageous  to  the  ZNP,  and  so 
outwardly  it  proclaimed  multi-racialism  and  an  outright  rejection  of  any  policy  seeking 
to  solve  any  national  problems  in  Zanzibar  along  racial  lines.  However,  this  was 
contradictory  given  the  social,  economic  and  political  privileges  enjoyed  by  the  Arab 
minority,  and  any  attempt  to  elevate  the  position  of  the  Africans  would  imply  the 
retrenchment  of  the  privileges  of  the  Arabs.  There  was  also  the  fear  of  revenge  which 
many  Arabs  believed  the  Africans  would  take,  should  they  obtain  political  power.  This 
may  have  been  used  to  generate  fear  and  participation  within  the  Arab  population,  but  it 
is  also  indicative  of  less  than  harmonious  relations  between  the  two  ethnic  groups. 157 
21  The  African  Association  was  formed  in  1934  with  the  mainland  Africans  as  its  main 
support.  The  association  was  initially  formed  to  fight  for  and  safeguard  the  interests  of 
the  African  community.  Politically  it  was  pretty  inactive,  but  later  it  became  affiliated 
with  the  Tanganyika  African  Association  (TAA)  on  the  mainland  and  adopted  a  specific 
political  agenda.  Between  1951  and  1953,  African  leaders  embraced  an  increasingly 
militant  position  towards  the  British  colonial  regime.  They  articulated  their  grievances 
and  sought  to  mobilise  popular  support  behind  a  demand  for  political  and  social  reform 
(Lofchie,  1965:  158).  Between  1954  and  1960.  this  posture  was  abandoned  and  a  more 
conservative  position  was  adopted  as  Arab  nationalism  demonstrated  its  power, 
challenging  the  Africans.  However,  the  African  nationalist  movement  was  severely 
handicapped  by  the  lack  of  a  politically  active  intellectual  elite.  Africans  were  hindered 
from  acquiring  education  (Khamis,  1972).  The  few  who  had  been  educated  were  employed 
as  civil  servants  or  in  professional  occupations,  though  colonial  legislation  still 
prevented  them  from  participating  in  political  activities  (Lofchie,  1965). 
The  lack  of  an  effective  leadership  and  organisational  capacity  meant  that  the  Africans 
withdrew  from  their  original  militant  position  into  a  conservative  pro-colonial 
position.  The  emphasis  changed  from  issues  of  injustice  and  under-representation  to 
the  fear  of  the  re-emergence  of  Arab  domination.  Winning  reforms  for  the  African 
population  was  dropped  in  favour  of  fighting  against  Arab  nationalism.  The  fear  was 
that  with  the  establishment  of  a  pro-Arab  self-governing  state,  Africans  would  find 
themselves  in  a  permanent  political,  economic  and  social  vacuum.  Rather  than  face 
such  a  situation,  the  ASP  suggested  that  independence  be  delayed  until  they  were  able  to 
participate  in  the  management  of  government  affairs.  Their  intentions  were  for  a 
"constitutional  evolution  from  Protectorate  to  an  African  nation"  (Lofchie,  1965:  168). 
Thus  the  different  ethnic  or  racial  groups  become  increasingly  polarised. 
With  the  impending  elections  the  African  association  become  a  formal  political  party.  It 
widened  its  base  to  became  a  popular  movement.  However.  historically  the  African  and 
Shirazi  communities  were  unable  to  co-operate  and  this  division  implied  that  the 
elections  would  be  difficult  for  both.  The  Shirazi  and  mainland  Africans  maintained 
separate  communal  associations  and  the  disunity  between  them  was  the  principal 
obstacle  to  the  formation  of  an  all-African  political  party.  Considerable  efforts  were 
made  to  bring  the  two  communities  together  to  form  a  united  front,  ultimately  leading  to 
the  creation  of  the  Afro-Shirazi  Union  (ASU)  in  1957. 
31  The  Shirazi  Association  was  formed  in  Pemba  in  1939  and  later  extended  its 
activities  to  Unguja.  Like  the  others,  it  pursued  the  interests  of  the  indigenous 
population,  mainly  the  Hadimu,  Tumbatu  and  Pemba.  Prior  to  the  escalation  of 
political  developments,  the  Shirazi  Association  operated  more  or  less  as  a  trade  union 
in  rivalry  with  the  Arab  associations. 158 
The  Shirazi  Association  contested  against  the  African  Association  over  the  allocation 
of  the  nominated  seats  in  the  Legislative  Council  reserved  for  representatives  of  the 
African  community.  When  all  the  places  were  awarded  to  the  Shirazi  Association  the 
Africans  were  deeply  offended  and  resentful.  This  created  profound  divisions  between 
the  two  groups.  However,  by  the  mid-1950s,  the  Africans  saw  the  need  for  a  merger 
between  the  two  associations.  With  the  rise  of  powerful  Arab  nationalist  movement, 
they  were  willing  to  bury  their  differences  and  provide  a  united  front  against  the  Arab 
Association  and  what  it  stood  for.  The  Pemba  Shirazi,  however,  were  against  policies 
that  proposed  merging  the  African  and  Shirazi  associations,  and  consequently  the 
Shirazi  leadership  in  Zanzibar  and  Pemba  became  divided  on  this  issue  (Lofchie, 
1965:  169.  Mosare  1969:  228).  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  there  was  little  friction 
between  the  Shirazi  and  the  Arabs  in  Pemba. 
The  Unguja  (Hadimu)  Shirazi  realised  the  urgency  for  a  united  response  to  the  threat  of 
Arab  domination.  These  were  sufficient  grounds  for  reconciling  and  unifying  the 
Shirazi  and  mainland  Africans.  In  practice.  this  proved  to  be  an  arduous  task.  The 
mainland  Africans  and  the  Shirazi  had  contrasting  relationships  with  the  Arabs. 
Lofchie  (op  cit.:  170)  notes  that  "for  a  variety  of  historical  reasons,  the  place  of  the  Arab 
community  was  the  one  issue  on  which  Shirazi  and  mainland  Africans  had  completely 
different  attitudes:  on  this  subject  they  could  not  possibly  unite".  To  the  mainland 
Africans,  Arab  rule  represented  the  notorious  face  of  the  slave  trade  and  Arab 
colonisation.  Moreover  the  Africans  were  generally  regarded  as  outsiders.  Socially, 
economically  and  ethnically  they  occupied  the  lowest  strata.  Small  wonder  then  that 
the  ZNP  represented  a  threat  of  permanent  racial  and  class  domination. 
The  Pemba  Shirazi  enjoyed  relatively  harmonious  relations  with  the  Arabs  and  under 
the  Sultan  they  held  prestigious  administrative  positions.  They  rarely  suffered  any 
affront  from  the  Arabs  and  their  mode  of  life  remained  unchanged  and  unaffected. 
Consequently  many  Shirazis  accepted  the  Arabs  as  the  rightful  and  legitimate  rulers  of 
Zanzibar  (Lofchie  op  cit.:  170),  in  fact  some  regarded  it  as  an  act  of  God  that  the  rightful 
rulers  of  Pemba  and  Zanzibar  were  the  Arabs"  (Mosare,  1969:  232).  Moreover  the  practice 
of  the  colonial  administration  in  treating  the  Shirazi  and  the  mainland  Africans  as  one 
being  inferior  to  the  other  further  widened  the  rift  between  the  two.  Thus  they  did  not 
lend  their  support  to  any  movement  which  sought  to  obstruct  Arab  nationalism. 
The  attitude  of  the  Pemba  Shirazi  with  regard  to  Arabs  and  mainland  Africans  was 
different  from  their  Unguja  (Hadimu)  compatriots.  The  Pemba  based  Shirazi  refused  to 
join  the  ASU.  They  gave  a  number  of  preconditions  for  joining  but  as  they  contradicted 
the  alms  of  the  ASU,  they  could  not  unite.  The  Pemba  Shirazi  sought  to  nominate  all 
candidates  in  Pemba  where  they  felt  they  represented  the  majority  of  Africans.  In 
addition  they  required  that  the  name  of  the  proposed  united  party  should  not  include 159 
any  reference  to  any  racial  composition  of  its  membership.  They  wanted  a  nationalist 
political  organisation. 
Gradually  the  ASU  scored  some  political  capital.  In  the  July  1957  elections  it  won  five  of 
the  six  contested  seats.  After  the  elections  it  was  renamed  the  Afro-Shirazi  Party  (ASP). 
and  the  elected  Shirazi  members  from  Pemba  took  their  seats  in  the  Legislative  Council 
as  members  of  the  ASP.  The  Shirazi  Association  of  Pemba  maintained  its  organisation 
and  aims  forming  the  framework  on  which  the  Zanzibar  and  Pemba  People's  Party 
(ZPPP)  was  founded.  Arab  and  African  nationalism  gave  impulse  to  the  formation  of 
Zanzibar's  third  political  party,  the  ZPPP  in  1959.  It  expected  to  be  an  independent  third 
force  in  Zanzibar  politics,  avoiding  the  overt  racial  bias  of  the  ASP  yet  remaining 
essentially  an  African  party  devoted  to  African  interests  (Lofchie,  1965).  These  aims 
were  later  lost  as  it  moved  closer  to  the  ZNP,  attracted  by  its  multi-racial,  though 
ambiguous  platform. 
After  the  1957  elections  the  ASP  also  wanted  independence  and  confronted  their  rivals 
by  bitterly  attacking  the  racial  practices  of  the  ZNP  under  the  guise  of  multi-racial 
politics.  The  ethnic  dimension  of  Zanzibari  politics  became  increasingly  evident  and 
potentially  explosive. 
41  The  Indian  Association  was  formed  in  the  early  1910s,  fighting  for  the  interests  of  the 
Indian  community,  which  were  mainly  commercial.  The  association  was  initially 
apolitical  in  its  activities. 
With  time  open  political  rivalry  between  the  Indian  Association  and  the  Arab 
Association  loomed,  stemming  from  the  socio-economic  polarity  between  the  two 
communities.  (Lofchie,  1965).  Following  the  abolition  of  slave  trade  many  of  the  former 
slave  owners  were  transformed  into  capitalist  producers  (farmers).  But  with  the  absence 
of  free  labour  they  rapidly  fell  into  the  clutches  of  merchants  (money  lenders)  and  were 
reduced  by  indebtedness  to  little  more  than  managers  of  their  own  plantations 
(Depelchin,  1991).  The  Arabs  bitterly  resented  this.  The  climax  of  the  contradiction 
between  the  associations  are  highlighted  by  the  strife  over  the  indebtedness  of  the  Arabs. 
The  Arabs  became  vulnerable  to  extreme  forms  of  economic  dependence  on  the  Asians. 
By  the  1930s  around  65%  of  all  the  clove  plantations  were  fully  mortgaged  to  the  Asians 
(Lofchle,  1965:  105).  This  situation  caused  much  concern  with  the  colonial  authorities 
who  used  legislative  powers  to  assist  the  indebtedness  of  the  Arabs. 
The  Indian  Association  came  out  strongly  in  defence  of  its  members'  interests  which 
were  threatened  by  intervention  from  the  colonial  authorities.  Several  measures  aimed 
at  solving  the  problem  of  Arab  indebtedness  were  attempted,  though  it  became  clear  that 
official  objectives  to  restore  the  Arab  oligarchy  to  solvency  would  have  profound 
economic  and  political  implications  to  other  ethnic  groups.  Meanwhile  the  colonial 160 
administration  had  to  choose  between  alleviating  the  protectorate's  worsening 
economic  situation  or  risk  offending  the  economic  interests  of  the  Asian  community.  It 
chose  the  former.  resulting  in  a  confrontation  with  the  economically  powerful  Indians. 
The  inevitable  dispute  came  in  1934  when  legislation  was  enacted  forbidding  the 
alienation  of  land  from  the  Arabs  or  Africans  to  Indians  without  the  consent  of  the 
British  Resident.  In  addition  a  moratorium  on  all  debts  was  declared.  The  nearly 
defunct  Clove  Growers  Association  (CGA)  was  reorganised  and  resuscitated.  From  a 
voluntary  co-operative  society.  it  became  a  strong  institution  with  powers  to  regulate 
and  supervise  the  clove  industry.  It  policed  the  business  practices  of  the  Asian 
community.  The  CGA  challenged  the  economic  hegemony  of  the  Indians  and  so 
increased  tensions  between  the  Indians  and  the  colonial  government.  This  tension 
peaked  in  1937  when  the  CGA  was  granted  exclusive  rights  to  purchase  cloves  from  local 
producers  forcing  the  Indian  merchants  to  buy  all  cloves  from  the  CGA  at  a  price 
determined  by  the  CGA. 
In  response  the  Indian  National  Association  boycotted  the  clove  industry  by  refusing  to 
buy  or  sell  cloves.  The  effects  of  this  were  limited  and  Arab  and  African  farmers 
benefited  due  to  higher  prices  offered  by  the  CGA. 
The  Indian  Association  solicited  the  support  of  the  Indian  National  Congress  of  India  in 
its  campaign  against  the  colonial  authorities  and  the  CGA.  India  imported  about  40°x6  of 
total  clove  exports  and  a  boycott  followed.  The  combined  effects  of  the  internal  and 
external  boycotts  were  critical.  By  1938  the  political  atmosphere  In  Zanzibar 
approached  hysterical  levels  and  racial  violence  threatened  to  break  out.  To  defuse  the 
situation  a  number  of  economic  and  political  policy  measures  were  taken.  This  resulted 
In  the  'Heads  of  Agreement'  compromise  treaty  which  meant  that  the  CGA  would  not 
exercise  its  authority  on  export  cloves  and  Indian  exporters  agreed  to  purchase  500/6  of 
all  cloves  for  export  from  the  CGA.  The  CGA  and  Indian  Association  also  guaranteed  the 
Arab  Association  that  growers  would  receive  reasonable  prices.  This  agreement  brought 
to  a  close  the  political  aspect  of  the  agricultural  indebtedness  problem  (Lofchie  op.  cit.  ). 
6.5  Pre-revolution  political  developments 
The  period  leading  up  to  independence  in  the  early  1960s  was  marred  by  political 
confrontations  characterised  by  pronounced  racial-ethnic  divisions.  Zanzibar's 
economy  was  based  on  a  colonial  capitalist  mode  of  production  (1915-1954).  Slavery 
was  abolished  and  the  new  system  was  based  on  the  exploitation  of  free  labour  by  capital 
through  a  money  relationship  (Ferguson,  1991).  Labourers  and  peasants  sold  their 
produce  and  labour  to  the  land  owning  class,  merchants  and  state  in  return  for  cash.  The 
proletariat  in  Zanzibar  was  not  entirely  landless  since  they  had  access  to  means  of 161 
production  and  the  appropriation  of  surplus  value  occurred  through  exchange.  As  a 
consequence;  "The  structure  of  Zanzibar's  political  economy  during  the  colonial  period 
had  arisen  not  by  accident,  but  out  of  the  needs  of  colonial  production.  Zanzibar  became 
an  underdeveloped  area  as  a  result  of  this  process"  (Bowles,  1991:  79). 
Internally  the  ethnic  divide  was  continually  being  emphasised  and  encouraged,  splitting 
society  and  delaying  independence.  The  period  between  1957  and  1964  is  often  referred 
to  as  Zama  za  Stasa  (the  period  of  party  politics).  The  British  colonial  administration 
realised  that  a  new  political  force  seeking  independence  had  emerged.  Babu  (1991) 
accuses  the  colonialists  of  practising  divide  and  rule  by  pitting  the  different  ethnic 
groups  against  each  other.  Arab  against  Indian.  African  against  Arab  and  so  on.  Most 
citizens  were  identified  with  an  ethnic  association  (there  were  23  in  all).  Babu  (1991:  224) 
states  that:  "Ethnic  distinctions  thus  became  part  of  the  popular  consciousness  which 
was  bound  to  influence  the  country's  politics".  However,  it  would  be  erroneous  to  assume 
that  there  was  only  an  ethnic  dimension.  For,  example  most  of  the  Arab  leaders  (of  the 
Arab  Association)  came  from  the  landlord  class.  Moreover,  many  were  descendants  of 
ex-slave  grandmothers  or  mothers  and  with  intermarriage  it  was  difficult  sometimes  to 
make  out  who  was  an  Arab  or  who  was  an  African,  though  they  still  aligned  themselves 
to  one  ethnic  group  or  another  .1 
The  educational  system  was  used  as  a  mechanism  which  fostered  ethnic/racial  divisions 
and  disparities.  The  already  over-privileged  racial  groups  increased  their  social  and 
economic  advantages  over  others,  while  the  majority  were  denied  unrestricted  access  to 
it  (Lofchie,  1965;  Khamis,  1972).  For  example.  at  primary  school  level,  Africans  had  a 
higher  enrolment  mainly  because  of  their  larger  numbers,  but  proceeding  to  higher 
levels  their  numbers  and  proportions  decreased  disproportionately  to  other 
racial/ethnic  groups  (Figure  6.1). 
Figure  6.2  shows  the  ethnic  distribution  of  population  in  Zanzibar  in  1948.  Comparing 
the  proportions  enrolled  at  school  shows  a  lop-sided  distribution  of  children  by  their 
ethnic  groups  at  higher  levels.  The  education  system  confined  state-assisted  education 
to  the  sons  of  the  privileged  classes  in  Zanzibar.  The  disparity  was  extreme.  such  that  in 
a  population  265,000  persons,  190,000  (72%)  had  no  schooling.  In  the  rural  areas  of 
Unguja  only  21%  of  children  under  the  age  of  15  had  attended  school,  while  in  Pemba  it 
was  nearly  11%  (Bowles,  1990:  87  quoting  Batson,  undated).  Already  there  existed  some 
extreme  spatial  disparities  even  in  primary  education. 
1A 
number  of  slave  masters  kept  a  category  of  slave  known  as  Mashuria  (concubines)  who  were  often  also  working 
slaves  of  the  household. 162 
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Figure  6.1  Student  enrolment  by  ethnic/racial  groups  (1950s) 
Figures  6.1  and  6.2  show  clearly  that  the  smaller  and  more  privileged  ethnic/racial 
groupings  enjoyed  greater  access  to  education.  Using  other  indices  to  measure  social 
structure,  such  as  ownership  of  land,  occupation  and  socio-economic  ranking,  Lofchie 
(1965)  arrives  at  the  inescapable  conclusion  that  Zanzibari  society  was  rigidly  stratified 
along  social  lines  which  was  radically  plural  and  wholly  unsuited  to  the  emergence  of  a 
unified  nationalistic  political  movement.  Social  integration  appeared  highly  unlikely 
under  such  conditions,  "for  the  most  significant  feature  of  this  plural  society  was  the 
stable  character  of  the  race-class  system  and  the  almost  complete  absence  of  upward 
mobility  for  the  African  population"  (Lofchie,  1965:  93). 
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Source:  1948  Census  of  Zanzibar  Protectorate. 
Figure  6.2  Zanzibar:  Distribution  of  population  by  major  ethnic/racial  groups-1948 
(percentages) 
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The  Arab-Asian  monopoly  of  the  elite  status  and  the  need  to  defend  the  privileged 
position  occupied  by  those  groups  meant  that  whatever  policies  or  programmes  that 
would  emerge  would  further  reinforce  the  status  quo.  Lofchie  (1965:  94)  sums  it  quite 
despondently  by  stating  that.  "to  be  born  an  African  was  in  itself  -  irrespective  of 
education,  land  ownership  or  family  position  -a  handicap  to  upward  mobility".  The 
reality  was  that  insofar  as  upward  social  and  economic  mobility  was  concerned, 
Africans  were  not  accepted,  and  particularly  the  mainland  Africans  (Emerson,  1960; 
Ayany,  1969).  Such  a  situation  extended  the  rift  between  the  people  of  Zanzibar  and  was 
to  be  one  of  the  issues  in  the  political  and  social  developments  taking  place  in  the 
islands  following  independence. 
One  other  important  ingredient  was  the  influence  of  religion.  The  Moslem  faith  has 
considerable  influence  In  Zanzibar.  It  was  introduced  by  the  Arabs,  and  the  majority  of 
the  population  are  Moslems.  The  influence  of  Islam  and  the  Arab  culture  is  widespread 
and  dominant  such  that  by  the  1940s  over  96%  of  the  population  were  Moslems,  and  this 
is  still  the  case.  There  are  several  Islamic  sects  with  the  dominant  one  being  the  Sunni 
followed  by  the  Ibadhi  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  Shia.  The  majority  of  the  African 
population  are  Sunni.  The  majority  of  the  Ibadhi  were  Arabs  and  most  Shia  and  Hindus 
were  Asians.  The  few  Christians  were  Africans,  Asians  from  Goa  and  Europeans.  By  the 
1950s  the  non-Moslem  population  accounted  for  3.4%  of  the  population. 
Although  the  Islamic  faith  has  the  potential  to  be  the  basis  for  political  solidarity 
amongst  the  various  ethnic  groups,  this  did  not  happen.  Lofchie  (1965)  noted  that  in 
Zanzibar,  Islam  furnished  a  powerful  impetus  towards  inter-ethnic  solidarity  among  a 
racially  stratified  population  and  was  conducive  to  widespread  African  support  for  the 
nationalistic  movement  sponsored  and  lead  by  the  Arabs.  But  at  the  same  time, 
economic  differences  which  operated  along  racial  lines  accentuated  ethnic  divisions  and 
caused  them  to  become  an  alternative  and  divisive  bias  of  political  loyalty.  The 
consequences  of  the  influence  of  religion,  particularly  as  far  as  Arab  nationalism  was 
concerned,  were  to  be  seen  in  subsequent  political  development  and  campaigns. 
In  various  ways  religion  played  a  role  in  political  conflict,  mainly  between  certain 
classes  and  the  colonial  administration.  For  example,  rinderpest,  East  Coast  fever  and 
anthrax  were  prevalent  In  Eastern  Africa  and  in  1944  some  cattle  were  slaughtered  by 
the  Veterinary  Department  after  they  had  contracted  rinderpest.  In  1949  the 
Department  required  cattle  owning  peasants  to  have  their  cattle  dipped  against  East 
Coast  fever  and  other  tick  borne  diseases.  However  some  of  the  cattle  still  died  after 
dipping.  1  The  colonial  administration  was  promptly  accused  of  wishing  to  diminish 
their  herds,  and  as  Muslims,  this  was  interpreted  as  a  malicious  attempt  by  infidels 
(Bowles,  1991:  95).  Compulsory  inoculation  was  also  introduced  and  in  1951  two  cart 
1  The  peasants  had  to  dip  them  weekly  and  pay  for  the  service  and  they  resented  this. 164 
owners  refused  to  have  this  done  and  they  were  arrested  and  fined.  Turmoil  ensued, 
villagers  boycotted  administration  activities,  their  leaders  were  arrested  and  fined,  and 
crowds  surrounded  the  count  attempting  to  release  them.  Later  the  crowd  attacked  the 
prison  and  police  fired  on  them  killing  five.  The  riots,  which  were  part  of  the  peasant 
anti-colonial  movement,  are  referred  to  as  Vita  vya  Ngombe  (the  cattle  riots)  or  the 
Anthrax  Revolt.  This  incident  became  the  basis  for  the  formation  of  a  peasants  anti- 
colonial  association  known  as  'Hizbul  Watan  li  Riala  Sultan'  (The  National  Party  of  the 
Sultan's  Subjects  -  NPSS).  1 
6.6  Towards  Independence  -  Zama  Za  Slasa 
Three  rounds  of  elections  ensued  prior  to  Zanzibar  attaining  Independence  in  1957.  and 
in  January  and  June  of  1962.  The  following  sections  analyse  the  elections  and  their 
implications  for  the  political  developments  leading  to  independence  and  Revolution. 
This  period  of  considerable  party  political  activity  is  commonly  referred  to  as  Zama  Za. 
Siasa. 
6.6.1  The  1957  Elections 
The  1957  elections  were  held  on  the  recommendations  of  the  Coutts  Report  (1956).  The 
results  of  these  elections  were  to  form  the  basis  of  a  gradual  process  of  transferring 
governance  of  the  Protectorate  to  Zanzibaris.  The  elections  were  contested  by  political 
parties,  racial  and  religious  organisations  (Othman  and  Mlimuka,  1989). 
The  Coutts  Report  (1956)  gave  the  franchise  to  any  literate  male  subjects  of  the  Sultan 
either  at  least  25  years  old  and  had  an  income  of  £25.2  Under  these  conditions  an 
electorate  of  only  about  40,000  people  or  13.3%  of  the  population  was  created,  a  large 
section  of  society  being  excluded  from  participating.  The  elections  were  due  for  July  21, 
1957  and  under  these  conditions  the  Arab  group  expected  to  win  outright  while  the 
African  opposition  was  seriously  handicapped  by  their  economic  and  educational 
limitations. 
The  Afro-Shirazi  Union's  (ASU)  hitherto  warring  factions  developed  some 
rapprochement,  creating  the  Afro  Shirazi  Party  (ASP)  in  1957.  The  ASP  was  better 
organised  and  aimed  to  win  most  of  the  six  seats  in  the  Legislative  Council  (LEGCO). 
1  By  calling  themselves  'Subjects  of  the  Sultan',  the  peasant  movement  united  an  ethnically  divided  population, 
gained  the  movement  a  wider  appeal,  since  the  Sultan's  domain  included  Pemba  and  embraced  the  people  of 
coastal  Kenya  who  were  officially  the  Sultan's  subjects.  The  peasants  saw  nothing  wrong  in  being  ruled  by  a 
monarchy.  However,  despite  its  uniting  appeal,  it  still  discriminated  against  mainland  Africans.  See  also  Babu 
(1991:  222-223). 
2  This  was  an  enormous  amount  considering  that  in  1966  per  capita  income  for  Zanzibar  was  £  29  (IMF,  1969. 
Survey  of  African  Economies,  International  Monetary  Fund).  Clearly  the  intentions  were  to  alienate  the  poverty 
stricken  majority  from  participating  in  the  elections.  The  economic  and  racial  divisions  were  more  or  less  along 
the  same  lines.  There  was  also  the  added  dimension  with  sexist  discrimination  barring  women  from  participating. 165 
Interestingly  though,  the  ASP's  strategy  was  pro-British,  clearly  indicative  of  their 
apprehension  with  the  Arab  nationalists  (ZNP).  Babu  (1991)  argues  that  this  reflected 
the  absence  of  competent  leadership  within  the  ASP.  The  ASP  appreciated  their 
organisational  limitations,  so  they  advocated  for  a  delay  in  the  granting  of 
independence  implying  that.  the  British  should  remain  for  a  period  of  tutelage  (Ayany, 
1970).  ASP  members  expressed  their  technical  incapability  to  cope  with  the 
complexities  of  a  modern  government  while  facing  more  skilled  and  crafty  adversaries. 
Prior  to  the  1957  elections  the  ASP  arranged  an  electoral  pact  representing  the  various 
anti-Arab  groups.  The  outcome  of  the  elections  shocked  the  Arab  nationalists.  The 
ASP's  electoral  pact  won  5  of  the  6  elective  seats.  The  sixth  seat  was  won  by  an 
Independent  Moslem,  Implying  that  the  Zanzibar  Nationalist  Party  was  defeated.  Three 
of  the  five  seats  were  for  the  Afro-Shirazis  and  two  were  for  the  Shirazis.  Two  were  taken 
by  Africans  of  non-party  ethnic  associations  and  the  remaining  one  was  backed  by  the 
Moslem  community.  Indeed,  "these  results  revealed  the  deep  primordial  divisions  in 
Zanzibari  politics"  (Yeager,  1982:  21). 
The  outcome  of  the  elections  were  interpreted  by  some  commentators  as  evidence  that 
perhaps  Zanzibar  was  more  properly  linked  with  East  Africa  than  with  the  Arab  League 
and  Middle  East  (Times,  London,  August  15.1957  p.  9).  The  same  paper  suggested  that  for 
the  Arabs  to  regain  their  identity,  they  would  have  to  find  a  way  of  building  a 
rapprochement  with  the  Africans,  implying  the  necessity  to  forgo  their  privileged 
position  and  to  support  ethnic-racial  and  socio-economic  equality  to  all  peoples  of 
whatever  origins  in  Zanzibar,  an  implausible  agenda. 
The  results  of  the  July  1957  elections  made  it  difficult  to  distinguish  party  ideological 
differences  from  racially  motivated  conflicts  occurring  within  the  leadership  and  at 
grass  roots  levels.  Political  propaganda  increasingly  adopted  racial-ethnic 
connotations.  The  ASP  invited  all  to  join  its  ranks  but  also  considered  Arabs  and 
Indians  as  foreigners,  just  as  did  the  Nationalist  Party  considered  Africans  and 
especially  the  'recent'  Immigrants  from  the  mainland.  To  the  ASP,  the  Arabs  and  the 
Sultan  were  perceived  as  colonialists,  just  as  the  British  were. 
The  ZNP  reorganised  itself  and  sought  external  ties  to  gain  recognition  as  a  genuine 
nationalist  party  as  well  as  gain  material  support.  Both  the  ASP  and  ZNP  suffered 
considerably  from  the  factional  and  ethnic/racial  divisions.  By  1959  the  ASP  was 
unable  to  hold  together  its  confederation  of  Shirazis,  and  the  Pemba  Shirazis  withdrew 
and  formed  the  Zanzibar  and  Pemba  People's  Party  (ZPPP).  This  robbed  the  ASP  of  Its 
Pemba  supporters.  The  decision  to  splinter  reflects  the  beliefs  of  the  rich  Pemba 
peasants  that  their  interests  lay  in  a  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  rather  than  in  any 
transfer  of  power  to  an  African  party  (Bowles,  1991).  The  remaining  groups  rallied  to 
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One  important  development  which  took  place  after  1957  election  was  the  existence  of  an 
uneasy  truce  between  the  political  parties  and  in  1959  they  jointly  demanded 
independence  for  Zanzibar  by  1960.  The  British  Colonial  Secretary  rejected  the 
proposal.  Meanwhile,  agitation  for  independence  continued.  Ian  MacLeod,  the  Colonial 
Secretary  appointed  Sir  Hilary  Blood,  a  Constitutional  Commissioner,  to  examine 
Zanzibar's  constitutional  position  and  make  recommendations.  The  terms  of  reference 
only  allowed  it  to  recommend  what  was  to  cover  the  next  stage  of  Zanzibar's 
constitutional  development.  In  June  1960  the  Blood  Report  was  published  and  came  out 
with  proposals  much  in  line  with  what  had  occurred  in  Singapore,  i.  e.  rather  than 
independence,  it  proposed  the  introduction  of  a  representative  form  of  government.  The 
report  was  acclaimed  by  the  ASP  who  considered  it  as  the  basis  for  further 
constitutional  advance,  and  because  presumably  gave  it  time  to  mobilise  political 
support.  The  ZNP  rejected  the  report  categorically.  It  had  built  in  measures  which  would 
erode  the  privileged  and  dominant  positions  the  Arabs  held  in  the  country.  Despite  the 
rejection,  the  ZNP  and  other  parties,  continued  to  campaign  for  the  impending  elections. 
In  November  1960,  the  Blood  Report  was  adopted  with  some  changes,  ready  for  the 
January  1961  elections.  The  Executive  Council  would  consist  of  the  British  Resident  as 
President,  3  ex-o  f%io  members,  22  (instead  of  the  proposed  29)  elected  members  and  up 
to  5  appointed  members.  A  speaker  was  also  included.  The  constituencies  were 
increased  to  eight,  five  in  Unguja  island  and  three  in  Pemba.  Appointed  members  of  the 
Legislative  Council  (LEGCO)  were  to  be  reduced  from  six  to  four.  The  electorate  was  to  be 
increased  by  reducing  the  minimum  age  for  exemption  from  the  literacy  qualifications 
from  40  to  30  years  and  for  literate  electors  age  qualification  was  reduced  from  25  to  21 
years. 
The  prelude  to  the  1961  elections  was  marked  by  a  substantial  reorganisation  of  the  ZNP 
after  the  phenomenal  defeat  it  faced  in  the  preceding  elections.  It  expanded  its  influence 
and  strength  through  the  trade  unions,  party  based  media  and  political  propaganda.  The 
ASP's  strategies  were  similar.  though  it  still  suffered  from  the  lack  of  adequate 
management  and  a  shortage  of  funds. 
The  main  issues  at  stake  in  the  1961  elections  were  loyalty  to  the  Sultan,  Pan- 
Africanism,  the  East  African  Federation,  the  Kenya  Coastal  Strip,  Immigration  and 
Naturalisation,  Land  Reform  and  Zanzibarisation  of  the  Civil  Service.  The  contesting 
parties  each  emphasised  on  different  themes.  The  ZNP  and  ZPPP  exhibited  strong 
emotional  loyalties  and  commitments  to  the  Sultanate.  Though  also  adopting  the  same 
position.  some  ASP  leaders  opposed  monarchical  government  in  an  independent 167 
Zanzibar  (Ayany.  1970).  The  ASP  advocated  Pan-Africanism  whilst  the  ZNP  treated 
with  suspicion  the  fact  the  some  mainland  politicians  supported  the  ASP.  1  The  ZPPP 
tried  to  remain  indifferent  in  this  matter. 
The  ASP  was  in  favour  of  Zanzibar  joining  the  proposed  East  African  Federation  which 
was  to  comprise  Kenya,  Uganda  and  Tanganyika.  The  motivations  were  both  economic 
and  perhaps  more  important  to  ASP,  political.  The  East  African  mainland  territories 
were  African  and  Karume  is  quoted  as  stating  that  the  ASP  saw  Zanzibar  as  a  partner  in 
the  Federation  (East  African  Standard,  Nairobi  Dec.  30,1960,  p.  5).  The  ZNP  wanted 
independence  within  an  East  African  Federation  and  Commonwealth  but  stressing  its 
autonomy,  while  the  ZPPP  envisaged  eventual  complete  independence  within  the 
Commonwealth  but  outwith  an  East  African  Federation  (loc.  cit  p.  5).  All  the  parties 
supported  the  idea  of  ceding  the  Coastal  Strip  to  Kenya.  The  ASP  encouraged 
unrestricted  movement  of  Africans  from  the  mainland  and  advocated  citizenship  for 
mainland  Africans  who  had  lived  and  worked  in  Zanzibar  for  more  than  six  months. 
Restrictive  immigration  policies  discriminating  against  incoming  mainland  Africans 
were  promoted  by  both  the  ZNP  and  ZPPP. 
Both  the  ZNP  and  ZPPP  endorsed  non-racial  land  policies,  while  the  ASP  demanded  that 
some  of  the  fertile  land  on  the  eastern  side  be  redistributed  to  the  disadvantaged 
Africans.  The  ZPPP  supported  the  idea  of  compulsory  purchase  of  land  from  absentee 
and  inefficient  landlords.  The  land  issue  was  becoming  increasingly  sensitive  since  the 
wealthier  groups,  often  Arabs,  had  alienated  the  poor,  predominantly  Africans,  from 
ownership  of  fertile  land  and  they  stood  to  lose  should  the  ASP  come  into  power. 
Naturally  the  position  of  the  parties  were  in  favour  of  the  core  of  their  respective 
supporters. 
The  ASP  aspired  for  the  Zanzibarisation  of  the  civil  service  as  did  the  ZNP  and  ZPPP, 
but  with  differing  emphases.  2  Insofar  as  the  ASP  was  concerned,  Zanzibarisation  also 
meant  Africanisation,  and  implied  a  policy  of  recruiting  more  Africans  to  positions  of 
higher  responsibility  in  the  governance  of  the  Protectorate.  The  ZNP  and  ZPPP 
advocated  'non-racial'  policies  as  this  was  convenient  to  them,  especially  if  the  status 
quo  would  be  maintained.  Families  of  most  Arabs  and  wealthy  Shirazis  were  better 
educated  anyway  and  automatically  qualified  for  a  Zanzibarisation  programme,  thus 
conveniently  over-representing  their  communities  in  the  civil  service. 
1  The  Tanganyika  African  National  Union  (TANU)  supported  the  position  of  the  ASP.  TANU  was  under  the 
leadership  of  Julius  Nyerere  and  advocated  Pan-Africanism  during  the  early  period  of  the  struggle  for 
independence  in  Africa. 
2  Zanzibarisation  meant  replacing  non-Zanzibaris  in  the  civil  service  by  Zanzibari  people.  The  parties  had  different 
definitions  of  who  was  Zanzibari  and  who  was  not.  The  ZNP  and  ZPPP  did  not  consider  recent  immigrant 
mainland  Africans  as  Zanzibaris,  whilst  the  ASP  did.  However,  the  definition  of  'recent'  varied. 168 
All  these  political  developments  occurred  as  the  'Cold  War'  was  escalating.  The  parties 
inadvertently  participated  in  it  by  accusing  one  another  of  alignment  to  different 
foreign  powers.  The  Eastern  and  Western  Blocs  followed  these  developments  carefully. 
The  ZNP  seeking  pro-Arab  League  support,  had  its  delegates  establish  contact  with 
Gamel  Abdel  Nasser  of  Egypt  and  visited  Beijing  and  Moscow.  The  West  was  also 
concerned  and  exasperated  with  such  developments  (Wilson,  1989).  Moreover.  the  ZNP 
attacked  the  American  Mercury  ground  satellite  tracking  station  project  being 
established  in  Zanzibar.  1  They  wanted  it  to  be  removed  and  used  it  in  their  campaigns 
against  the  ASP.  The  ASP  had  no  objection  to  the  stations  being  there  but  emphatically 
objected  to  the  establishment  of  any  foreign  military  bases  on  the  islands.  2  The  ASP 
accused  the  ZNP  of  being  pro-Communist  while  the  ZNP  accused  the  ASP  as  being  a 
stooge  of  the  West. 
The  monarch,  Sultan  Seyyid  Sir  Abdullah  Khalifa  and  his  family  lacked  impartiality  in 
these  political  developments.  They  became  involved  in  political  manoeuvres  and 
intrigues  and  so  fell  prey  to  sectional  and  partisan  interests,  and  especially  to  the  pro- 
nationalistic  activities  of  the  Sultan's  son  (Rotberg,  1960).  This  throne  was  viewed  with 
suspicion  by  the  ASP  as  it  became  embroiled  into  the  prevailing  ethnopolitics.  Although 
all  parties  advocated  non-racial  principles  and  made  considerable  efforts  to  be  seen  as 
doing  so,  in  reality  they  all  had  some  racial-ethnic  allusions.  Clearly  the  privileged 
groups  sought  a  subtle  continuation  of  the  status  quo. 
6.6.3  The  January  1961  Elections 
The  results  of  the  January  elections  showed  considerable  improvements  in  the  standing 
of  the  ZNP.  It  won  9  of  the  22  seats,  the  ASP  secured  10  seats  and  the  ZPPP  3  seats  (Table 
6.2).  No  single  party  emerged  with  an  overwhelming  majority  and  so  a  government  could 
not  be  formed.  The  geographical  distribution  of  the  seats  won  is  interesting  in  that  it 
reflected  the  racial-ethnic  support  for  the  parties  spatially. 
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Total  13  9  22 
Source:  Lofchie,  (1965). 
Table  6.2  Geographical  distribution  of  seats  (January  1961  elections) 
1  These  were  said  to  be  satellite  tracking  stations. 
2  The  satellite  tracking  station  was  finally  removed. 169 
Geographically,  the  ASP's  position  in  Pemba  had  improved  to  a  degree  compared  to  the 
previous  elections  (1957)  when  the  party  was  not  functioning  in  the  island.  Despite  this 
situation  it  was  still  weaker  there  compared  to  its  opponents.  The  ZNP  and  ZPPP  were 
elated  and  the  ASP  was  shocked  after  having  swept  the  previous  elections.  In  1957  the 
African  representatives  took  78%  of  the  votes  cast,  but  in  the  January  1961  elections 
they  secured  only  43%.  From  holding  83%  of  the  seats  the  ASP  retained  only  45%. 
The  ZNP  considered  their  campaign  and  influence  to  be  successful.  The  same  applied  to 
the  ZPPP  which  was  non-existent  at  the  previous  elections,  or  rather  many  of  its 
members  had  voted  for  the  ASP.  Another  election  was  called  for  June  to  break  the 
deadlock.  Meanwhile  political  marriages  of  convenience  were  being  made.  These 
elections  were  a  turning  point  in  Zanzibar's  political  and  constitutional  history.  The 
ASP  and  indeed  others,  were  convinced  that  the  British  were  conniving  with  the  Arab 
oligarchy  to  establish  an  Arab  State  (Othman  and  Mlimuka.  1989)  and  it  is  against  this 
background  that  subsequent  election  campaigns  would  be  held  with  so  much  passion. 
The  ZNP  and  ZPPP  formed  an  electoral  coalition  isolating  the  ASP.  Under  the  coalition 
the  ZNP  and  ZPPP  candidates  would  not  oppose  one  another.  In  terms  of  their  electoral 
appeal  the  position  of  all  parties  were  more  or  less  the  same  as  in  the  January  elections. 
Before  the  June  elections,  a  new  constituency  was  created  in  Pemba  to  prevent  another 
deadlock.  However,  the  drawing  up  of  constituencies  and  the  addition  of  the  new 
constituency  in  Pemba  where  the  ASP  enjoyed  less  support  worked  against  the  ASP's 
favour,  introducing  an  element  of  doubt  about  the  true  intentions  of  the  colonial 
authorities  (Middleton  et.  al.  1965:  57).  The  results  were  that  the  ZNP  increased  its  share 
of  seats  by  one  to  match  the  ASP's  (Table  6.3). 
Despite  frequent  and  widespread  disturbances.  the  turnout  was  large.  In  terms  of  the 
total  votes  cast  the  ASP  took  50%  of  the  votes,  the  ZNP  35%  and  the  ZPPP  14%  (Figures 
6.6  and  6.7).  The  results  triggered  an  unprecedented  degree  of  violence  between 
supporters  of  the  rival  parties.  The  elections  had  uncovered  the  seething  racial-ethnic 
and  social  divisions  in  Zanzibar.  It  was  reported  that  64  Arabs  were  killed  in  a  week  of 
rioting  (Yeager,  1982:  22).  The  political  campaigns  had  further  fuelled  the  heightened 
inter-ethnic/racial  and  class  divisions. 
Soon  after  the  June  1961  election,  the  ZNP-ZPPP  coalition  began  to  fracture.  The 
imminent  breakdown  was  on  ideological  grounds  and  would  add  yet  another  dimension 
to  the  already  complex  situation.  One  break-away  splinter  formed  the  Umma  Party 170 
(Mass  Party)  under  Abdulrahman  Babu.  I  Meanwhile  the  contradictions  and  conflicts  in 
Zanzibari  society  continued.  Tragically,  it  seemed  that  'violence  was  being  accepted  as  a 
way  of  resolving  political  conflict"  (Lofchie,  1965:  205).  Every  aspect  of  Zanzibari  life 
was  affected.  Arab  shops  were  boycotted  by  Africans  while  African  squatters  were 
evicted  from  Arab  owned  plantations.  Established  Afro-Shirazi  dock  workers  and 
labourers  at  the  port  were  displaced  by  pro-Nationalist  Party  labour.  The  divisions  were 











ZNP  5  5  10 
ZPPP  0  3  3 
Total  13  10  23 
Source:  Lo[chie  (1965) 
Table  6.3  Geographical  distribution  of  seats  (June  1961  Elections) 
6.7  The  1962  Constitutional  Conference 
Following  the  June  election  a  'National  Government'  was  formed  with  the  ZPPP  holding 
the  balance  of  political  power.  In  preparation  for  the  transfer  of  power  and  bringing 
independence  to  Zanzibar.  a  Constitutional  Conference  was  held  at  Lancaster  House  in 
1962. 
The  islands  were  becoming  more  of  a  liability  to  the  British  Government.  On  the 
political  side  violence  and  disturbances  continued  to  take  place.  Economically,  the 
viability  of  Zanzibar's  economy  was  wavering.  The  abolition  of  slavery  and  the  decline 
in  ivory  trades  meant  that  the  island  economy  was  entirely  dependent  on  cloves  and 
copra.  The  erratic  nature  of  the  clove  economy  further  emphasised  the  vulnerability  of 
the  country's  economic  base.  2  Its  position  as  the  entrepSt  to  the  African  hinterland  was 
in  doubt,  since  it  was  not  clear  what  position  the  newly  emerging  East  African  countries 
would  take  with  respect  to  trade  and  commerce  with  Zanzibar.  This  situation  signifies 
the  changing  global  economic  relations  with  decolonisation.  Zanzibar  was  losing  its 
advantageous  position  as  the  entrep6t  to  the  African  continent  -  the  centre  of  activity 
that  formed  a  unique  commercial  empire  spanning  East  and  West,  bridging  the  Orient 
and  Occident.  With  direct  neo-colonial  relations  being  established  between  the  emerging 
1  The  left  within  the  ZNP-ZPPP  coalition 
2A 
report  on  the  economy  of  Zanzibar  showed  that  the  economy  was  facing  constraints  and  suggested  to  the 
government  ways  and  means  of  diversifying  and  establishing  economic  links  with  the  mainland  East  African 
countries  to  expand  the  island's  market  (Selwyn  and  Watson,  1962.  Zanzibar  Protectorate,  Report  on  the 
Economic  development  of  the  Zanzibar  Protectorate). 171 
states  of  Africa,  Zanzibar's  'middle-man'  position  was  redundant  and  so  it  was  relegated 
to  the  periphery. 
However,  its  position  was  still  important  with  respect  to  the  global  balance  of 
geopolitical  power.  Events  on  the  islands  drew  interest  from  the  African  continent,  the 
Middle  East  and  Gulf,  the  East  and  West  Blocs,  China  and  North  Korea.  Zanzibar's  lost 
economic  zenith  was  replaced  by  a  geostrategic  one.  Under  these  circumstances.  it  was  in 
the  interest  of  the  colonial  regime  that  with  independence  approaching,  the  'right'  group 
should  be  in  power  to  continue  to  facilitate  neo-colonial  relations  and  guarantee  that 
Zanzibar  did  not  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Eastern  Bloc. 
Meanwhile  pressure  was  mounting  from  all  the  main  parties  to  proceed  quickly  towards 
internal  self-government.  The  British  colonial  authorities  agreed  to  this  demand  and 
sought  to  facilitate  independence.  The  Constitutional  Conference  was  yet  another 
vehicle  used  to  proceed  towards  that  objective.  It  was  agreed  by  all  parties  that  the 
Sultan  and  the  ruling  dynasty  should  continue  as  a  Constitutional  Monarchy.  As  a 
starting  point  'internal  self-government'  would  be  executed. 
However,  the  British  authorities  were  anxious  about  the  discord  leading  to  and  following 
the  1961  elections.  There  was  an  atmosphere  of  political  restlessness  making  the 
colonial  authorities  uneasy  about  granting  self-government  under  such  circumstances. 
Independence  was  delayed,  as  an  18  month  state  of  emergency  was  enforced,  extending 
from  mid-1961  to  the  end  of  1962.  This  news  was  not  well  received  in  Zanzibar.  The 
parties  expressed  their  displeasure  with  the  action  of  the  British  authorities. 
Meanwhile  external  interests  intervened  in  Zanzibar's  Zama  Za  Siasa.  The  political 
activities  of  the  leftist  radicals  generated  uneasiness  in  the  West.  The  Times  of  London 
(May  7.1962.  p.  8)  reported  that  Zanzibar  was  becoming  'the  Cuba  of  Africa'.  A  general 
phobia  about  the  influence  of  communism  was  whipped  up.  The  views  of  socialists  such 
as  Abdulrahman  Babu,  the  Secretary  General  of  the  ZNP  and  later  leader  of  the  Umma 
Party,  led  him  to  be  labelled  as  a  well  known  communist  sympathiser  (Reporter. 
Nairobi,  May  12,1962  p.  13).  Babu  and  his  band  were  hounded,  tried  for  various  'crimes' 
such  as  publishing  seditious  materials,  fined  and  convicted. 
Ayany  (1970:  105)  pointed  out  that  "it  would  appear  that  by  some  twist  of  irony,  it  was 
perhaps  Britain's  unequivocal  intention  to  grant  independence  to  Zanzibaris  that 
seemed  to  have  let  loose  the  forces  that  were  delaying  the  attainment  of  that  goal*. 
However,  others  disagree  with  this,  stating  that  this  is  precisely  how  the  colonial 
authorities  wanted  the  situation  to  be  viewed,  since  they  perpetuated  the  continuation  of 
ethnopolitics  in  the  Isles  (Babu,  1991:  Bowles,  1991).  However,  it  can  also  be  argued  that 
by  the  1960s  the  process  of  decolonisation  was  in  full  swing  and  as  the  poor  state  of 
Zanzibar's  economy  would  be  more  of  an  economic  liability  to  the  colonial  authorities, 172 
there  was  little  benefit  in  delaying  independence. 
Towards  the  end  of  1962.  the  political  tensions  (and  security  situation)  had  improved 
somewhat  and  by  December  the  state  of  emergency  was  lifted.  The  British  government 
made  it  clear  that  if  this  atmosphere  prevailed  the  transition  to  independence  would  be 
hastened.  On  January  24,1963,  Zanzibar  became  an  internally  self-governing  territory. 
In  April  1963  the  new  Colonial  Secretary  announced  that  elections  would  be  held  in  the 
following  July.  The  British  authorities  consulted  with  the  Zanzibaris  on  the  timing  of  a 
final  conference  to  chart  out  the  final  stage  of  the  transfer  of  authority  to  Zanzibaris  and 
to  fix  a  date  for  independence.  Internal  self-government  commenced  in  June  1963  with  a 
Zanzibar  Cabinet  comprising  eight  Ministers  headed  by  Prime  Minister  Sheikh 
Mohamed  Shamte.  Some  of  the  opposition's  demands  regarding  the  extension  of  the 
voting  franchise  and  universal  adult  suffrage  were  accepted.  The  number  of 
constituencies  was  also  Increased  from  23  to  31,  with  17  in  Unguja  and  14  in  Pemba. 
6.8  En  route  to  Independence  (1963) 
Measures  were  taken  to  maintain  peace  during  the  election  campaigns  and  elections. 
However,  below  the  surface  the  issues  dividing  the  people  remained  and  were  as  sensitive 
as  ever  (Ayany,  1970).  Zanzibaris  wanted  independence  as  soon  as  possible  and  the 
political  rivals  were  willing,  albeit  temporarily,  to  bury  their  differences  to  achieve  this 
common  objective.  The  high  turnout  of  voters  supports  this  fact  with  over  95%  of  the 
registered  voters  turning  out  to  cast  their  votes. 
The  ZNP/ZPPP  alliance  won  18  of  the  31  seats  and  the  ASP  took  the  remaining  13.  The 
ASP  was  weak  in  Pemba,  winning  only  2  of  the  14  seats  but  stronger  in  Unguja  where  the 
ZNP/ZPPP  coalition  managed  to  win  only  6  of  the  17  seats.  The  ASP  won  63%  of  the 
votes  cast  in  Unguja  and  44%  of  the  votes  in  Pemba  (Figures  6.3  and  6.4).  Intriguingly, 
despite  winning  only  2  seats  in  Pemba,  the  ASP  had  actually  increased  the  proportion  of 
voters  in  that  island  from  23.7%  in  the  January  1961  elections  to  36.6%  in  the  following 
June  and  up  to  44.4%  in  the  1963  elections  (see  Figures  6.3  and  6.4).  The  ASP  is  the  only 
party  that  consistently  increased  its  share  of  the  votes  cast.  In  contrast  the  ZNP's  share 
diminished  consistently.  The  ZPPP  only  increased  its  share  between  June  1961  and 
1963.  Overall.  between  1961  and  1963  the  ASP  had  steadily  increased  the  number  of 
people  voting  for  it  from  38%  to  43.2%,  to  50.6%  and  by  July  1963  to  54.2%  (Figures  6.3 
and  6.4). 
The  creation  of  additional  constituencies  although  desired  by  all  parties  was  to  be  yet 
another  major  anomaly  in  the  elections.  With  no  specific  guide-lines  as  to  how  and 
where  the  new  constituencies  were  to  be  created.  there  was  ample  room  for  political 
manoeuvring  with  direct  consequences  on  the  results  of  the  elections.  Especially 173 
doubtful  is  the  manner  in  which  seats  were  created  In  Zanzibar  Town.  Mosare  (1969)  and 
Yeager  (1982:  23)  note  that  the  1963  ZNP/ZPPP  alliance  victory  was  "partly  due  to 
gerrymandering  in  the  Stone  Town  sections  of  Zanzibar  Town.  "  Bowles  (1991:  101)  also 
agrees  with  this  accusation  stating  that;  "It  appears  that  there  is  some  truth  in  the 
accusations  in  a  general  sense,  though  the  electoral  results  were  due  to  the  alliances 
already  described". 
Despite  consistently  winning  an  overall  majority  of  votes  cast  it  was  unlikely  that  under 
the  existing  situation  the  ASP  could  ever  form  a  government.  One  analyst  summarised 
the  situation  grimly  by  stating  that  the  introduction  of  a  democratic  political 
institution  in  Zanzibar  failed  to  lead  to  a  constitutional  transfer  of  power  from  the  Arab 
oligarchy  to  the  African  majority  and  in  so  failing,  the  small  Arab  oligarchy  had 
survived  the  introduction  of  representative  'majorita.  rian'  institutions  (Lofchie.  1965). 
The  ZNP  too  suffered  from  problems  of  internal  cohesion.  A  small  but  critical  faction 
led  by  Abdulrahman  Babu  disagreed  in  several  matters  of  principle  with  the  larger 
section  of  the  party  led  by  All  Muhsin  Barwani.  The  splinter  faction  adopted  a  radical 
political  stance  whereas  the  latter  was  leaning  to  the  right.  Their  ideological  differences 
were  more  serious.  The  question  was  which  would  predominate  in  a  future  ZNP 
controlled  independent  state,  religion,  nationalism  or  Marxism?  Muhsin  strongly 
believed  in  his  party's  religiously  derived  'theory  of  national  community'.  This  group 
was  of  a  conservative  nature  and  basically  advocated  independence,  pseudo-nationalism 
and  maintenance  of  the  status  quo.  Babu's  militant  group  was  in  tune  with  the 
revolutionary  socialism  of  the  likes  in  China  and  Cuba  and  based  on  internationalism 
and  the  socio-economic  reorganisation  and  transformation  of  society.  They  rejected  the 
religious  based  concepts  of  Muhsin  and  the  ZNP  cabinet  as  a  whole  and  "they  saw  such 
views  as  the  product  of  a  bourgeois  class  position"  (Lofchie,  1965,258). 
The  final  break  came  with  disagreements  over  electoral  strategy  and  the  sincerity  of  the 
Party's  efforts  to  achieve  a  multi-racial  society.  Babu's  faction  wanted  to  lend  political 
legitimacy  to  the  concept  of  multi-racialism.  Conversely,  Barwani  felt  that  the  timing 
for  such  a  move  was  inopportune,  as  it  might  jeopardise  the  party's  chances  in  the 
elections  and  in  this  he  was  supported  by  a  large  and  influential  section  of  the  party. 
Babu  resigned  to  form  another  party  which  reflected  the  ideological  position  of  his 
group,  this  was  the  Umma  Party  (the  party  of  the  masses). 174 
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The  Urrama  Party  did  not  stand  in  the  July  1963  elections.  As  an  anti-government  policy 
organisation  it  proved  to  be  a  political  thorn.  Its  radical  thinking  and  organisational 
capabilities  appealed  to  the  youthful  elite,  trade  Unions,  the  opposition  press  and  even 
some  ASP  militants.  Its  ability  to  harass  the  government,  unify  and  inspire  the  African 
population  and  gain  international  support  for  the  oppositions  cause  were  considerable. 
Despite  Its  Marxist  based  ideology  and  unifying  appeal,  its  leadership  was 
predominantly  Arab  and  Comorian  and  this  was  treated  as  suspect  by  many  ASP  leaders 
who  were  unwilling  to  cooperate  with  Umma.  The  obvious  explanation  for  this  is  the 
better  access  to  education  and  contacts  with  the  outside  world  that  they  had.  However, 
the  reality  of  Zanzibari  politics  and  intrigue  made  it  pertinent  to  view  issues  with  racial- 
ethnic  bias  and  suspicion  and  so  their  ethnic  backgrounds  were  sometimes  a  liability. 
The  Umma  Party's  activities  drew  punitive  action  against  its  leadership  by  the  ZNP 
government.  Beside  being  charged  for  instigation,  Babu  was  denied  a  passport  to  attend 
the  London  Constitution  Conference  in  1963.  The  crude  and  frivolous  retaliatory 
measures  of  the  ZNP  further  complicated  the  precarious  political  situation  and  was 
indicative  of  the  true  agenda  of  the  core  (petty  bourgeoisie)  of  the  ZNP,  which  certainly 
differed  from  what  they  pontificated  from  the  political  pulpits. 
The  ASP  also  suffered  from  the  defeats  of  the  1961  and  1963  elections.  Its  supporters 
were  demoralised  and  several  factions  appeared  within  the  party.  One  group  proposed  a 
coalition  with  the  ZNP  but  this  was  rejected.  The  ZNP  wanted  the  ASP  to  dissolve  itself 
and  its  constituent  members  join  the  ZNP.  A  second  group  led  by  Abeid  Karume  sought  to 
become  a  strong  but  loyal  parliamentary  opposition.  Another  faction  coveted  open  co- 
operation  with  Umma  and  approved  of  protest  tactics  such  as  civil  disobedience  and 
resistance.  The  ASP  was  becoming  divided  and  dispirited.  Umma,  though  small, 
superseded  the  ASP  ideologically  and  led  an  effective  opposition  and  agitation 
movement  against  the  ZNP/ZPPP  government.  However  its  support  at  the  grassroots 
level  was  small. 
The  ASP  gained  a  considerable  number  of  votes  cast  in  Pemba  in  1963  and  this  was 
important.  The  gain  is  attributable  to  its  campaign  strategy  which  focused  less  on 
racial-ethnic  issues,  included  a  religious  dimension  and  advocated  principles  of  unity 
and  national  loyalty.  This  approach  was  not  so  different  from  the  position  of  the 
ZNP/ZPPP  alliance.  The  ASP  organised  and  presented  itself  in  a  better  light  and  this 
appealed  to  many  of  the  rural  Shirazi  and  African  voters.  Moreover  its  local  leaders 
were  recruited  from  within  the  island  and  the  split  in  the  ZPPP  in  1961  encouraged  some 
to  join  the  ASP. 
Meanwhile  the  ZNP/ZPPP  government  continued  to  suppress  the  opposition  and 
legislation  was  passed  imposing  strict  control  and  limitations  on  opposition  activities 177 
and  the  placed  curbs  on  the  media.  Important  positions  were  given  to  Arab  supporters  of 
the  party.  The  Constitutional  Monarchy  was  rapidly  becoming  an  authoritarian  regime. 
as  the  policies  adopted  by  the  government  created  an  atmosphere  of  apprehension  and 
fear. 
6.9  Geographical  Voting  Patterns 
Population  distribution  in  Zanzibar  was  principally  distributed  along  ethnic  lines. 
This  is  due  to  Zanzibar's  historical  development  in  which  each  ethnic  group  played  a 
specific  role  in  the  island  economy  at  various  times.  Also  as  introduced  in  section  6.2,  it 
is  also  due  to  the  time  each  group  arrived  in  the  islands  and  the  relations  they  had  with 
each  other  and  especially  so  in  the  relations  of  production.  These  factors  determined 
where  each  ethnic  group  settled.  Land  alienation  further  entrenched  these  spatial,  social 
and  economic  divisions. 
The  voting  patterns  during  the  various  elections  reflect  the  deep  rooted  economic.  social, 
racial-ethnic  and  spatial  stratification  of  Zanzibari  society.  Voting  patterns  reflected 
the  central  interests  of  the  various  ethnic/racial  groups  as  well  as  the 
privileged/underprivileged  positions  of  those  groups  (see  Figures  6.5,6.6  and  6.7).  This 
situation  is  summed  up  by  Lofchie  (1965:  238)  by  stating  that  "Zanzibar's  Islamic  multi- 
racial  political  culture  produced  considerable  Shirazi  voting  support  for  Arab 
leadership  only  in  Pemba.  In  Zanzibar  there  has  always  been  an  acute  awareness  of  a 
separate  African  political  identity.  generated  primarily  by  the  ethnic  pattern  of 
stratification  which  existed  in  Zanzibar's  society".  There  was  a  clear  difference  in 
geographical  support  for  the  various  parties  reflecting  inter-island  and  intra-island 
(including  rural-urban)  differences. 
Figures  6.5  and  6.6  shows  the  geographical  voting  patterns  and  support  amongst 
different  ethnic-racial  groups.  The  ASP  enjoyed  its  support  mainly  from  mainland 
Africans  and  the  Hadimu  Shirazi  and  consequently  won  all  the  seats  in  Unguja  island 
with  the  exception  in  the  far  north  and  north-east  Unguja  island  and  the  Stone  Town 
areas  of  Zanzibar  Town.  The  latter  areas  coincide  with  plantations  and  areas  of  good 
soil  fertility  while  the  large  sections  of  ASP  support  consist  of  the  coral  rag  areas,  which 
are  poor  for  agriculture. 
On  Unguja  Island  the  ZNP  was  supported  by  ethnic  minorities  (Arabs,  Indians, 
Comorians  -  urban  based)  and  the  Tumbatu  Shirazis  (Figures  6.5  and  6.6).  More 
precisely  these  were  the  non-African  areas  in  Zanzibar  Town,  the  two  seats  in  the  Stone 
Town  area  being  the  domicile  of  the  Indian  commercial  and  bureaucratic  middle  class 
and  wealthy  Arab  land  and  plantation  owners.  The  third  constituency  was  inhabited  by 
Comorians  and  Ismaili  Asians.  In  the  long  term  and  with  the  collusion  of  the  colonial 178 
authorities,  it  appears  that  the  division  of  constituencies  was  along  ethnic-racial  lines, 
working  to  the  advantage  of  the  ZNP  (and  later  the  ZNP/ZPPP  alliance). 
The  situation  was  markedly  different  in  Pemba  where  the  ASP  consistently  only 
managed  to  win  and  secure  two  seats  throughout  all  the  post  1957  elections.  The 
increasing  voting  proportions  supporting  the  ASP  (from  23.7%  in  January  1961  to 
44.4%  in  1963)  in  the  small  geographical  area  that  it  held,  suggests  that  there  was  a  very 
high  concentration  of  population  in  them  (Figures  6.3,6.4,6.5  and  6.6).  The  ASP 
constituencies  are  characterised  by  poor  soils,  unsuitable  for  intensive  cultivation  and 
not  surprisingly  few  Arabs  settled  there.  These  are  Micheweni-Kojani  in  the  north-west 
and  Panza-Mkoani  in  the  south-west  (Figure  6.6).  Elsewhere  in  the  island  the  Pemba 
Shirazis  and  Arabs  predominantly  voted  for  the  ZNP/ZPPP  alliance. 
Arab  land  alienation  had  been  more  extensive  in  Unguja  compared  to  Pemba.  Arab 
immigrants  displaced  indigenous  people  from  most  of  the  fertile  areas,  e.  g.  the  Hadimu 
were  pushed  onto  less  fertile  areas  on  the  eastern  side.  Lofchie  (1965:  245)  notes  that  the 
situation  was  further  compounded  by  the  "relative  poverty  of  the  rural  coastal  fishing 
village  as  opposed  to  the  moderate  prosperity  of  the  clove  and  coconut  area,  the  hardship 
of  country  life  as  opposed  to  the  comparative  luxury  of  an  urban  existence".  Land 
alienation  was  less  extensive  in  Pemba  where  there  was  adequate  good  quality  soils  for 
both  Arabs  and  Shirazis.  In  addition,  as  mentioned  in  section  6.2  the  manner  in  which 
the  Arabs  arrived  and  settled  in  Pemba  and  conducted  social  and  economic  relations 
with  the  people  there  is  quite  different  from  what  occurred  in  Unguja. 179 
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6.10  Zanzibar  Independence  (1963) 
The  last  Constitutional  Conference  was  held  in  September  1963  in  London,  December  10, 
1963  being  set  as  the  date  for  independence.  Despite  the  tensions  in  the  islands,  the 
conference  was  conducted  in  an  atmosphere  of  relative  restraint  and  calm.  At  midnight 
December  9,1963  Zanzibar  became  an  independent  state.  The  Arab  sections  of  society 
rejoiced  while  most  African  areas  remained  indifferent  to  the  occasion.  Some  African 
taxi  drivers  were  quoted  as  saying  that  it  was  independence  for  the  Arabs  and  not  for  the 
Africans  (cf.  Clyde  Sanger  quoted  in  by  John  Okello  1967:  2  1).  ASP  supporters  stated  that 
Uhuru  (liberty/independence)  should  not  only  mean  freedom  from  "British,  but  also 
from  Arab  rule  as  symbolised  by  the  Sultan"  (Ayany,  1970:  118).  The  ASP  Secretary- 
General,  Sheikh  Thabit  Kombo  accused  the  British  of  having  helped  the  Arabs  and 
neglecting  the  African  majority  (Ayany  op.  cit.  ). 
These  results  effectively  meant  that  Zanzibar  became  an  Arab  State  signalling  the  end  of 
any  hopes  that,  through  democratic  and  constitutional  processes,  an  African-ruled 
Zanzibar  would  ever  emerge  (Othman  and  Mlimuka.  1989).  "Arab  rule  had  not  only 
survived  the  introduction  of  representative  institutions,  but  had  acquired  a  degree  of 
legitimacy  under  Constitutional  democracy  "(Lofchie,  1965:  68). 
The  ZNP/ZPPP  government  applied  increasingly  authoritarian  measures  imposing 
crippling  restrictions  on  the  activities  of  the  opposition.  Travel  to  the  East  African 
mainland  and  Europe  was  restricted  and  opposition  party  activists  were  subjected  to 
arbitrary  search  and  seizure.  The  police  force,  with  most  of  its  members  coming  from 
Tanganyika,  Kenya  and  Nyasaland  was  de-Africanised.  Mainland  African  police  were 
demobilised  and  repatriated  to  their  country  of  origin  and  replaced  by  loyal  Arab, 
Shirazi  or  indigenous  Africans.  Some  were  discharged  without  being  repatriated  having 
lived  in  the  islands  for  a  long  time. 
The  police  force  was  demoralised  and  experienced  personnel  were  replaced  by  hastily 
recruited  untrained  ones.  The  government  was  becoming  far  from  popular  with  the 
mainland  countries,  and  most  awkward  was  the  fact  that  the  combination  of  its  actions 
"convinced  many  local  Africans  that  the  government  was  fully  intended  to  create  an 
Arab  police  state"  (Lofchle,  1965:  268).  The  manner  in  which  the  political  process  had 
been  directed  and  developed  became  intolerable  and  with  the  capricious  measures  of  the 
ruling  party  aimed  at  silencing  the  opposition,  frustration  and  anger  abound. 
By  January  1964  the  situation  in  Zanzibar  exhibited  symptoms  of  a  highly  unstable 
political  and  social  order  (L)fchie,  1965;  Mosare,  1969;  Ayany,  1970;  Yeager,  1982  and 
Othman  and  Mlimuka,  1989)  i.  e. 183 
Q  There  existed  political  instability  which  was  a  result  of  the  extreme  socio- 
economic  discrepancies  between  the  competing  ethnically  defined  political  groups. 
Q  The  ethnic/race-class  division  was  so  pronounced  that  it  almost  became  the  sole 
political  issue  in  the  country.  There  lacked  a  single  overriding  political  issue  that 
superseded  all  others  and  the  existing  political  conflicts  divided  society  into 
polarised  segments.  With  no  other  prominent  source  of  disagreement  important 
enough  to  create  overlapping  and  cross  cutting  patterns  of  membership  or  common 
ground  between  the  opposing  groups,  there  lacked  political  accommodation. 
The  weakness  of  the  parliamentary  system  resulted  partially  from  the  political 
fragility  of  the  dominant  elite.  Colonial  rule  undermined  and  altered  the  political 
position  and  role  of  the  traditional  ethnic  oligarchy.  The  oligarchy  was  no  longer 
an  inherently  powerful  political  force  and  could  not  buttress  representative 
institutions  with  autonomous  powers  of  social  control.  In  fact,  if  anything,  they 
achieved  the  opposite. 
Q  Parliamentary  institutions  lacked  inherent  stability  because  they  had  not 
acquired  popular  consensus  validations.  Despite  proclamations  of  nationalism, 
there  was  no  widespread  acceptance  among  Zanzibaris  of  a  basic  political 
philosophy  which  might  have  led  to  a  commitment  to  democratic  parliamentary 
procedures.  The  symbolic  political  values  were  confined  to  party  objectives  and 
thus  the  preservation  of  the  representative  system  was  treated  with  broad 
indiference  on  both  sides. 
U  Economic  stagnation  also  contributed  to  parliamentary  instability  and  regime 
weakness.  Politically  harmful  socio-economic  differentiation  became  reinforced 
by  frustrating  policies  aimed  at  achieving  gradual  integration  of  society.  Under 
these  circumstances  the  government  was  handicapped  in  any  effort  to  achieve 
broad  popular  consensus. 
U  Geopolitical  considerations  were  highly  relevant  to  its  instability.  The 
government's  ability  to  deal  with  and  overcome  a  crisis  also  depended  upon  its 
external  relations  with  neighbouring  countries  and  this  was  increasingly 
questionable. 
Zanzibar's  first  post-independence  government  could  not  last  long  under  these 
circumstances.  Although  the  desire  for  independence  and  self-government  was 
widespread  the  internal  conflicts  had  developed  considerably  and  cohesion  was  lacking. 
One  commentator  suggests  that  the  'incipient  authoritarianism  may,  indirectly,  have 
contributed  to  the  effort  to  overthrow  the  government  (Lofchie,  1965:  265).  The  violent 
overthrow  of  the  government  was  irreminent. 
6.11  The  Zanzibar  Revolution  (1964) 
On  January  12,1964  a  coup  d'etat  took  place.  A  small  group  of  insurgents  led  by  a 184 
eccentric  ex-policeman.  John  Okello,  attacked  two  police  stations  and  equipped 
themselves  with  arms.  The  radio  station  and  other  strategic  places  were  taken  and 
amidst  some  fighting  the  government  of  Sultan  Seyyid  Jamshid  bin-Abdullah  under 
Prime  Minister  Sheikh  Mohamed  Shamte  Hamadi  capitulated.  The  Sultan  and  his 
family  fled  to  exile  in  Europe,  as  appeals  for  intervention  from  Britain  were  rejected. 
While  Okello  was  the  leader  of  the  insurgents  and  executed  the  coup,  a  short  period  of 
political  ambiguity  emerged  in  which  it  was  unclear  who  exactly  were  behind  the 
Revolution.  Wilson  (1989)  reports  that  the  insurgents  consisted  of  ASP  youth  league 
members,  together  with  large  numbers  of  unemployed,  angry  and  frustrated  lumpen 
youth,  as  it  succeeded  ASP  and  Umma  cadres  took  control.  Okello  announced  a 
Revolutionary  Council  which  consisted  of  both  ASP  and  Umma  Party  members.  l  A 
Revolutionary  government  was  formed  with  the  ASP  leader,  Abeid  Amaan  Karume 
becoming  the  first  president  of  the  People's  Republic  of  Zanzibar  and  Pemba.  Abdulla 
Hanga  the  deputy  Secretary  General  of  the  ASP  and  a  Babu  supporter  became  Vice- 
president  and  Prime  Minister.  Abdulrahman  Babu  became  Minister  for  External 
Affairs. 
Meanwhile  Karume  requested  for  assistance  from  Tanganyika  in  controlling  the 
deteriorating  security  situation  in  the  country  and  to  pre-empt  any  counter-coup 
attempts.  Two  hundred  armed  police  were  promptly  dispatched  to  assist.  With  this  the 
regime  in  Zanzibar  was  firmly  established.  Umma  merged  with  the  ASP  to  form  a 
consolidated  and  unified  regime.  Trade  Union  affiliates  of  the  two  parties  unified  to 
form  the  Federation  of  Revolutionary  Trade  Unions.  The  merger  of  the  ASP  and  Umma 
leadership  created  a  militant  leadership  which  was  to  be  a  major  force  in  the  early  post- 
revolutionary  political  development  of  Zanzibar. 
Several  measures  were  taken  to  change  the  social  and  economic  relations  and  this 
included  the  Africanisation  of  the  bureaucracy.  land  redistribution.  elimination  of  all 
symbolic  vestiges  of  the  racially  divided  society  e.  g.  racial  clubs  and  societies,  while 
national  solidarity  was  to  replace  racial  solidarity.  On  January  30,1964,  Karume 
announced  that  Zanzibar  was  a  one  party  state  under  the  ASP  and  all  other  parties  were 
banned.  Swahili  replaced  English  as  the  national  language  and  large  privately  owned 
businesses  and  assets  were  nationalised.  The  position  of  wealthy  Arabs  and  Asian 
merchants  became  increasingly  precarious. 
The  Revolutionary  Government  inherited  serious  economic  problems.  The  economy  of 
Zanzibar  was  far  from  healthy  and  had  become  even  more  depressed.  The  Revolution 
brought  about  a  seizure  in  economic  activity  and  investors  and  capital  fled  from  the 
1  The  erratic  and  eccentric  John  Okello  was  soon  eliminated  from  any  leadership  position  and  in  March  of  that  year 
was  banned  from  returning  to  Zanzibar  after  travelling  to  Kenya.  His  frequent  disagreements  with  the  regime 
leaders  and  erratic  nature  made  him  an  undesirable  element. 185 
country.  There  was  going  to  be  difficulty  in  maintaining  the  economic  and  even  political 
viability  of  Zanzibar.  External  recognition  of  the  new  Republic  (and  regime)  came 
quickly  though  in  small  numbers.  By  the  end  of  January  it  was  recognised  by  over  17 
countries.  The  East  African  mainland  states  and  a  number  of  East  Bloc  countries 
including  the  Soviet  Union,  Czechoslovakia,  Cuba,  The  Peoples'  Republic  of  China,  East 
Germany  and  Yugoslavia  recognised  it.  Britain,  the  United  States  (US)  and  France  also 
gave  recognition  to  the  regime,  though  much  later. 
Zanzibar  was  by  no  means  stable;  if  anything  there  was  a  heightened  external  interest  in 
the  direction  of  political  and  diplomatic  relations  on  the  islands.  Zanzibar  was  very 
vulnerable.  Within  a  very  short  time  the  island  state  become  embroiled  in  the  on-going 
cold  war.  Most  of  its  non-African  support  came  from  the  Eastern  Bloc,  China  and  North 
Korea.  The  Western  media  caused  concern  and  in  the  period  between  March  to  April, 
1964,  the  major  papers  expressed  fears  about  a  communist  or  'Cuban  type'  regime  in 
Zanzibar.  This  situation  was  further  compounded  by  a  statement  issued  by  the  Soviet 
Union  warning  against  foreign  interference  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  Zanzibar.  Viewing 
this  situation  against  the  1961  Bay  of  Pigs  fiasco,  the  1962  Cuban  Missile  Crisis  and  the 
militarisation  of  the  Indian  Ocean  it  is  plain  that  Zanzibar  was  in  a  geostrategic  'hot 
spot'. 
Meanwhile  the  Eastern  Bloc  countries  together  with  China  and  North  Korea  gave  their 
unfailing  support  to  the  regime.  However,  this  assistance  was  regarded  in  a  negative 
light  by  the  West  and  confirmed  suspicions  that  the  islands  were  being  used  as  a  base  for 
political  manoeuvres  and  destabilisation  in  the  African  continent  where  the  process  of 
decolonisation  and  neo-colonisation  was  progressing.  A  statement  to  this  effect  was 
made  by  the  US  Ambassador  in  Nairobi.  Kenya  and  the  regime  in  Zanzibar  saw  this  as 
an  attempt  to  instigate  conflict  between  Zanzibar  and  Its  East  African  neighbours, 
which  the  ASP  considered  as  important  allies. 
The  Revolutionary  Government  was  uneasy  about  the  intentions  of  the  West  and  fearing 
attempts  to  restore  the  Monarchy  and  the  displaced  Arab  regime,  introduced  a  decree  in 
March  stipulating  the  death  sentence  for  anyone  who  might  enter  the  Republic  to 
organise  counter-revolutionary  activities  or  incite  others  to  do  so.  The  President  was 
empowered  to  declare  anyone  a  persona  non  grata  without  right  of  appeal  to  courts. 
It  appears  that  even  if  authorities  in  Tanganyika  were  aware  of  an  imminent  coup.  the 
timing  certainly  took  them  by  surprise.  Prior  to  the  revolution  the  Soviet  Union 
portrayed  the  ZNP  as  a  "popular  anti-imperialist  movement.  and  the  ASP  as  the  agents 
of  the  British"  (Clayton,  1981:  108).  But  overnight  the  latter  became  the  party  of  the 
workers  and  the  peasants  and  the  ZNP  the  bourgeois  leadership  of  a  first-stage  bourgeois 
independence.  The  shifting  of  policies.  strategies  and  alliances  and  the  intrigue 
involved  definitely  confounded  external  viewers  of  Zanzibari  politics. 186 
East  German  technical  help  arrived  to  assist  the  treasury,  health  services,  broadcasting, 
shipping  and  education,  while  the  Chinese  sent  expertise  for  the  public  works 
department  and  agriculture  and  rural  development.  The  Soviet  Union  assisted  in 
establishing  a  small  defence  force  and  re-establishing  the  police  force  (Clayton,  1981). 
These  developments  obviously  increased  the  worries  of  the  West,  but  also  caused  concern 
in  Tanganyika.  Moreover  violent  repression  still  continued,  threatening  to  lead  to  a 
reign  of  terror. 
The  US  had  appointed  an  experienced  career  diplomat.  Frank  Carlucci.  as  the  US  Charge 
d'Affairs,  replacing  the  expelled  Pickard.  1  Meanwhile  Eastern  and  Western  Bloc 
military  assistance  were  being  granted  to  various  interests  to  fight  wars  by  proxy  and 
American  naval  activities  in  the  Indian  Ocean  and  campaigns  of  disinformation 
seriously  threatened  to  compromise  the  security  situation  in  Zanzibar. 
Political  developments  in  the  ASP  caused  concern  to  Karume.  The  more  radical 
elements  within  the  Party  consisting  of  ASP  militants  and  former  Umma  radicals  had 
considerable  influence  within  the  Revolutionary  Council  and  dominated  political 
developments.  Their  links  with  the  East  Bloc  and  propagation  of  Marxism  did  not 
comfort  Karume.  There  was  an  imminent  danger  that  he  would  lose  control  of  the 
situation.  Worried  about  the  intentions  and  motivations  of  both  East  and  West  and  the 
speed  of  developments  in  the  political  and  security  arena.  Karume  once  again  turned  to 
Tanganyika. 
Tanganyika  too  was  concerned  about  the  escalation  of  the  Cold  War  politics  in  the  region 
and  even  more  concerned  about  the  consequences  should  Zanzibar  become  firmly 
controlled  by  either  the  East  or  West,  or  if  the  ousted  regime  was  reinstated.  In  addition 
Nyerere's  Pan-Africanist  ideals  made  it  an  obligation  to  assist  Zanzibar.  Clayton  (1981) 
goes  further  to  suggest  that  amongst  other  reasons.  Nyerere's  urgency  for  the  Union  was 
the  strong  distrust  of  the  growing  influence  of  foreign  communists  in  Zanzibar,  while 
externally  Britain  and  the  US  may  have  also  supported  the  idea.  Wilson  (1989)  provides 
some  interesting  evidence  of  communications  from  the  US  Embassies  in  Dar  es  Salaam 
and  Nairobi  that  show  that  intervention  from  Tanganyika  was  at  par  with  American 
and  British  interests.  It  is  under  these  heightened  political  and  security  conditions  that 
the  Union  was  conceived. 
6.12  The  Union  of  Tanganyika  and  Zanzibar,  April  1964 
In  April  26,1964,  three  months  after  the  revolution,  the  Union  between  Zanzibar  and 
Tanganyika  was  established.  Both  Tanganyika  and  the  People's  Republic  of  Zanzibar 
1  Frank  Carlucci  proceeded  to  become  Counsellor  for  Political  Affairs  in  Brazil  (1965-69),  US  Ambassador, 
Portugal  1975-78;  Deputy  Director  Central  Intelligence  Official  (1978-81  and  then  National  Security  Adviser  and 
Defence  Secretary  under  President  Reagan. 187 
ceased  to  exist  forming  the  United  Republic  of  Tanganyika  and  Zanzibar.  later  to  become 
the  United  Republic  of  Tanzania.  The  Acts  of  Union  were  hastily  passed  through  the 
Tanganyika  National  Assembly  to  ratify  the  Act.  Briefly,  the  Bill  provided,  inter  alia  : 
"  The  United  Republic  of  Tanganyika  and  Zanzibar  would  have  Julius  Nyerere  as  its 
first  President  and  Sheikh  Abeid  Karume  as  its  first  Vice-President  and  Rashid 
Mfaume  Kawawa  as  its  second  Vice-President. 
"  The  new  Republic  would  be  governed  in  accordance  with  the  Constitution  of 
Tanganyika  which  would  be  modified  to  provide  a  local  legislative  and  executive  for 
Zanzibar,  but  with  limited  powers  to  enable  it  handle  internal  affairs,  until  a 
Constituent  Assembly  had  approved  a  new  Union  Constitution. 
"  The  Union  Parliament,  which  would  comprise  representatives  from  Zanzibar  and 
the  Union's  Executive  would  have  reserved  powers  over  foreign  affairs,  police, 
citizenship.  immigration  and  external  trade. 
The  Union  allowed  Zanzibar  to  retain  the  institutional  autonomy  which  Karume  was 
adamant  to  give  up.  Zanzibar  maintained  its  own  Ministries  and  Departments  pursuing 
the  broad  development  objectives  set  out  by  the  ASP  led  government.  It  pursued  Its  own 
social  and  economic  policies  and  with  its  own  budget.  The  Peoples'  Liberation  Army 
(PLA)  was  amalgamated  with  the  Tanganyika  Army  (TA)  to  form  the  Tanzania  Peoples' 
Defence  Force  (TPDF),  and  on  monetary  matters  both  countries  shared  a  common 
currency.  In  the  1960s  the  East  African  currency  was  strong  and  stable  and  enjoyed 
parity  throughout  East  Africa. 
It  appears  that  under  these  circumstances,  insofar  as  Zanzibar  was  concerned,  a  Union 
with  Tanganyika  would  be  the  most  effective  means  of  preserving  its  autonomy.  Nyerere 
saw  the  union  "as  an  African  regaining  of  an  area  that  had  been  lost,  and  who  spoke  of  a 
marriage  which  would  in  time,  and  by  sharing,  would  lead  to  a  full  and  complete  merger" 
(Clayton,  1981:  113).  Karume's  concept  of  the  Union  was  different,  as  he  perceived  it  as 
achieving  a  new  balance  for  Zanzibar  between  its  two  historic  cultures,  and  not 
absorption  by  either  one  of  them  (ibid.  ).  Here  lies  the  distinct  and  fundamental 
differences  in  the  perceptions  of  the  Union  by  the  two  parties. 
Immediately  after  the  Union,  Zanzibar  continued  to  practice  considerable  independence 
both  In  domestic  and  even  in  international  affairs.  The  islands'  government 
unofficially  maintained  "an  almost  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  several  areas  of  policy 
which  by  the  terms  of  the  constitution,  were  assigned  to  the  Tanzania  government" 
(Lofchie,  1965:  281).  1  However,  according  to  Ayany  (1970)  this  situation  was  to  be 
expected  and  mentions  that  "the  Union  Interim  Constitution  which  came  into  force  in 
1  Constitution  here  implies  the  Interim  Union  Constitution  which,  for  example,  stated  that  external  affairs  were  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Union  Government. 188 
July.  1965  states  that,  until  a  Union  between  the  TANU  and  ASP  has  evolved,  the  ASP 
shall  continue  to  operate  in  and  for  Zanzibar,  notwithstanding  the  provision  in  the 
Constitution  that  there  shall  be  (only)  one  political  party  in  Tanzania"  (op.  cit:  145).  The 
reality  and  evidence  shows  that  time  and  again  that,  "Zanzibar  has  in  actual  practice 
resisted  administrative  and  political  integration...  "  (Lofchie,  1965:  280).  The  ASP 
continued  to  exercise  a  high  degree  of  autonomy. 
Clayton  (1981)  suggests  that  in  view  of  its  small  size,  isolation,  economic  viability  and 
vulnerability,  it  was  difficult  for  Zanzibar  to  survive  alone  under  the  tension  that 
prevailed  in  the  region.  Through  the  Union  it  could  theoretically  remain  independent 
while  drawing  from  the  Mainland  resources  to  implement  its  social  and  economic 
aspirations.  However,  there  are  several  SIS  that  also  faced  scarcity  of  resources  and 
have  been  economically  viable  and  have  survived.  Examples  include  Seychelles,  the 
Maldives  and  Mauritius.  The  argument  overlooks  the  tendency  for  autonomy  and  the 
degree  of  insularity  that  often  prevails  in  island  communities.  Moreover,  the  Arab  state 
of  Zanzibar  existed  for  about  80  years  before  British  rule  and  74  years  under  British  rule, 
though  during  that  period  the  economy  then  was  based  on  the  role  it  played  in  the 
expansion  of  European  capitalism  and  the  situation  had  changed  considerably  since. 
Internationally,  there  was  a  gradual  reduction  in  interest  in  the  islands  by  both  the  East 
and  West  and  this  in  part,  is  attributed  to  the  Union  (Clayton,  1981).  This  also  had  the 
effect  of  creating  a  gap  between  the  local  radicals  and  whatever  external  support  they 
enjoyed.  However,  despite  the  Union  and  the  internal  developments,  the  Revolutionary 
Council  remained  very  apprehensive  about  both  internal  and  external  threats. 
Internally  the  influence  of  the  former  Umma  and  ASP  radical  activists  were  blunted. 
Controversial  leaders  were  given  positions  in  the  new  Union  Cabinet.  Even  though 
ideological  differences  between  the  various  factions  did  not  end,  they  diminished  as 
Karume  Increased  his  influence  gradually  assuming  significant  personal  power.  Those 
who  appeared  to  threaten  his  position  were  shrewdly  removed  or  eliminated.  He 
consolidated  his  own  position  and  that  of  the  Revolutionary  Council  (RC)  in  general. 
Soon  he  usurped  almost  total  power. 
6.13  Ethnopoltics 
This  section  has  highlighted  the  emergence  of  political  organisation  and  the  nature  of 
their  interests  and  conflicts.  The  conflicts  had  distinct  ethnic  dimensions  which  often 
overshadowed  class  differentials.  As  a  group,  the  mainland  Africans  were  the  lowest 
and  most  dispossessed.  The  Arabs  were  the  landed  gentry,  engaged  in  agriculture  the 
dominant  sector  in  the  island  economy.  The  Indians  were  the  merchant  capitalists. 
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economically  no  better  off  than  the  Africans. 
The  Asians  formed  the  merchant  class,  conducting  and  controlling  the  business  of  the 
Island.  Although  much  smaller  in  numbers  and  with  no  direct  involvement  in  the 
politics  of  the  islands,  they  had  Indirect  political  control  through  their  domination  of 
the  economy.  This  was  not  a  new  phenomenon,  indeed  this  trend  is  traced  back  as  far  as 
the  existence  of  the  Arab  state  of  Zanzibar  (Sheriff.  1987:  247). 
The  ethnic  groups  tended  to  cluster  together  pursuing  a  'common  interest',  and  so  class 
differences  within  a  group  paled  into  obscurity.  The  Arabs  occupied  the  most  fertile  land 
in  the  islands  while  the  Indians  often  resided  In  urban  areas  or  where  their  businesses 
were  based.  Most  of  the  Africans  resided  in  the  less  fertile  'coral  rag'  areas.  There  was  a 
marked  spatial  differentiation  based  on  ethnicity  as  each  ethnic  group  occupied 
different  class  positions.  Ethnic  divisions  featured  prominently  in  Zanzibar  even 
before  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  late  1800s  and  with  the  abolition  of  slavery  it 
adopted  increasingly  an  active  political  dimension.  This  certainly  confirms  Hettne's 
(1990)  observation  that  politicised  ethnicity  is  not  a  new  phenomenon.  It  will  be  shown 
in  the  following  sections  that  ethnopolitics  is  related  to  social  and  economic 
development  in  many  ways. 
6.14  Class  and  social  formation 
Following  the  analyses  in  the  preceding  sections,  can  it  be  said  that  the  1964  Zanzibar 
Revolution  was  merely  the  overthrow  of  an  oppressive  racial  minority  (Arab)  by  a 
downtrodden  majority  (African)?  Not  entirely.  It  is  agreed  with  Sheriff,  that  to  perceive 
it  purely  as  an  inter-ethnic  conflict  would  be  simplistic  if  not  racist  (Sheriff,  1991). 
Class  differences  existed  in  Zanzibar  and  continue  to  do  so.  Mlahagwa  and  Temu  (1991) 
argue  that  it  would  be  improper  to  equate  race  and  class  in  analysing  social  formation  in 
the  Isles.  However,  it  is  Zanzibar's  peculiar  history  that  accounts  for  the  ethnic-racial 
phenomenon. 
Class  differences  and  formation  existed  and  cut  across  ethnic-racial  differences.  They 
developed  with  the  complex  transition  from  a  slave  mode  of  production  that  developed 
under  capitalism  to  colonial  capitalism  developed  by  imperialism.  Sheriff  (1991:  249) 
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"The  old  mode  was  partially  dissolved  to  destroy  its  independence,  while 
elements  of  pre-capitalists  relations  were  preserved  and  articulated  with  the 
capitalist  mode,  but  classes  in  general  were  prevented  from  maturing  into 
classical  capitalist  forms  under  colonial  rule.  The  exhausted  classes  of  past 
years,  such  as  the  landlords,  were  neither  retired  from  the  stage  in  history 
nor  transformed  into  a  dynamic  class.  The  peasantry  was  preserved  in  a 
semi-decomposed  form  as  cheap  migrant  labour,  but  did  not  realise  its  full 
potential  through  the  maturation  of  its  component  strata.  The  free  working 
class  that  grew  out  of  slavery  was  frozen  in  a  semi-proletarian,  semi-peasant 
condition,  while  the  stunting  of  the  industrialisation  process  in  the  colonial 
economy  hindered  the  emergence  of  a  true  proletariat.  " 191 
The  consequence  of  this  is  that  Zanzibar's  class  character  was  obscured  by  ideologies  of 
race  and  communal  identities.  These  differences  were  encouraged  to  take  precedence 
over  the  developments  of  class  formations  and  identities.  Thus  the  different  segments  of 
nationalist  movements  in  Zanzibar  became  increasingly  divided  and  by  the  time  the 
1964  Revolution  erupted,  it  lacked  the  leadership  of  a  class  with  a  clear  ideology  to  guide 
the  struggle  against  imperialism  and  socio-economic  development. 
Three  major  racial-ethnic  groups  emerge,  and  these  were  further  divided  into  no  less 
than  23  ethnic  and  communal  associations  (Sheriff,  1991).  These  groups  contained  a 
cross-section  of  classes  dominated  by  the  most  powerful  interests  (the  petty  bourgeoisie 
elites)  and  control  was  exercised  through  communal  activities  and  patron-client 
relationships.  This  situation  further  moulded  consciousness  along  ethnic  lines.  The 
elites  of  each  of  these  groups  emphasised  their  distinctiveness  from  other  groups, 
constructing  and  maintaining  barriers  between  the  membership  of  each.  When 
necessary,  the  leaders  forged  alliances  across  boundaries  to  promote  their  interests. 
Zanzibari  nationalist  ideology  emerged  in  the  1950s  from  a  radical  faction  within  the 
Arab  Association,  however  it  took  time  to  mature.  The  conflict  between  the  British 
colonial  authorities  and  the  peasant  cattle-keepers  led  to  the  realisation  that  there  was  a 
need  to  overlook  petty  ethnic  loyalties  and  so  they  formed  the  NPSS,  which  was  the  first 
nationalist  movement.  What  is  also  interesting  is  that  it  emerged  from  the  rural  areas. 
The  seeds  of  nationalism  sowed  by  the  NPSS  were  disseminated  to  the  ZNP. 
Meanwhile  urban  based  intellectuals  also  developed  a  nationalist  ideology  and 
constructed  an  effective  nation-wide  network,  They  also  established  wide  external 
relations.  The  ASP  lacked  this,  since  its  focus  was  on  exploiting  the  racial/ethnic 
divide.  It  obtained  its  support  mainly  from  the  rural  peasantry  of  central  and  southern 
Unguja,  a  small  part  of  rural  Pemba  and  the  peripheral  areas  of  Zanzibar  Town.  The 
remaining  peasantry  favoured  the  non-racial  nationalist  ideology  of  the  ZNP-ZPPP 
alliance.  However.  internal  contradictions  within  the  ZNP-ZPPP  alliance  lead  to  a 
split,  confirming  the  existence  of  the  self-interest  of  the  petty  bourgeoisie.  Increasingly 
the  predominant  political  issue  was  being  taken  overshadowed  by  ethnic/racial  issues, 
and  these  camouflaged  the  inherent  interests  of  the  elites  of  each  group.  Thus 
"reactionary  racial  ideologies  and  immature  class  distinctions  prevented  the  rival 
nationalist  movements  from  realising  the  supreme  need  to  resolve  what  was  the 
fundamental  contradiction  of  the  moment..  .  the  necessity  to  carry  through  a  national 
democratic  revolution  to  end  imperialist  domination"  (Sheriff.  1991:  260). 
With  the  Revolution  the  ASP  took  power.  The  radicals  of  the  Umma  Party  and  some  of 
the  progressive  elements  in  the  ASP  attempted  to  steer  the  revolution  along  classical 
socialist  lines,  but  the  interests  and  influence  of  the  petty  bourgeoisie  leadership  were 192 
stronger.  It  was  only  a  matter  of  time  before  the  radicals  were  eliminated.  With  support 
from  the  Mainland  its  position  was  secure  and  to  enhance  it  a  hastily  arranged  Union 
was  established.  Anyone  or  group,  whether  left  or  right,  that  threatened  the  regime  was 
eliminated,  and  so,  as  Sheriff  ended  his  conclusion:  "Nothing  was  left  to  stand  in  the 
way  of  the  populist  autocracy"  (Sheriff.  1991:  261). 
6.16  Spatial  Organisation 
There  are  two  dimensions  of  the  spatial  implications  of  what  occurred  in  Zanzibar 
between  Arab  colonisation  and  European  colonialism.  The  first  is  related  to  the 
position  that  it  occupied  by  virtue  of  the  role  it  played  in  the  evolving  capitalist  global 
economic  system,  and  the  second  include  the  internal  spatial  implications  between  the 
sister  islands,  soil  rich  and  soil  poor  areas,  and  rural-urban. 
6.15.1  The  external  spatial  dimensions 
The  Omani  Arabs  came  from  a  pre-capitalist  social  formation,  but  at  the  same  time  the 
forces  of  capitalism  had  already  penetrated  parts  of  the  Middle  East  and  Eastern  Africa 
operating  under  the  expansion  of  industrial  capitalism.  The  settlement  of  the  Omani 
Arabs  was  also  linked  to  economic  and  political  events  occurring  in  Oman  and  their  role 
in  Zanzibar  was  akin  to  a  comprador  group  serving  the  interests  of  metropolitan  capital 
(Mlahagwa  and  Temu,  1991). 
As  a  slave  mode  of  production  developing  in  Zanzibar  in  the  Middle  and  Far  East 
capitalist  formations  were  developing  and  the  necessary  means  of  contacts  and 
communications  between  Eastern  Africa  (Zanzibar)  and  India  and  the  Middle  East  were 
being  developed  (Figures  6.8  and  6.9).  This  was  the  process  of  spatial  transformation  at 
the  periphery.  At  the  global  level  the  peripheries  were  being  connected  by  a  network  of 
steamships  and  communications  (Latham,  1978,1981).  International  steam  ship  routes 
connecting  Zanzibar.  the  entrepOt.  were  developed.  The  same  applies  to  the  telegraph 
systems  connecting  Asia  and  Africa.  It  was  only  a  matter  of  time  that  the  slave  mode  of 
production  would  have  to  be  replaced  by  free  labour  producing  primary  goods  for  export 
and  providing  a  market  for  industrial  products.  The  global  capitalist  economic  system 
based  on  industrial  capital  was  expanding  and  Zanzibar's  role  would  become 
diminished  as  direct  contacts  were  being  established  between  its  hinterland  and  the 
metropoles,  thus  pushing  the  islands  into  the  periphery. 
6.15.2  The  internal  spatial  dimensions 
Internally  a  plantation  system  had  evolved  gradually  replacing  the  'traditional'  basis  of 
the  economy,  that  is  the  trade  in  slaves.  Initially  slave  labour.  and  subsequently  paid 193 
labour  worked  the  clove  plantations.  However,  given  the  small  land  areas  of  the  islands 
and  the  need  for  larger  areas  to  grow  cloves,  it  became  necessary  to  alienate  much  of  the 
land  for  plantation  agriculture.  The  better  quality  land  was  given  to  clove  production 
and  this  followed  the  natural  east-west  divide,  and  the  settlement  of  the  respective 
participants  in  the  colonial  capitalist  mode  of  production  settled  or  resided  more  or  less 
along  the  same  lines.  The  Africans  in  the  marginal  areas,  the  Arabs  and  the  Pemba 
Shirazi  in  the  Western  side  and  the  northern  parts  of  Unguja,  and  some  of  the  large  land 
owners  and  the  petty  bourgeoisie  in  urban  areas.  These  spatial  differences  were 
effectively  developed  in  response  to  external  needs. 
The  development  of  the  clove  economy  had  a  number  of  detrimental  consequences  and  is 
associated  with  the  process  of  underdevelopment.  The  first  is  the  alienation  of  land, 
reducing  the  amount  of  fertile  land  for  the  production  of  food.  This  was  especially 
sensitive  in  Unguja  island  where  the  amount  of  fertile  land  is  much  less.  An  increasing 
number  of  peasants  were  forced  to  scratch  a  living  in  the  coral  rag  where  it  is  only 
possible  to  cultivate  pockets  of  land  on  a  shifting  basis  (Bowels,  1991).  However, 
gradually  yields  declined  and  many  peasants  were  threatened  with  famine.  These 
developments  gave  rise  to  the  need  to  import  food.  The  colonial  state  imported  food 
through  merchants  from  the  Far  East  and  so  Zanzibar  could  not  became  self-sufficient 
in  food  production.  The  imported  food  was  cheap  and  so  discouraged  any  possibility  of 
domestic  food  production  and  so  Zanzibar  suffered  from  endemic  food  shortages.  By 
1964  only  11%  of  the  cultivable  land  was  used  for  grain  production  and  90%  of  grain 
demand  was  being  imported  (Bowels,  1991). 
Clove  picking  provided  better  cash  incomes  compared  to  say  rice  production.  So  during 
harvests  many  peasants  would  neglect  their  farms  in  favour  of  higher  cash  incomes,  this 
resulted  in  a  phenomenon  which  (Bowles,  1991)  call  the  `alienation  of  time'  between  the 
peasants'  own  farms  and  those  of  the  clove  producers.  Because  of  the  limited  available 
time  for  labour  and  the  poor  quality  of  land  many  peasants  sought  to  produce  a  crop  that 
demanded  less  in  terms  of  labour  demand,  mainly  cassava.  This  contributed  to 
nutritional  deficiencies  amongst  the  Zanzibari  peasantry. 
The  internal  spatial  differentials  are  symptomatic  of  contradictions  within  Zanzibari 
society  that  resulted  from  the  different  modes  of  production  exchange  and  distribution. 
It  was  assumed  that  upon  independence  these  would  be  confronted,  but  the  dominance  of 
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6.16  Summary  and  conclusions 
Through  an  historical  analysis,  this  chapter  has  provided  the  background  to  pre- 
Revolution  Zanzibar.  It  has  also  revealed  and  analysed  the  underlying  forces  and  issues 
leading  to  the  1964  Revolution.  The  analysis  is  relevant  in  that  internally  it  has 
provided  the  background  to  social,  economic  and  political  developments  after  1964  and 
this  forms  the  basis  of  further  analysis  and  discussions  regarding  the  identification  of 
development  problems  the  constraints  and  the  potential  solutions.  Externally  it  has 
shown  the  shifting  role  and  position  that  Zanzibar  occupied  in  its  modern  history  and 
that  many  of  its  internal  constraints  are  related  to  the  external  events  and 
environment.  In  many  ways  it  does  not  differ  from  the  experiences  of  many  other 
developing  SIS.  However  in  some  respects,  such  as  its  role  as  an  entrepbt  to  Eastern  and 
Central  Africa  and  its  connections  with  the  Middle  and  Far  East  and  Western  Europe. 
Zanzibar  is  in  a  unique  position. 
Zanzibar  has  experienced  and  played  diverse  roles  in  the  global  economic  system  ever 
since  the  penetration  of  Omani  colonialism.  Its  economy  was  initially  based  on  slave 
trade  (in  the  1800s)  and  subsequently  on  merchandise  trade  (late  1800s  to  1900s)and 
finally  to  commodity  production.  Its  importance  Is  highlighted  by  the  economic 
activities  taking  place.  By  1871  British  shipping  to  and  from  Zanzibar  was  greater  than 
any  other  nation  and  Zanzibar's  entrepbt  role  had  grown  with  the  re-export  or 
transhipment  trade  reaching  2  million  pounds  (Bader,  1991).  By  the  1950s  Zanzibar  was 
a  fully  fledged  plantation  economy  and  its  role  as  an  entrepdt  had  diminished.  Finally 
with  the  Eastern  and  Central  African  countries  attaining  their  independence  and 
forging  direct  links  with  the  metropoles  the  islands  ceased  to  become  a  node  of 
commercial  activity.  At  this  stage  Zanzibar  had  a  severely  dislocated  economy, 
dependent  on  two  exports,  copra  and  cloves,  both  of  which  were  experiencing  erratic 
production  and  demand,  and  which  over  the  long  term  the  prices  that  they  enjoyed  in  the 
world  market  were  on  a  declining  trend.  Further,  its  domestic  capability  in  producing 
sufficient  food  was  declining.  Zanzibar  had  effectively  been  moved  out  to  the  extreme 
periphery  of  the  global  economic  system. 
Even  as  the  islands  were  approaching  independence,  internally  the  country  lacked  any 
popular  consensus  and  society  had  become  increasingly  polarised.  Moreover,  the  pre- 
Independence  policies  contributed  to  shortages  in  skilled  and  experienced  human 
resources  and  were  further  exacerbated  by  the  social/ethnic/racial  stratification  that 
existed  and  policies  which  further  disadvantaged  the  lower  class  and  ethnic  groups.  The 
same  differentiation  served  to  erode  the  confidence  of  many  in  the  lower  stratum. 
Clearly,  as  the  case  of  Zanzibar  shows,  ethnically  or  racially  dominated  political 196 
developments  cannot  simply  be  disregarded  by  development  theorists  as  something  of 
the  past,  or  a  matter  best  left  to  historians  and  anthropologists.  The  conflicts  that  were 
generated  and  the  divisions  that  arose  in  Zanzibar  society  were  derivatives  of  economic, 
colonial  and  imperial  developments.  The  experience  of  Zanzibar  highlights  the  role 
that  the  indigenous  petty  bourgeoisie  played  in  manipulating  and  utilising  ethnic 
loyalties  primarily  for  their  own  economic  and  political  interests. 
External  economic  and  geopolitical  interests  and  influences  played  a  key  role  in  the 
direction  and  speed  of  political  and  social  development  in  the  islands.  Nasser  and  the 
Arab  league  had  given  the  Arab  world  confidence  and  interest  in  self-determination  in 
the  affairs  of  their  region.  Militant  Arabs  in  Zanzibar  identified  with  this  as  with 
socialist  developments  occurring  in  the  Eastern  Bloc,  China  and  North  Korea.  These 
developments  were  not  welcomed  by  some  Western  interests,  and  consequently  the 
Revolution  was  interpreted  as  being  a  newly  won  'sphere  of  influence'  of  the  Soviet  Bloc. 
Class  differences  existed  within  the  ethic-racial  organisations  and  these  are 
characterised  by  the  diverse  interest/pressure  groups  within  the  ASP,  ZNP  and  ZPPP. 
The  ZNP  subsequently  split  between  a  left  and  a  right  group,  with  the  latter  (petty- 
bourgeoisie  land  owning  class)  becoming  dominant.  When  the  ASP  came  into  power  it 
eliminated  the  opposition  and  internally  rivalries  surfaced  and  once  again  the  radical 
group  was  eliminated  leaving  an  African  urban  petty  bourgeoisie  class  spearheading  the 
Revolution.  It  barely  had  a  creditworthy  social  and  economic  development  programme, 
instead  the  government  focused  on  heightening  ethnic  and  racial  rivalries.  With  the 
absence  of  colonialism  there  lacked  any  issue  based  common  group  which  the 
opposition  and  the  ruling  party  could  focus  on  other  than  their  perceived  ethnic 
differences.  The  Union  with  Tanganyika  both  strengthened  the  position  of  the  ASP  and 
its  leadership,  but  also  provided  security  and  stability  to  the  islands,  leaving  the 
opposing  sides  of  the  super  power  rivalry  content. 
Even  as  Zanzibar  achieved  its  independence  it  was  a  plantation  (monoculture)  economy, 
increasingly  dependent  on  food  and  energy  imports.  The  economy  lacked  scale,  entailed 
high  transport  and  factor  costs  as  it  lost  its  strategic  role  in  the  global  economy  and  had 
a  shortage  of  experienced  skilled  personnel  for  government  and  business.  Zanzibar  was 
structurally  dependent.  It  also  had  functional  dependency  with  the  wilful  neglect  of  food 
production  and  its  failure  to  attempt  to  diversify  and  develop  locally  owned  capital 
investment.  Moreover.  Zanzibar's  bourgeoisie  were  merchants  rather  than 
entrepreneurs,  a  characteristic  accentuated  by  the  restrictions  of  its  size  on  the 
profitability  of  industry.  Since  most  of  them  belonged  to  one  of  the  opposing  ethnic 
groups,  they  too  were  eliminated  from  participating  in  the  socio-economic  development 
of  the  SIS.  It  is  under  these  debilitating  circumstances  that  Zanzibar  set  out  on  its  'First 
Phase'  of  its  post-Revolution  development. 197 
7.0  Evolution  after  the  Revolution,  1964-1972 
7.1  Introduction 
The  first  eight  years  after  the  1964  Revolution  are  analysed  in  this  chapter,  a  period  in 
which  some  critical  events  occurred  affecting  Zanzibar's  development  circumstances. 
However,  before  looking  at  these  some  background  information  is  provided  which  will 
assist  in  further  understanding  the  development  constraints  in  contemporary  Zanzibar. 
The  period  between  1964  and  1972  is  termed  by  the  party  in  Zanzibar  as  the  First  Phase 
of  the  Zanzibari  Revolution.  1  It  was  to  be  dominated  by  the  presidency  of  Sheikh  Abeid 
Amaan  Karume.  2  One  of  the  outstanding  aspects  of  this  period  was  the  meteoric  rise  of 
the  ASP  President,  who  through  the  coup  d'etat  came  to  control  Zanzibar.  The  ASP  had 
considerable  support  albeit  predominantly  from  the  indigenous  and  mainland  Africans 
in  Unguja  and  some  areas  in  Pemba.  Amidst  the  furore  of  the  first  few  weeks  of  the 
Revolution,  sweeping  changes  in  the  class  and  socio-economic  structure  were  declared, 
emanating  from  the  radical  Umma  activists  who  had  joined  the  ASP  bandwagon. 
Of  particular  relevance  to  this  period  is  the  character  of  Sheikh  Karume.  With  little 
formal  education  and  having  been  a  merchant  seaman,  he  was  a  charismatic  elderly 
person  who  led  the  ASP  during  difficult  times.  One  analyst  suggests  that  the  ASP,  at 
least  until  the  period  of  the  1964  Revolution,  should  be  regarded  as  a  petty  bourgeoisie 
party  (Bowles,  1991).  This  implies  that  Karume  too  was  part  of  the  petty  bourgeoisie.  His 
style  of  leadership  increasingly  emphasised  the  individual  rather  than  the  party  or  any 
radical  ideology,  which  in  a  way  is  not  surprising  given  the  lack  of  a  specific  ideological 
base.  In  time  he  became  increasingly  despotic  his  speeches  and  policies  being  based  on 
notions  of  a  populist  autocracy.  3 
1  Information  sources  for  this  period  are  difficult  to  obtain  and  therefore  limited. 
2  There  are  three  phases  of  the  post  revolution  era.  The  first  is  the  period  under  Kamine  and  characterised  by  the 
iron  fist  of  the  Zanzibar  Revolutionary  Council  (ZRC).  The  second  is  the  period  under  Sheikh  Aboud  Jumbe, 
which  saw  the  relaxation  of  some  of  the  excessive  powers  of  the  ZRC  and  the  Presidency/Chairman  of  the  ZRC. 
This  period  also  saw  a  slightly  higher  degree  of  tolerance  and  the  re-introduction  of  elections,  albeit  in  a  single 
party  system.  The  statist  approach  to  development  was  enhanced.  The  current  phase,  the  third  has  been  under 
three  leaders,  i.  e.,  Sheikh  Ali  Hassan  Mwinyi,  Sheikh  Idris  Abdul  Wakil  and  currently  President  Salmin  Amour. 
This  period  is  characterised  by  a  greater  degree  of  tolerance,  a  gradual  democratisation  process,  economic 
liberalisation,  freedom  of  movement  and  to  some  extent  expression.  The  current  period  is  expected  to  herald  the 
re-emergence  of  multi-party  politics  (multipartism),  hopefully  without  the  negative  aspects  of  Zama  Za  Siasa. 
3  Clayton  (1981)  gives  the  following  summary  of  the  attributes  of  populism:  Attitudes  may  be  judged  more 
important  than  achievements  and  leaders  must  represent  their  attitudes  in  style.  Populist  leaders  tend  to  establish 
a  special  bond  with  the  masses  and  the  movement  may  be  loosely  organised  and  defined,  anti-intellectual  and 
both  anti-establishment  and  counter-establishment.  Conspiracy  fixations  may  lead  to  mindless  violence  and  yet 
it  is  still  opposed  to  class  conflict.  Over  time  leaders  may  be  corrupt  with  success.  The  economic  aims  are  small 198 
The  process  of  democratisation  was  abandoned  as  it  was  felt  that  it  had  served  no  useful 
purposes  for  the  majority  of  the  people.  The  crude  manipulation  of  this  process  by  both 
the  colonial  government  and  the  Arab  oligarchy  had  nullified  its  usefulness.  To  the 
majority  of  the  people,  the  revolutionaries  promised  far  more  than  the  status  quo.  These 
dramatic  changes  implied  that  Zanzibar  was  to  commence  on  a  new  phase  in  its 
historical  development,  a  period  which  was  to  be  deeply  affected  by  the  ripples  and 
swells  of  the  Cold  War  and  of  regional  politics. 
There  are  a  number  of  reasons  which,  in  combination,  were  to  determine  the  path 
Zanzibar  would  take  in  its  social,  economic,  cultural  and  political  development  during 
the  First  Phase.  To  comprehend  this  process,  it  is  pertinent  to  understand  the  character 
of  its  leadership  and  the  internal  and  external  pressures  which  bore  on  the  new  African 
island  state.  All  these  would  subsequently  affect  both  the  internal  development  policies 
and  strategies  and  the  external  relationships  which  the  Isles  had  with  other  countries 
and  particularly  mainland  Tanzania. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  the  intrigues  of  the  Cold  War  affected  the  state  of  affairs  in 
Zanzibar  and  especially  the  integration  of  Zanzibar  and  Tanganyika.  Plans  for  the 
Union  were  quickly  drawn  up  and  it  was  implemented.  Some  analysts  have  since  shown 
that  Super  Power  politics  on  the  side  of  the  US  and  Britain  strongly  influenced  this 
(Wilson,  1987).  However,  this  notion  has  been  denied  by  Nyerere,  in  an  address  to  his 
National  Assembly.  He  insisted  that,  the  move  was  inspired  by  the  desire  for  African 
unity  and  had  nothing  to  do  with  cold  War  Politics:  "  'There  is  no  other  reason.  Unity  in 
our  continent  does  not  have  to  come  via  Moscow  or  Washington'  "(  Smith,  1973:  127). 
However,  Nyerere  is  also  reported  to  have  been  long  worried  about  the  closeness  and 
possible  influence  of  Zanzibar  to  Tanganyika,  and  is  said  to  have  responded  to  a 
question  about  the  turmoil  in  the  Islands  and  their  repercussions  by  stating  that,  "If  I 
could  tow  that  island  out  into  the  middle  of  the  Indian  Ocean,  I'd  do  it  ." 
(Smith,  1973:  90]. 
Nyerere  predicted  even  before  Tanganyika's  Independence  (1961),  that  one  of  the 
country's  biggest  problems  in  later  years  would  be  Zanzibar,  and  especially  its 
vulnerability  to  external  influences,  presumably  referring  to  the  influences  emanating 
from  the  Gulf  and  the  radical  philosophies  of  the  leftists  in  Zanzibar.  Nyerere  was  under 
no  delusion  about  the  consequences  of  the  growing  East-West  conflict  and  what  this 
could  entail  for  the  country  and  the  region.  He  would  do  all  he  could  to  keep  both  sides 
apart,  so  that  Tanzania  was  deemed  to  be  a  'Communist'  state  in  the  West  and  yet  also 
not  a  'Marxist'  or  a  'close  ally'  by  the  Eastern  bloc. 
co-operatives  with  little  capital  (presumably  to  contain  any  political  aspirations  of  indigenous  capital).  Foreign 
finance  is  opposed  though  small  local  capital  may  be  permissible.  Populism  is  often  urban,  especially  amongst 
artisans  and  recent  immigrants.  Populists  do  not  objects  to  either  a  strong  state  or  economic  inequalities  so  long 
as  they  serve  populist  interests.  Populism  is  isolationist.  religious,  opposed  to  science  and  technology,  often 
nostalgic  for  a  vision  of  a  lost  past,  and  on  occasions  mildly  racial  if  facing  an  oligarchy  of  a  different  ethnicity. 
Post-Revolution  Zanzibar  contained  all  of  these  traits  with  the  exception  of  allowing  small  local  capitalists  to 
function  and  it  did  not  explicitly  oppose  science  and  technology. 199 
Even  if  the  union  had  taken  place  as  part  of  the  process  of  unifying  Africa,  there  cannot 
be  any  doubt  that  there  were  the  influences,  both  overt  and  covert,  internal  and  external, 
which  served  to  accelerate  the  unification  process.  Moreover,  where  the  terrible  effects 
of  the  Cold  War  were  apparent  elsewhere  in  Africa,  as  in  the  Congo,  envoys  of  the 
opposing  sides  were  active  in  Dar  es  Salaam.  The  pro-Western  media  meanwhile  kept  a 
close  watch  on  matters  in  Zanzibar.  A  considerable  part  of  the  reportage  at  the  time  was 
either  a  gross  misunderstanding  and  misrepresentation  of  the  situation,  which  was 
unlikely,  malicious  misinformation  or  a  combination  of  all  these. 
Comments  emanating  from  the  pro-Western  media  and  often  hostile  to  Zanzibar 
infuriated  the  Karume  regime  and  fuelled  the  distrust  towards  the  West.  On  Nyerere's 
part,  it  certainly  caused  concern  about  the  intentions  of  the  West,  bringing  Zanzibar  to 
the  centre  of  Cold  War  politics.  The  focus  of  the  Cold  War  conflict  was  at  Tanganyika's 
front  door.  Smith  (1973:  129)  points  out  that  "Nyerere  resented  the  way  in  which  the 
British  and  American  press  characterised  him  as  a  'moderate'  and  'pro-Western'".  He 
had  been  congratulated  for  fighting  communism  by  seizing  the  islands!  Such  statements 
embarrassed  the  Zanzibaris  and  threatened  to  split  relations  between  the  isles  and  the 
Mainland. 
The  Revolution  had  created  an  African  state  of  Zanzibar.  A  number  of  measures  were 
taken  to  restructure  the  economy  and  relations  of  production,  exchange  and 
distribution.  Development  strategies  focused  on  the  provision  of  basic  needs  and 
redressing  the  gross  imbalances  in  Zanzibari  society.  Moreover,  Zanzibar  would  also 
make  its  mark  in  the  international  arena.  But  the  first  steps  would  be  difficult  as  the 
regime  was  attempting  drastic  soclo-economic  changes  in  the  light  of  some  serious 
disadvantages  that  included  shortages  of  skilled  personnel  and  a  frail  economy. 
Between  1961  and  1963  Zanzibar  sustained  a  trade  deficit  averaging  about  £  0.8  milllon.  l 
There  was  also  a  budget  deficit  of  nearly  9  0.4  million  over  the  same  period  (IMF:  1969). 
7.2  The  Fist  Phase  of  the  Revolution 
One  of  the  first  moves  that  Karume  took  was  to  reinforce  his  position  and  weaken  that  of 
his  adversaries.  He  announced  that  Zanzibar  had  become  a  one  party  state.  the  ASP 
would  represent  the  interests  of  Zanzibaris  and  banned  all  opposition  parties.  The 
leader  of  the  Umma  Party,  Abdulrahman  Babu  immediately  announced  his  party's 
merger  with  the  ASP.  The  intentions  were  to  consolidate  the  Revolution  and  'unify  the 
country.  It  was  also  an  attempt  by  the  more  progressive  elements  in  Zanzibar  to 
participate  in  and  steer  the  socio-economic  development  of  the  SIS.  The  merger 
provided  Karume  with  advisers  and  administrators,  and  in  the  early  years  Zanzibar  was 
seen  as  a  budding  Marxist  enclave.  However,  Karume,  like  most  populists,  distrusted  the 
1  At  the  time  £1=  TShs.  20  =  US  $  2.80. 200 
well  educated  elites  in  Zanzibar.  most  of  whom  were  of  Arab  descent  and  he  resolved  to 
eliminate  their  influence.  The  paradox  is  that  as  the  situation  became  hostile  to  them. 
many  moved  to  the  mainland  and  elsewhere  to  seek  employment  and  security.  while  at 
the  same  time  Karume  would  need  educated  people  around  him  to  help  him  run  the 
country. 
As  in  many  other  Revolutions,  the  new  government  seized  the  'commanding  heights'  of 
the  economy.  It  took  over  and  distributed  large  quantities  of  plantation  holdings  owned 
by  Arabs  to  African  peasants.  Karume  had  the  island's  rickshaws  collected  and  he 
ceremoniously  burnt  them  promising  £100  compensation  to  each  owner  (Smith,  1973). 
This  act  made  him  highly  popular  and  it  was  a  symbolic  end  to  the  degrading  practice 
quite  prevalent  in  Zanzibar  in  which  humans  worked  as  animals.  Such  gestures  gained 
him  immense  grassroots  support. 
The  economic  system  was  radically  transformed  from  a  being  a  hybrid:  a  combination 
of  an  open  free  market  system  combined  with  a  feudal  agricultural  economy,  to  a  'closed' 
centralised  economy  increasingly  divorced  from  the  world  economy.  The  inherited  legal 
system  was  changed  not  to  suit  the  needs  and  requirements  of  the  Zanzibari  people,  but 
instead  the  aspirations  of  the  ruling  regime  while  the  democratic  structures  that  existed 
were  abolished  and  replaced  by  an  autocracy.  1 
7.3  Autocratic  Rule 
The  early  period  of  the  revolution  saw  much  violence  and  hostilities  against  supporters 
of  the  ousted  regime,  mainly  Arabs  and  Asians.  It  is  reported  that  over  1,200  Arabs  and 
Asians  fled  from  the  isles,  most  of  whom  were  the  elite  and  those  who  had  valuable 
experience  in  running  business,  commerce  and  government  (Smith,  1973:  122).  While 
Karume  may  have  seen  this  as  getting  rid  of  undesirable  elements  who  would  probably 
cause  more  trouble  than  good,  their  departure  was  to  have  detrimental  effects  on 
governance  and  indeed  did  adversely  affect  the  overall  development  process  in  Zanzibar. 
The  process  of  eliminating  the  opposition  and  even  potential  opposition  elements 
occurred  even  within  the  ASP  (Throup,  1988).  The  individual  who  conducted  the  coup, 
Field  Marshal  John  Okello,  had  left  the  isles  to  visit  his  family  in  Uganda.  2  Passing 
through  Nairobi,  Okello  indicated  through  the  press  that  he  was  quite  willing  to  start 
revolutions  in  southern  Africa  wherever  there  were  colonialists  still  in  power  (Smith, 
1973:  123).  Such  statements  coupled  with  his  extraordinary  handling  of  the  situation 
1  The  ASP,  twice  denied  the  right  to  govern  by  an  electoral  process  imposed  and  shaped  by  the  colonial  power,  felt 
that  there  was  no  option  but  to  seize  power.  Being  denied  twice  left  the  ASP  leadership  (particularly  Karume) 
with  no  faith  in  Western  style  democracy  (Westminster-Lancaster). 
2  John  Okello  was  a  Ugandan,  who  worked  in  Pemba  as  an  ASP  activist  and  according  to  several  sources  lead  the 
revolution.  However,  the  official  ASP  version  challenges  this  notion  stating  the  head  executed  the  coup,  and  did 
not  lead  the  Revolution.  For  further  reference  see,  Okello,  J. Revolution  in  Zanzibar,  (Nairobi,  EAPH,  1967)  for 
his  own  version,  Lofchie,  (1965),  op  cit.  Smith,  (1973)  op  cit.  amongst  others. 201 
during  the  revolution  clearly  indicated  that  he  was  an  unstable  element  and  that  his 
presence  caused  considerable  concern  in  Zanzibar.  So  while  he  was  out  of  the  country  it 
was  made  known  to  him  that  he  was  unwelcome  in  Zanzibar.  Karume's  rule  became 
increasingly  harsh  and  authoritarian  and  this  was  caused  by  the  paranoia  that  there 
were  elements  plotting  against  the  government.  both  internally  and  externally. 
There  were  also  attempts,  often  crude  to  say  the  least,  to  redress  the  excesses  and 
imbalances  of  the  previous  regimes.  The  following  measures,  which  moulded  the  new 
character  of  Zanzibar  as  well  as  determine  social,  economic  and  development  trends  on 
the  isles,  were  taken.  They  also  served  to  reduce  the  non-African  status  and  influence  on 
the  islands  and  consolidated  Karume's  own  power. 
Deportations  of  Asians  and  Arabs  took  place  arbitrarily  beginning  immediately  after 
the  Revolution.  Though  in  small  numbers,  in  1971  all  non-citizen  Asians  were  required 
to  leave  the  country  within  a  year.  This  was  motivated  by  the  belief  that  Asians  were 
still  trying  to  control  the  economy  and  therefore  it  was  necessary  to  curtail  their 
economic  power.  They  were  also  prevented  from  leaving  with  money  or  moveable 
property.  The  regime  was  obviously  trying  to  curtail  the  influence  of  the  merchant  class, 
who  were  predominantly  Asian. 
The  Arabs  and  Asians  were  not  the  only  ones  to  suffer  under  authoritarian  rule.  The 
Comorians,  known  locally  as  the  Ngazija  (Wangazija),  were  required  (in  1968)  to 
renounce  their  country  of  origin,  and  government  officials  of  Comorian  ancestry  had  to 
resign  at  once  and  repay  their  earnings.  1  Comorians  were  singled  out  and  harassed  in 
the  suspicion  that  there  existed  a  conspiracy  amongst  them  against  the  regime.  From 
the  previous  chapter,  it  will  be  recalled  that  the  Wangazija  (Comorians)  tended  to  reside 
in  a  particular  part  of  Zanzibar  Town,  in  a  constituency  in  which  they  had  assisted  to 
swing  the  vote  in  favour  of  the  ZNP.  Socially  and  economically,  they  were  in  the  higher 
classes,  and  as  emigrants  they  were  often  the  elite  of  Comorian  society  (in  the  Comoros). 
They  were  educated  and  worked  in  the  civil  services. 
Interestingly  enough.  one  of  the  main  intellectuals  and  organisers  within  the  ASP, 
Abdulrahman  Babu,  was  also  affected  by  these  measures.  Babu  was  part  Comorian  and 
such  measures  coupled  with  the  lack  of  general  popular  support  for  his  radical  group 
were  to  ease  him  out  of  the  political  limelight.  Moreover  he  did  not  support  the  Union 
and  his  opinions  did  not  go  unnoticed  by  the  ASP  leadership  and  the  Revolutionary 
Council  since  before  the  Union  he  had  actually  advised  Karume  it.  Babu's  fear  was  that 
Zanzibar  would  be  absorbed  by  Tanganyika.  These  and  other  contradictory  opinions 
were  unacceptable  to  Karume  and  Babu's  motives  became  suspect.  Given  Babu's 
1  According  to  Clayton  (1981),  the  majority  of  Comorians  had  earlier  tended  to  support  the  ZNP  and  their  loyalty 
was  therefore  suspect.  The  alliance  of  the  Comorians  with  respect  to  race  was  also  doubtful.  At  times  they 
insisted  on  their  rights  as  French  subjects,  having  originated  from  the  French  colony  of  the  Comoros.  They  also 
they  appeared  to  align  themselves  with  the  Arab  Nationalists.  Karume  did  not  consider  them  as  Africans. 
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background.  political  acumen.  leadership  and  organisational  qualities,  he  would 
become  more  of  a  burden  than  an  asset  to  Karume  and  would  have  to  be  removed. 
Initially  he  was  posted  to  the  Union  Cabinet  where  his  influence  on  island  matters 
would  be  diminished.  Later  fearing  for  himself  and  seeing  that  the  revolution  was 
heading  in  a  different  direction,  Babu  moved  to  the  Mainland,  never  returning  to  the 
islands  for  fear  of  arrest  and  possible  elimination  (Smith,  1973;  Clayton,  1981;  Thorn. 
1988). 
7.4  The  Union  of  Tanganyika  and  Zanzibar 
Karume's  attitude  and  indeed  that  of  the  Zanzibar  Revolutionary  Council  (ZRC)  towards 
the  Union  was  that  Zanzibar  should  retain  considerable  degree  of  autonomy  without 
interference  from  the  Mainland.  The  Mainland-Isles  links  were  often  tense  and  even 
before  the  Union  was  instituted,  the  very  mention  of  a  merger  between  the  two  countries 
was  vehemently  resisted  These  anxieties  were  expressed  in  several  instances.  Before 
independence,  for  obvious  reasons,  the  ZNP  and  ZPPP  made  it  known  distinctly  that 
they  would  not  condone  any  thought  of  establishing  such  political  links  with 
Tanganyika.  They  also  pointed  out  that  the  ASP  was  interested  in  doing  just  that  and 
that  this  was  an  attempt  by  the  Mainland  to  take  over  Zanzibar  by  assisting  mainland 
Africans  on  the  islands. 
The  ASP  however,  attested  that  there  were  historical  links  with  the  Mainland  and  it  was 
in  their  interests  to  encourage  them.  Without  doubt,  the  ASP  enjoyed  considerable 
support  from  the  Tanganyika  African  National  Union  (TANU),  the  dominant  political 
party  on  the  Mainland.  Moreover  a  substantial  number  of  its  own  supporters  originated 
from  the  mainland  Insofar  as  Karume's  actions  showed,  however  good  the  relations 
with  the  Mainland  were,  this  did  not  necessarily  imply  the  islands  were  to  be  absorbed 
by  Tanganyika.  The  ASP  wanted  to  establish  links  with  the  African  mainland  since 
they  perceived  Zanzibar  as  an  African  state  temporarily  taken  over  by  an  Arab 
monarchy  which  then  came  under  British  rule  during  the  expansion  of  Imperialism.  On 
the  Mainland  the  views  about  the  Union  differed.  The  idea  was  to  form  and  consolidate  a 
unitary  state  in  which  Tanganyika  and  Zanzibar  would  cease  to  exist  and  replaced  by  the 
United  Republic  of  Tanzania.  Whatever  the  case,  the  Union  was  going  to  be  a 
controversial  issue  and  a  subject  of  extreme  political  propaganda  from  the  regime's 
opponents,  both  in  the  short  and  the  long  term. 
A  number  of  observers  have  noted  that  consistently,  Karume  argued  that  it  was  the 
wishes  of  Zanzibar  to  retain  a  considerable  degree  of  autonomy  (Smith,  1973;  Clayton, 
1971;  Othman  and  Mlimuka,  1989).  We  can  see  this,  for  example,  through  Zanzibar 
acting  independently  on  several  Union  issues,  much  to  the  embarrassment  of  the 
Mainland  partner.  In  1968  Karume  made  it  known  that  as  far  as  he  was  concerned,  the 203 
Union  had  been  carried  as  forward  as  was  necessary  and  that  no  further  measures 
limiting  island  autonomy  should  to  be  taken.  Zanzibar  was  not  going  to  be  another 
'district  of  Tanganyika'  or  another  region  of  Tanzania,  as  it  was  alleged  by  ASP's 
opponents.  Earlier,  in  1965  Nyerere  mentioned  that  Zanzibaris  were  a  proud  people  and 
that  no  one  intended  that  Zanzibar  should  become  simply  the  Republic's  eighteenth 
region.  Nyerere  understood  their  apprehension  and  had  to  handle  the  situation  with  a 
great  degree  of  tact  and  tolerance. 
Through  the  Second  Interim  Constitution  of  Tanzania,  foreign  affairs,  defence,  police, 
banking,  external  trade  and  borrowing,  taxation  and  customs,  constitutional  revision, 
emergency  powers,  currency,  posts  and  telecommunications,  harbours,  aviation, 
exchange  control  and  movement  of  citizens  were  firmly  established  under  the  umbrella 
of  the  Union  government.  Despite  this,  the  Union  gave  considerable  leeway  to  Zanzibar 
and  Clayton  (1981:  131)  mentions  that  in  practice,  "Zanzibar  continued  to  follow  its  own 
path  in  every  field*.  In  reality  Zanzibar  changed  little  following  the  Union.  Karume  was 
still  the  President  and  absolute  leader,  Mainland  travellers  to  the  island  had  to  go 
through  elaborate  entry  procedures  much  the  same  as  they  would  if  they  were  to  go  to  a 
foreign  country.  Visas  were  required  to  go  to  Zanzibar.  although  these  were  eventually 
stopped. 
In  one  way  or  another  disagreements  or  contradictions  within  the  Union  emanating 
from  Zanzibar  reinforced  Karume's  convictions  that  Zanzibar's  internal,  and  external 
matters  were  the  express  concern  of  the  Zanzibaris  alone.  For  example,  regarding 
democracy  and  elections  in  Zanzibar.  Karume  placed  Nyerere  in  a  difficult  position. 
Along  with  banning  the  opposition,  Karume  suspended  the  democratisation  process  and 
any  elections.  The  official  position  from  Dar  es  salaam  was  that  "once  enemies  of  the 
Revolution  had  finally  disappeared,  it  would  be  possible  to  have  elections  in  Zanzibar".  1 
Nyerere  was  obliged  to  defend  Karume's  position  stating  that  the  islanders  were  still 
afraid  that  attempts  might  be  made  to  subvert  the  regime  and  return  Zanzibar  to 
minority  control.  In  1968  he  indicted  that  he  did  not  expect  free  election  on  Zanzibar  for 
fifty  years  and  felt  that  elections  are  "a  tool  of  the  imperialists  to  sabotage  the  people,  " 
(Clayton,  1981:  132).  2  He  claimed  that  the  colonial  power  introduced  the  electoral  system 
only  to  prolong  its  rule,  not  listen  to  the  voice  of  the  people  and  therefore  there  was  need 
for  it.  3  He  was  referring  to  the  pre-independence  elections  where  gerrymandering 
occurred  and  the  ASP  won  a  popular  majority  but  could  not  form  a  government. 
Zanzibar  was  preferentially  treated  in  its  representation  in  the  Union  government.  In 
1  Hint  given  by  Lawi  Sijaona,  Union  government's  Minister  for  Home  Affairs  to  question  raised  in  parliament  in 
1965. 
2  It  is  reported  that  Karume  declared  that  there  would  be  no  elections  for  sixty  years,  see  e.  g.  Othman  and  Mlimuka 
(1989b:  164).  Whatever  the  period,  there  would  be  no  elections  for  a  considerable  time. 
3  Interview  he  had  with  The  Standard  in  1968. 204 
1967  seven  of  the  22  Cabinet  members  and  40  of  the  183  MPs  were  from  the  islands.  1 
There  was  a  disproportionate  number  of  members  of  parliament  and  cabinet  from 
Zanzibar  from  1965  and  this  has  since  increased.  Zanzibar  was  'over  represented'  in  the 
Union  parliament  as  well,  with  the  proportion  of  representatives  from  Zanzibar 
increasing  over  time  (Tables  7.1  and  7.2).  Moreover,  until  recently.  most  of  the 
Mainland  members  had  been  elected  whereas  the  Zanzibari  members  gained  their 
positions  in  the  ZRC  or  Zanzibar  government. 
Area  Members/Representative 
s 
Percent 
Mainland  143  78.1 
Zanzibar  40  21.9* 
Total  183  100.00 
Source:  Clayton,  1981 
Table  7.1  Composition  of  the  National  Assembly  (1967) 
Area  Elected  Nominated/appointed/re  Total  (0/0) 
presenting  mass 
organisation/  Ex-Officio 
members 
Mainland  119  4  6"  °A' 
nzi  ar  0  26  73  .  5° 
To-fal  69  241  0.0% 
Source:  Statistical  Abstract  (1987) 
Table  7.2  Composition  of  the  National  Assembly  (1986) 
Despite  the  large  numbers  of  representative  in  the  Union  parliament,  the  contribution 
of  Zanzibaris  to  the  proceedings  were  occasional  and  sometimes  even  attendance  by  the 
ZRC  nominees  was  quite  low,  suggesting  that  interest  towards  Union  matters  were  given 
a  low  priority  by  the  Zanzibaris  (Clayton,  op.  cit.  ).  This  confirms  for  Zanzibaris,  that 
internal  (or  'national')  matters  had  precedence  over  Union  issues. 
Perhaps  as  a  matter  of  appeasing  the  islanders,  they  were  given  a  larger  proportion  of 
official  posts,  for  example  in  diplomatic  missions.  The  idea  behind  this  was  to  increase 
their  confidence  in  the  Union  and  reinforce  it.  Zanzibar  was  allowed  to  establish  its 
own  foreign  relations  and  negotiate  sources  of  aid  , 
financial  and  technical  assistance. 
Despite  the  attempts  to  reduce  political  conflict  within  the  Union,  on  several  occasions 
relations  between  the  two  sides  were  tested.  Several  incidents  were  to  strain  relations 
between  Zanzibar  and  Dar  es  Salaam,  such  as  those  concerning  human  rights  violations 
and  repression.  The  regime  took  severe  measures  by  eliminating  any  opposition.  to  the 
embarrassment  of  the  Mainland  authorities.  A  state  of  virtual  lawlessness  existed  in 
Zanzibar  in  which  the  islands  were  ruled  by  decree.  Many  people  were  jailed  and  killed 
1  In  other  words  about  22%  in  the  Parliament  represented  2.7%  of  the  population  of  the  United  Republic.. 
Zanzibar's  population  was  about  350,000  compared  to  12,000,000  on  the  Mainland. 205 
(Smith,  1973:  Clayton,  1981).  Estimates  of  imprisonment,  disappearances  and 
presumably  deaths  vary  and  probably  may  never  be  fully  known.  Clayton  (1981)  reports 
that  detainees  who  were  in  detention  at  the  time  of  the  Union  who  numbered  around 
2,000,  had  almost  all  been  released,  "but  capricious  arrests  and  reports  of  conspiracies, 
real  or  imagined,  provided  a  limited  but  steady  supply  of  new  ones"  (op.  cit.:  124-125). 
Some  of  the  events  were  preposterous.  In  1966  Karume  issued  a  decree  making  it  illegal 
for  parents  to  withhold  consent  for  their  daughters'  marriage.  This  was  aimed  at  Arabs 
and  Asians  to  make  their  daughters  available  to  any  person  who  chose  to  marry  them. 
The  controversy  surfaced  again  in  1970  when  a  number  of  young  Asian  girls  were 
forcibly  married  (Africa  Report:  December,  1970).  This  increased  the  anxiety  amongst 
the  minorities  in  Zanzibar  and  relatives  who  protested  were  jailed  and  flogged  and  some 
Asian  families  were  threatened  with  deportation.  To  Karume  this  appeared  to  be  an 
effective  way  of  overcoming  ethnic-racial  differences  and  stratification  in  Zanzibari 
society,  both  of  which  were  a  legacy  of  Arab  and  colonial  rule.  No  doubt  this  was  a  crude 
way  of  solving  the  'ethnic-racial'  problem  and  there  is  little  doubt  that  there  was  also  an 
inkling  of  reprisal  for  the  humiliation  that  they  had  to  undergo  under  the  Arabs  and 
Asians.  Karume  is  reported  to  have  said  that,  'In  colonial  times  the  Arabs  took  African 
concubines  without  bothering  to  marry  them.  Now  that  we  are  in  power  the  shoe  is  on 
the  other  foot'  (Africa  Report:  op.  cit.  )  Nyerere's  position  was  compromised  increasingly 
and  despite  his  disgust  and  contempt  for  such  actions  there  was  little  that  he  could  do 
other  than  appeal  to  Karume  to  stop  such  actions. 
Perhaps  not  surprisingly,  there  were  numerous  rumours  of  plots  to  overthrow  the 
regime,  some  real  and  others  imagined  and  those  who  happened  to  be  accused  of 
conspiracy  were  dealt  with  mercilessly.  For  example,  in  1964  seventeen  leading  plotters 
were  arrested,  placed  before  a  'kangaroo'  court  and  were  executed.  In  1969  another  plot 
was  revealed  and  fourteen  people  were  accused  of  plotting.  This  time  some  prominent 
members  of  Karume's  own  regime  were  implicated.  Amongst  the  alleged  plotters  were  a 
former  Union  Minister  and  the  former  Tanzanian  Ambassador  to  the  U.  S.  A.,  both  of 
whom  were  Zanzibaris.  They  were  arrested  in  Dar  es  Salaam  and  detained.  Pressure  was 
applied  to  repatriate  them  to  Zanzibar  and  Karume  was  ready  to  break  up  the  Union  if 
they  would  not  be  returned  (Clayton.  1981:  133).  Nyerere  complied  and  after  a  secret  trial 
four  of  the  alleged  plotters  were  executed.  Much  to  the  displeasure  of  the  Union 
President,  the  two  who  were  returned  from  Dar  es  Salaam  were  amongst  those  executed  . 
Nyerere's  expectation  that  they  would  be  given  at  least  a  fair  trial  were  disappointed. 
The  federation  between  the  Mainland  and  the  islands  were  characterised  by  sensitive 
political  relations  which  were  constantly  being  upset  by  the  Karume  regime  for  their 
interests.  The  regime  in  Zanzibar  needed  the  Union  for  political  stability  and 
maintenance  of  the  status  quo.  The  mainland  government  remained  under  pressure 206 
from  Zanzibar  to  keep  exiled  Zanzibari  elements  under  detention,  often  for  their  own 
safety.  Although  under  the  Union  a  common  defence  force  existed,  Zanzibar  continued 
to  maintain  its  own  military  units. 
The  dilemma  that  the  Mainland  government  faced  was  that  it  was  imperative  that 
relations  with  the  islands  continue  and  the  Union  survive  despite  the  costs  this  entailed. 
Amongst  other  aspects,  geographical  location  and  security  considerations  dictated  that 
it  was  important  that  the  Mainland  have  a  regime  that  was  sympathetic  and  co-operated 
with  it.  Smith,  (1973)  reports  an  interview  given  by  a  senior  Tanganyika  government 
official,  Oscar  Kambona,  in  which  he  comments  about  events  in  Zanzibar  and  their 
possible  consequences  in  the  region.  Kambona  stated  that  Our  first  concern  was  the 
growing  Communist  presence  and,  second  the  danger  of  the  Cold  War  coming  in  ...  The 
problem  was  how  to  isolate  Zanzibar  from  the  Eastern  countries,  yet  not  to  be  used  by  the 
West  for  its  own  purposes"  (op.  cit.  :  128).  This  statement  shows  where  the  Mainland's 
underlying  interests  with  the  Union  lay. 
Apart  from  guaranteeing  the  security  of  the  regime  in  the  islands,  the  Union  had  other 
benefits  for  the  islands,  which  were  directly  and  indirectly  economic.  First  it  provided 
an  umbrella  of  general  security  for  the  island  state,  enabling  it  to  focus  on  development. 
Zanzibar  contributed  10  million  Shillings  (9500,000)  towards  Union  services  in  1964/65 
(17.8%  of  its  recurrent  budget  expenditure).  The  following  year  this  proportion  fell  to 
15.6%  and  by  1966/67  it  was  13.5%  (IMF,  1969).  1  The  contributions  covered  defence, 
home  affairs,  air  services,  currency,  posts  and  telecommunications  and  overseas 
representation.  Zanzibar  maintained  its  own  bank  and  all  local  revenues  were  held 
there.  Foreign  reserves  were  held  independently  in  banks  in  London  and  Moscow. 
Zanzibar  could  purchase  goods  and  services  from  the  Mainland  without  expending 
foreign  currency,  and  this  included  fuel  and  some  food.  Obviously  the  Zanzibar  treasury 
got  considerable  relief  and  could  divert  resources  that  were  `saved'  into  development 
expenditure.  The  price  of  cloves  experienced  a  sharp  increase  in  the  world  market  which 
enabled  the  First  Phase  government  achieve  a  significant  economic  recovery  and  make 
considerable  public  investments.  There  is  some  unsubstantiated  information  which 
suggests  that  towards  the  end  of  the  1970s,  Zanzibar  did  not  keep  abreast  with  its 
contributions,  suggesting  that  Karume  was  perhaps  fed  up  with  the  Union.  However, 
Union  services  continued  uninterrupted. 
It  is  obvious  that  apart  from  the  threat  of  losing  autonomy  and  sovereignty.  there  were 
benefits  and  other  considerable  positive  potential  for  Zanzibar  in  the  Union.  The  main 
difficulty  has  been  the  different  interpretation  of  the  objectives  for  the  Union  by  each 
side.  Such  a  situation  has  meant  that  Zanzibar  was  unable  to  adequately  exploit  the 
economic  advantages.  Nevertheless,  the  economic  advantages  emphasise  the  special 
1  Its  current  contribution  amount  to  less  than  10%. 207 
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7.5  The  Zanzibar  Revolutionary  Council  (ZRC) 
The  Zanzibar  Revolutionary  Council  (ZRC)  began  as  a  powerful  body  ruling  over  post- 
revolution  Zanzibar  from  the  day  its  members  were  announced  immediately  after  the 
coup.  It  consisted  of  persons  known  as  the  "Committee  of  Thirteen".  The  group  is  said  to 
have  been  formed  a  few  weeks  before  the  Revolution  and  comprised  several  radical 
elements  of  the  ASP  Youth  League.  The  ZRC  comprised  the  members  of  this  committee, 
John  Okello  and  the  members  of  government.  In  total  it  had  about  thirty  members 
under  the  chairmanship  of  Sheikh  Karume.  The  members  were  appointed  by  Karume 
although  from  time  to  time  some  would  be  dropped  and  new  members  would  be  selected. 
The  members  of  the  ZRC  effectively  had  absolute  powers  and  enjoyed  considerable 
privileges.  The  islands  were  ruled  by  decree  and  legislation  appeared  in  the  name  of  the 
ZRC  with  a  presidential  approval  to  each  decree.  However.  this  situation  was  to  change 
as  the  President  became  increasingly  powerful  the  authority  and  influence  of  the  ZRC 
declined  steadily  as  the  ZRC  became  more  of  a  ratifying  body  for  the  execution  of  the 
President's  wishes.  Autocracy  was  becoming  established. 
Popular  elections  within  Zanzibar  were  suspended  and  the  original  idea  of  convening  a 
constituent  assembly  was  shelved  in  1965.  To  enact  such  a  constitution  implied  limiting 
the  powers  of  the  regime  and  obviously  this  was  not  in  the  interests  of  the  ZRC 
hierarchy.  Technically.  the  government  was  not  answerable  or  accountable  to  the 
people.  Far  from  being  a  representative  body,  the  ZRC  became  a  kind  of  hereditary  body 
where  its  members  were  nominated  or  dismissed  at  the  whims  of  the  Chairman. 
As  early  as  1965  in  an  attempt  to  give  predominance  to  the  ruling  party  (ASP)  some 
changes  were  made  to  the  constitution.  A  Central  Committee  (CC)  was  formed 
comprising  of  a  number  of  ZRC  members  with  the  President  of  the  ASP  as  the  chairman. 
Although  the  CC  operated  in  the  name  of  the  ZRC  it  was  above  it  and  operated  through 
clientelism,  patronage  and  terror.  In  1972  a  decree  was  enacted  to  merge  the  Party  with 
the  government  and  as  a  result  some  party  departments  were  to  perform  governmental 
functions  instead  of  Ministries.  There  hardly  existed  any  distinction  between  party  and 
government  and  as  such  even  the  size  of  the  party's  executive  wing  expanded  in  size 
considerably.  The  party  reigned  supreme  over  government.  Even  personal  often  petty 
aspects  of  life  were  dictated  for  by  the  ZRC.  For  example,  hairstyles  and  dress  followed 
ZRC  directives.  Any  divergence  was  punishable.  often  severely. 
Of  government  itself  there  was  a  general  lack  of  continuity.  Portfolios  were  changed 
frequently  and  there  was  no  guaranteeing  how  long  an  individual,  whether  a  Minister  or 
ranking  civil  servant,  would  last  in  a  position.  Consequently  this  affected  the 
implementation  of  government  policy  and  development  programmes.  In  this  state  of 209 
fear,  apprehension  and  uncertainty,  ultimate  decision  making  converged  on  the  ZRC, 
which  itself  was  constrained  by  the  lack  of  skilled  management  necessary  for 
development  purposes. 
In  fact  by  the  end  of  the  First  Phase  virtually  all  power  was  vested  in  the  Presidency.  For 
eight  years  Karume  survived  as  what  Smith  (op.  cit.:  136)  calls  "the  phlegmatic  but 
oppressive  dictator  of  Zanzibar".  The  period  is  characterised  by  Karume's,  charismatic 
yet  controversial.  cunning,  ruthless  approach 
7.6  External  relations 
Foreign  relations  were  intricately  tied  to  aid,  technical  assistance,  loans  and  grants. 
Zanzibar's  sources  of  aid  and  loans  were  largely  from  Eastern  Bloc  countries  which 
recognised  its  separate  existence  from  the  beginning.  The  immediate  post-revolution 
period  saw  substantial  flows  of  aid  from  China,  East  Germany  and  the  Soviet  Union. 
China  was  the  largest  aid  donor  from  the  outset  and  Chinese  aid  was  mostly  interest  free. 
As  early  as  February  1964  Zanzibar  received  £185,000  from  China  (Smith,  1973:  124).  A 
series  of  other  loans  followed  amounting  to  $12,000,000  by  1970  (Africa  Record, 
December  1970).  Other  forms  of  aid  comprised  military  equipment  and  training 
personnel  for  Zanzibar's  new  army.  Prior  to  the  Revolution  the  main  source  of  grants 
and  loans  originated  from  the  United  Kingdom.  After  the  Revolution  the  People's 
Republic  of  China  and  East  Germany  became  the  largest  donors  and  sources  of  loans 
(Table  7.3). 
Over  the  next  few  years  Zanzibar  received  substantial  non-military  aid  and  loans  from 
China.  Bailey  (1975:  42)  notes  that  "a  100  million  Shillings  loan  was  produced  for 
Zanzibar,  a  sum  which  represented  nearly  300  Shillings  per  capita  for  Zanzibar's'  small 
population".  1  The  money  was  for  financing  and  constructing  a  shoe  factory.  a  cigarette 
factory,  a  major  sports  stadium,  the  Upenja  state  farm,  water  supplies  programmes,  a 
tractor  repair  station,  a  printing  press  and  the  transport  sector.  Large  numbers  of 
Chinese  instructors  and  officials  were  involved  in  the  various  projects.  Clayton, 
(1981:  149)  notes  that  Zanzibaris  also  benefited  from  the  Chinese  supported  projects  on 
the  Mainland,  through  purchases  of  consumer  goods,  shipping  services  from  the  China- 
Tanzania  Shipping  Line.  Considerable  quantities  of  rice  were  sold  to  Zanzibar  and  this 
is  an  important  aspect  given  the  fact  that  Zanzibar  has  always  been  dependent  on  food 
imports  and  especially  rice,  wheat  flour  and  sugar. 
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Source 
)61/62  1962/63  1963/64  1964/65  196.5/00 
Sodes  (In  Millions  of  Ei  unýtad  Mud  &fiTl;  ul  Mud 
Tanzania  Shillin  s 
Eastern  -  -  -  3.4  -  5.7  3.0 
German 
Mainland  -  -  -  1.6  -  1.9  17.3 
China 
United  -  1.0  5.1  --  -  - 
Kin  dom 
Total  -  1.0  5.1  ------------  5.0  -  7.6  20.3 
Loans 
------------  Ci  ants.: 
Eastern  -  -  -  10.0  -  -  10.3 
German 
United  2.3  2.2  1.0  1.2  0.3  1.5  - 
Kin  dour 
United  -  -  -  1.7  0.7  -  - 
States 
Mainland  -  -  -  1.6  1.6  -  - 
China 
Total 
External  2.3  3.2  6.1  19.5  2.6  9.1  30.6 
Sources 
:  IMF,  1969:  289. 
Table  7.3  Sources  of  external  finance  on  Capital  Budget  (1961-66) 
The  Chinese  assisted  in  the  provision  of  essential  social  and  economic  services  such  as 
health  care  and  agriculture.  In  view  of  this,  it  comes  as  no  surprise  that  Karume  regarded 
and  looked  to  China  "not  as  a  friend,  but  as  a  brother"  (Smith,  1973:  125).  China's 
position  as  an  ally  transcended  the  other  major  donors  such  that  by  1969,  Soviet  and 
East  German  military  assistance  had  been  phased  out  and  since  then  external  aid  was 
mainly  provided  by  China  (Bailey,  1975:  45). 
East  Germany  established  diplomatic  representation  in  Zanzibar,  the  first  in  Africa, 
much  to  the  dismay  of  West  Germany  which  protested  to  Tanzania.  stating  that  this 
event  contravened  the  Hallstein  Doctrine,  of  which  the  West  German  government 
adhered  to  strongly.  1  The  Tanzania  government  found  itself  in  a  dilemma  and 
attempted  to  reach  a  compromise  which  inadvertently  failed,  while  the  West  German 
government  showed  its  disapproval  of  Tanzania's  position  by  promptly  cancelling 
military  and  other  aid,  which  included  £4  million  in  technical  assistance.  The  proposed 
compromise  in  which  the  East  German  embassy  in  Zanzibar  become  a  trade  mission  was 
unacceptable  to  Karume.  Nyerere  offered  East  Germany  one  consulate-general  either  in 
Zanzibar  or  Dar  es  Salaam,  but  this  too  was  unacceptable  to  East  Germany.  Karume  in 
turn  demanded  that  Tanzania  should  recognise  East  Germany.  At  one  point  according  to 
I  Basically  that  doctrine  recognised  the  fact  that  only  one  Germany  exists  despite  the  East-West  divide,  and  as  such 
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Clayton  (1981:  147)  it  was  reported  that  the  East  Germans  advised  Karume  that  the 
break-up  of  the  Union  would  be  preferable"  than  reverse  what  had  already  been  achieved 
in  Zanzibar.  Smith  (1973  :  138)  comments  that  the  "West  German  response  represented 
precisely  the  sort  of  clumsy  diplomatic  bullying  of  a  weak  nation  by  a  powerful  one  that 
Nyerere  deeply  resents".  The  rift  between  West  Germany  and  Tanzania  was  to  take  a  long 
time  to  heal.  While  the  West  Germans  expected  that  the  Union  of  Tanganyika  and 
Zanzibar  would  further  exacerbate  the  problems  of  German  unification  through  the 
formal  recognition  of  two  separate  and  independent  'Germanys',  they  clearly  failed  to 
see  that  the  state  of  the  Tanganyika  and  Zanzibar  Union  at  the  time  was  not  dictated 
from  Dar  es  Salaam  and  served  only  to  further  complicate  the  situation  in  Zanzibar  and 
increase  tensions  with  the  mainland.  Ironically,  it  was  important  enough  to  achieve 
German  re-unification  at  the  expense  of  the  rupture  of  Tanzanian  unity!  Of  course  this 
was  part  of  the  Cold  War  conflict  being  fought  in  the  periphery.  However,  this  particular 
event  underscored  Zanzibar's  desire  to  retain  and  practice  its  autonomy  even  though  in 
view  of  the  articles  of  Union  what  Zanzibar  did  was  erroneous. 
Having  established  its  first  embassy  in  Africa.  East  Germany  continued  to  pour  aid  into 
Zanzibar.  A  new  radio  transmitter  was  provided  and  an  entire  modern  township  was 
built  in  N'gambo.  1  They  provided  technical  assistance  in  telecommunications, 
education,  housing  and  health.  Assistance  was  given  to  the  fisheries  sector.  A  dairy 
project  was  established  in  the  agricultural  sector.  Freighters  laden  with  consumer  goods 
arrived.  Other  technical  assistance  including  the  formulation  of  a  Zanzibar's  first  post- 
Revolution  development  programme. 
Between  1964-65  East  Germany  became  Zanzibar's  second  largest  aid  donor  after  China. 
By  1970  over  100  East  Germans  were  in  Zanzibar  on  various  projects.  However,  by  the 
end  of  the  year  a  rift  developed  between  Zanzibar  and  East  Germany  and  the  East 
German  consul  was  expelled  and  with  that  most  of  the  East  German  experts  departed.  It 
is  not  clear  as  to  what  caused  or  what  was  the  nature  of  the  rift.  Clayton  (1981:  148) 
suggests  that  the  rigidity  and  impatience  of  the  East  Germans  against  the  less 
sophisticated  Zanzibari  style  of  administration,  coupled  with  the  failures  of  some  of  the 
projects  and  heavy  loan  charges  may  have  been  responsible.  In  personal  interviews  with 
officials  it  is  clear  that  the  failures  of  many  of  the  German  (planned  and  funded)  projects 
made  Karume  disenchanted  and  suspicious  of  the  Germans.  The  East  Germans  had  little 
understanding  of  the  historical  developments  in  Zanzibar  and  how  it  arrived  at  its 
current  position.  Post-revolution  Zanzibar  experienced  conspicuous  shortage  of  trained 
and  experienced  personnel  in  many  fields,  and  for  most  of  the  projects  established,  this 
was  an  essential  input.  Yet  many  of  the  projects  did  not  adequately  cater  for  this 
element  nor  many  other  cultural  aspects. 
1  This  area  was  cleared  and  several  large  blocks  of  flats  were  constructed.  The  area  (Michenzani)  is  a  landmark  in 
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The  Soviet  Union's  position  on  Zanzibar  also  gave  considerable  concern  to  the  West. 
Soviet  statements  warning  the  West  to  keep  their  hands  off  Zanzibar  did  not  serve  to 
tone  down  the  confusion  about  and  within  the  islands.  In  fact  quite  the  contrary. 
Moreover  a  considerable  number  of  the  progressive  elements  in  Zanzibar,  from  both  the 
ASP  and  Umma  maintained  ties  with  the  Soviets.  '  Soviet  support  tended  to  be  towards 
the  provision  of  military  assistance.  They  assisted  in  the  training  and  equipping  of  the 
People's  Liberation  Army.  Despite  this,  Karume  developed  a  dislike  and  scepticism 
towards  the  Soviets  and  by  the  end  of  the  1960s  most  of  the  Soviet  advisers  were  replaced 
by  Chinese  personnel.  Apart  from  military  aid,  a  tuna  fishing  project  was  to  be 
established  by  the  Soviets. 
Zanzibar  developed  diplomatic  relations  with  several  countries  from  the  East-West  and 
North-South  divide  which  included,  Cuba,  Czechoslovakia,  Egypt,  Pakistan  and  Sweden 
and  many  other  countries  with  diplomatic  relations  with  the  United  Republic  of 
Tanzania. 
Zanzibar's  links  with  the  East  Bloc  and  China  emanated  from  links  established  by  the 
radical  elements  of  both  the  ZNP  and  ASP  during  Zama  Za  Siasa  (Baba.  1991). 
Ideologically.  Zanzibar  increasingly  drew  from  the  Mainland  and  emulated  some  of  its 
policies.  On  the  Mainland  a  philosophy  based  on  Ujamaa  (African  Socialism)  and  self- 
reliance  was  followed.  The  ASP's  ideology  was  based  on  populism  with  emphases  on 
self-reliance.  Prior  to  Independence  there  were  discussions  and  negotiations  between 
TALAU  and  ASP.  There  was  also  considerable  influence  from  PAFMECA  meetings  which 
both  the  ASP  and  ZNP  attended.  2 
Britain  and  the  United  States  ultimately  recognised  the  regime  in  Zanzibar,  albeit  too 
late  to  benefit  the  West  Bloc.  Zanzibar's  relations  with  the  West  were  far  from  cordial.  In 
January  1965  a  crisis  arose  when  two  US  diplomats  were  accused  of  complicity  in  a  plot 
to  overthrow  the  government.  3  The  US  authorities  claimed  that  the  accusation  was 
based  on  a  misunderstanding  of  monitored  telephone  conversations.  However,  the 
diplomats  were  expelled,  and  in  retaliation  Tanzania's  counsellor  in  Washington  was 
expelled  too.  Relations  diminished  between  the  two  countries  and  US  aid  was  limited  to 
one  small  project. 
Despite  its  enmity  with  the  West,  Zanzibar  developed  a  limited  but  nonetheless 
important  trading  relationship  with  Britain.  It  contracted  a  British  company  to 
1  An  interview  with  a  defecting  K.  G.  B.  officer,  I.  Dzhirkvelov  by  The  Times  of  27  May  1980,  suggests  that  Kassim 
Hangs,  a  Minister  in  the  first  Union  government  was  probably  amongst  a  group  of  Tanzanians,  both  in  the  Isles 
and  Mainland  who  maintained  close  ties  with  Moscow. 
2  PAFMECA  is  the  acronym  for  the  Pan-African  Freedom  Movement  for  East  and  Central  Africa  which  consisted  of 
a  group  of  political  organisations  which  spearheaded  the  struggle  for  independence  in  Africa.  The  ASP  and  ZNP 
had  been  counselled  during  PAFMECA  meeting  to  co-ordinate  efforts  aimed  at  decolonisation  in  Zanzibar. 
3  The  two  who  were  implicated  in  the  plot  were  said  to  be  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (CIA)  employees.  They  were 
Robert  Gordon  a  counsellor  of  the  US  embassy  in  Dar  es  Salaam,  and  Frank  Carlucci,  the  charge  d'affaires  in 
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construct  its  colour  television  broadcasting  station  and  other  contracts  with  the 
airports  at  Zanzibar  and  Pemba.  It  also  had  an  agreement  with  Britain  for  use  of  the 
Crown  Agents  facilities.  This  was  perhaps  the  single  important  relationship  that 
Zanzibar  had  with  the  West. 
By  virtue  of  It  being  part  of  the  Union  Zanzibar  had  relinquished  its  independent 
membership  of  the  United  Nations  (UN)  and  its  affiliated  bodies.  In  spite  of  this,  it  was 
able  to  obtain  the  assistance  of  the  UN  bodies.  Although  in  theory  Zanzibar  ceased  to 
exist  as  an  independent  state,  in  practice,  as  can  be  seen  this  was  far  from  the  case,  often 
to  the  embarrassment  of  both  parties  in  the  Union.  It  unilaterally  decided  with  whom  it 
wished  to  have  economic,  trade  and  other  links.  For  example,  when  it  developed  trading 
links  with  Britain,  the  Mainland  side  was  in  dispute  with  Britain  over  the  Rhodesian 
issue  regarding  the  Unilateral  Declaration  of  Independence  (UDI)  by  Ian  Smith  and  his 
cronies.  Also  when  Zanzibar  developed  economic  and  political  links  with  China,  the 
Soviet  Union  and  East  Germany.  the  Union  government  was  put  under  pressure  by  the 
West  since  it  was  expected  to  have  control  or  leverage  over  the  islands.  This  shows  how 
the  superpowers  and  indeed  many  other  states  misinterpreted  the  real  relationship 
between  Zanzibar  and  the  Mainland. 
Subsequent  action  taken  by  the  West  with  respect  to  Zanzibar  was  to  affect  the  political 
and  social  development  processes  which  were  to  take  place  on  the  islands.  In  response  to 
the  general  reaction  of  the  West,  it  can  be  argued  that  Zanzibar  had  acted  in  a  rational 
manner  and  made  use  of  whatever  resources  and  options  that  were  available  to  ensure 
internal  political  and  social  stability  and  minimise  both  internal  and  external  attempts 
to  destabilise  the  regime.  It  also  explains  the  cause  and  nature  of  its  external  relations 
and  why  it  persistently  embarked  on  a  programmes  geared  towards  economic  self- 
reliance  and  social  development. 
The  essence  of  foreign  relations  and  aid  delivery  to  Zanzibar  were  similar  to  many  other 
SIS,  that  is,  the  interests  of  the  donor  do  not  necessarily  converge  with  those  of  the 
recipient.  Clearly,  regional  and  Cold  War  relations  played  an  important  part  in 
moulding  Zanzibar's  position,  but  it  must  also  be  recalled  that  prior  to  independence  the 
former  colonial  power,  Britain  had  attempted  unsuccessfully  to  create  a  normal 
neocolony.  The  failure  also  contributed  to  the  complex  situation  leading  to  the  First 
Phase  of  the  Zanzibar  Revolution  and  Zanzibar's  unique  experiences  amongst  the 
developing  SIS. 
There  is  little  doubt  that  as  far  the  Eastern  bloc  countries  were  concerned,  the  building  of 
an  effective  donor-recipient  relationships  was  significant  to  their  objectives  of 
developing  political  and  strategic  alliances  through  aid  and  other  links  (Table  7.1). 
Regardless  of  the  geopolitical  influences  linked  to  the  grants  and  loans,  Zanzibar,  like 
many  other  SIS,  enjoyed  exceptionally  high  per  capita  aid  flows  from  the  Eastern  bloc. 214 
It  is  also  important  to  note  that  whenever  such  aid  or  economic  and  diplomatic  relations 
were  deemed  to  be  suspect.  Karume  did  not  hesitate  to  reduce  or  even  terminate  them. 
perhaps  revealing  an  innate  suspicion  of  foreigners  perhaps  stemming  from  the 
frustrating  experiences  with  the  colonial  authorities  during  Zama  Zu  Siasa.  Thus 
although  much  of  the  aid  and  links  were  with  the  Eastern  bloc,  these  too  diminished  as 
an  increasing  level  of  autocracy  and  autarky  surfaced. 
Zanzibar  benefited  from  the  'small  country  bias'.  as  observed  by  De  Vries  (1975). 
Perhaps  this  is  not  so  surprising  when  one  considers  that  aid  given  to  small  states 
assumes  a  much  higher  'visibility'  than  in  larger  states  (Connell.  1988:  76)  and  many 
donors  believe  that  it  is  much  easier  to  effectively  evaluate  the  effects  of  aid  In  small 
countries  (Eisen,  1973).  Its  position  just  off  the  East  African  coast  was  strategic  to  the 
Interests  of  both  the  East  and  West  Bloc  and  this  was  especially  important  given  that  the 
militarisation  of  the  Indian  Ocean  was  taking  place. 
7.7  Development  Policies  and  Strategies 
During  the  First  Phase,  Zanzibar  had  two  development  plans,  the  First  Three  Year  Plan 
(1966-1969)  which  was  not  implemented,  and  the  Four  Year  Plan  (1967-1971).  Both 
plans  emphasised  on  self-reliance.  The  major  weakness  of  both  plans  is  that  they  failed 
to  identify  the  sources  of  financing  the  programmes  in  them.  The  programmes 
outweighed  local  capacity  to  fund  them. 
The  development  policies  were  characterised  by  a  conviction  in  self-sufficiency  and  de- 
linking  from  the  external  economic  system  that  it  can  be  best  described  as  autarky.  Self- 
reliance  was  paramount.  This  is  not  unique  to  Zanzibar,  since  self-reliance  as  a  strategy 
is  quite  common  for  many  SIS,  "usually  stressing  the  limited  objectives  of  a  more  self- 
reliant  approach  through  the  development  of  domestic  resources:  agriculture,  fisheries 
and  where  possible,  minerals"  (Connell,  1988).  However,  there  was  a  lack  of  an  efficient 
and  appropriate  development  programme  to  support  the  autarkic  policies  and  nor  did 
the  personnel  exist  to  implement  them. 
In  Zanzibar  the  self-reliance  approach  was  abrupt,  with  little  concern  about  the  range  of 
consequences.  For  example,  when  the  government  wanted  to  curb  extensive  expenditure 
on  food  imports  (rice),  rice  imports  were  abruptly  cut  in  the  anticipation  that  somehow 
domestic  production  would  respond  to  fill  in  the  shortfall.  This  did  not  happen  and 
instead  drastic  shortages  of  food  occurred,  so  that  rice  had  to  be  rationed  and 
consequently  real  prices  rose  sharply.  In  turn  this  precipitated  frustration  and 
resentment  against  the  regime  and  the  islands  were  nowhere  nearer  self-reliance  in  rice 
production. 
A  close  look  at  the  Capital  Budget  for  Zanzibar  between  1961  and  1966  shows  a  drastic 215 
change  in  emphasis  in  investment  and  expenditure  patterns.  Agricultural  investment  is 
estimated  to  have  increased  three-fold  from  7.7  million  shillings,  just  before  the 
Revolution  (1963/64),  to  35.5  million  shillings  in  the  following  year  (Table  7.4).  Total 
expenditure  increased  nearly  five  fold.  Agriculture  and  natural  resources  and  works  and 
communications  (schools,  hospitals,  roads,  agricultural  extension,  and  small  projects) 
were  the  sectors  which  received  significant  increases  in  expenditures  (IMF,  1969:  288). 
1961/62  1962/63  1963/64  1964/65  1965/66 
Expenditure  (In  Millions  of  FEfimaed  AcaA  Estin  W  Ami 
Tanzania  Shillings) 
Agriculture  and 
natural  resources  0.9  1.7  3.3  11.2  2.5  9.1  - 
Social  services  0.9  1.3  0.7  3.6  1.0  0.3 
Works  and 
Communications  2.8  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.7  -  - 
General  services  0.3  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.7  - 
Planning, 
development,  and  -  -  -  1.7  0.5  -  - 
bade 
Total  capital  4.9  F 
6A  7.7  34.3  9.8  11.7  35.5 
e  nditure 
Source:  IMF,  1969:  289. 
Table  7.4  Zanzibar's  Capital  Budget  (1961-66) 
Contrary  to  expectations,  towards  the  end  of  the  First  Phase  the  island  economy  became 
structurally  even  more  lop-sided  and  more  dependent  on  a  single  agricultural  export 
crop  (cloves).  Of  course  this  situation  contradicted  the  self-reliance  objectives 
compounding  the  islands'  vulnerability. 
Central  economic  planning  was  introduced.  In  1965  "the  government  approached  the 
government  of  the  German  Democratic  Republic  to  assist  in  the  preparation  and 
formulation  of  economic  plans  that  would  result  in  the  optimum  utilisation  of  economic 
resources"  (GoZ,  1989a:  14).  Table  7.4  shows  that  in  1964/65  some  resources  were  set 
aside  for  planning  purposes  although  it  lasted  for  only  one  financial/planning  year, 
confirming  the  regime's  abandonment  of  such  an  approach.  The  economic  situation  was 
reviewed  by  a  group  of  East  German  experts  during  1965  and  a  preliminary  report 
entitled  The  Analysis  of  the  Economic  Problem  in  Zanzibar'  was  produced.  It  served  as 
a  working  paper  for  formulating  a  systematic  and  comprehensive  economic  plan 
covering  the  period  from  1966/67  -  1970/71.  In  May  1966  the  plan  was  formally 
submitted  to  the  government.  According  to  GoZ  (1989)  the  plan  focused  on: 
Q  Establishing  domestic  resources  of  accumulation.  Implying  that  the  productive 
sectors  of  the  economy  come  under  state  control  so  that  they  can  generate  income 
which  can  be  reinvested  in  various  other  sectors  and  programmes. 216 
Q  Increasing  the  share  of  commodity  production  in  the  gross  sector.  This  meant 
encouraging  manufacturing  of  consumer  goods  so  as  to.  offset  imports  (import 
substitution  industrialisation)  and  also  as  a  means  of  diversifying  the  economy. 
The  long  term  objectives  were  to  produce  both  for  domestic  consumption  and 
export. 
Q  Utilising  available  economic  and  natural  resources.  The  economy  was 
dependent  on  primary  export  of  two  crops,  one  of  which  had  declining  potential 
(copra).  Other  potential  sectors  such  as  fisheries,  tourism,  alternative  crops  in 
agriculture,  and  trade  were  making  small  contributions  to  the  economy. 
Diversification  of  the  economy  was  essential. 
O  Reduce  unemployment  and  train  skilled  labour.  With  the  implementation  of  the 
above,  it  was  anticipated  that  employment  would  be  generated  and  much  of  the 
human  resources  would  need  to  be  trained.  Increasing  the  number  of  employed 
and  their  income  generating  potential  would  mean  a  wider  and  larger  tax  base  for 
government  would  become  available,  and  this  would  in  turn  finance  further 
socio-economic  growth. 
The  total  capital  investment  envisaged  was  94,232.800.1  However,  in  spite  of  the  plan 
being  "scientifically  prepared  and  ...  very  comprehensive"  (GoZ.  1989:  15),  it  was  never 
implemented.  Although  no  specific  reason  is  given  for  its  non-implementation,  there 
were  a  number  of  constraints  facing  the  plan.  The  main  problems  facing  the  regime  was 
an  acute  shortage  of  the  required  skills  to  enable  it  to  implement  development 
programmes.  Funding,  it  was  assumed,  would  come  from  a  variety  of  sources,  but  the 
complexity  of  its  external  relations  meant  that  these  would  have  to  come  in  the  form  of 
loans  from  East  Germany  which  entailed  high  interest  rates.  Moreover.  the 
governmental  institutions  necessary  to  implement  such  a  plan  did  not  exist. 
The  shortages  of  personnel  can  be  attributed  to  the  colonial  government's  pre- 
independence  policies,  the  deliberate  policy  of  holding  back  the  educational  and  social 
development  of  those  in  the  'lower'  class-racial  strata.  Its  impact  now  hindered  the 
development  efforts  in  Zanzibar.  However.  the  regime  itself  was  not  without  blame. 
Some  of  the  drastic  measures  it  took  such  as  deporting  undesirable  elements  thought  to 
be  not  loyal  to  the  Revolution  drastically  reduced  the  trained  labour  pool. 
Meanwhile  the  government  proceeded  with  development  targets  and  budgets  set  on  an 
annual  basis  without  specific  medium  or  long  term  objectives.  This  state  of  affairs 
continued  until  1973  and  would  reflect  the  lack  of  a  specific  programme  of  action  to  set 
Zanzibar  on  the  path  to  appropriate  development.  Projects  were  simply  conceived  at  the 
1  Estimated  to  be  about  84,656,000  shillings. 217 
spur  of  the  moment  or  as  a  need  became  manifest.  Inevitably  the  result  was  a  series  of 
projects  and  programmes  which  lacked  co-ordination  between  relevant  sectors.  The 
annual  plans  were  characterised  by  a  distinctive  emphasis  on  investment  in  the  services 
sector.  There  was  land  redistribution  and  increased  agricultural  investment.  The 
agricultural  sector  remained  dominant,  indicative  of  the  failure  to  diversify  the 
economy. 
Nationalisation  took  place  widely  as  it  was  part  of  the  programme  of  the  state  to  take 
control  of  the  dominant  sectors  of  the  economy,  including  the  major  financial  and 
economic  institutions  (local  and  foreign).  In  1965  many  Arab  and  Asian  owned  stores, 
small  businesses  and  plants  were  taken  over.  This  included  garages,  petrol  stations, 
small  factories  and  the  like.  Private  businesses  were  banned  by  1971.  The  objective  was 
to  reduce  the  economic  power  and  influence  of  the  remaining  merchant  class. 
The  People's  Bank  of  Zanzibar  was  established  in  1966  and  became  the  state  bank.  1 
Internal  distribution  and  external  trade  were  all  through  state  corporations 
(parastatals).  External  trade  came  under  a  parastatal  called  Bizar}je,  the  acronym  for 
Biashara  za  Nje  (external  trade),  ports  came  under  the  Zanzibar  Wharfage  Corporation, 
the  Clove  Growers  Association  (CGA)  although  already  a  parastatal  corporation,  became 
the  Zanzibar  State  Trading  Corporation  (ZSTC).  A  number  of  other  corporations  were 
formed  dealing  with  tourism  and  hotels,  construction,  industries,  transport,  rice  and 
milling. 
The  public  sector  expanded  as  the  private  sector  was  absorbed  by  the  state.  There  was  a 
proportionate  decrease  in  private  sector  contributions  to  the  economy  and  a 
concomitant  increase  in  public  sector  contributions.  About  70%  of  all  registered 
employees  were  employed  by  central  government  and  nearly  90%  by  government  and 
public  enterprises.  This  high  proportion  is  symptomatic  of  many  other  developing  SIS 
where  employment  is  concentrated  in  the  public  sector  (Bertram  and  Waters,  1985,1986). 
Many  of  the  development  projects  had  a  high  profile  and  were  in  urban  areas  (e.  g.  mass 
housing,  television  where  there  lacked  rural-electrification  and  dual-carriageways  in  a 
country  with  less  than  1000  vehicles).  Increasingly  there  was  an  urban  bias  in 
government  programmes  and  employment  which  also  meant  an  expanding  bureaucracy. 
The  regime  was  clearly  adopting  a  statist  approach  to  governance,  in  which  the  petty 
bourgeoisie  controlled  the  state  and  development  philosophies  and  programmes  would 
be  conducted  in  the  name  of  the  state.  Such  an  approach  had  become  quite  common  in 
1  Income  from  the  sale  of  cloves  was  paid  into  it  for  onward  joint  holding  by  National  and  Grindlay's  Bank. 
London  and  the  Narodny  Bank,  Moscow.  The  People's  Bank  of  Zanzibar  was  independent  and  not  a  subsidiary  of 
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many  newly  emerging  Sub-Saharan  African  states.  Thus  the  statist  approach 
contributed  to  subsequent  course  of  events,  compounding  the  inherent  problems  of  a 
peripheral  developing  SIS. 
The  agricultural  sector  was  and  remained  the  dominant  sector  contributing  81%  of 
national  income  (1966).  It  was  based  primarily  on  the  production  and  processing  of 
cloves  for  export.  The  regime  inherited  a  troubled  economy,  one  report  stating  that  "T'he 
value  of  exports  to  Asia  (excluding  the  sub-continent  of  India)  has  steadily  fallen  since 
1957  (except  in  1961  when  a  poor  clove  crop  in  Madagascar  helped  to  boost  Zanzibar 
sales).  "  (Smith,  1966:  68).  To  make  matters  worse.  between  1964  and  1966  the  main 
importers  of  cloves,  India  and  Indonesia,  suffered  foreign  exchange  shortages,  which 
resulted  in  a  depressed  market  for  cloves  and  some  stockpiling  (IMF.  1969).  In  response 
to  this,  the  government  attempted  to  diversify  into  other  agricultural  products.  The 
objectives  were  to  increase  production  of  cocoa  for  export  and  production  of  rice  and 
pulses  for  domestic  consumption  to  reduce  foreign  exchange  expenditure  on  food.  Food 
has  always  been  the  leading  category  of  imports.  accounting  for  an  average  of  37%  of 
total  imports  between  1961  and  1965  (Table  7.3).  This  proportion  increased  to  41.5%  of 
total  imports  by  1965. 
It  was  mentioned  earlier  that  the  agricultural  sector  was  affected  by  a  widespread  land 
redistribution  exercise  which  according  to  Clayton  (op  at  :  137)  bore  the  "hallmark  of 
Karume's  own  populist  thinking  prevailing  over  socialist  doctrinal  theory".  Zanzibar's 
land/agricultural  policies  were  different  from  that  operating  on  the  Mainland.  Whereas 
on  the  Mainland  communal  production  and  communal  settlements  were  to  form  the 
basis  of  modified  Tanzanian  society,  in  Zanzibar,  individual  peasant  producers  were  the 
essence  of  peasant  production  and  land  occupancy/use.  This  approach  could  have 
attained  a  considerable  measure  of  success  if  only  it  had  followed  other  policies  such  as 
utilising  producer  price  incentives.  However,  official  policy  disregarded  price  incentives 
and  state  set  prices  merely  discouraged  agricultural  production.  The  agricultural  sector 
was  based  on  peasant  production  with  the  state  taking  a  large  share  of  the  surplus 
generated  and  the  peasants  receiving  less  and  less.  Moreover,  apart  from  price,  there  was 
also  a  lack  of  other  incentives.  Although  it  may  be  argued  that  the  government  provided 
a  pool  of  tractors  for  hire,  these  alone  were  not  sufficient.  Agricultural  credit. 
appropriate  technology  and  extension  services  were  lacking. 
There  were  about  49  major  estate  owners  in  Unguja  and  Pemba  islands.  with  the  larger 
estates  located  in  Unguja.  In  Pemba  farms  tended  to  be  smaller  in  size.  About  284  farms 
of  various  sizes  were  expropriated  and  redistributed  by  the  end  of  1965  (Clayton,  1981). 
The  land  redistribution  exercise  was  generally  based  on  the  division  of  existing  estates 219 
into  three-acre  plots  issued  with  title  deeds.  The  plots  were  distributed  to  peasants, 
usually  those  who  had  previously  share-cropped  in  the  area.  By  the  end  of  the  First 
Phase  over  26,716  hectares  were  redistributed  to  some  22,262  peasants  (SMZ,  1983:  10)1 
However  all  land  was  owned  by  the  state  and  the  peasants  simply  grew  what  they  could, 
although  the  government  could  also  direct  the  peasant  farmers  what  to  grow. 
Some  villages  owned  tractors  and  where  these  did  not  exist,  tractors  were  leased  out  from 
a  central  pool  for  a  charge.  The  period  immediately  after  the  land  redistribution 
exercise  saw  a  considerable  increase  in  the  area  under  cultivation  and  especially  under 
mechanised  cultivation  (fig.  7.1).  Between  1963-64  there  was  over  an  eleven-fold 
increase  in  the  area  cultivated  by  tractor  and  a  doubling  of  total  land  area  under 
cultivation.  Although  the  total  amounts  of  food  grown  increased  slightly,  a  parallel 
increase  in  locally  grown  rice  did  not  materialise. 
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Source:  GoZ  (1983)  Sera  Ya  Kilimo  Na  Mifugo,  Buku  la  Kwanza,  Zanzibar,  p.  228.  November,  1983. 
Figure  7.1  Zanzibar:  Area  under  cultivation  (1961-1972) 
State  farms  were  introduced  to  produce  strategic  crops  (e.  g.,  cloves,  rice  and  sugar-cane). 
This  was  a  secondary  production  system  to  the  peasants  producing  both  food  and  cash 
crops.  A  1058  acre  rice  farm  was  established  with  Chinese  assistance.  Several  other 
state  run  projects  were  established,  including  a  poultry  unit,  a  dairy  farm  and  a  ranch. 
However,  for  a  variety  of  reasons  including  poor  management  and  technological  skills, 
the  performance  of  the  state  farms  was  not  satisfactory  (SMZ,  1983). 
1  Government  Land  Decree  No.  13  of  1965  stipulates  that  all  land  is  the  property  of  the  state. 
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The  over  dependence  on  food  imports  was  an  unhealthy  situation  for  the  economy. 
Apart  from  redistributing  land  and  encouraging  smallholder  production,  severe 
restrictions  were  placed  on  food  imports  and  a  rationing  system  was  introduced.  At 
times  the  shortages  became  quite  serious.  There  was  not  an  absolute  lack  of  food:  rather 
the  government  did  not  appreciate  the  population's  preference  for  rice,  wheat  and  sugar. 
The  regime  was  adamant  about  food  dependency  and  determined  to  save  vast  amounts  of 
foreign  exchange  spent  on  food  imports  and  persisted  in  taking  Draconian  measures  to 
achieve  reduction  on  food  imports.  There  was  some  purchase  of  food  from  the  Mainland, 
but  this  constituted  only  a  small  proportion  of  total  food  imports.  The  Mainland  was 
not  self-sufficient  in  rice  or  wheat,  and  these  were  the  most  preferred  foods  in  the  coastal 
parts  of  the  Mainland  too. 
Food  riots  broke  out  occasionally,  which  were  put  down  harshly.  Various  other 
alternatives  were  attempted  to  increase  domestic  food  production  with  little  success. 
These  included  irrigation  farming  and  opening  a  youth  agricultural  camp.  On  the  whole 
the  secondary  production  sector  in  agriculture  failed,  and  especially  so  in  rice. 
Meanwhile  the  government  maintained  relatively  stable  prices  through  controls  (IMF, 
1969).  The  potential  of  the  traditional  sector  was  never  fully  exploited  as  it  is  obvious 
that  inadequate  crop  prices  and  coercive  methods  in  encouraging  domestic  food 
production  did  more  harm  than  good. 
Despite  their  falling  prices  and  demand,  cloves  played  a  vital  role  within  the  economy. 
During  the  first  half  of  the  First  Phase  both  clove  and  coconut  production  were  on  the 
increase  (IMF.  1969).  For  example,  In  1964/65  6,000  tons  of  cloves  were  harvested 
increasing  to  14,000  tons  by  the  following  year.  Cloves  tend  to  have  fluctuating  (cyclic) 
trend  in  output.  from  one  year  to  the  next  (see  Figure  7.2).  However,  general  trends 
exhibited  Increasing  output. 
There  was  also  an  increase  in  the  production  of  coconut,  the  second  export  crop.  Both 
cloves  and  coconuts  produced  other  products  after  being  processed.  These  include,  clove 
oil,  coconut  oil,  coir  fibre,  copra  and  copra  cake  and  a  considerable  proportion  was 
exported.  Despite  this,  Zanzibar's  range  of  export  produce  remained  very  narrow. 
The  First  Phase  enjoyed  a  remarkable  good  fortune  in  which  it  saw  an  unexpected  and 
dramatic  increase  in  demand  and  an  upturn  in  the  world  price  of  cloves.  Zanzibar 
produces  a  particularly  high  quality  crop  fetching  premium  prices.  Apart  from  the  vast 
stocks  which  Zanzibar  held,  production  also  increased  substantially  and  remained  high 
until  the  mid-1960's  (Table  7.2).  In  1966/67  prices  rose  almost  three  fold  from  about 
$550  per  ton  to  over  $1,500.  In  1969  the  latter  Figure  almost  doubled  to  nearly  $3,000.  In 
response.  Zanzibar  raised  the  amounts  exported  between  1966  and  1968  (Fig.  7.2). 
Although  between  1968  and  1970  production  and  exports  fell  substantially,  income 
levels  from  cloves  remained  high  since  prices  had  trebled.  The  islands  also  held 221 
substantial  amounts  of  cloves  in  reserve  which  they  could  release  when  production  was 
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Source:  Department  of  Statistics,  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Planning,  Zanzibar.  1990. 
Figure  7.2  Total  production  and  export  of  cloves  in  Zanzibar  (1961-72) 
Since  the  1963/64  record  output,  production  has  been  lower  and  by  1969  exports  also 
plummeted.  Despite  the  attractive  prices,  production  trends  were  gradually  falling.  In 
part,  this  was  the  outcome  of  attempts  to  diversify  the  agricultural  economy  into 
growing  food  and  other  crops.  It  was  also  a  response  to  agricultural  policies  in  which  the 
benefits  of  the  higher  world  prices  were  not  passed  onto  the  producers.  Clove  growers 
were  paid  around  or  even  less  than  10%  of  the  overseas  purchase  price  (Clayton,  1981). 
Labour  shortages,  careless  cutting  by  unskilled  pickers  and  clove  bush  disease  further 
compounded  the  problem  (GoZ,  1983).  Smuggling  of  cloves  was  rife  because  of  the  poor 
domestic  prices  paid  to  growers.  For  example,  on  the  Mainland  cloves  fetched  around 
six  times  the  price  paid  in  Zanzibar,  where  in  1971  it  was  only  TShs.  1.50  per  lb  (Africa 
Con,  f  idential,  October,  1971). 
By  the  early  1970's  other  major  producers  of  cloves  produced  substantial  amounts  of 
cloves  and  the  world  market  became  glutted.  Moreover,  Indonesia,  Zanzibar's  major 
consumer  was  expanding  its  own  production  to  offset  its  high  expenditure  on  importing 
the  spice.  This  was  detrimental  to  Zanzibar's  future  foreign  earnings  especially  as  the 
country  had  become  almost  totally  dependent  on  the  crop.  It  had  entrenched  itself  into  a 
monocrop  economy,  a  position  from  which  it  would  be  difficult  to  withdraw. 222 
7.73  Marine  and  Fisheries 
Being  an  island  state,  it  is  natural  that  the  country  should  seek  to  exploit  one  of  its  most 
obvious  natural  resources,  the  fisheries  sector.  The  Zanzibari  fisheries  sector  was,  and 
still  is,  characterised  by  artisanal  fisheries  using  traditional  fishing  gear  and  aimed 
primarily  at  subsistence.  The  post-1964  period  saw  an  attempt  at  introducing  a  modern 
fishing  sector  aiming  at  coastal  and  deep  sea  fishing.  External  assistance  towards 
fisheries  in  most  small  island  states  has  generally  favoured  large-scale  fisheries  rather 
than  artisanal  operations  (Kent,  1986).  Zanzibar  was  no  exception  to  this,  although  the 
degree  of  success  has  been  very  limited.  Assistance  was  sought  from  external  sources  and 
Soviet  technical  assistance  was  provided  in  the  case  of  the  deep  sea  fishing  project. 
However,  the  project  proved  to  be  a  failure  probably  because  of  the  poor  planning  by  the 
Soviet  advisers  (Clayton  1981:  135).  East  German  assistance  was  also  provided  in  the 
case  of  small  coastal  fishing  vessels  and  this  too  had  limited  success.  The  development 
of  the  fisheries  sector  was  hampered  by  infrastructural  problems  such  as  cold  storage 
and  distribution,  which  reflect  failures  in  planning  in  terms  of  co-ordination  and 
inefficiency.  A  fishing  parastatal  organisation  was  established  but  it  soon  began  to 
operate  at  a  loss.  There  was  no  export  of  fish  and  despite  the  attempts  at  modernising  the 
sector,  it  has  remained  largely  artisanal  and  contributes  mainly  towards  only  domestic 
consumption. 
Perhaps  one  of  the  greatest  errors  in  the  fisheries  sector  was  that  the  artisanal  fisheries 
sector  itself  was  not  adequately  developed  despite  its  potential.  Artisanal  fishing 
suffered  from  inappropriate  policies  and  inefficiency.  For  example.  the  prices  offered 
(set)  by  the  government  were  below  that  offered  on  the  Mainland,  so  it  was  more 
attractive  to  sell  there.  However,  fishermen  faced  bureaucratic  problems  and 
competition  from  Mainland  fishermen  when  selling  there  and  this  reduced  the  incentive 
to  fish.  Also  there  were  few  attempts  to  exploit  alternative  marine  resources  such  as 
lobster  and  shrimp  fishing,  and  the  harvesting  and  exporting  of  seaweed.  Meanwhile, 
fisheries  has  remained  the  single  largest  contributor  of  protein  to  the  islands'  diet. 
One  other  aspect  that  has  been  in  contention  for  some  time  is  that  in  forming  the  Union 
problems  arose  from  the  delimitation  of  maritime  boundaries  -  the  declaration  of  the 
respective  EEZ's.  This  has  developed  into  a  potentially  controversial  issue  as  both  the 
Mainland  and  Zanzibar  governments  have  claims  over  maritime  jurisdictions. 
Although  during  the  First  Phase  this  issue  did  not  emerge  as  a  major  issue,  more  recently 
it  has  been  a  subject  of  debate  between  the  two  governments  so  that  Tanzania  has  still 
not  declared  its  Exclusive  Economic  Zone  (EEZ). 223 
Historically,  Zanzibar  has  enjoyed  a  long  trading  tradition  especially  when  It  was  the 
entrepat  for  East  Africa,  linking  the  coast  and  hinterland  of  Eastern  and  Central  Africa 
to  the  metropole  (Sheriff,  1988).  After  the  revolution  the  private  sector  was  effectively 
eliminated  from  participating  economic  activities  in  the  region.  Consequently, 
Zanzibar's  share  of  regional  trade  declined  significantly,  mainly  through  self  imposed 
regulations  and  restrictions.  Imports  were  confined  to  Bizarije,  (the  parastatal 
concerned  with  imports  of  essential  items)  and  exports  to  the  Zanzibar  State  Trading 
Corporation  (ZSTC).  The  main  imports  comprised  rice,  wheat  flour,  sugar,  other  food 
items,  building  materials,  clothing,  bicycles  and  a  number  of  other  consumer  goods 
(IMF,  1969).  However,  the  parastatal  organisation  entrusted  with  internal  trade  and 
distribution  became  unprofitable  and  faced  numerous  problems,  including  inadequate 
storage  and  skilled  personnel  to  run  it  efficiently  (Clayton,  1981). 
The  ZSTC  had  essentially  taken  over  the  hitherto  quite  prosperous  Clove  Growers' 
Association  (CGA).  In  fact,  the  CGA  was  already  a  parastatal,  but  perhaps  out  of  political 
rhetoric  more  than  anything  else,  it  too  was  nationalised,  renamed  and  given  additional 
functions.  ZSTC  had  many  function  the  main  ones  being: 
Q  the  purchasing  of  agricultural  produce  for  export  from  farmers  and  the  produce 
included  cloves,  cloves  stems,  chillies,  spices,  and  sea  shells. 
Q  transportation  of  goods  to  stores. 
Q  selling  directly  to  customers  as  distributors  and  wholesalers. 
Q  purchasing  numerous  commodities  from  the  mainland  for  sale  in  Zanzibar  and 
vice  versa. 
Q  operating  distilleries  processing  from  agricultural  produce. 
As  in  the  case  of  Bizanje,  certain  aspects  of  the  operations  of  ZSTC  were  loss  bearing.  In 
both  cases  government  subsidies  were  provided  and  this  was  possible  given  the  relatively 
good  incomes  derived  from  clove  exports  and  significant  external  development 
assistance. 
Trade  and  commerce  have  always  been  more  important  than  manufacturing.  Prior  to 
the  revolution  Zanzibar's  bourgeoisie  were  more  merchants  than  entrepreneurs,  a 
characteristic  accentuated  by  the  constraints  of  the  small  domestic  market.  In  a  study  of 
the  potential  of  developing  manufacturing  industry  in  Zanzibar.  Selwyn  and  Watson 
(1962)  emphasised  the  limitations  of  market  size,  infrastructural  constraints,  the 
unfavourable  attitude  towards  foreigners  and  the  government's  attitude  towards 
immigration.  and  especially  of  technicians,  which  has  not  been  as  liberal  as  might  be 
anticipated.  In  their  report,  they  suggest  that  the  prospects  for  introducing  other 224 
manufacturing  industries  "depend  entirely  on  the  size  of  the  market,  and  at  present  we 
consider  the  possibilities  limited"  (op.  cit  :  9).  They  recommended  that  the  first  priority 
should  be  to  expand  the  market  and  this  implies  looking  towards  the  Mainland.  They 
recommended  that  the  government  enter  into  negotiations  with  the  governments  of 
Kenya,  Tanganyika  and  Uganda  for  the  abolition  of  import  duties  on  goods  originating 
in  Zanzibar  and  discouraging  Zanzibar  harmonising  its  import  duties  with  those  of  the 
Mainland.  This  has  since  been  followed,  enabling  Zanzibar  to  have  a  substantial  re- 
export  sub-sector. 
Between  1961  and  1965  re-exports  constituted  an  average  of  19.6%  of  the  islands'  exports 
(Table  7.5).  In  1961  re-exports  were  nearly  1990  of  total  exports  peaking  to  28.9°/6  In  1962. 
By  1965  this  proportion  declined  to  15%  with  the  withdrawal  of  the  private  sector  in  the 
import-export  trade.  What  is  clear  is  that  Zanzibar  had  lost  its  position  as  a  major 
participant  in  regional  trade  and  commerce,  and  indeed  with  the  outside  world.  Its 
external  trading  partners  were  limited  and  trade  flows  were  increasingly  with  the 
Mainland.  The  main  external  trading  partners  (exports)  were  Indonesia,  India  and  the 
Mainland  and  in  the  case  of  imports  -  UK,  China,  and  the  Mainland. 
Prior  to  the  revolution  Zanzibar  had  a  diminutive  manufacturing  sector  which  was 
mainly  in  the  private  sector.  The  existing  plants  were  involved  in  processing  coconut 
oil,  soap  and  detergents  making,  food  processing,  soft  drinks,  coir  fibre  and  carpet 
making  and  beverages.  Production  was  predominantly  for  domestic  consumption. 
These  were  all  nationalised  after  the  Revolution. 
The  Revolutionary  government  set  out  on  a  drive  to  expand  the  islands'  industrial  sector 
and  established  factories  for  making  shoes,  cigarettes,  soft  drinks,  animal  feeds,  sugar, 
dairy  products,  spare  parts  for  tractors,  basic  medicines,  and  furniture  making.  In 
1964/65  the  manufacturing  sector  was  allocated  about  5%  of  the  development  budget  and 
this  proportion  increased  gradually  on  an  annual  basis  reaching  almost  20%  by  the 
mid-1970s. 
Manufacturing  in  Zanzibar  has  always  been  consumer  oriented  aimed  at  the  domestic 
market  (i.  e.,  import  substitution).  The  post-Revolution  manufacturing  expansion 
occurred  with  the  expanding  foreign  reserves  and  most  of  the  plants  depended  on 
importing  most  inputs  and  spares  and  could  only  continue  provided  there  were  adequate 
foreign  reserves.  This  was  possible  up  to  the  end  of  the  First  Phase  through  the  incomes 
generated  by  cloves  and  the  savings  derived  from  drastic  curtailment  in  expenditures  on 
food  imports.  However.  the  demand  for  foreign  exchange  to  facilitate  local  production 
would  cause  serious  problems  and  hinder  industrial  development  in  the  future. 225 
In 
. 
Mi11ions  of  Pounds)  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965 
Domestic  Ex  s< 
Cloves  ¬  2.4  2.1  3.1  2.2  2.3 
Clove  oils  0.1  0.1  0.1  ¬  0.1  ¬  0.1 
Co  0.4  0.4  0.6  0.5  I  0.8 
Coir  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Coconut  oil  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2  - 
Coconuts  0.1  0.1  0.1  ¬  0.1  - 
Cake  -  0.1  --  - 
Others  0.2  0.2  0.1  ¬  0.1  0.2 
Total  domestic  ex  rts*  3.6  3.2  4.3  3.2  3.4 
Re-exports  0.8  1.3  0.8  0.8  0.6 
Total  Ex  rts*  4.3  4.5  5.1  ¬  4.0  4.0 
--  is 
Food  1.8  1.9  1.9  1.5  1.7 
Beverage  and  tobacco  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2 
Crude  materials  0.4  0.5  0.5  -  - 
Mineral  fuels  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.3  ¬  0.3 
Chemicals  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1 
Manufactured  goods  1.6  1.4  1.6  0.5  ¬  0.6 
Machinery  and  transport 
ui  ment  0.8  0.5  0.4  0.2  ¬  0.2 
------  Miscellaneous  --------  - 0.2  0.2  0.3  0.9  1.0 
Total  imnorts*  s 
Bat  mce  (4  trade 
[surplus  or  deficit(-)) 
5.5 
l.? 
5.3  5.4  3.7  1.1 
-0.8 
1 
-0.3  0.3  i  t).  1 
*  Because  of  rounding,  figures  do  not  add  to  all  totals. 
Source:  IMF,  1969:  292. 
Table  7.5  Zanzibar's  External  Trade  (1961-65) 
It  has  been  observed  elsewhere  that  the  establishment  of  import  substitution 
industrialisation  in  SIS  has  been  difficult  and  that  the  main  restrictions  include  high 
transport  costs,  market  size,  capital  shortages  and  the  requirements  of  foreign  exchange 
for  the  upkeep  of  such  plants.  Other  constraints  include  the  small  size  and 
fragmentation  of  islands,  low  earnings  of  the  domestic  market,  limited  skills,  few  raw 
materials,  inadequate  access  to  appropriate  technology  and  investment  capital,  the  high 
cost  of  energy  and  the  lack  of  customs  protection  for  new  industries  (Connell.  1988). 
Zanzibar  is  no  exception  to  this,  although  through  the  government  monopoly  it  enjoyed 
a  high  degree  of  protection.  However  this  also  entailed  the  consequences  of  over 
protection.  which  include  poor  quality  goods,  high  manufacturing  costs  and 
inefficiency,  all  of  which  meant  that  local  industries  were  unable  to  compete  with 
external  products  and  therefore  also  unable  to  export.  This  contention  is  supported  by  a 
1986  UNCTAD  report  in  which  it  highlighted  the  paradox  facing  Industrialisation 
efforts  in  small  economies.  It  stated  that;  in  a  small  country  with  no  free  trade, 
industrial  growth  may  be  inefficient,  however,  with  free  trade  a  small  country  may 
experience  no  growth  at  all  and  may  in  fact  de-industrialise"  (UNCTAD.  1986:  25). 226 
The  main  impacts  of  the  expansion  of  manufacturing  in  Zanzibar  are  the  change  in  its 
contribution  to  GDP  from  around  1%  to  an  average  of  5%  towards  the  end  of  the  First 
Phase,  and  the  considerable  employment  that  was  created.  Despite  contributing  to  an 
urban  emphasis,  in  the  short  term  employment  was  available.  The  failures  include  the 
fact  that  manufacturing  efforts  were  not  matched  with  concomitant  efforts  aimed  at 
manufacturing  for  export  and  generating  foreign  exchange  and  therefore  also  achieving 
some  degree  of  diversification.  Despite  the  existence  of  the  Union,  manufacturing  and 
trade  failed  to  exploit  the  market  potential  on  the  Mainland.  It  appears  that  the  notion 
of  autonomy  at  times  overruled  economic  interests  and  prospects. 
Substantial  investments  were  made  in  the  services  sector,  and  particularly  education, 
housing  and  health,  in  that  order.  The  Karume  regime  was  determined  to  expand 
educational  opportunities  for  the  African  section  of  the  community,  which  until  then 
had  been  the  least  favoured.  Although  a  similar  situation  existed  in  Tanganyika  and 
indeed  in  the  other  newly  emerging  East  African  states,  the  African  section  in  Zanzibari 
society  was  particularly  disadvantaged. 
Initially  a  ratio  system  of  educational  opportunities  was  introduced  which  closely 
reflected  the  racial  proportions  in  society.  Universal  primary  and  upper  education  was 
declared  and  provided  free.  This  was  based  on  a  10  year  free  compulsory  education.  By 
the  end  of  that  phase,  pupils  in  primary  school  numbered  over  45,000.  Those  in 
secondary  education  (up  to  secondary  3)  approached  10,000  whilst  those  in  colleges  were 
about  600. 
There  were  extreme  difficulties  in  meeting  the  needs  of  the  programme,  particularly  in 
providing  quality  teaching  staff.  Following  the  exodus  of  the  majority  of  the  non- 
African  teachers  (and  other  skilled  civil  servants),  there  was  difficulty  in  obtaining 
personnel  and  handling  the  good  though  ambitious  objectives  set  out  in  the  various 
sectors.  To  achieve  the  target  teachers  from  overseas  had  to  be  drafted  in.  l 
Although  the  provision  of  education  in  primary  schools  was  impressive,  the  same  could 
not  be  said  about  secondary  and  other  schools  and  colleges.  This  situation  continued 
right  through  and  after  the  First  Phase.  A  report  recently  pointed  out  that  as  a  result  of  a 
shortage  of  adequately  qualified  teachers,  the  quality  of  post  primary  education  has 
deteriorated  resulting  in  fewer  children  being  accepted  into  higher  secondary  schools. 
The  report  further  notes  that  the  "decline  in  the  number  of  children  gaining  ordinary 
and  advanced  level  passes  has  meant  that  there  are  a  lack  of  Zanzibaris  possessing  the 
1  These  came  from  Cuba,  Czechoslovakia,  China,  Pakistan,  Egypt,  East  Germany  and  Ghana.  Very  few  came  from 
the  Mainland,  as  that  country  itself  faced  a  shortage  of  teachers. 227 
minimum  entrance  qualification  required  by  institutes  of  higher  education  on  the 
mainland  and  abroad.  As  a  consequence  all  sectors  of  the  economy  are  now  suffering 
from  acute  skill  shortages"  (GoZ.  1989:  92). 
It  was  Karume's  long  cherished  ambition  to  establish  a  university.  impractical  as  it  may 
sound  (as  a  consequence  of  the  small  size,  costs,  infrastructure  and  other  inputs). 
However,  by  the  end  of  the  First  Phase  fewer  Zanzibaris  than  anticipated  managed  to 
acquire  a  higher  education,  especially  at  university  level.  This  was  due  to  several 
reasons:  Apart  from  the  difficulties  of  achieving  the  required  entry  grades  and  obtaining 
tuition  support,  travelling  outside  the  islands  was  difficult  especially  if  this  was  not 
with  the  approval  of  the  state.  For  example.  in  1969  it  was  announced  that  anyone 
marrying  a  Zanzibari  girl  and  taking  her  away  from  the  islands,  would  be  require  to 
reimburse  the  state  all  educational  and  medical  costs  incurred  on  her  by  the  state.  The 
following  year  a  decree  was  enacted  imposing  hefty  payments  and  even  the 
imprisonment  of  parents  whose  children  left  the  islands.  The  idea  was  for  those  who 
benefited  from  the  state  should  remain  and  contribute  to  the  country.  However,  the 
incentives  for  this  did  not  exist:  on  the  contrary  with  the  repression  there  was  every 
reason  for  some  people  to  emigrate. 
Migration  was  strictly  controlled  to  curtail  the  outflow  of  the  young  and  educated.  Of 
course  the  undesirable  elements  of  society  were  'weeded  out'  and  encouraged  or  permitted 
to  leave  the  country.  This  group  comprised  mainly  of  political  opponents  and  their 
families. 
An  ambitious  housing  programme  modelled  on  the  East  European  approach  to  state 
housing  was  implemented.  Zanzibar  received  considerable  East  German  finance  and 
expertise  for  the  project.  Although  the  programme  was  predominantly  urban,  there  was 
also  a  number  of  rural  town  housing  projects.  In  1972  some  21  million  shillings  was 
earmarked  for  housing  alone.  1  Eleven  new  towns  were  planned  and  implemented  to 
various  degrees.  Some  of  these  'new  towns'  were  in  the  rural  areas  and  it  can  be  assumed 
that  there  were  intentions  of  creating  competing  urban  areas  to  Zanzibar  Town. 
The  houses  and  apartments  that  were  constructed  were  allocated  to  the  population  either 
on  a  rent  free  basis  for  those  who  had  their  houses  demolished  or  else  just  a  nominal 
rent  was  charged.  At  around  36  shillings  (£1.80)  per  month,  the  rent  is  said  to  have  been 
amongst  the  lowest  in  Africa  (Clayton.  1981).  So  much  emphasis  was  paid  to  the  housing 
scheme  that  by  the  end  of  the  First  Phase.  nearly  70%  of  the  country's  development 
resources  were  allocated  to  it  alone!  (SMZ,  1987). 
Health  services  were  expanded  with  the  assistance  of  foreign  aid  particularly  from 
1  About  £1,050,000. 228 
China  and  East  Germany.  Compared  to  the  education  sector,  staffing  difficulties  were 
even  more  severe  and  often  the  same  donor  countries  provided  personnel.  In  terms  of 
infrastructure,  rural  and  urban  clinics,  a  paramedical  and  nursing  school  and  a  small 
drugs  manufacturing  unit  were  established.  An  attempt  was  made  to  extend  primary 
health  service  centres  all  over  the  country.  However,  these  efforts  were  hindered  by  the 
lack  of  staff  and  shortages  of  drugs.  Private  practitioners  were  banned  in  1970. 
There  was  an  on-going  project  to  combat  malaria  under  the  World  Health  Organisation, 
but  this  was  terminated  abruptly  for  unknown  reasons  and  Zanzibar  has  become  an  area 
with  a  high  prevalence  of  malaria.  1  In  the  long  term  however,  Zanzibaris  were  to  suffer 
significantly  from  the  inadequacies  of  the  health  system  which  focused  on  curative 
rather  than  preventive  measures,  so  that  it  is  characterised  by  relatively  high  infant 
and  maternal  mortality  rates  and  general  morbidity  rates. 
With  high  fertility  rates  and  restricted  emigration,  the  population  continued  to  expand 
rapidly.  Significant  factors  affecting  this  were  the  relatively  large  number  of  children 
desired  by  women,  the  role  of  the  dominant  religion,  which  is  natalist,  and  the  lack  of 
contraception.  The  possession  of  contraceptives  was  declared  illegal,  of  which  Clayton 
(1981:  122)  stated  that;  "Karume's  objections  were  neither  moral  nor  theological:  He 
simply  wanted  the  population  to  increase"  (op  cit  :  122). 
Between  1964  and  1977  an  average  of  65%  of  Zanzibar's  development  budget  went  into 
the  provision  of  education,  health,  housing  and  provision  of  water  supplies.  This  was  an 
important  and  impressive  beginning  for  the  ASP  government  as  hitherto,  most 
Zanzibaris  had  limited  access  to  these  services.  This  was  a  deliberate  effort  aimed  at 
ameliorating  the  poor  social  conditions  of  the  majority  of  the  population.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  there  was  a  bias  towards  the  provision  of  services  and  basic  needs,  and  this 
was  at  the  expense  of  the  productive  sectors. 
The  tourist  sector  had  considerable  potential  and  yet  it  was  neglected.  2  Apart  from  its 
natural  attractions,  Zanzibar  also  enjoys  a  rich  heritage  in  its  Arabic  buildings, 
architecture  and  history.  It  has  been  suggested  that  one  aspect  which  may  have 
contributed  to  the  lack  of  emphasis  of  the  tourist  sector  is  that  it  would  entail  a  free  flow 
of  visitors  who  may  have  political  reasons  for  visiting  the  islands.  3  The  regime  was  not 
happy  with  such  a  state  of  affairs  and  so  although  the  need  for  tourism  was 
1  Karume  is  reported  to  have  said  that  Zanzibar  did  not  require  the  WHO  staff/input.  However,  he  was  highly 
suspicious  of  foreigners  whom  he  did  not  invite  personally  and  that  position  is  further  complicated  by  a  paranoia 
that  he  had  against  agents  working  for  his  downfall  and  the  return  of  the  Sultan. 
2A  World  Tourism  Organisation  (WTO)/  United  Nations  Industrial  Development  Organisation  (UNIDO)  report, 
1983,  entitled  "Zanzibar  Tourism  Development  Plan"  stipulates  quite  clearly  that  there  exists  a  significant 
potential  for  tourism  in  Zanzibar. 
3  In  discussions  and  interviews  with  government  officials. 229 
acknowledged.  It  would  have  to  be  regulated  and  monitored  very  closely. 
Tourism  was  given  low  priority,  apart  from  the  construction  of  one  large  state  owned 
hotel  and  embarking  on  plans  for  one  just  north  of  Zanzibar  town  and  another  in  Pemba 
island.  Tourists  were  permitted  to  arrive.  Initially  on  day  trips  and  later  in  'controlled' 
parties,  reminiscent  of  the  style  in  the  former  East  Bloc.  The  total  number  of  visitors  on 
business  and  tourist  visits  jumped  from  just  over  a  thousand  the  year  after  the 
Revolution  peaking  in  1969  with  about  3.760  and  then  as  restrictions  and  difficulties  In 
movement  to  the  islands  increased.  numbers  began  to  fall  (Figure  7.3).  Income  derived 
from  tourism  followed  trends  in  arrival  up  to  1066/67  and  then  dropped  sharply. 
Thereafter.  although  the  numbers  of  visitors  increased  incomes  continued  to  fall  until 
1970.  This  perhaps  indicates  that  there  lacked  a  link  between  tourism  and  local  tourism 
related  activities  and  so  there  was  little  for  tourists  to  spend  on.  However.  after  1070 
tourism  incomes  rose  sharply  (Figure  7.3).  The  duration  of  stay  was  very  short.  In 
general  the  number  of  visitors  remained  low  and  so  the  contribution  of  tourism  to  CDP 
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Yfgure  7.3  Tourist  arrivals  and  revenue  In  Zanzibar  (1965-72) 
The  First  Three  Year  Development  Plan  (1978.81)  notes  that  the  tourist  sector  has  been 
beleaguered  with  problems  and  that  it  has  been  unsuccessful  since  1964.  The  failure  to 
exploit  the  tourist  sector  meant  that  the  country  lost  an  opportunity  to  Increase  Its 
foreign  exchange  generating  capacity.  to  create  employment  through  related  activities. 
and  to  diversify  the  economy.  The  strong  influence  of  Islamic  culture  and  the  concerns 
about  the  Cold  War  are  also  said  to  be  factors  which  inhibited  tourism  development. 
Zanzibar's  neglect  of  tourism  links  with  an  observation  made  by  one  expert.  noting  that 
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'The  status  of  economic  development  in  IMS  is  symbolised  by  the  increasing  economic 
and  social  influence  of  tourism,  and  the  massive  dependence  upon  it.  The  few  countries 
where  tourism  is  unimportant,  in  the  Atlantic  IMS,  Comoros  and  the  central  Pacific..., 
are  amongst  the  poorest  of  all  LDCs"  (Connell,  1988:  62).  This  observation  is  relevant  to 
Zanzibar. 
However,  one  might  also  argue  that  one  positive  aspect  of  the  policies  of  the  First  Phase 
is  that  the  people  and  culture  has  remained  'unadulterated'  through  the  absence  of 
tourism  as  has  occurred  in  coastal  Kenya.  However,  given  the  limited  resources  which 
the  islands  have  and  the  numerous  constraints  facing  socio-economic  development,  and 
the  need  to  maximise  its  scarce  resources,  the  failure  to  develop  and  exploit  this  sector 
can  be  considered  as  a  major  failing. 
Zanzibar  had  no  definite  spatial  development  policy  during  the  First  Phase.  Any  spatial 
implications  of  development  were  the  result  of  either  the  unintended  outcome  of  sectoral 
policies  or  the  result  of  applying  negative  ones  in  the  attempt  to  redress  class  and  ethnic- 
racial  inequalities.  Despite  the  lack  of  the  spatial  dimension  in  planning.  there  was  a 
concern  for  the  rural  area  which  were  predominantly  in  a  disadvantaged  position  during 
pre-Revolution  Zanzibar.  Thus  social  policies  and  strategies  were  geared  to  this  rectify 
this  situation.  However,  what  determined  different  areas  receiving  preference  in 
development  investments  over  others  was  based  on  subjective  decisions  of  the  upper 
hierarchy  of  the  Party.  This,  of  course,  further  contributed  to  the  spatial  imbalances  in 
the  island  economy,  with  dire  consequences  in  terms  of  internal  migration  and  the 
economic,  political  and  spatial  polarisation  of  society. 
Consequently,  industrial  establishments,  housing  development,  educational  and  health 
projects  which  aimed  at  improving  the  quality  of  life  of  the  impoverished  class  and 
expand  the  economy  were  arbitrarily  located,  broadening  existing,  and  creating  new, 
spatial  inequalities.  Despite  policy  measures  aimed  at  supporting  the  rural  population 
and  the  traditional  sector.  relative  incomes  then  declined  and  living  conditions 
deteriorated. 
Between  1967  and  1978  internal  migration  trends  have  been  predominantly  rural- 
urban,  particularly  towards  Zanzibar  West  region  which  includes  Zanzibar  Town,  the 
largest  urban  centre.  During  that  intercensal  period,  over  35%  of  the  population  was 
involved  in  inter-regional  migration  and  all  regions  with  the  exception  of  Zanzibar  West 
experienced  net  losses,  the  latter  gaining.  Zanzibar  North  and  Pemba  South  had  the 
lowest  net  losses  (see  the  section  on  migration  in  chapter  11). 231 
Repressive  and  coercive  measures  were  taken  by  authorities  in  certain  areas,  especially 
in  some  rural  areas  of  Pemba.  to  enforce  government  policies.  This  generated  fear  and 
uncertainty.  Food  and  other  shortages  made  the  quality  of  life  in  many  rural  areas 
worse.  Migration  towards  towns  and  particularly  Zanzibar  town  was  inevitable  given 
the  better  conditions  there  and  the  possibility  of  better  paid  wage  labour. 
By  1967.50%  of  the  population  of  Unguja  island  lived  in  and  around  Zanzibar  town 
This  was  about  2096  of  the  island.  ultimately  putting  immense  pressure  on  the  town's 
infrastructure  and  management.  demanding  a  disproportionate  share  of  the  country's 
resources.  The  implications  are  that  resources  were  increasingly  diverted  from  rural  to 
urban  areas.  Political  authority  was  at  the  centre  and  increasingly  under  the  control  of 
one  individual.  With  the  centralisation  of  power  and  decision  making  came  the 
convergence  of  urban  biased  projects  (Upton.  1977).  This  phenomenon  is  quite  common 
to  many  LDCs,  as  many  a  politician  tend  to  favour  the  more  prestigious  and  visible 
projects.  Examples  include  Zanzibar  Town's  dual-carriage-ways.  the  monumental 
multistoried  housing  projects  reminiscent  of  European  housing  estates.  Ill  designed  for 
Zanzibari  lifestyles.  factories  and  other  projects.  There  was  a  trend  for  a 
disproportionate  share  of  public  investment  towards  urban  areas. 
Spatial  Inequalities  also  increased  between  the  main  islands.  with  Unguja  benefiting  at 
the  expense  of  Pemba.  Infrastructural  development  was  already  uneven  and  in  favour  of 
the  Unguja.  and  yet  no  measures  were  taken  to  redress  this  imbalance.  On  the  contrary. 
some  vindictive  policies  carried  out  during  the  First  Phase  augmented  the  difficult 
conditions  in  Pemba.  Apart  from  being  the  most  likely  area  from  where  political 
opposition  would  stem.  it  was  also  where  most  of  Zanzibar's  cloves  are  grown.  Pemba 
had  more  than  four  and  a  half  times  as  many  trees  as  in  Unguja  island  a  situation  which 
remains  the  same  (thus  a  recent  census  of  cloves  trees  by  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture 
shows  that  Unguja  island  has  18%  of  the  clove  trees  and  Pemba  island  82ß6).  1 
Public  investment  and  development  projects  did  not  reflect  this.  nor  did  they 
aggressively  seek  spatial  egalitarianism.  Instead  a  disproportionate  Investment  was 
made  in  Unguja.  With  the  centralisation  of  power  and  decision  making  came  also  the 
centralisation  of  urban  development.  Clayton  (1981)  notes  that  a  Rural  Settlement  and 
Village  development  Fund  was  established  in  1967.  in  which  workers  in  rural  areas 
contributed  3%  of  their  monthly  earnings  and  traders  a  sum  equivalent  to  10%  of  their 
tax.  The  Fund  was  for  financing  rural  and  village  Initiated  projects.  However,  the 
disbursements  of  funds  was  lop-sided  and  according  to  one  observer,  'The  fund  was 
however  used  to  benefit  Unguja  farmers  more  than  those  in  Pemba,  again  a  reflection  of 
the  base  of  Karume's  power'  Clayton  (op.  cit.  :  139).  Karume  never  extended  his  power  or 
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Figure  8.10  Trends  in  GDP  In  Zanzibar  and  Mainland  Tanzania  1976-1987 
Indes  numbers  (1976  =  100) 
Barring  any  adverse  climatic  conditions.  its  domestic  food  production  capability  could 
offset  the  large  food  imports.  During  the  same  period  an  average  of  8%  of  the  value  of  the 
Mainland  imports  comprised  food.  compared  to  Zanzibar's  40%.  Although  there  was 
some  scope  for  diversification  within  the  agricultural  sector  through  increased 
production  and  exports  in  other  food  and  cash  crops,  this  failed  to  occur.  Diversification 
could  have  reduced  the  food  import  bill  and  the  extreme  dependency  on  food  imports. 
By  the  early  1980s  the  state  of  the  Zanzibari  economy  was  ailing  and  with  adverse  socio- 
economic  consequences  and  the  future  looking  bleak.  The  existing  social  and  economic 
infrastructure  deteriorated  for  want  of  maintenance.  One  government  report  assessing 
the  state  of  the  economy  noted  that  `buildings  such  as  schools,  and  other  physical 
infrastructure,  particularly  the  water  supply  system.  have  deteriorated  badly  through 
lack  of  maintenance  and  spare  parts"  (GoZ,  1987b:  88).  The  report  concludes  that  "There 
is,  therefore.  a  major  gap  between  the  resources  required  to  provide  the  social  services 
that  the  government  would  wish  and  the  resources  available"  (op.  cit.  ).  The  productive 
sectors  were  equally  affected  and  their  declining  contribution  is  reflected  in  figures  8.8, 
8.9.8.10.  Population  was  growing  faster  than  anticipated  (2.7%  p.  a.  as  opposed  to  2.3% 
p.  a.  ).  and  with  a  net  migration  rate  of  -0.5  the  doubling  time  is  25  years.  Thus  by  2006  the 
population  could  reach  the  one  million  mark  and  with  the  fast  growing  population 
having  the  effect  of  further  depressing  per  capita  incomes.  I 
Per  capita  incomes  in  both  parts  of  the  United  Republic  were  falling  by  the  end  of  the 
First  Phase  and  continued  into  the  Second  Phase.  However,  the  rate  of  decline  in 
Zanzibar  was  sharper  than  in  the  Mainland  and  consequently  trends  in  GNP  diverged. 
Taking  1976  as  the  base  year.  per  capita  GDPs  depict  falling  trends  (Figures  8.11  and 
The  1988  census  shows  an  even  higher  growth  rate  of  3%  per  annum,  suggesting  that  it  will  take  a  shorter  period 
to  get  to  I  million. 263 
8.12).  In  the  case  of  Zanzibar,  in  1981  there  was  a  brief  upswing  lasting  to  1982.  By  the 
following  year  (1983)  GDP  was  nearly  a  half  of  what  it  was  in  1976.  Thereafter  the 
declining  trend  continued  (overlapping  with  increasing  clove  exports  revenues  -  see  also 
Figure  8.9). 
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Source:  GoZ  (1981,1982,1984;  JMT,  1988,1989) 
Figure  8.11  Population  Growth,  GDP  and  Per  Capita  GDP  In  Zanzibar  1976-1987 
(1976  =  100) 
The  sharp  decline  had  adverse  economic  and  political  repercussions.  First,  it  meant 
that  a  range  of  imports  had  to  be  curtailed  and  from  the  experiences  of  the  previous 
regime,  food  would  not  be  the  first.  Manufacturing,  which  was  largely  import 
substitution  based,  was  already  facing  management  and  operational  problems  due  lack 
of  skilled  personnel,  capital,  power  and  excessive  control  by  the  state,  was  affected 
immediately.  Following  this  were  funds  for  infrastructural  development  projects.  At 
the  same  time  there  were  limited  prospects  of  additional  assistance  from  the  Mainland 
since  the  economy  there  was  also  undergoing  a  gradual  but  persistent  decline. 
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Figure  8.12  Per  capita  incomes  of  Zanzibar  and  Mainland  Tanzania  1976-1987 
(1976  =  100) 264 
The  slump  in  world  prices  and  production  of  cloves  is  but  one  factor  that  contributed  to 
the  poor  performance  of  the  Zanzibari  economy.  In  1973/74  oil  prices  rose  sharply,  and 
in  Zanzibar  crude  oil  rose  from  TShs.  98/=  per  ton  in  1970  to  633/=  in  1975,  a  rise  of 
546%!.  There  were  also  increases  in  food,  spares,  consumer  and  capital  goods,  all  of 
which  seriously  affected  the  import  capacity  of  the  economy.  Within  a  very  short  period 
real  income  and  foreign  exchange  earning  capacity  declined  drastically  while  the  costs 
of  imports  rose  sharply,  adding  more  pressure  to  the  beleaguered  economy.  Moreover, 
the  generous  incomes  Zanzibar  enjoyed  in  the  early  1970s  and  1980s  affected  the  terms 
of  trade.  Obviously,  it  tended  to  import  larger  amounts  than  it  could  export  and  when 
revenues  permitted  imports  also  rose.  Then  there  was  the  gradual  erosion  of  real 
monetary  values  as  a  result  of  gradual  devaluation  of  the  Tanzania  Shilling.  In  this 
respect,  arguments  and  advice  propagated  by  the  World  Bank,  IMF  and  indeed  neo- 
Liberal  economists,  that  devaluation  and  appropriate  agricultural  policies  would 
encourage  peasant  producers  to  increase  production  and  export  more,  are  largely 
inappropriate,  irrelevant  and  misleading  for  the  SIS  economies  such  as  Zanzibar. 
Further  production  in  cloves  in  a  glutted  market  is  meaningless,  while  the  costs  of 
imports,  of  which  it  is  highly  dependent  are  set  to  rise  steeply.  Even  if  it  could  diversify, 
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Ftgure  8.13  Sectoral  contributions  to  the  economy  1976-88 
(Percentage) 
The  government's  sources  of  revenues  were  very  narrow  indeed.  Traditionally  this  came 
from  the  marketing  of  cloves  and  other  agricultural  exports,  taxes  and  profits  generated 
by  parastatal  organisations.  However,  particularly  between  1980  and  1983,  the 
contribution  of  the  agricultural  sector  became  smaller  and  revenues  generated  from 
trade  and  services  increased  their  share  although  in  general  these  too  were  restricted 
(Figure  8.13).  After  nearly  two  decades  and  several  attempts  at  restructuring  the  island 
economy,  agriculture  remained  the  mainstay  of  the  economy,  followed  by  services.  With 
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state  control,  there  was  a  limited  amount  of  trading  activity  occurring,  while  services 
were  characterised  by  inefficiency  and  overstaffing.  The  very  low  contributions  of 
construction  and  industrial  activities  reveals  the  low  level  of  investment  and 
productivity.  The  share  of  manufacturing  arose  only  when  clove  revenues  increased 
reflecting  a  tendency  in  import  substitution  industrialisation,  e.  g.,  1975/76  and 
1980/81.  Sectors  such  as  tourism,  that  were  forming  the  foundation  of  economies  such 
as  Seychelles  and  others  in  the  Caribbean  had  been  ignored  and  contributed  minutely  to 
the  Zanzibari  economy.  By  1979  foreign  aid  and  loans  amounted  to  only  5%  of  the 
development  and  recurrent  budget,  and  thus  in  failing  to  attract  the  necessary  resources 
to  create  a  foundation  from  which  it  would  have  proceeded  to  build  the  economy.  it  left  a 
legacy  with  severe  structural  disadvantages.  All  this  translated  into  the  failure  of 
development  policies  and  programmes  which  in  the  long  term  resulted  in  low  revenue 
generating  capacity  by  the  government  and  an  overall  low  level  of  economic  activity  in 
the  country. 
8.6  Summary  and  Conclusions 
The  economic  and  social  problems  that  occurred  during  the  Second  Phase  culminated 
with  widespread  political  and  social  discontent  which  in  turn  made  those  in  government 
uneasy.  This  period  resulted  in  the  so  called  "polluted  political  atmosphere"  which 
covered  the  period  between  1983  and  early  1984,  culminating  with  Sheikh  Aboud 
Jumbe's  forced  resignation.  Blame  for  the  "polluted  political  atmosphere"  was  placed  on 
Jumbe  for  letting  the  situation  get  out  of  hand  (Othman  and  Mlimuka,  1989b).  However, 
it  is  unlikely  that  there  was  a  single  cause  for  this. 
It  has  been  suggested  that  the  true  causes  for  this  situation  lie  further  back  in  1977,  when 
TANU  and  ASP  merged  to  establish  CCM  as  the  sole  political  party  in  the  Mainland  and 
Isles.  Certain  prominent  people  who  prior  to  the  Union  accumulated  considerable 
powers  and  were  virtually  answerable  to  no  one.  were  not  happy  with  this.  Others  lost 
senior  party  position  with  the  first  post-Revolution  elections  and  more  lost  again  in  the 
1982  CCM  elections  (Othman  and  Mlimuka.  1989b).  In  a  small  island  society  this  would 
have  severe  implications  given  the  high  degree  of  personalism  and  patron-clientelism 
which  was  practised  in  various  degrees  and  at  various  levels.  Moreover  this  situation 
took  place  with  the  apparent  approval,  if  not  inspiration  of  the  Mainland  placing  its 
motives  under  suspicion  by  the  various  petty  and  bureaucratic  bourgeoisie  classes  in  the 
islands.  The  merging  of  the  ASP  and  CCM  signified  the  usurping  of  political  power  by  the 
Mainland  bureaucratic  bourgeoisie.  Considering  the  historical  experiences  and  events 
during  Zama  Za.  Slasa  and  the  First  Phase,  it  comes  as  no  surprise  that  the  "political 
atmosphere"  became  polluted  and  that  quite  often  the  geographical  source  of  discontent 
was  Pemba  island,  first  given  its  historical  experiences  and  background,  but  more 
importantly  given  its  deprived  status  (more  on  this  in  chapters  11,12  and  13). 266 
It  was  suggested  in  the  previous  chapter  that  one  of  the  main  incentives  for  consenting  to 
the  Union.  at  least  insofar  as  Zanzibar  was  concerned,  were  the  security  guarantees  that 
it  provided  the  regime  on  the  Isles.  This  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  there  was  an 
overall  willingness  to  surrender  autonomy.  in  fact  quite  the  contrary.  First.  there  were 
obviously  different  objectives  for  the  Union  on  either  side  and  second,  clearly  the 
notions  of  insularity  and  obsessive  autonomy  that  are  very  common  In  small  states 
have  been  underestimated.  The  operation  of  these  factors  in  other  small  island  societies 
have  also  been  observed  by  Lowenthal  (1987). 
The  social  and  economic  indicators  presented  In  this  chapter  show  that  a  combination 
of  political,  economic,  social  and  even  physical  factors  lead  to  the  island's  state  of 
economic  stagnation  and  as  suggested  extensively  in  the  literature  review,  many  of  those 
factors  are  inherent  within  a  small  island  developing  economy.  It  has  also  has  been 
shown  by  the  model  in  chapter  two  how  these  parameters  are  Interrelated  In  a  fairly 
complex  manner  and  are  especially  sensitive  in  small  societies.  For  example,  the 
shortage  of  expertise  in  the  formulation  and  implementation  of  development  strategies 
and  programmes  led  to  inappropriate  strategies  and  programmes  being  adopted, 
management  constraints  and  inefficiency.  This  in  turn  contributed  to  a  shortage  of 
revenues  to  enable  further  domestic  investments  to  be  made  in  more  productive  sectors 
and  therefore  in  the  long  term  there  was  no  diversification  of  the  economy.  The  self- 
preservation  of  the  status  quo,  also  meant  that  both  the  potential  of  the  merchant  class 
and  foreign  investments  were  barred  from  participating  in  the  economy,  thereby 
debilitating  the  already  vulnerable  economy  which  is  characterised  by  extremely 
limited  potentials. 
The  island  economy.  like  many  others,  was  laboured  under  its  heavy  dependency  on 
imported  food,  energy,  consumer  and  capital  goods,  all  of  which  made  it  susceptible  to 
external  fluctuations  in  demand  and  prices.  Despite  the  economy  being  weak,  and  its 
low  capacity  for  income  generation,  the  size  of  the  government  bureaucracy  continued  to 
grow  partially  because  of  various  programmes  being  implemented  but  also  because  of  the 
influences  of  familism  and  personalism.  There  was  also  growing  urbanisation,  which 
by  the  end  of  the  Second  Phase  was  over  32%.  Ironically,  the  provision  of  employment 
in  government,  which  was  generally  located  in  urban  areas,  to  some  extent  further 
attracted  the  disenchanted  and  youthful  rural  populations,  which  in  turn  increased 
pressure  on  the  government  to  'create'  employment  for  the  expanding  urban  population. 
This  situation  reflects  the  ineffectiveness  and  lack  of  sustainability  of  rural 
development  programmes  implemented  during  both  periods. 267 
The  implications  of  emigration  restrictions  is  that  remittances  were  lacking  or 
'invisible'  in  the  economy.  1  It  follows  that  there  no  evidence  of  domestic  economic 
activities  such  as  investments  in  housing.  small  businesses.  artisanal  fishing.  or 
consumer  goods,  which  can  be  said  to  have  been  catalysed  by  remittances.  Everything 
was  almost  totally  dependent  on  the  patronage  of  those  in  the  establishment  and  created 
a  culture  of  expectation  from  the  government  all  of  which  in  a  curious  manner 
contradicted  with  the  spirit  of  self-help  and  self-reliance  which  had  evolved  in  the  Isles. 
Restricting  private  sector  entrepreneurship  limited  employment  opportunities,  and  the 
generation  of  taxation  revenue,  in  turn  contributing  to  the  shortage  of  resources  for 
reinvestment  into  the  economy.  The  problems  of  skilled  personnel  was  obviously  not 
limited  to  functional  managers.  It  also  affected  policy  and  decision  makers.  However.  it 
must  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  two  decades  after  the  1964  Revolution  the  potential  for 
the  re-emergence  of  an  opposition  based  on  the  class-ethnic  differences  remained  a 
distinct  possibility  threatening  the  status  quo.  The  period  in  the  which  there  was  an 
absence  of  any  opposition  or  consultation  signified  that  the  Revolution  had  been  taken 
over  overtly  by  a  petty  bourgeoisie  class  within  its  own  ranks,  a  class  which  now 
transformed  itself  into  a  bureaucratic  bourgeoisie,  akin  to  that  existing  on  the 
Mainland. 
As  it  shall  be  shown  in  chapters  11  to  13,  rural-urban  migration  and  inter-island 
migration  were  both  high.  while  emigration  was  very  low  in  comparison  to  other  small 
island  states  where  it  is  a  characteristic  of  their  economic  structure.  Although  a 
considerable  degree  of  freedom  of  expression  and  movement  was  allowed,  the  lack  of 
skills  and  the  nature  of  social  and  economic  developments  on  the  Mainland  were  not 
particularly  attractive  to  facilitate  emigration,  while  movement  to  Kenya  was  restricted 
by  the  break-up  of  the  East  African  Community.  The  combination  of  a  very  low  degree  of 
emigration  and  high  fertility  rates  contributed  to  a  high  degree  of  urbanisation,  also  a 
platform  for  emigration  once  conditions  allow. 
Moreover,  with  the  Party  merger  and  constitutional  changes,  the  development 
philosophy  and  subsequent  development  policies  mimicked  those  occurring  on  the 
Mainland.  2  However,  many  of  these  did  not  appreciate  the  unique  conditions  facing  a 
small  island  economy  and  so  failed  to  address  them  appropriately.  Both  sides  of  the 
Union  proceeded  with  more  or  less  uniform  development  policies  as  though  they  shared 
more  in  common,  whereas  in  reality  there  were  considerable  differences.  The  problems 
1  The  term  'invisible'  is  used  because  there  is  no  clear  evidence  that  there  was  much  movement  of  remitted  moneys 
or  goods.  However,  in  informal  interviews  with  some  households  a  small  number  of  respondents  admitted  that  with 
some  difficulty  money  and  goods  were  remitted. 
2  For  example,  the  Three  Year  Plan  (1978/79  to  1981/82)  makes  mention  of  implementing  the  programmes  under 
the  Ujamaa  and  Self-reliance  philosophy,  yet  as  mentioned  earlier  no  villagisation  (resettlement)  programmes 
such  as  those  that  were  implemented  in  the  Mainland,  were  executed. 268 
inherent  in  peripheral  developing  small  economies  were  not  noticed  and  thus  largely 
ignored. 
During  this  phase  the  economy  of  Zanzibar  was  characterised  by  high  level  public 
expenditures  In  social  services,  public  sector  employment  and  some  investment  in  the 
productive  sectors.  Manufacture  consisted  of  import  substitution  industries,  while 
agriculture  (cash  cropping)  remained  central  to  the  economy  with  no  diversification  in 
the  economy.  The  was  a  considerable  degree  of  migration,  mainly  inter-island  and  rural 
to  urban  and  the  absence  of  significant  emigration  contributed  to  a  high  degree  of 
urbanisation.  Compared  to  many  other  SIS.  there  lacked  remitted  incomes  and  there 
was  no  plans  to  establish  a  rentier  economy  (e.  g.  tourism  and  financial  services). 
Development  aid  was  not  sought  and  there  lacked  an  indigenous  class  of  entrepreneurs. 
As  such  Zanzibar  was  following  a  unique  path  uncharacteristic  of  most  SIS  elsewhere.  It 
projected  an  image  of  a  Revolutionary  regime,  undergoing  a  major  social  and  economic 
transformation  largely  based  on  self-reliance,  and  determined  to  create  an  egalitarian 
society.  However.  after  the  two  phases,  this  objective  remained  elusive.  Although  it  had 
set  out  seeking  room  for  manoeuvre,  this  process  was  never  fully  achieved. 
In  summary  then,  while  elsewhere  many  SIS  were  transforming  into  MIRAB  economies 
(Bertram  and  Watters.  1985,1986;  Connell.  1988),  the  same  cannot  be  said  of  Zanzibar. 
Although  Migration  was  taking  place.  It  was  largely  internal  and  so  Remittances  from 
overseas  were  largely  lacking.  However,  there  was  a  high  degree  of  Urbanisation  and 
Bureaucracy  through  expanding  Government  Employment.  External  Aid  to  sustain  the 
bureaucracy  and  government  employment  was  small.  Admittedly,  the  high  income 
generated  when  clove  prices  rose  steeply  managed  to  sustain  the  government  and  to  some 
degree  allowed  Zanzibar  to  pursue  this  unique  path.  no  matter  how  unsustainable  it  was. 
The  other  important  factor  is  the  absence  of  innovative  strategies  and  policies  to  guide 
the  social  and  economic  development  of  the  Isles  onto  a  more  appropriate  path  given  the 
range  of  development  constraints  it  faced  and  make  the  best  use  of  the  relative 
prosperity  it  enjoyed  for  a  short  time.  In  fact,  many  of  the  policies  occurring  in  the  First 
and  Second  Phases  restricted  a  number  of  other  possibilities  which  were  exploited  fully 
elsewhere  (e.  g.,  tourism.  financial  services,  philately.  private  sector  investments  etc.,  ) 
and  this  in  part,  explains  the  differences  in  economic  development  between  Zanzibar 
and  the  more  successful  SIS  facing  similar  constraints  (e.  g.  Maldives). 
The  Second  Phase  ended  with  the  abrupt  summoning  of  Sheikh  Aboud  Jumbe  in  January 
1984  to  Dodoma.  the  Capital  of  Tanzania  to  attend  a  special  session  of  the  National 
Executive  Committee  (NEC)  of  CCM.  Its  agenda  was  to  discuss  the  deteriorating  and 
precarious  political  developments  in  Zanzibar.  It  ended  with  the  forced  resignation  of 
Aboud  Jumbe  as  President  of  Zanzibar.  Chairman  of  the  Revolutionary  Council,  Vice- 
President  of  the  United  Republic  of  Tanzania  and  Vice-Chairman  of  CCM.  The  NEC 269 
proceeded  to  appoint  All  Hassan  Mwinyi  as  the  Interim  President  of  Zanzibar.  The 
appropriateness  of  this  appointment  made  by  a  body  on  the  Mainland  consisting  of 
persons  who  were  predominantly  non-Zanzibaris  has  been  questioned  (Othman  and 
Mlimuka,  1989a).  However,  All  Hassan  Mwinyi  was  formally  elected  in  the  1984 
Presidential  elections  and  this  process  set  Zanzibar  out  in  yet  another  direction,  this 
time  taking  a  bolder  approach  to  its  social.  economic  and  political  developments. 270 
9.0  The  Third  Phase,  Adjustment,  Recovery,  Liberalisation  and  Re- 
linkinQ  to  the  Global  Economy 
M  Introduction 
This  chapter  analyses  and  summarises  the  political  and  socio-economic  developments 
that  have  occurred  (and  are  still  evolving)  during  the  Third  Phase  (post-1984).  The 
economic  problems  and  constraints  affecting  the  Isles  that  culminated  with  a  Third 
Phase  of  the  Revolution  are  identified  and  explained.  The  Third  Phase  signals  a 
divergence  from  the  preceding  period  with  its  socio-economic  policies  and  results,  and  a 
general  movement  towards  a  greater  democratisation  of  political  decision  making.  Also 
important  is  the  continuing  debate  for  improved  exchange  between  the  developed  and 
developing  worlds.  This  is  happening  under  the  shadow  of  a  global  change  in  the  balance 
of  power  in  favour  of  the  so  called  free  world'  an  in  economic  terms  this  translates  into 
neo-liberalism.  Zanzibar  too  is  affected  and  thus  the  post-1984  period  has  seen  some 
major  changes  in  the  approaches  adopted  in  confronting  its  development  problems. 
Though  without  explicitly  stating  this,  it  appears  that  the  SIS  is  resigned  to  some  form  of 
dependency,  albeit  'a  negotiated  one'.  The  Third  Phase  is  distinct  from  the  others  in  the 
search  for  room  to  manoeuvre,  though  the  challenge  remains  how  to  move  towards 
interdependence  and  self-reliance. 
9.2  The  Third  Phase  government 
The  economic,  social.  political  and  cultural  developments  of  the  Second  Phase  of  the 
Revolution  climaxed  with  the  abrupt  removal  of  the  President  of  Zanzibar  in  1984. 
Insofar  as  political  developments  are  concerned,  the  unity  of  the  two  political  parties  in 
power  (TANU  and  ASP)  and  the  consolidation  of  the  Union  had  facilitated  direct 
intervention  in  the  political  developments  of  Zanzibar.  Intervention  was  facilitated  by 
the  gradual  reduction  and  transfer  of  some  decision  making  powers  from  the  Zanzibar 
government  to  the  Union  government  through  four  amendments  of  the  Union 
Constitution  between  1964  and  1977  (Shivji,  1990)  and  the  merger  of  TANU  and  ASP  to 
form  CCM  in  1977.  Zanzibar  continued  to  retain  considerable  autonomy.  and  internally 
the  government  and  Isles'  side  of  CCM  extended  the  system  of  representation  and 
participation  to  bolster  its  political  legitimacy. 
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Zanzibari  autonomy.  Proponents  of  a  stronger  and  closer  union  saw  autonomy  as  an 
obstacle  to  strengthening  the  Union.  While  'strengthening'  the  Union,  the  political 
leadership  of  Zanzibar  gained  an  increasing  say  in  Union  matters  although  at  the 
expense  of  its  own  autonomy.  '  During  the  first  phase,  a  high  degree  of  autonomy  had 
been  a  central  objective.  What  appears  to  be  an  obsession  with  autonomy  is  a  significant 
characteristic  of  many  island  communities  and  intrusions  are  rarely  entertained.  This 
is  demonstrated  by  the  number  of  times  the  Zanzibari  leadership  pursued  matters 
crucial  to  their  socio-economic  development  in  their  separate  ways  and  particularly 
during  the  first  phase. 
Between  the  end  of  1983  and  the  beginning  of  1984,  the  political  situation  in  Zanzibar 
had  become  tense  (Othman  and  Mlimuka,  1989:  60).  The  Party  (CCM)  solicited  the 
opinions  of  the  people  of  Zanzibar  regarding  the  1979  Constitutions  of  Zanzibar  and  the 
1977  Union  Constitution,  and  to  propose  amendments  if  there  was  need.  The  responses 
were  contrary  to  Party  expectations.  The  existence  and  purposes  of  the  Union  and  the 
role  of  CCM  itself  were  both  questioned.  People  were  allowed  to  air  their  views  freely  and 
the  results  shook  the  proponents  of  the  Union  and  threatened  the  status  quo  in 
Zanzibar.  2  Several  explanations  are  provided  for  such  reactions,  including  Aboud 
Jumbe's  increasing  nationalistic  stance.  Othman  and  Mlimuka  (1989:  61)  suggest  that 
most  of  the  ASP  members  wanted  the  Union,  but  a  few  leaders  (phase  one  protagonists) 
had  lost  their  prominence  and  powers  as  a  result  of  the  ASP-TAND  merger  and  this  was 
an  opportunity  to  work  against  the  recent  developments.  The  enactment  of  the  1979 
Zanzibar  Constitution  further  eroded  their  remaining  influences  and  privileges. 
The  greater  amalgamation  of  the  two  sides  enabled  the  National  Executive  Committee 
(NEC)  of  CCM  to  hold  a  special  session  in  January  1984  on  the  Mainland  that  took  the 
drastic  measure  of  forcing  the  resignation  of  the  President  of  Zanzibar,  who  was  also  the 
Vice-President  of  the  United  Republic  of  Tanzania  and  Vice-Chairman  of  the  Party.  This 
was  done  to  eliminate  threats  to  the  Union  and  establish  stability  in  the  Isles.  The 
process  of  'democratising'  the  Isles  had  begun  to  falter,  and  the  political  atmosphere  in 
the  Isles  had  become  'polluted'  with  wishes  to  break  the  Union  and  change  the  political 
system, 
The  same  CCM  National  Executive  Committee  session  nominated  an  interim  President 
from  it's  Zanzibar  members.  This  was  Mr.  Ally  Hassan  Mwinyi,  a  prominent  Zanzibari 
politician  who  had  once  served  in  the  Union  Cabinet.  He  was  later  (through  the  1984 
1  Shivji  (1990)  notes  that  despite  the  several  measures  aimed  at  transferring  powers  of  the  Zanzibar  Government  to 
the  Union  Government  and  the  justifications  forwarded  for  these  measure,  that  is  consolidating  the  Union  with 
the  objective  of  complete  fusion  and  eventually  creating  a  unitary  state,  nothing  of  the  kind  was  envisaged  in  the 
original  agreement.  through  the  1964  Acts  of  Union. 
2  This  period  is  referred  to  as  the  time  when  the  Islands'  "political  atmosphere  became  polluted".  This  generally 
implies  that  the  accepted  levels  of  tolerance  were  being  exceeded  and  the  security  of  the  state  was  being 
undermined.  Certain  elements  within  and  outwith  Zanzibar  were  taking  advantage  of  the  situation  and  fuelling 
dissent.  The  Islands  were  in  danger  of  falling  into  a  state  of  anarchy. 272 
Presidential  elections)  'confirmed'  by  the  electorate  through  the  One  Party  electoral 
system  already  operating  in  Zanzibar.  '  The  merger  of  the  political  parties  had  asserted 
its  authority  and  shown  that  it  had  a  considerable  degree  of  'supremacy  and  influence'  in 
the  political  aspects  of  the  Union. 
President  Mwinyi  inherited  a  government  and  an  economy  that  were  on  the  verge  of 
collapse.  the  socio-economic  situation  of  the  whole  country  having  deteriorated 
immensely.  His  coming  into  power  was  partly  as  a  result  of  the  deteriorating  socio- 
political  developments  in  the  Isles.  The  first  tasks  of  the  new  leadership  were  to  attempt 
to  salvage  the  economy  of  Zanzibar  and  in  the  process  also  gain  the  political  legitimacy 
and  the  confidence  of  the  people. 
The  Mainland  economy  was  also  in  a  poor  state,  undergoing  a  series  of  structural 
adjustment  and  economic  recovery  programmes  (ERPs).  Meanwhile  Zanzibar 
implemented  a  number  of  crises  austerity  measures  to  cope  with  the  situation  at  hand. 
Although  the  overall  development  problems  of  the  two  sides  in  the  Union  were  generally 
the  same.  the  choices  for  the  islands  were  limited  and  its  development  experiences  were 
different  from  those  of  the  Mainland.  There  lacked  an  awareness  that  a  slightly 
different  approach  would  be  required  in  confronting  Zanzibar's  development  problems. 
The  Union  government  too  was  in  serious  economic  difficulties  during  the  same  period. 
It  was  locked  in  discussion  with  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  extreme 
pressure  was  put  on  it  by  the  World  Bank.  the  IMF  and  donor  countries  to  restructure  its 
economy  and  readjust  its  development  objectives.  Initially  the  Mainland  was  not  in 
agreement  with  some  of  the  prescribed  austerity  measures  and  attempted  its  own 
internally  designed  measures.  However,  these  fell  far  short  of  those  prescribed  by  the 
IMF.  and  it  was  denied  access  to  funds  from  the  monetary  organisations.  Zanzibar  being 
part  of  the  Union,  is  automatically  subjected  to  the  same  conditions. 
The  Third  Phase  government  felt  that  it  had  little  option  but  to  restructure  its  economy 
and  embark  on  an  austerity  programme.  As  a  severely  underdeveloped  SIS  it  faced 
limitations  in  the  necessary  expertise  and  resources  to  design  and  implement  an  ERP. 
Assistance  was  solicited  from  developed  countries  and  multilateral  organisations  and 
by  1986  the  Economic  Recovery  Programme  (ERP)  had  begun.  2 
To  arrest  and  reverse  the  deteriorating  socio-economic  situation  the  Zanzibari 
government  embarked  on  a  set  of  unconventional  strategies.  First  there  was  the 
recognition  that  the  inherent  development  constraints  required  solutions  that  would  be 
1  Sheikh  Aboud  Jumbe  was  appointed  by  the  Special  Committee  of  the  Central  Committee  of  the  ASP  after  the 
assassination  of  Sheikh  Abeid  Karume.  In  1984  when  the  Presidential  seat  became  vacant  the  name  of  the 
candidate  was  decided  on  the  mainland  by  a  body  which  was  mainly  non-Zanzibari  (Othman  and  Mlimuka.  1989). 
2  The  funding  for  the  study  came  from  Western  countries,  the  'experts'  came  from  the  same  sources  too  and 
consequently  proposed  an  Economic  Recovery  Programme  quite  similar  to  what  was  generally  being  prescribed 
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quite  different  from  those  on  the  Mainland,  and  second,  in  view  of  the  severely  limited 
domestic  resources,  the  whole  process  would  be  dependent  on  external  assistance. 
It  Is  relevant  that  perhaps  for  the  first  time  there  was  a  formal  recognition  that  Zanzibar 
had  slightly  different  sets  of  problems  to  the  Mainland  which  would  require  a  different 
approach  and  special  consideration  when  dealing  with  them  (Government  of  Zanzibar, 
1986;  Government  of  Zanzibar.  1987a:  1987b;  1987c).  The  Third  Phase  government 
gradually  regained  the  confidence  of  the  people,  while  playing  on  the  economic  and 
security  advantages  the  Union  offered.  '  By  a  twist  of  political  ingenuity  and  political 
developments  on  the  Mainland  it  also  continued  to  assert  its  autonomy  and  make 
economic  and  social  gains  from  the  Union.  2  The  Union  was  to  take  on  a  more 
pronounced  dimension  so  that  It  could  not  remain  at  the  level  of  purely  political  and 
security  matters.  From  the  Zanzibari  side  it  was  determined  to  maximise  the  positive 
aspects  which  could  be  gained  from  the  Union.  Before  these  aspects  are  outlined,  an 
overview  of  the  macroeconomic  situation  of  Zanzibar  during  the  early  and  mid  1980s  is 
necessary. 
9.3  Overview  of  the  Macro-Economy  of  Zanzibar  in  the  19806 
By  1983  Zanzibar's  per  capita  income  was  about  US  $  170,  qualifying  it  as  one  of  the 
poorest  countries  in  the  world.  Per  capita  income  was  not  too  different  to  that  of  the 
Mainland.  By  1988  the  United  Republic  of  Tanzania  was  ranked  the  fourth  poorest 
country  in  the  world  (World  Bank  1990).  3  Comparing  the  basic  indicators  for  countries 
with  population  under  5  million,  statistics  for  Zanzibar  show  that  in  terms  of  per  capita 
income  alone  it  is  the  poorest  country  with  a  population  of  under  a  million.  However, 
compared  to  more  populated  or  larger  countries  its  position  is  about  as  poor  as 
Bangladesh  (World  Bank,  1990). 
From  the  'peak'  economic  conditions  of  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s  Zanzibar  has 
deteriorated  immensely.  Compared  to  a  selection  of  small  and  larger  LDCs,  its  position 
has  fallen  (Table  9.1).  On  the  whole  it  is  in  a  precarious  social  and  economic  situation. 
1  We  shall  continue  with  the  terminology  being  used  by  the  Party  leadership  in  identifying  the 
governments/regimes,  and  call  Mr.  Mwinyi's  government  the  Third  Phase  of  the  Union.  First,  because  in  the 
United  Republic  this  is  the  'standard'  terminology  and  therefore  is  understandable  there  and,  second,  it  coincides 
with  the  major  changes  and  approaches  in  the  Isles  contemporary  development  experiences  and  therefore 
distinguishes  clearly  between  the  different  stages. 
2  The  Union  government  established  a  Union  ERP  and  a  change  in  leadership  was  on  the  verge  of  taking  place 
with  President  Julius  Nyerere  about  to  step  down.  As  it  happened  the  Zanzibar  President,  Ally  Hassan  Mwinyi  was 
to  succeed  him. 
3  This  per  capita  income  is  the  average  of  the  two  sides  of  the  Union.  Prior  to  the  mid-1980s  the  per  capita  income 
of  Zanzibar  had  often  been  well  above  that  of  the  Mainland. 274 




annual  annual  We 
Population  Area  Dollars  growth  rate  of  expectancy  Adult  illiteracy 
('000)  ('000  1988  rate  (%)  inflation  at  Female  Total 
COUNTRY  mid-1988  Km  Sq.  )  1965-88  (%)  birth  1985  1985 
'6  5-W  '80-  8  8  (years) 
1.  Guinea-Bissau  940  36  190  -1.9  ..  49.0  40  83  69 
2.  Gambia  822  11  200  1.1  8.1  13.9  44  85  75 
3.  Equatorial  Guinea  336  28  410  ..  .... 
46  .. 
63 
4.  Maldives  202  (<500)  410  2.3  .. 
7.1  60  ....  5.  Guyana  799  215  420  -4.4  8.1  15.9  63  54 
6.  Comoros  442  2  440  0.6  .. 
5.8  56 
7.  Sao  Tome'  &  Princip6  119  1  490  -0.1  ..  18.1  65 
8  Solomon  Islands  303  29  630  .. 
7.7  13.1  64 
9.  Western  Samoa  159  3  640  ..  ..  10.5  66  ....  10.  Kiribati  67  1  650  ..  .. 
5.7  55 
11.  Cape  Verde  360  4  680  ..  .. 
8.9  65  61  53 
12.  Swaziland  735  17  810  2.2  9.1  11.4  56  34  32 
13.  Tonga  97  1  830  ..  .. 
66 
14.  Vanuatu  147  12  840  ..  .. 
4.3  64 
15.  St.  Vincent  &  Grenadines  112  (<500)  1200  2.0  10.9  4.3  70 
1  16.  Zanzibar  600  2  170  -2.4  .. 
28.3  55  4 
17  Mainland  Tanzania  24.1  881  160  -0.5  9.9  25.7  53 
"  for  1976-1988 
Source:  World  Bank  (1990),  JMT  (1988),  JMT  (1989) 
Table  9.1  Basic  indicators  of  development  for  selected  small  countries  (plus 
Mainland  Tanzania). 
In  contrast  to  Zanzibar's  position.  Lowenthal  (1987:  33)  observes  that:  "Few  small  states 
are  found  among  the  world's  poorest  countries.  Most  of  them  enjoy  levels  of  living 
substantially  above  those  of  larger  Third  World  states  ....  In  sum,  small  states  account  for 
half  the  global  total  but  only  one-fourth  of  the  least  prosperous  moiety".  He  also 
concludes  generally  that  in  view  of  their  small  size,  they  might  be  expected  to  experience 
extremes  of  destitution  but  this  is  not  so.  The  concomitants  of  persistent  poverty  that 
afflict  larger  developing  countries  are  not  to  be  found  in  most  small  states.  However, 
Zanzibar  (and  the  Comoros)  appear  to  be  amongst  the  exceptions  to  the  rule.  This  is  the 
first  of  a  number  of  indicators  which  show  it  was  facing  serious  problems,  a  reflection  of 
the  position  that  it  occupies  in  the  global  economy,  and  of  the  structural  dislocation  of 
its  economy. 
Prior  to  the  1970s,  Zanzibar  enjoyed  a  higher  per  capita  income  level  compared  to  the 
Mainland  (Figures  9.1  and  Table  9.1).  By  1975/76  a  relatively  sharp  downward 
movement  has  occurred  in  Zanzibar  with  Per  capita  incomes  falling  by  half  in  eight 
years.  Subsequently  there  have  occurred  wild  fluctuations,  reflecting  the  erratic 
production  and  exports  of  cloves  and  other  structural  problems  within  the  economy. 275 
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Figure  9.1  Per  Capita  Incomes,  Zanzibar  and  the  Mainland 
(1976-1987) 
Amongst  others  factors,  the  plunge  in  Zanzibar's  per  capita  income  between  1976  and 
1980  is  attributable  to  three  factors.  First,  is  the  drastic  fall  in  the  demand  for  its 
principal  primary  export,  cloves  and  related  to  this  is  a  concomitant  decline  of  clove 
prices  in  the  world  market.  Also  related  to  the  previous  two,  is  the  decline  in  production 
trends  of  the  crop.  The  average  production  level  was  about  20,000  tons  per  annum  in  the 
1960s,  falling  to  an  average  of  12,000  tons  per  annum  in  the  1970s  and  the  current 
average  level  stands  at  about  7,000  tons  per  annum.  Second  are  the  effects  of  the 
devaluation  of  the  Tanzania  Shilling  over  the  same  period  which  has  seriously  affected 
the  costs  of  imported  goods  including  agricultural  and  manufacturing  inputs  and  did  not 
help  with  clove  exports  since  both  demand  and  prices  were  falling  in  the  world  market 
anyway  and,  fifth,  is  the  rapid  population  growth  rate  which  increased  at  an  average  of 
3.0%  per  annum  over  this  period. 
Because  of  their  relatively  small  population  and  resources  to  population  ratios,  the 
narrow  range  of  economic  activities  and  higher  per  capita  aid  flows,  it  is  common  for 
the  majority  of  SS  and  SIS  to  exhibit  higher  per  capita  income  levels  (Lowenthal,  1987). 
This  did  not  apply  to  Zanzibar,  that  is  until  quite  recently.  Even  when  comparing  with 
the  Mainland  it  can  be  seen  that  in  the  1970s  per  capita  incomes  were  considerably 
higher  for  the  Isles  (Figure  9.1).  However,  by  the  1980s  they  were  similar,  and  Zanzibar 
has  had  to  confront  this  reality  by  calling  for  significant  external  assistance.  By 
1989/90,  the  government  was  forced  to  call  for  an  international  donor's  meeting  to 
attract  funding  for  its  development  programmes. 276 
YEAR 
(Million  T 
GDP  at  factor  cost 
.  s.  ) 
Growth  rates 
(%chang¬) 
Per  Capita  Income 
(at  1976  prices) 
Percentage  Change 
(at  1976  prices) 
Exchange  rates 
(Us$) 
1976  978.8  -  2,240  8.4  -  1977  946.4  -3.4  2,110  -5.8  8.0 
1978  784.8  -17.0  1,040  -50.7  7.7 
1979  632.4  -19.4  1,290  +24.0  8.3 
1980  623.2  -1.5  1,240  -3.9  8.2 
1981  677.3  +8.7  1,313  +5.9  8.3 
1982  783.9  +15.7  1,479  +12.6  9.3 
1983  688.5  -12.7  1,229  -16.9  11.3 
1984  685.0  +2.5  1,225  -0.3  15.5 
1985  726.4  +6.0  1,238  +1.1  17.4 
1986  748.5  -3.0  1,271  +2.7  34.2 
1987  773.7  +3.4  1,279  +0.6  85.1  * 
1988  783.4  +1.3  1,222  -4.5  124.5* 
'  Compiled  from  figures  obtained  from  GoZ  (1990) 
Source:  GoZ  (1981,1984,1986a,  19880;  JMT  (1989)  GoZ  (  1989c,  1990a). 
Table  9.2  Trends  in  GDP  In  constant  (1978)  prices,  Zanzibar 
(1976-88) 
Taking  1976  as  the  base  year  and  comparing  trends  in  population  growth.  GDP  and  per 
capita  incomes,  a  persistent  downward  trend  of  the  economy  of  the  Isles  is  clearly 
defined  (Figure  9.2).  These  trends  highlight  the  economic  vulnerability  and  dependent 
nature  of  Zanzibar.  Population  growth  rates  (Isles  3.00/6  per  annum.  1978-1988)  have 
increased  at  a  faster  rate  than  in  the  Mainland  (2.7%  per  annum.  1978-1988)  thus 
affecting  per  capita  income  levels  and  increasing  demands  on  diminishing  government 
revenues.  Between  1981/82  and  1985/86  government  revenues  fell  by  52%  in  real  terms, 
attributed  to  by  a  parallel  decline  in  cloves  revenues.  Over  the  same  period  revenues 
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1976-1987  (1976=100) 
Sales  tax  and  customs  duties  have  increasingly  become  important  sources  of  revenue, 
yielding  64%  of  domestic  government  revenues  in  1986/87.  Levies  from  State 
Corporations  declined  as  their  importance  and  performance  also  fell,  yielding  a  mere 
13%  in  1986/87.  Real  recurrent  expenditure  also  declined,  though  at  a  more  gradual  rate, 
to  a  level  20%  lower  in  1986/87  than  in  1981/82.  Consequently  government 
contributions  to  development  expenditure  have  suffered,  declining  by  44%  in  real  terms 
over  five  years  from  1981/82. 
In  summary  the  overall  macroeconomic  sector  and  public  sector  borrowing  depicts  the 
following  symptoms; 
"  Government  revenues  have  dropped  more  rapidly  then  expenditure; 
"  The  government's  contribution  towards  meeting  development  expenditure  has 
also  declined  affecting  the  capacity  of  the  state:  in  1982/83  it  financed  74%  of  the 
development  budget  and  by  1985/85  it  stood  at  49%,  and  had  the  government  paid 
its  full  contributions  to  the  Union  Budget,  this  figure  would  have  been  still  lower. 
By  1992  it  contribution  was  around  12%. 
"  Although  foreign  borrowing  has  generally  been  low  as  a  result  of  cautious 
borrowing  practices.  the  government  has  borrowed  heavily  from  the  Central  Bank 
(Bank  of  Tanzania).  In  1986/87  its  budgeted  repayment  to  creditors  was  T.  Shs. 
459  million  which  exceeded  its  total  exports  of  T.  Shs  400  million.  That  year  it 
only  managed  to  pay  less  than  50%  of  the  amount  it  aimed  to  pay, 
"  Parastatal  Corporations  generated  debts  of  about  T.  Shs  1,000  million  thus  further 
exacerbating  the  crippling  situation. 
The  above  are  symptomatic  of  an  economy  requiring  major  policy  changes,  and  large 
injections  of  external  resources  simply  to  halt  the  decline.  Zanzibar  is  lacking  the 
capacity  to  generate  resources  for  both  recurrent  and  development  expenditures  and  the 
principles  of  self-reliance  needed  to  be  revised  or  shelved. 278 
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Figure  9.3  Per  Capita  Incomes,  Zanzibar  and  Mainland  Tanzania  (1976-1987) 
(1976=100) 
One  of  the  problems  Is  that  despite  all  the  rhetoric  about  self-reliance  and  achieving  an 
economic  revolution  (Khamis.  1972)  the  Isles'  basic  economic  structures  have  remained 
essentially  the  same  since  1964  with  agriculture  being  the  dominant  sector  providing 
some  of  its  food  needs,  revenue  and  employment.  By  the  mid-1970s  overall  economic 
performance  was  falling,  while  population  growth  has  increased  at  a  steady  pace  (Figure 
and  Table  9.2),  such  that  In  the  decade  between  1976  and  1986  GDP  declined  by  about  25% 
in  real  terms.  In  response  to  this,  there  has  been  a  declining  trend  in  real  investment. 
while  imports  increased  at  a  faster  rate  than  exports,  contributing  to  a  steady 
deterioration  in  the  balance  of  trade  with  foreign  exchange  reserves  falling  from  US  $  39 
million  in  1980  to  around  US  $  26  million  in  1985/86.  The  impact  of  this  on  the 
population  was  profound.  Consumer  prices  increased  at  an  annual  compound  rate  of 
26%  between  1980  and  1986  while  real  wages  declined  to  levels  which  by  1985  were  53% 
of  their  1980  value  (GoZ:  1986b.  1987b.  1989c). 
With  the  slowing  down  of  economic  activity  and  declining  terms  of  trade,  employment 
was  affected.  As  is  the  case  in  such  SIS,  the  government  meanwhile  continued  to  employ 
and  the  number  of  registered  employees  in  the  formal  sector  increased  by  only  6%  in 
seven  years  (which  is  quite  low  compared  to  previous  years).  It  is  interesting  to  note  that 
in  1986  about  95%  of  these  were  in  the  public  sector  (GoZ,  1986b,  1986b)  !  Paradoxically, 
given  the  state  of  the  economy  it  is  expected  that  employment  would  at  least  be  frozen. 
whereas  this  actually  increased!  However,  as  discussed  in  the  literature  review,  this 
conforms  to  a  phenomena  commonly  found  in  many  SIS  with  the  public  sector 279 
providing  employment  especially  at  a  time  when  other  sectors  are  unable  to  do  so. 
Curbing  employment  anywhere  is  often  a  politically  difficult  task,  but  in  SIS  it  is  even 
more  so  given  the  limited  alternatives  and  the  effects  of  personalism,  particularism, 
patronage.  and  expectations  from  the  community, 
The  poor  economic  situation  is  attributed  to  both  external  and  internal  causes.  The 
main  external  cause  is  that  there  has  been  an  increased  supply  and  demand  for  cloves  in 
the  world  market  has  remained  static.  Indonesia.  the  major  importer  of  cloves,  had 
become  a  major  producer  in  its  own  right  in  an  effort  to  reduce  importation  of  the  spice. 
Meanwhile  other  countries  such  a  Madagascar,  Mauritius,  Comoros  and  Brazil  were  also 
producing  significant  amounts  of  the  crop  thus  bringing  the  world  market  prices  yet 
further  down.  In  1980  cloves  fetched  US  $  9.000  per  ton  and  by  1989  this  was  US  $  1,700. 
There  are  several  other  major  internal  causes  that  are  more  to  do  with  socio-economic 
policies  that  had  been  pursued  since  the  revolution  and  other  factors  which  contributed 
to  the  poor  economic  performance  (Tables  9.2  and  9.3).  These  have  been  identified  by 
various  sources  (GoZ,  1986;  GoZ.  1986,1987)  as; 
"  declining  government  revenues  in  the  face  of  a  rapidly  rising  population,  and 
population  growth  outstripping  food  production: 
0  an  ideologically  rigid  economic  structure  which  discouraged  trade  and  private 
initiatives,  concentrating  activity  in  an  inefficient  public  sector.  failing  to 
diversify  and  remaining  a  primary  commodity  producer; 
9  the  arbitrary  allocation  of  foreign  exchange  by  government,  without  priorities 
thus  denying  potentially  productive  sectors: 
"a  pricing  structure  which  has  favoured  consumption  of  imported  commodities, 
especially  food  (rice)  at  the  expense  of  investment  and  production,  thus  failing  to 
reflect  the  true  costs  of  goods  in  the  economy,  (food  dependency) 
0  an  inadequate  system  of  project  selection,  prioritisation  and  evaluation  and 
distribution  of  scarce  resources  (funds),  and; 
"  an  acute  shortage  of  trained  and  skilled  personnel  to  manage  development 
programmes  and  projects. 280 
The  economic  outlook  for  the  1980s  held  little,  if  any.  prospects  for  improvement.  A 
further  real  decline  in  government  revenues  was  envisaged  and  occurred.  There  was  a 
severe  shortage  of  foreign  exchange  for  production  and  the  provision  of  basic  needs 
(including  food  and  medical  imports)  and  a  further  decline  in  real  GDP  continued 
unabated  (Table  9.3). 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
GDP  at  factor  cost  1384  1729  2229  2362  2920  3499  4136  4688  6877 
(Million  T.  Shs.  ) 
Constants  623.2  677.3  783.9  688.5  685.0  726.4  746.5  773.7  783.4 
Growth  rates  -1.5  +8.7  +15.7  -12.7  +2.5  +6.0  -3.0  +3.4  +1.3 
(%  Change) 
(Million  T.  Shs.  ) 
Exports  635  517  498  283  247  687  563  514  1344.8 
(Million  T.  Shs.  ) 
Imports  622  684  685  605  640  936  1514  2009  2896.2 
(Million  T.  Shs.  ) 
Visible  Balance  of  Trade  +13  -167  -187  -323  -392  -249  -952  -1495  1551.4 
(Million  T.  Shs.  ) 
Inflation  (CPI  in  %)"  23.0  29.0  18.5  32.1  39.0 
Real  Growth  (in  %)  -12.0  -4.0  +7.4  +3.2  -0.5 
Consumer  Price  Index  159.3  199.3  254.6  292.7  399.5  628.3  843.2 
Change  in  CPI  (%)  25.1  27.7  15.0  36.5  57.3  34.2 
Source:  Department  of  Statistics.  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Planning. 
"  CPI  =  Consumer  Price  Index. 
able  9.3  Gross  Domestic  Product,  Exports,  Imports.  Balance  of  Trade.  Inflation,  and 
Consumer  Price  Index  (1980-1988) 
The  population  suffered  undue  hardships,  shortages  of  basic  needs  such  as  medicines, 
transport  difficulties,  constraints  in  food,  energy  and  water  supplies.  It  was  arduous  for 
the  government  to  sustain  food  imports  at  existing  levels,  particularly  of  rice  (Figure  9.3 
and  Table  9.4)  while  continuing  with  high  public  expenditure. 
Urgent  responses  were  required  in  the  face  of  mounting  concern  about  the  deteriorating 
situation  and  general  dissatisfaction.  Not  surprisingly.  subversive  and  dissident 
activities  fuelled  by  the  precarious  economic  situation  and  exploiting  historic  tensions 
within  the  fabric  of  Zanzibari  society  were  taking  place.  Meanwhile  class 
differentiation  continues  to  exist,  while  spatial  disparities  as  represented  by  growing 
rural-urban  and  inter-island  differentiation  and  social  injustice. 281 
Food  Type  Tons  Value  (in  US$) 
Rice  40000  14600000 
Wheat  Flour  18000  6300000 
Sugar  12000  3600000 
Total  70000  24500000 
Source:  GoZ  (1988a,  1988c) 
Table  9.4  Annual  food  requirements  1988-1986 
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A  new  element  in  these  developments  is  the  revival  of  religious  sentiment  in  an  era  in 
which  there  has  been  a  global  revival  in  Islam.  Although  usually  more  a  means  of 
support  for  the  state,  in  recent  years  it  has  also  appeared  as  the  source  for  collectively 
expressed  dissent.  1  For  example,  The  Daily  News  of  Thursday.  September  1.1988:  3 
reported  the  May  13  riots  in  which  clashes  between  security  forces  and  an  unlawful 
procession  left  two  dead  and  several  injured.  Two  young  Moslems  had  incited 
worshippers  at  the  Forodhani  Mosque  through  preaching  and  distributing  of  leaflets. 
One  of  pair  is  said  to  have  taken  the  floor  at  the  Mosque  and  challenged  fellow  believers 
to  mount  a  Holy  War  (Jihad)  against  the  non-Moslem.  Everyone  at  the  Mosque  was 
moved  by  the  fiery  speech...  and  that  the  young  Moslems  began  chanting  Allah  Akber...  " 
I  While  this  may  have  something  to  do  with  spiritual  awakening,  it  also  is  part  and  parcel  of  the  struggle  for 
greater  equality,  justice  and  self-preservation  in  society.  In  recent  years  Islam  is  seen  by  many  as  an  alternative 
to  failed  and  frustrating  attempts  aimed  at  development  by  various  governments.  Notable  examples  include  the 
rise  of  Islamic  Fundamentalism  in  Egypt,  Tunisia,  and  Northern  Africa  in  general,  the  Middle  East  and  Asia.  It  is  a 
manifestation  of  social  conflict  within  society  at  different  levels  and  in  the  light  of  current  economic  and  social 
antagonism  it  is  certainly  encroaching  in  various  parts  of  Africa.  However,  the  danger  remains  that  such 
expression  can  often  be  easily  manipulated  by  various  interest  groups,  internal  or  external,  rendering  the  SIS 
more  vulnerable. 282 
(op.  cit.  ).  Events  leading  to  that  day  were  based  on  a  demonstration  against  a  statement 
made  by  a  leader  of  the  Women's  Organisation  of  Tanzania  (Umoja  wa  Wanawake) 
against  polygamy  and  was  interpreted  by  the  demonstrators  as  interference  (from  the 
Mainland)  in  Zanzibari  and  religious  affairs. 
In  such  situations  conflict  is  both  religious  and  cultural,  it  is  necessary  to  be  able  to 
distinguish  what  they  both  are.  There  is  certainly  some  interrelationship  between  the 
erosion  of  socio-economic  achievements  and  the  level  of  disenchantment  and 
frustration  by  some  sections  of  Zanzibari  society.  1  Such  actions  are  easily  initiated  and 
inflamed  during  adverse  economic  situations  and  for  SIS  these  are  often  the  main 
sources  of  covert  destabilisation.  The  experiences  of  Zanzibar  are  not  unique  as 
Espindola  (1987:  67)  points  out:  'Small  states  are  particularly  vulnerable  to  subversion, 
especially  when  local  activists  have  external  support  ...  Even  if  an  attempt  at  subversion 
does  not  meet  with  outright  success,  an  occasional  outburst  of  terrorism  suffices  to 
wreck  a  small  state's  economy,  scaring  away  tourists  and  foreign  firms.  " 
Zanzibar  has  been  facing  such  a  situation  during  the  early  1980s  during  which  times  it  is 
difficult  to  undertake  drastic  social  and  economic  reforms,  especially  those 
implementing  stringent  austerity  measures  such  as  the  removal  of  subsidies,  the 
curtailment  of  certain  'traditional  imports'.  the  decontrol  of  basic  consumer  good  prices 
and  currency  devaluation.  Moreover  the  'subsistence  safety  net'  was  being  eroded 
making  large  sections  of  the  population  vulnerable  to  additional  if  not  absolute  poverty. 
For  those  in  power  it  would  be  practically  political  suicide  to  take  introduce  reforms 
aimed  at  establishing  a  multi-party  democratic  system?  Even  within  the  ruling  party 
there  were  serious  rifts  concerning  such  matters  and  it  is  believed  that  this  has  partly 
contributed  to  the  removal  of  a  Chief  Minister  and  other  ranking  party  officials.  3 
9.4  State  of  the  Union  and  the  changing  political  dimension 
By  the  beginning  of  the  Third  Phase  the  Union  between  Zanzibar  and  the  Mainland  had 
been  'enhanced'.  It  had  developed  in  a  series  of  stages  and  steps  through  a  number  of 
amendments  in  the  original  Acts  of  Union  (1964)  .  the  introduction  of  new  Constitutions 
In  Zanzibar  and  the  United  Republic,  and  through  the  merger  of  the  sole  political  parties 
In  the  two  countries. 
1  Graffiti  appeared  on  walls  in  the  streets  of  Stone  Town  stating  'Police  go  home.  '  Presumably  this  referred  to 
occasional  reinforcements  drafted  in  from  the  mainland  in  times  of  political  tension. 
2  Recent  evidence  from  elsewhere  in  the  world,  especially  in  Eastern  Europe  and  parts  of  Africa  (Zambia)  have 
shown  that  the  people  tend  to  elect  the  opposition,  even  if  the  vote  is  only  for  changes  sake. 
3  The  arrest  and  removal  of  the  Chief  Minister  is  a  equivocal  issue.  Officially  it  is  said  to  be  due  to  malpractice  in 
the  running  of  government  business,  other  reasons  mentioned  include  the  pursuing  of  conflicting  policies  and 
personal  political  aspirations.  Conflicting  versions  appear  in  different  publications  and  from  other  sources, 
what  is  relevant  here  is  that  this  occurred  during  the  height  of  the  difficult  social,  economic  and  political  period. 283 
A  gradual  but  firm  transfer  of  power  from  Zanzibar  to  the  Union  took  place.  On  the 
political  side.  the  merger  of  the  political  parties  meant  that  there  now  existed  only  a 
single  political  party  acting  In  the  interests  of  the  United  Republic  of  Tanzania. 
According  to  Shivji  (1990)  the  legal  foundations  of  the  Union  are  to  be  found  within  'the 
four  walls'  of  the  Acts  of  Union  which  ratified  and  approved  the  treaty  called  the  Articles 
of  Union  (op.  cit:  90).  He  points  out  that  despite  the  amendments  made  to  'enhance'  the 
Union,  which  at  the  same  time  effectively  reduced  the  autonomy  of  Zanzibar,  the 
authorities  in  the  Isles  did  not  always  abide  by  them  (Shivji,  1990:  66).  For  example, 
Zanzibar  continued  to  enjoy  some  autonomy  through  maintaining  its  own  foreign 
exchange  accounts.  conducting  external  trade,  having  its  own  state  bank,  and  entering 
into  bilateral  loan  agreements  with  foreign  states  (Fimbo,  u.  d.;  Kabudi,  1983).  1 
Moreover  it  has  consistently  refused  to  implement  its  financial  'obligations'  arising 
from  some  of  the  amendments  made  to  the  Acts  of  Union  (Fimbo,  u.  d.  ).  Shivji  (1990) 
questions  the  constitutional  validity  of  the  amendments  anyway,  stating  that  the  basic 
scheme  and  essential  features  of  the  Union  had  been  mapped  out  in  the  Articles  of  Union 
and  that  the  scheme  was  implicitly  immutable  i.  e.,  any  additions  to,  or  subtle 
alterations  of,  the  reserved  list  on  Union  Matters  effectively  erodes  the  very  core  of  those 
foundations  (Shivji,  1990:  90-91). 
Since  1965  there  have  been  several  amendments  to  the  Act  of  Union  which  forms  the 
basis  of  the  original  understanding  and  agreement  between  the  people  of  the  two 
countries.  It  is  these  changes  that  have  been  the  sources  of  numerous  misunderstandings 
and  tensions.  Shivji  touches  on  the  root  problem  of  the  Union  in  stating  that  "The 
danger  to  the  Union  comes  from  politically  unwise  and  legally  unjustifiable  departures 
from  those  provisions"  (op.  cit  :  91). 
Clearly  from  the  legal  stand  point  of  the  Union  the  claim  made  by  some  Party 
proponents  that  the  Union  is  a  Unitary  Constitution,  and  that  the  United  Republic  is  a 
Unitary  State.  does  not  stand.  2  In  practice,  the  relationship  has  been  based  on  a  federal 
model  and  proven  several  times  through  the  independent  actions  of  various 
administrations  of  the  Zanzibari  Government,  a  point  which  is  also  noted  by  Kabudi 
(1986),  Fimbo  (u.  d)  and  Shivji  (1990). 
Zanzibar  is  effectively  a  partner  in  a  federal  union  with  a  considerable  degree  of 
autonomy  regarding  its  own  development.  However,  the  situation  has  been  complicated 
1  One  of  the  many  interesting  and  controversial  aspects  of  the  Union  is  the  fact  that  although  in  1965  currency, 
coinage  and  legal  tender,  banks  and  banking,;  foreign  exchange  and  foreign  exchange  control  were  added  to  the 
list  of  Union  matters,  and  this  was  signed  by  Karume  who  is  known  to  have  been  an  ardent  and  vociferous 
2 
opponent  of  merging  the  Isles'  foreign  exchange  in  the  Union,  in  practice  Zanzibar  reneged  on  this  matter. 
Shivji  (1990)  refers  to  a  party  ideologue.  Mr.  P.  Msekwa  who  mentions  in  his  writings  that  the  Union  of 
Tanganyika  and  Zanzibar  can  be  compared  to  the  case  of  Northern  Ireland,  and  consequently  implies  that  it  is 
based  on  a  Unitary  Constitution.  Shivji  points  out  that  this  is  an  erroneous  understanding  which  is  by  law 
grossly  inaccurate  and  politically  offensive  to  Zanzibari  sentiments  (op.  cit.:  39). 284 
by  legal  amendments  and  the  changing  politics  of  central-island  relationships.  The 
interventions  which  were  to  lead  to  reduced  autonomy  arose  out  of  conflicting  political 
interests  emanating  between  the  two  partners.  But  these  at  times  have  conflicted  with 
matters  central  to  the  economic  viability  of  the  Isles  and  have  been  influenced  by  an 
institution  which  is  less  sensitive  to  the  special  considerations  of  a  small  island  state. 
An  equal  share  of  the  blame  lies  with  the  authorities  in  the  Isles,  who  have  failed  to 
appreciate  the  precarious  position  of  island  economies.  Some  Union  matters  still  fall 
within  'grey  areas'  (i.  e.  are  neither  the  exclusive  reserve  of  the  Union  or  the  Isles 
governments).  One  example  of  this  has  been  the  procedure  for  requesting  foreign 
assistance.  Although  Zanzibar  has  on  several  occasions  acted  independently  on  related 
matters.  its  position  regarding  development  assistance  which  has  been  donated  to  the 
United  Republic  of  Tanzania  has  been  unclear.  The  general  feeling  in  the  Isles  is  one  of 
losing  out'  for  some  time  on  this  matter.  For  example,  in  The  Daily  News  of  May  18, 
1991:  1.  one  citizen  voiced  his  concern  about  the  differential  rates  of  progress  in  social 
services  and  manufacturing  sectors  In  favour  of  the  Mainland  "while  Zanzibar's 
economic  position  was  stagnating.  "  and  that  to  him,  this  was  an  Indication  that  a  large 
proportion  of  development  aid  given  to  Tanzania  Is  hijacked  by  the  Union 
government.  " 
To  a  degree  this  reflects  a  lack  of  awareness  of  the  political  division  of  labour,  in  that 
developments  in  the  economic  and  social  development  of  the  Isles  are  the  express 
concern  of  the  Zanzibari  Government.  However,  external  affairs,  including  external 
trade  and  borrowing,  all  of  which  are  linked  to  the  question  of  development  aid,  are 
Union  matters.  In  striving  for  economic  development  and  in  expressing  its  political 
autonomy,  especially  during  the  First  Phase,  Zanzibar  established  its  own  sources  of 
external  funding  and  conducted  some  of  its  international  affairs  unilaterally.  In  the 
interest  of  preserving  the  Union  overall,  such  acts  went  unheeded  by  the  Union 
government.  Compared  to  the  Mainland,  the  Isles  economy  had  been  fairly  buoyant 
(until  the  mid-1970s)  and  prevailing  aspirations  for  self-reliance  entailed  policies  and 
strategies  quite  different  from  those  pursued  in  the  Mainland,  which  was  consistently 
suffering  from  the  barrages  of  falling  commodity  prices,  and  other  endogenous  and 
exogenous  factors.  From  the  mid-1970s  through  to  the  1990s  the  reality  of  economic 
vulnerability  rocked  the  Isles  economy  profoundly. 
Moreover.  as  discussed  in  an  earlier  chapter,  the  basis  for  creating  the  Union  may  not  be 
as  important  in  the  post-1980s  as  they  were  in  the  1960s.  The  Union  exists  and  in  the 
light  of  the  limited  options  available  to  the  Isles  and  in  the  search  for  'room  to 
manoeuvre'.  a  shift  in  priorities  from  the  purely  political/security  consideration  to 
economic  ones  appear  appropriate  and  timely. 
It  appears  that  the  security  and  'cold  war'  tensions  focusing  around  the  Indian  Ocean 285 
have  waned.  The  1980s  witnessed  the  break-up  of  the  Soviet  Bloc  and  the  Soviet  Union 
and  this  manifests  itself  In  a  reduction  of  hostilities  between  the  various  paws  in  the 
global  chess  game.  However.  the  risk  to  SIS  remains  In  other  forms,  as  the  cases  of 
Seychelles.  Comoros,  and  Grenada  exemplify,  and  Zanzibar  Is  not  Immune  from  this. 
There  are  interested  groups  from  within  and  outwith  the  Isles  desperately  wanting  to 
seize  political  and  economic  power,  moreover  prevailing  evidence  from  around  the  globe 
reveal  disturbing  trends  of  increasing  and  devastating  ethnic  conflicts  and  regional 
powers  striving  to  fill  in  gaps  left  by  superpowers.  Contrary  to  initial  expectations  the 
post-Glasnost  era  has  seen  an  unprecedented  increase  in  wars  and  upheavals  around  the 
globe  and  SS  and  SIS  are  perhaps  now  even  more  vulnerable  to  destabilisation  and 
control  by  small  dissident  groups.  criminal  elements  and  even  some  MNCs  and  TNCs 
with  dubious  interests. 
Espindola  (1987)  highlights  the  vulnerability  of  small  island  states  to  attacks  by 
exogenous  irregular  forces,  whether  they  are  exiles,  mercenaries,  or  mere  adventurers. 
Interest  is  no  longer  only  on  those  countries  with  strategic  value  because  of  their  natural 
resources  or  geographical  position.  Internal  and  external  interests  may  cooperate  to 
gain  political  power.  Both  covert  and  overt  low-cost  operations  are  common,  and  used  to 
destabilise  a  country  or  effect  a  change  in  its  affiliation  even  if  the  country  is  of  little 
strategic  value  (Espindola,  1987). 
Events  occurring  in  Pemba  and  reports  emanating  from  Zanzibar  suggest  that  such 
threats  are  not  empty  ones.  For  example,  The  Sunday  News  of  August  7,1988:  7.  reports 
that  the  Zanzibar  Chief  Minister,  Dr.  All  Omar  Juma  said  that  "a11  moves  to  lure 
Zanzibaris  from  their  belief  in  national  unity  and  common  understanding  by  some 
Zanzibaris  living  in  foreign  countries,  were  futile.  "  The  Chief  Minister  was  referring  to 
the  periodic  threats  and  aggravation  that  Zanzibar  experiences  from  antagonists 
attempting  to  destabilise  and  change  the  government  and  political  system  by  coercion. 
This  is  supported  by  the  fact  that  the  Party  has  consistently  been  attempting  to  placate 
its  citizens  and  much  of  these  efforts  have  been  concentrated  in  the  island  of  Pemba  and 
is  evidenced  by  frequent  visits  by  high  ranking  party  officials  to  the  island.  However, 
the  existence  of  a  Union  defence  force  is  a  significant  deterrence  and  provides 
considerable  support  for  the  status  quo.  1 
In  1988,  the  Deputy  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  for  Defence  and  National  Service  is 
quoted  as  saying  that  the  speech  by  the  Chairman  of  the  Revolutionary  Council  and 
President  of  Zanzibar....  in  which  he  reminded  people  that  the  defence  of  Zanzibar  was 
inseparable  from  that  of  the  Mainland  should  be  taken  seriously.  If  anything  befalls 
Zanzibar  it  would  affect  the  whole  of  Tanzania.  `  (The  Daily  News,  August  12,1988:  1). 
1  In  the  other  extreme  it  could  also  be  argued  that  the  same  force  is  also  enough  to  deter  the  status  quo  to  attempt  a 
break  from  the  Union.  A  kind  of  a  carrot  and  stick  arrangement.  However,  the  validity  of  such  a  view  can  be 
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We  can  judge  from  this  that  the  issue  of  national  security  is  a  delicate  one.  whether  it  is 
for  national  interests  per  se  or  for  the  preservation  of  the  status  quo.  It  is  not  an  empty 
threat  to  dissidents  in  that  they  would  have  to  consider  taking  on  a  much  larger  force  in 
their  ambitions.  The  case  of  the  security  arrangements  between  the  Gambia  and  Senegal 
provides  a  similar  precedent  of  a  security  pact  between  a  vulnerable,  small  and  a  larger 
developing  county,  the  difference  being  the  absence  of  a  political  union  and  a  weak 
economic  union. 
More  recently.  the  Business  TYmes  (January  13.1989:  1)  reported  that  Zanzibar  marked 
the  Silver  Anniversary  of  the  Revolution  with  its  economy  dilapidated  and  a  'polluted' 
political  atmosphere  amidst  tight  security.  Apart  from  the  depressed  economic  and 
social  conditions.  this  was  also  in  reference  to  threats  of  secession  at  two  levels;  the  first 
from  the  Mainland  and  the  second,  between  the  twin  islands  of  Unguja  and  Pemba.  In 
the  same  report  President  Idris  Abdul  Wakil  addressed  the  people  saying,  "Let  us 
consolidate  the  unity  between  the  people  of  Pemba  and  Unguja,  let  us  strengthen  the 
Union  of  Zanzibar  and  Tanzania  mainland"  (op.  cit).  again  referring  to  the  two  main 
areas  which  had  experienced  a  number  of  problems  in  recent  times.  In  essence  then,  it 
would  appear  that  the  leadership  is  admitting  that  there  is  a  threat  to  the  Union  besides 
another  one  of  threatening  to  divide  the  two  islands. 
Security  wise,  Zanzibar  has  at  its  disposal  the  Union  defence  forces  which  are  enough  to 
deter  most  from  mounting  an  incursion.  These  arrangements  are  responsible  for  a 
considerable  degree  of  stability  in  the  Isles,  particularly  as  a  deterrence  and  only  a  small 
proportion  of  its  resources  are  expended  in  defence  and  security  matters  largely  through 
'economies  of  scale'.  It  contributes  to  creating  the  necessary  stability  required  to  pursue 
development  objectives  with  a  minimal  security  threat. 
Security  and  stability  are  important  for  the  current  stage  of  Zanzibar's  socio-economic 
development.  The  government'  continues  to  seek  external  assistance  and  closer  co- 
operation  with  the  Mainland  in  economic  affairs.  Structural  adjustment  and  economic 
recovery  programmes  are  a  precondition  of  obtaining  external  assistance  despite  the 
knowledge  that  austerity  measures  often  provoke  considerable  social  unrest.  To 
implement  such  programmes,  the  government  require  a  measure  of  support  and 
tolerance  from  the  people.  However,  for  its  opponents  it  is  an  ideal  time  for  waging  a 
campaign  against  the  government,  the  opportunities  for  which  have  been  enhanced  by 
the  moves  towards  democratisation. 
Experience  from  elsewhere  in  the  developing  world  gives  rise  to  concern  that  is  relevant 
to  the  Isles.  For  example.  early  in  1985  the  Sudanese  government  was  pressured  into 
making  structural  reforms  by  its  main  donor.  the  United  States,  the  International 
Monetary  Fund  and  other  creditors  by  the  threat  of  the  withdrawal  of  aid  and  loans.  In 
response  to  these  pressures  and  to  assurances  of  continued  support,  Jaffer  El  Nimeiry, 287 
the  Sudanese  leader  adopted  an  astute  economic  recovery  programme,  which  included  a 
devaluation  of  currency  and  the  slashing  of  subsidies  on  petrol,  bread  and  other  staples 
(Timberlake.  1984).  The  consequence  of  this  was  a  coup  in  April,  1985.  Elsewhere  in 
Africa,  e.  g.  Egypt,  many  governments  which  attempted  such  restructuring  and  austerity 
measures  found  themselves  facing  serious  social  unrest.  Such  a  situation  would 
heighten  the  vulnerability  of  many  a  SIS,  and  the  poorest  ones  tread  this  precarious 
path  (e.  g.,  Cape  Verde,  Sao  Tome  and  Principe,  the  Comoros  etc.  ) 
The  economic  benefits  from  the  Union  enables  the  government  to  attempt  to  maintain 
basic  subsistence  levels.  For  example,  The  Daffy  News  of  November  23,1988:  1  reported 
that  "Zanzibar  will  be  supplied  with  more  food,  textiles  and  industrial  raw  materials 
from  the  Mainland  to  enable  it  absorb  the  effects  of  the  recent  agreement  signed  by  the 
Union  government  with  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)".  It  was  also  reported 
that  the  Prime  Minister  (Mainland)  also  directed  that  more  means  should  be  explored 
to  ease  the  IMF  'conditionalities'  on  the  Isles  economy"  (op.  cit.  ).  So  apart  from  the 
political  and  security  arrangements,  there  Is  an  important  degree  of  economic  support 
through  fiscal  (credit  and  borrowing)  and  trading  arrangements  which  generally  favour 
the  Isles  (these  are  analysed  and  discussed  in  chapters  10  and  11). 
9.5  Room  to  manoeuvre,  Liberalisation  policies 
In  the  absence  of  few  other  practical  alternatives.  and  in  the  attempt  to  exploit  a  historic 
economic  advantage,  economic  liberalisation  policies  were  introduced  with  the  aim  of 
stimulating  trade  and  production  in  the  economy.  These  policies  are  regarded  as 
'liberal'  in  that  a  considerable  extent  of  state  intervention  over  the  economy  was 
reduced.  The  aim  was  to  tap  the  resources  of  the  private  sector.  allowing  a  greater 
participation  so  as  to  inject  otherwise  dormant  resources  into  the  Isles'  economy. 
The  policies  were  in  initiated  1984  when  the  government  allowed  market  forces  to 
increasingly  determine  resource  allocation  (GoZ,  1987:  5).  It  was  necessary  that  specific 
government  policies  reflect  the  broader  strategic  changes  that  were  pursued  despite  the 
difficult  political  decisions  that  would  have  to  be  taken  in  implementing  them.  Many  of 
these  decisions  are  'political'  in  the  sense  that  they  are  sensitive  to  the  interests  of 
individual  and  groups  so  that  potentially  their  implementation  could  result  in 
government  unpopularity. 
The  immediate  problem  for  Zanzibar  was  perceived  as  the  increasingly  diminishing 
resources  at  the  disposal  of  the  government.  Up  until  the  end  of  the  Second  Phase, 
government  revenues  which  were  largely  derived  from  cloves  had  been  reduced  to 
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"  the  provision  of  free  basic  services  such  as  education  and  health, 
"  importation  of  food,  particularly  rice,  flour  and  sugar,  and 
0  employment  of  surplus  staff  in  the  public  sector. 
There  was  little  or  virtually  no  investment  in  new  and  productive  enterprises  and  worse, 
there  was  a  marked  deterioration  in  the  economic  infrastructure  as  a  result  of  the  lack  of 
basic  maintenance.  Much  of  the  existing  infrastructure  was  constructed  between  the 
1920s  and  1940s  with  some  additions  soon  after  the  Revolution.  The  Economic  Recovery 
Programme  (ERP)  aimed  at  establishing  a  foundation  for  growth.  A  series  of  short  term 
(and  difficult)  measures  to  redress  the  major  imbalances  were  proposed  and 
implemented.  These  include  the  improvement  of  the  financial  sector  and  an  emphasis 
on  policies  designed  to  bring  about  the  rapid  revival  of  economic  and  particularly 
productive  activities  through  (GoZ.  1986b,  1987a.  1987b.  1989c;  JMT.  1989); 
"  Increasing  revenues  by  charging  for  selected  government  services  which  had 
hitherto  been  provided  free.  or  what  is  also  known  as  cost  recovery  measures  for 
government  services  such  as  education: 
"  reducing  the  public  sector  wage  bill  through  retrenchment.  This  implied  a 
significant  reduction  in  size  of  the  civil  service  (initially  by  about  18%)  and 
related  to  this,  obtaining  a  better  balance  between  government  expenditure  on 
salaries  and  other  costs,  such  as  equipment  and  materials; 
"  reducing  food  and  other  subsidies  with  the  long  term  aim  of  removing  them 
altogether.  This  translates  into  increasing  the  price  of  rice  to  market  levels  and 
a  steady  reduction  in  quantities  imported.  Prices  of  other  goods  are  to  be  set  at 
levels  reflecting  their  real  costs; 
"  improving  foreign  exchange  allocation  and  directing  it  to  productive  use  e.  g. 
allocating  to  efficiently  operating  industries  and  other  productive  sectors; 
"  ensuring  that  parastatal  activities  are  being  run  along  commercial  lines.  Those 
falling  would  to  be  closed  or  sold  to  the  private  sector. 
"  encouraging  agricultural  and  fisheries  production  by  providing  incentives, 
inputs,  extension  services  and  relaxing  restrictions  in  marketing; 
"  introducing  measures  to  improve  the  recovery  of  customs  land  sales  tax: 
"  re-allocating  priorities  in  the  public  investment  programme  to  favour 
rehabilitation  of  projects  at  the  expense  of  new  investments  and  allocating  a 289 
larger  share  of  resources  to  infrastructure  and  education; 
"  Introducing  measures  aimed  at  encouraging  and  protecting  the  private  sector 
which  had  been  restricted  through  unnecessary  regulations  and  enabling 
investors  to  set  up  and  operate  without  too  much  government  interference; 
"  encouraging  the  development  and  exploitation  of  alternative  sources  of  wealth 
such  as  agricultural  products  (non-traditional),  fishing  (under  exploited  and 
unprocessed)  and  tourism  (dormant). 
There  are  other  measures  related  to  the  above  which  include  training  and  incentives  for 
the  public  sectors,  greater  priority  towards  maintenance  and  rehabilitation,  reduce  rice 
imports  by  about  25,000  tons  over  a  period  of  two  years  and  increasing  domestic  food 
production  capacity.  There  is  also  the  need  to  realign  government  expenditure  to  meet 
revenue,  eliminate  expenditure  on  government  functions  that  are  deemed  as  non 
essential,  reintroduce  self-help  schemes  for  the  rehabilitation  and  construction  of  class- 
rooms,  health  centres,  upkeep  of  feeder  roads  and  water  supplies,  extending  financial 
services  to  district  levels  and  the  removal  of  some  export  restrictions.  In  this  way,  some 
of  the  costs  incurred  by  the  state  are  taken  on  by  citizens  through  self-help  schemes. 
The  size  of  the  total  labour  force  was  estimated  to  be  about  259.000  or  400/6  of  the 
population  (1988  population  =  640,578).  The  formal  sector  was  estimated  to  be 
employing  14.7%  of  the  registered  employees  (37,000)  in  1987  and  nearly  70%  is  said  to 
be  employed  in  the  public  sector.  As  discussed  in  chapter  three,  this  characteristic  is 
quite  common  in  many  SS  and  SIS  and  Zanzibar  certainly  conforms  to  it.  This  is 
indicative  of  an  over-manned  civil  service  with  low  levels  of  skills  and  training  and 
hence  low  efficiency  too  and  the  situation  is  further  compounded  by  the  lack  of 
equipment  and  materials. 
The  ERl'  made  it  clear  that  it  was  important  that  these  measure  be  implemented  as  soon 
as  possible  and  to  a  strict  timetable.  For  example,  it  proposed  a  period  of  between  three 
to  six  months  to  reduce  the  size  of  the  public  sector  by  18%  and  the  removal  of  food 
subsidies.  This  was  over-ambitious  if  not  imprudent,  and  did  not  happen  according  to 
the  suggested  time-table.  Instead  the  government  made  steady  progress  towards  the  goal 
by  stretching  the  time  period  and  implementing  the  programmes  in  stages.  Even  then, 
there  have  been  some  difficulties.  The  GoZ  has  been  cornered  by  the  bad  situation  it  has 
been  facing  to  accept  this  advice,  even  though  it  does  not  provide  alternatives  for  those 
being  laid  off.  The  new  approach  is  based  on  the  power  and  successes  of  the  market 
forces,  a  situation  which  first,  is  hardly  applicable  to  this  particular  environment  and 
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The  private  sector's  participation  took  time  to  take  effect,  but  by  1985/86  it  began 
providing  employment  and  services  to  the  population.  There  is  little  evidence  of  private 
investment  in  production  activities,  most  seem  to  centre  on  transport,  hotels  and 
tourism  and  trade/commerce.  To  some  extent  there  has  been  increased  exports  in  non- 
traditional  goods  such  as  seaweed  and  chillies. 
Liberalisation  has  been  accompanied  by  an  increased  movement  of  people.  Many 
informal  activities  have  gradually  become  formal  as  they  expand,  and  especially  so  in 
commerce  and  trade  where  the  percentage  change  in  its  contribution  to  GDP  in  1988  over 
1980  is  32.7  %.  The  transports  sector  both  land  and  marine  saw  the  proliferation  of 
private  sector  participation,  enhancing  movement  of  people  and  goods  within  and 
outwith  the  Isles.  The  construction  sector  has  seen  a  13.8%  change  in  contribution  to 
GDP  (1988  over  1980)  provides  a  good  indicator  of  economic  activity  in  an  economy. 
a6  The  implications  of  the  1987  Tanzania  General  Elections  for  Zanzibar 
The  retirement  of  the  Union  President,  Julius  Nyerere  in  1987.  paved  the  way  for 
elections  for  a  new  leader.  Quite  unexpectedly,  the  new  President  came  from  the  Isles,  as 
made  possible  through  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  Republic.  The 
new  Union  leader  Mr.  Ally  Hassan  Mwinyi,  who  was  until  then  the  President  of 
Zanzibar.  1  For  the  first  time  both  leaders  of  the  two  sides  of  the  Union  came  from 
Zanzibar.  The  importance  of  these  developments  lay  in  the  fact  that  changes  in 
Zanzibar  were  initiated  by  Mr.  Mwinyi's  government  and  now  there  was  ample  scope  to 
support  them  further  through  the  Union.  All  leaders  since  have  basically  followed  the 
same  social  and  economic  development  programmes  initiated  by  Mr.  Mwinyi  and 
comprise  the  Third  Phase. 
For  the  first  time,  statements  have  been  made  that  recognise  that  the  situation  in  the 
Isles  is  different  from  the  Mainland  and  may  require  a  different  approach  in 
confronting  it.  The  GoZ  Summary  (1987)  points  out  that  the  Union  is  not  a  static 
relationship  and  that  it  varies  according  to  the  state  of  the  two  economies.  In  the  past 
Zanzibar's  cloves  revenues  have  meant  that  it  had  a  relatively  strong  economy 
compared  to  that  of  the  Mainland.  In  recent  years  this  has  changed  and  all  the  more 
important  that  economic  co-operation  between  them  has  tangible  benefits  for  both 
economies.  The  same  document  (GoZ.  1987)  recommends  that  Zanzibar  should  pursue 
that  following  strategies  with  respect  to  Union  matters  during  the  course  of  the  ERP. 
Mr.  Idris  Abdul  Wakil  was  elected  to  replace  him  in  the  Isles,  and  he  is  followed  by  Mr.  Salmin  Amour,  the  current 
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Q  Zanzibar  should  seek  to  maximise  the  amount  of  aid  and  grants  from  donor 
organisations  as  the  success  of  the  ERP  depends  on  a  considerable  extent  on  aid 
that  it  can  generate  from  donors.  Since  loans  and  aid  are  a  Union  matter, 
Zanzibar  is  effectively  competing  with  other  parts  of  the  Union  and  is  necessary 
that  it  should  increase  its  share  of  aid  if  it; 
0  can  agree  with  the  Union  government  on  guidelines  for  division  of  donor 
assistance, 
"  GoZ  should  ensure  that  projects  which  are  to  be  put  to  donors  are  well 
prepared  and  supported  by  the  necessary  feasibility  studies.  This  is  a 
difficult  process  given  the  shortages  of  resources  and  skills  available, 
0  ensures  that  its  liaison  office  in  Dar  es  Salaam  was  staffed  with  sufficient 
high  calibre  staff  who  stayed  in  their  posts  long  enough  to  maintain 
continuity. 
U  Zanzibar  should  ensure  that  the  Mainland  is  aware  of  its  economic  interests 
through  regular  consultation  and  when  the  United  Republic  of  Tanzania's  policies 
are  not  appropriate.  Zanzibar  should  investigate  ways  to  alleviate  the 
consequences. 
D  Zanzibar  should  encourage  Union  institutions  to  contribute  to  the  development  of 
Zanzibar,  at  least  in  proportion  to  the  share  of  their  revenues  and  assets  generated 
in  the  Isles  and  especially  with  respect  to  the  financial  institutions  such  as 
banks. 
Zanzibar  should  continuously  monitor  economic  developments  on  the  Mainland 
and,  where  possible.  take  advantage  of  any  shortage  or  other  constraints  in  the 
Mainland  by  providing  these  and  benefiting  through  such  a  transaction. 
The  Isles  have  established  a  market  on  the  Mainland  for  some  of  its  goods  and  services. 
The  Mainland  is  a  relatively  cheap  and  secure  source  of  many  of  its  basic  imports.  An 
interdependent  relationship  has  developed  between  the  two  countries  facilitated  by  the 
political  Union. 
9.7  Summary  and  Conclusions 
The  basic  philosophy  of  Zanzibar  during  the  Third  Phase  is  summarised  as  follows: 
"Zanzibar  shall  remain  a  socialist  oriented  society  with  self-reliance  an  important 
objective.  However.  government  recognises  the  role  of  private  sector  in  stimulating  and 
fostering  economic  development".  (GoZ,  1986b:  3).  Refering  to  the  implementation  of 292 
strategies  and  policies  related  to  the  ERP.  the  government  suggests  that  "  Zanzibar  would 
change  from  a  predominantly  agricultural  economy  relying  on  cloves  to  an  'Island 
Economy'  based  on  industries,  tourism,  trade  and  other  services  related  to  these  sectors" 
(GoZ,  1990:  22). 
That  transformation  is  happening.  though  not  along  the  lines  expressed  above. 
Zanzibar  is  now  dependent  on  external  aid  to  implement  the  ERP.  and  it  will  continue  to 
be  reliant  on  external  assistance  for  its  economic  survival  and  development  for  some 
time.  Through  this  dependency.  it  has  effectively  're-linked'  into  the  global  economic 
system  and  is  obliged  to  open  up  its  economy  to  external  economic  interests  and 
established  legislation  encouraging  and  protecting  external  investments  and  profits. 
This  is  anticipation  that  part  of  the  profits  generated  will  be  reinvested  in  the  Isles  to 
rejuvenate  economic  growth  and  development. 
However.  strategy  wise,  it  does  not  state  explicitly  whether  to  achieve  a  greater  degree  of 
independence  or  even  interdependence,  and  yet  now  it  is  ever  more  so  dependent  on 
external  resources,  particularly  aid,  loans,  grants  and  foreign  investment.  For  a  place 
where  the  virtues  self-reliance  and  the  evils  of  dependency  have  been  trumpeted  for  so 
long,  but  where  they  have  remained  a  rhetoric  than  reality,  it  is  perhaps  understandable 
why  this  is  so.  However.  the  ERP  recommends  that  the  government  has  no  option  but  to 
obtain  external  assistance  and  the  government  has  made  it  a  matter  of  policy  to 
aggressively  seek  aid  through  setting  up  donor  conferences  to  support  it  ERP  (GoZ,  1992). 
In  an  overview  of  the  developments  during  the  Third  Phase,  five  main  characteristics 
appear.  First  is  a  major  internal  restructuring  of  the  island  economy  with  the  emphasis 
shifting  from  public  to  private  and  foreign  participation.  Second  is  the  increased 
realisation  that  it  suffers  from  a  unique  set  of  development  constraints  and  requires  a 
greater  level  of  autonomy  in  confronting  them.  Third  is  the  recognition  that  most 
conventional  strategies  have  failed,  partly  due  to  weaknesses  in  them,  but  also  due  to 
poor  implementation,  and  acceptance  that  unconventional  strategies  have  to  be  adopted 
in  the  light  of  the  Isles'  extremely  limited  prospects.  Fourth.  is  the  exploitation  of  the 
economic  potential  of  the  Union  and  thus  expanding  the  economic  viability  of  the  Isles' 
economy  and,  finally  is  the  resignation  to  the  fact  that  the  Isles  have  become 
increasingly  dependent  on  aid  for  survival  and  development.  At  this  juncture  it  is 
necessary  to  analyse  the  dominant  characteristics  that  have  emerged  in  Zanzibar's 
economy  since  1984.  The  relevant  analyses  and  discussions  both  at  the  macro  and 
micro  scales,  are  made  in  chapter  10  and  11. 293 
10.0  The  emerging  AGE  economy 
10.1  Introduction 
The  developments  outlined  in  the  preceding  chapter  have  contributed  to  important 
changes  in  the  dominant  characteristics  of  the  Zanzibari  economy,  with  some  critical 
social  and  political  implications.  Zanzibar  faces  considerable  difficulties  in  achieving 
economic  growth  and  compared  to  its  past  experiences,  it  has  had  to  resort  to 
'unorthodox  strategies,  '  of  development  such  as  liberalisation,  attracting  foreign  aid, 
private  and  multinational  investment,  tourism  and  is  now  seeking  to  lease  out  its 
fishing  grounds,  establish  tax  havens  and  an  EPZ. 
Either  by  choice  or  for  want  of  a  better  option.  Zanzibar  has  increased  its  ties  with  the 
metropolitan  powers  and  is  moving  from  a  productive  to  a  rentier  status.  It  does  not 
appear  that  there  is  a  wish  to  withdraw  towards  subsistence  and  self-reliance  and 
migration  of  the  able-bodied  has  reduced  some  of  the  opportunities  for  local 
development.  At  the  same  time  metropolitan  economies  have  been  willing  to  construct  a 
new  form  of  bureaucratic  dependency.  as  dependency  is  increasingly  negotiated.  1  With 
the  failure  of  conventional  development  strategies,  practices  once  regarded  in  Zanzibar 
as  taboo,  such  as  tourism,  emigration,  foreign  and  private  participation  in  the  economy 
have  become  enshrined  in  current  development  policies  (e.  g.  the  ERP  and  project  plans 
for  post-  1992/93). 
Zanzibar  has  become  increasingly  incorporated  into  the  periphery  in  a  number  of  ways, 
such  as  trade,  migration  and  political  subordination.  Its  struggle  for  survival  may  imply 
erosion  of  sovereignty  and  that  self-reliance  has  become  a  delusion.  Evidence  of  these 
factors  are  presented  first,  in  the  description  and  analyses  of  the  emerging  MIRAGE 
economy  with  examples  derived  from  secondary  sources  (reports  and  other  surveys), 
second,  in  related  aspects  such  as  trade,  agriculture,  rural  development  and  the 
dominant  form  of  dependency  which  exist  (chapter  11),  and  third,  through  the  socio- 
economic  survey  of  households  in  different  geographical  areas  that  the  survey  was 
conducted  (chapters  12  and  13)  for  the  purposes  of  supporting  observations,  statements 
and  hypotheses  postulated  in  this  study. 
1  Bureaucratic  dependency  is  one  in  which  the  bureaucratic  structures  are  dependent  on  the  generosity  of  donors  for 
policy  direction  and  funding  of  development  projects.  The  incoming  aid  also  tends  to  benefit  sections  of  the 
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10  2  The  NURAGE  economy 
Certain  common  characteristics  which  appear  in  many  SIS  have  been  identified  and 
discussed  in  chapter  four  and  are  generally  known  as  the  MIRAB  or  MIRAGE  economies 
(Connell,  1988:  Brookeßeld,  1986;  and  Bertram  and  Watters,  1985,1986)  Scholars  have 
noticed  certain  common  social,  economic  and  political  characteristics  which  occur  in 
many  of  the  developing  SIS.  The  smallest  Pacific  micro-states  have  been  conceptualised 
as  MIRAB  economies  because  of  their  dependency  on  Migration,  Remittances  and  Aid, 
and  the  Bureaucracy.  Such  economies  are  linked  to  the  decline  and  stagnation  of  the 
main  productive  sectors,  usually  agriculture,  and  to  the  growth  of  imports,  offset  by  aid, 
remittances  and  tourist  revenues. 
The  urban  bias  of  MIRAB  economies,  especially  in  the  delivery  of  aid  and  bank  loans  and 
more  generally  through  the  actions  of  the  bureaucracy.  coupled  with  the  collapse  of 
agriculture  and  fisheries  suggest  that  the  term  MURAB  economies  may  be  preferable  - 
Migration,  Urbanisation,  Aid  and  Bureaucracy  (Connell,  1988  quoting  personal 
communication  with  Munro,  1986).  Brookfield  has  developed  this  argument  and 
suggested  that  since  it  is  Government  Employment  that  predominates  in  the 
Bureaucracy.  the  micro  state  might  best  be  conceived  of  as  a  MIRAGE  (Migration. 
Urbanisation.  Aid  and  Government  Employment),  that  is  "scarcely  a  sustainable 
economy  at  all"  (Connell  op.  cit:  81,  quoting  Brookeßeld). 
Bertram  (1986)  agrees  and  maintains  that  in  such  SIS  the  thrust  of  most  development 
planning  on  production,  is  misplaced  since  aid.  philately  and  migrant  remittances  have 
become  the  foundation  of  the  modem  economy,  and  in  doing  so,  the  IMS  have  for  better 
or  for  worse,  virtually  overturned  the  classical  theories  of  economic  development 
(Connell,  1990:  12).  SIS  are  becoming  increasingly  urbanised  and  portray  characteristics 
similar  to  rapid  urbanising  developing  countries.  with  urban  primacy  and  neo-colonial 
state  policies  which  discriminate  against  the  traditional  mode  in  taxation,  investment 
allocation  and  pricing  of  rural  products  (Jones,  1990).  They  conform  to  Gugler's 
(1986:  202)  observation  that  "everywhere  it  is  government  by  the  city.  from  the  city,  for 
the  city.  " 
The  Zanzibari  economy  is  in  the  process  of  transforming  into  one  which  is 
characteristic  of  MIRAGE.  The  first  and  second  phases  did  not  exhibit  much  in  terms  of 
migration,  remittances  and  aid  as  they  were  not  of  significance.  Indeed,  in  the  case  of 
migration  and  remittances,  they  were  largely  absent  or  irrelevant  due  to  government 
policies  being  against  them,  and  the  relatively  strong  position  of  the  cloves  crop  in  the 
world  market  enabling  the  country  to  survive  without  much  aid.  In  the  first  phase  the 
government  was  often  reluctant  to  either  request  or  accept  aid,  and  even  loans  were 
accepted  selectively.  Pre-1984  Zanzibar  does  not  fit  closely  into  the  characteristics  or 
typologies  associated  with  MIRAB  or  MIRAGE  economies.  The  situation  was  unique  in 295 
that  the  dominant  characteristics  were  the  cloves  exports  and  growth  of  the  bureaucracy 
coupled  with  attempts  at  import  substitution  industrialisation  as  a  process  of  changing 
the  economic  structure  from  a  rural  monoculture  to  an  urban  industrial  economy,  in 
which  trade  would  become  the  'engine  of  growth'.  Predictably,  this  has  never  happened. 
With  the  urban  bias,  the  rural  sector  increasingly  became  alienated,  with  agricultural 
earnings  (for  producers)  falling  behind  urban  incomes  thus  increasing  the  magnetism  of 
the  urban  centres.  Failure  of  rural  based  policies  and  strategies,  the  stagnation  of 
agriculture  and  authoritarian  leadership,  particularly  in  outlying  areas,  stimulating  the 
younger  sections  of  the  population  to  migrate  towards  urban  areas  and  especially  the 
capital,  Zanzibar  Town.  Emigration  was  discouraged. 
From  the  mid-1980s  the  government  desperately  sought  external  assistance  in  forms  of 
aid.  grants,  loans  and  import  support  to  finance  development  objectives  and  attempt  to 
restructure  the  economy.  Liberal  economic  policies  and  free  movement  of  the  population 
were  introduced,  allowing  a  larger  section  of  the  population  to  participate  directly  in  the 
economy  through  trade  and  commerce.  There  began  to  emerge  a  group  of  people  who 
emigrated  (short  and  medium  term)  seeking  economic  opportunities  externally  and 
sending  back  remittances.  Equally  important  is  the  fact  that  through  historical  events, 
a  sizeable  and  also  quite  prosperous  section  of  the  population  resides  in  the  Gulf.  and 
others  in  Europe  and  maintain  contacts  with  kin  in  Zanzibar.  They  are  now  permitted 
to  send  remittance  to  their  relatives.  and  participate  in  investing  in  various  sections  of 
the  economy.  In  a  recent  budget  speech  the  Minister  for  Finance  made  the  following 
appeal,  "I  would  like  to  make  a  special  appeal  to  Zanzibaris,  wherever  they  may  be,  to 
avail  themselves  of  this  opportunity  to  support  the  development  of  the  country"  (GoZ. 
1991:  17). 
Both  internal  and  international  migration  have  become  important  to  the  economy  of 
Zanzibar.  Remittances  are  increasingly  occupying  an  important  position  in  the 
national  income,  and  urbanisation  has  approached  almost  unmanageable  levels 
entailing  all  the  related  problems  of  rapid  urbanisation  of  developing  countries.  Aid  is 
an  option  Increasingly  being  sought  and  dependent  upon.  Finally,  as  in  other  SIS,  the 
public  sector  continues  to  provide  the  largest  share  of  employment,  consequently  taking 
up  a  major  proportion  of  resources. 
Compared  to  previously,  the  economy  of  contemporary  Zanzibar  can  certainly  be 
described  as  that  of  a  MIRAGE,  where  migration,  remittances,  urbanisation.  aid  and 
government  employment  are  the  dominant  social,  economic  and  political  aspects  of  the 
island  economy,  at  the  expense  often  of  agriculture  and  rural  development.  The  nature  of 
this  type  of  economy  lends  little  hope  for  sustainable  development  since  the  trend  is 
towards  a  greater  dependence  on  the  characteristics  that  define  the  MIRAGE  economy. 296 
Zanzibar  has  also  taken  measures  to  exploit  other  potentials  such  as  tourism  and  trade. 
In  addition  there  is  the  potential  of  a  larger  market  through  its  special  political  and 
economic  relationship  with  the  Mainland,  and  through  it  with  other  countries  within 
the  region.  However.  Zanzibar  has  become  increasingly  dependent  on  the  Mainland, 
both  in  terms  of  its  security  and  economic  possibilities.  The  Mainland  provides  a 
market  for  its  labour  force  and  investment  potential  for  its  capital  and  this  has  the  effect 
of  reducing  some  of  the  problems  of  the  island  society.  However,  it  is  also  true  that 
through  this  it  has  developed  a  form  of  double-dependency.  which  is  commonly 
characteristic  of  land-locked  countries  (chapter  two). 
The  attraction  of  overseas  and  local  private  investment  through  the  creation  of 
beneficial  conditions  is  happening,  but  what  will  matter  most  is  the  type  of  investments 
that  are  made  and  the  types  of  employment  opportunities  that  are  generated  in  the  local 
economy.  Also  of  importance  is  the  degree  of  leakage  of  foreign  exchange  generated 
through  external  and  private  investment.  If  there  is  a  continual  high  level  flight  of 
capital  and  negligible  re-investment  in  the  local  economy.  then  there  is  no  hope  or  scope 
for  development,  let  alone  sustainable  development. 
Liberalisation  invites  the  inherent  dangers  of  the  private  sector  and  foreign  investors 
becoming  dominant  and  beginning  to  exert  disproportionate  influence  over  the 
government.  A  metamorphosis  of  the  island  economy  is  occurring,  but  it  may  not  spell 
out  an  interdependency  in  the  world  economy,  but  one  which  is  even  more  deeply 
entrenched  in  its  dependency,  as  it  develops  reliance  on  aid,  finance  and  imports. 
10.3  Population,  Migration  and  Urbanisation 
In  the  past  development  policies  and  strategies  have  been  frustrated  by  a  number  of 
factors,  many  of  which  are  characteristic  of  small  island  states.  Although  factors  such 
as  its  high  dependency  on  food  imports  and  a  low  level  of  self-sufficiency  were 
commonly  accepted  in  the  development  plans  and  cautioned  against  by  the  political 
leadership,  they  continued  to  exert  significant  pressures  on  the  sustainability  of  the 
island  economy. 
Rapid  population  growth  in  urban  areas  entail  a  fast  growing  demand  for  urban 
amenities,  increasing  pressure  on  existing  facilities.  In  this  respect  what  has  been 
happening  in  Zanzibar  is  similar  to  what  occurred  elsewhere.  For  example,  Hope 
(1982:  74)  noticed  similar  trends  in  the  Caribbean  islands,  and  stated  that:  The 
problems  of  the  agricultural  sector  as  a  declining  resource  base  and  the  resulting 
urbanization  faced  by  the  Caribbean  nations  derive  partly  from  their  small  size,  partly 
from  economic  fragmentation,  and  partly  from  the  fact  that  they  have  not  had  well  co- 
ordinated  strategies  for  their  economic  development".  This  is  certainly  true  for 
Zanzibar.  The  First  Phase  lacked  any  population  policy  and  the  Islamic  based  culture, 297 
Its  pro-natalism,  and  the  personal  opinions  of  Karume  regarding  population  control, 
militated  against  the  introduction  of  such  policies.  The  complexities  of  the  politics  of 
the  period  as  well  as  low  literacy  rates  for  both  men  and  women  further  contributed  to 
the  high  population  growth. 
1:  13.1  Population  Growth  factors 
The  demography  of  the  poorest  SIS  are  linked  to  their  development  problems  and 
prospects.  In  Zanzibar  there  were  some  important  trends  occurring  in  a  number  of 
population  indicators.  Data  available  for  midway  through  the  Second  Phase  (1978) 
show  that  Crude  Birth  Rate  (CBR)  was  59.2  /ooo  while  the  General  Fertility  Rate  (GFR)  was 
274.5/.  The  Total  Fertility  Rate  for  the  same  year  was  8.8.1  According  to  a  recent 
demographic  survey  of  the  islands,  fertility  levels  in  Zanzibar  are  amongst  the  highest 
In  the  world  (GoZ,  1989).  This  has  been  the  trend  since  1967  and  a  comparison  with  other 
island  states  reveals  certain  extremes  (Table  10.1). 
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Maldives  135  50.0  23.0  88  2.7  2.4  -0.3  11  20 
Mauritius  895  26.0  8.0  40  1.8  1.3  -0.5  444  44 
Seychelles  66  24.7  7.6  35  1.7  0.36  -13.5  221  26 
Comoros  350  59.2  22.0  91  -  3.5  -  157  17 
Cape  Verde  303  28.0  9.0  105  -  -  -  76  25 
Zanzibar  476  59.2  18.0  140  3.0  2.7  -0.5  201  30 
Mainland  17,036  49.0  19.1  137  -  3.2  -  18  13 
Tanzania 
East  -  47.0  20.0  146  -  -  -  12 
Africa* 
+  East  African  data  has  been  presented  for  comparison  purposes. 
-  indicates  that  the  relevant  information  is  not  available. 
Sources:  Lucas  (1980),  Zanzibar  Government  (1984),  Republic  of  Seychelles  (1989),  United  Republic  of  Tanzania 
(1989),  Commonwealth  Secretariat  (1990),  World  Bank  (1990). 
10.1  Demographic  indicators  for  selected  countries  (1978) 
In  1978  it  had  both  the  highest  Rate  of  Natural  Increase  and  Annual  Growth  Rate 
compared  to  the  other  countries.  It  also  had  a  relatively  high  urban  population  in 
proportion  to  SIS  standards.  Crude  Birth  (CBR)  and  Crude  Death  Rates  (CDR)  were  high, 
while  the  Net  Migration  Rate  relatively  low.  Clearly  Zanzibar's  population  was  growing 
rapidly.  The  situation  is  further  compounded  by  the  travel/emigration  restrictions  that 
existed,  as  indicated  by  the  relatively  low  Net  Migration  Rates.  Restrictions  include 
those  imposed  by  the  government  and  those  which  are  determined  by  the  destinations 
willing  to  accept  migrants,  which  in  the  case  of  Zanzibar,  is  restricted  largely  to  the 
i  The  average  number  of  children  a  woman  gave  birth  during  her  reproductive  life  span. 298 
Mainland.  Middle  Eastern  countries  and  particularly  Oman  accepts  some  emigrants,  but 
even  these  are  selected  according  to  ethnic  background,  marriage  and  skills.  In  all  these 
cases  the  numbers  are  relatively  small. 
During  the  Second  Phase  the  population  of  Zanzibar  reached  479,235  from  354,360  in 
1967  and  30°x6  resided  in  urban  areas  in  1978  compared  to  24%  in  1967.  Between  1967 
and  1978  the  population  growth  rate  was  2.7%  per  annum.  The  annual  growth  rate  in 
Unguja  Island  was  3.3%  and  in  Pemba  2.0%  (1978),  the  situation  in  the  former  island 
being  attributable  to  the  high  rural-urban  migration  trends.  As  in  other  LDC's  and 
developing  SIS,  urban  primacy  is  prominent.  Figure  10.1  and  table  10.2  depict  the 
population  growth  for  the  island's  districts  between  1967-1988.  Population  growth  was 
faster  in  urban  areas,  such  as  Zanzibar  Town  and  the  urban  areas  of  the  northern 
districts  of  both  Unguja  and  Pemba  islands  (Table  10.2). 
In  recent  years  there  have  been  some  changes  in  fertility,  mortality  and  spatial 
distribution  of  island  populations  which  are  interrelated  with  current  social  and 
economic  changes.  The  degree  of  urbanisation  in  many  island  economies  have  been 
fairly  rapid  and  generally  rural  populations  are  growing  at  a  slower  rate  compared  to  the 
urban.  For  example,  the  average  proportion  of  the  population  in  urban  areas  in  20  of  the 
low  income  small  countries  is  20.6%,  and  Zanzibar's  share  is  well  above  average  being  at 
while  30%.  1  Even  in  the  smallest  IMS,  uneven  development  and  urban  bias  has  become 
typical  (Connell,  1988a;  1988b).  In  fact  where  this  occurs,  the  degree  of  urbanisation  is 
higher  compared  to  most  larger  developing  countries. 
The  populations  of  SIS  have  been  growing  rapidly  despite  recent  mortality  and  fertility 
declines  and  high  emigration  rates.  Some  SIS  are  just  going  through  the  beginning  of  the 
demographic  transition,  and  this  is  certainly  true  for  the  case  of  Zanzibar,  as 
characterised  by  its  high  fertility  rates,  gradually  falling  mortality  rates  (including 
infant  mortality  rates)  and  until  recently,  limited  emigration. 
1  Computed  from  data  in  Basic  Statistical  Data  on  Selected  Small  Countries,  Commonwealth  Secretariat,  May  1991. 299 









Urban/West  Region  94894  142041  3.7 
Urban  (Zanzibar)  District  68380  110506  4.4 
West  District  26514  31535  1.5 
South  Region  39004  51749  2.6 
South  District  17251  21952  2.2 
Central  District  21753  29797  2.9 
North  Region  56219  77017  2.9 
North  "A"  District  35464  48124  2.8 
North  "B"  District  20755  29893  3.3 
Unguja  Island  190117  270807  3.3 
North  Region  71972  106290  3.5 
Wete  District*  -  58923  - 
Konde(Micheweni)  -  47367  - 
District* 
South  Region  92271  99014  0.6 
Chake  Chake  District  46482  47208  0.1 
Mkoani  District  45789  51806  1.0 
Pemba  Island  164243  205304  2.0 
*  Wete  and  Konde  districts,  the  latter  of  which  is  later  known  as  Micheweni,  were  created  after  the  1967  census 
thus  there  are  no  growth  rates  computed  for  them. 
Source:  GoZ.  1984. 
Table  10.2  Regional  and  District  intercensal  population  growth  rates 
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Districts  V 
*  Wete  and  Konde  districts,  the  latter  of  which  is  later  known  as  Micheweni,  were  created  after  the  1967  census 
thus  there  are  no  bar  charts  for  them  for  that  year. 
Source:  GoZ  (1981,1982,1984) 
Figure  10.1  Population  growth  in  Districts  1967,1978  and  1988 300 
1032  Patterns  and  trends  of  migration 
The  history  of  migration  demonstrates  that  its  structure,  including  its  duration,  volume 
and  destination,  is  affected  by  conditions  in  the  receiving  as  well  as  in  the  sending 
countries  (Mabogunje,  1970;  Findlay  and  Findlay,  1987;  Jones,  1990).  In  the  case  of 
Zanzibar.  emigration  to  the  Mainland  would  be  the  first  and  most  convenient  choice. 
The  1978  census  showed  conspicuous  levels  of  movement  between  the  Isles  and  the 
Mainland,  although  clearly  at  much  lower  levels  than  expected.  The  reasons  for  this 
include  restrictions  in  movement  imposed  by  the  authorities  in  Zanzibar  and  the 
absence  of  any  strong  economic  attractions  in  the  Mainland,  given  the  fact  that  the 
economy  there  was  even  weaker  than  that  of  Zanzibar  before  1978  and  similar  economic 
policies  restricting  private  enterprise  were  in  effect  (see  chapter  9  section  9  ). 
An  analysis  of  the  1978  census  in  relation  to  population  movements  shows  that  22.6°/6  of 
Zanzibar's  population  were  'lifetime'  migrants  (Table  10.3).  1  Of  this  proportion  18.1% 
were  enumerated  outside  their  region  of  birth  within  Zanzibar,  3.6%  were  born  in 
Mainland  Tanzania  and  0.9%  were  born  outside  the  United  Republic  of  Tanzania.  Inter- 
regional  migrants  accounted  for  77.4%  of  all  migrants,  with  most  moving  within  or 
going  to  Unguja  island  (83.2%). 
Birth  Place  Categories  (%) 
REGION  Other  Island  Mainland  Outside  Lifetime 
Regions  Tanzania  Tanzania  Migrants 
Unguja  North  8.4  1.9  0.4  10.7 
Unguja  Central  14.0  5.6  0.8  20.4 
Unguja  West  42.4  8.0  1.7  52.1 
Pemba  North  6.3  1.1  0.3  7.7 
Pemba  South  6.3  0.7  0.3  7.3 
Zanzibar  18.1  3.6  0.9  22.6 
Source:  1978  Census 
Table  10.3  Percentages  of  lifetime  migrants  (1978) 
A  large  proportion  of  the  population  (42.4%)  who  are  lifetime  migrants  in  Unguja  West 
which  is  the  main  urban  centre  on  the  island,  originated  from  other  island  regions.  This 
is  a  very  large  proportion  compared  to  other  island  regions  indicating  that  there  has 
been  a  definite  and  high  degree  of  rural-urban  long  term  population  movement. 
The  raw  data  for  life  time  migrants  in  Zanzibar  shows  that  by  1978  over  35%  of  the 
population  were  engaged  in  inter-regional  migration.  The  general  patterns  and 
directions  of  movement  are  towards  Zanzibar  West  region  and  the  capital,  Zanzibar 
Town.  The  region  experienced  a  net  gain  of  77.8%,  with  an  effectiveness  ratio  of  +0.81 
indicating  a  strong  unidirectional  movement  from  rural  to  urban  (Table  10.4).  Regions 
1  Lifetime  meaning  that  they  were  permanent  migrants  from  their  respective  places  of  birth. 301 
losing  the  largest  proportions  of  their  population  are  Pemba  North  (43%)  and  Unguja 
Central  (26.8%),  while  those  experiencing  smaller  losses  include  Pemba  South  (-14.1%) 
and  Unguja  North  (-15.1%). 
REGION  In  Out  Gross  Net  Effective-  Net 
Migration  migration  Migration  Migration  ness  Ratio  Migration 
Rate  % 
Unguja  North  5381  18519  23900  -13138  -0.55  -15.2 
Unguja  Central  6015  22131  28146  -16116  -0.57  -26.8  Unguja  West  60475  6399  66871  +54076  +0.81  +77.8 
Pemba  North  6289  15772  22061  -9483  -0.43  -43.0  Pemba  South  5448  20687  26035  -15339  -0.59  -14.1 
Total  Zanzibar  83608  83508  167013  -  - 
Source:  1978  Census. 
Table  10.4  We  Time  Internal  Migration  1978 
(Number  of  migrants) 
The  patterns  of  gains  and  losses  coincides  with  the  degree  and  location  of  new 
investments  and  better  amenities,  the  occurrence  of  employment  opportunities,  and  the 
availability  of  good  agricultural  land.  Aspects  such  as  electrification,  construction  of 
modern  roads  and  new  housing,  establishment  of  manufacturing  and  processing 
industries  tended  to  favour  urban  areas.  Regions  with  more  fertile  agricultural  land 
include  Unguja  North  and  Pemba  South.  Unguja  Central  (and  South)  and  Pemba  North 
tend  to  be  less  fertile,  comprising  large  sections  of  coral  rag. 
14  Inter-regional/inter-island  migration 
Inter-regional  and  inter-island  migration  between  1967-1978  showed  similar  trends. 
About  14.3%  of  the  population  migrated  during  the  same  period  and  Zanzibar  West 
attracted  the  largest  proportion  of  migrants  with  an  effectiveness  ratio  of  +.  73%  and  a 
net  migration  rate  of  30%  (Table  10.5).  This  reflects  a  typical  situation  of  growing  urban 
migration  focusing  on  the  primate  city,  common  to  most  Sub-Saharan  African 
countries.  Zanzibar  West  region  gained  over  20,000  migrants,  while  all  other  regions 
experienced  net  losses  and  Pemba  South  alone  leads  with  a  55%  loss.  Zanzibar  Central 
comes  ä  close  second  with  a  54%  loss  (Table  10.5). 
Region  in  Out  Gross  Net  Effective-  Net 
Migration  Migration  Migration  Migration  ness  Migration 
Ratios  Rate  % 
Unguja  North  2401  5742  8143  -3341  -.  41  -7.0 
Unguja  Central  2446  8175  10621  -5729  -.  54  -16.5 
Unguja  West  24035  3754  27789  +20281  +.  73  30.3 
Pemba  North  2580  7328  9908  -4748  -.  48  -7.3 
Pemba  South  2634  9097  11731  -6463  -.  55  -10.4 
Total  Zanzibar  34096  34096  68192 
Source:  1978  Census. 
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103,4  Sex  Ratios 
The  characteristics  of  the  migrating  population  provide  an  interesting  insight  about  the 
consequences  of  migration  to  both  receiving  and  losing  ends.  Sex  ratios  show  the  type  of 
people  who  are  migrating  and  what  the  consequences  may  be  if  either  sex  tends  to 
emigrate  more  than  the  other.  1 




Unguja  North  99  91  119 
Unguja  Central  103  99  123 
Unguja  West  99  97  111 
Pemba  South  99  97  143 
Pemba  North  98  96  152 
Total  Zanzibar  99  96  129 
Source:  1978  Census 
Table  10.6  Sex  ratios  of  migrant  populations  by  residence  categories  (1967-1978) 
The  data  available  shows  a  distinct  difference  between  the  sex  composition  of  migrants 
moving  within  and  between  the  islands  and  those  emigrating  to  the  Mainland  (Table 
10.6).  The  sex  ratio  for  migrants  moving  from  Zanzibar  to  the  Mainland  (emigrating)  is 
greater  than  that  of  internal  migrants,  implying  that  migrants  who  tend  to  move  outside 
the  Isles  are  often  males  and  female  migrants  often  tend  to  cross  inter-regional 
boundaries  and  remain  within  the  Isles.  The  table  shows  that  flows  from  Pemba  to  the 
Mainland  exhibit  a  greater  degree  of  imbalance  between  the  sexes.  This  is  also  true  for 
Unguja  Central  region.  The  same  regions  show  a  much  lower  ratio  of  males  to  females 
moving  within  the  same  region.  This  would  support  further  observations  and 
statements  made  in  the  preceding  sections.  It  can  be  deduced  that  male  migrants 
participate  significantly  in  both  inter-regional/inter-island  migration  and  emigration 
(mainly  to  the  Mainland).  whereas  female  migrants  are  more  involved  in  inter- 
regional/inter-island  migration.  This  is  characteristic  of  the  culture  and  traditions 
prevailing  in  the  Isles. 
Additional  explanations  for  these  patterns  of  movement  are  that  female  migrants  tend 
to  move  more  within  the  Isles  due  to  restrictive  immigration  policies  prescribed  during 
the  First  and  Second  Phases,  which  were  gender  discriminating.  Family  and  other 
social  ties,  such  as  staying  with  or  following  the  family  or  husband,  wherever  they  may 
be  or  move  to  also  restricts  the  movements  of  females. 
Motivations  for  male  migrants  and  emigrants,  include  seeking  alternative  and/or  better 
economic  or  other  opportunities  given  the  limited  opportunities  existing  in  the  more 
disadvantaged  regions,  which  also  tend  to  be  more  rural  and  remote.  It  must  be 
emphasised  that  restrictive  emigration  policies  were  not  applicable  only  to  females. 
1  Sex  ratios  are  expressed  as  a  proportion  of  males  to  females  in  the  population. 303 
However,  it  is  also  interesting  to  note  that  according  to  the  migration  report  (URT.  1978). 
the  urban  population  is  dominated  by  a  higher  female  ratio.  The  male/female  ratio  is  95 
males  per  100  females.  Comparing  this  to  the  Mainland,  a  different  picture  emerges,  in 
which  the  average  sex  ratio  is  108  males  to  100  females.  In  contrast  to  the  Isles' 
population,  the  Mainland  urban  population  is  dominated  by  adult  males.  This  would 
lend  support  to  the  contention  that  Zanzibar  Town  and  indeed  urban  areas  in  general  are 
losing  more  males  through  emigration. 
According  the  same  report  (URT,  1987)  most  adult  male  migrants  moved  mainly  to 
Mainland  Tanzania  and  some  to  the  Middle  East.  The  latter  is  due  to  the  historical  ties 
that  Zanzibar  has,  particularly  with  Oman.  Other  reasons  for  emigrating  to  the  Middle 
East  include  "deportations"  or  fleeing  from  the  political  and  social  upheavals  at  the 
outset  of  the  First  Phase.  Movement  to  the  East  African  mainland  coast  is  also  due  to 
historical  ties.  Cultural,  ethnic  and  family  ties  are  important  as  migrants  tend  to  follow 
kinship  ties.  The  absence  of  immigration  restrictions  on  the  Mainland  facilitated  such 
movements  although  during  the  early  part  of  the  Second  Phase  it  is  probable  that  these 
were  not  so  high  given  the  fact  that  most  islanders  would  have  been  used  to  better 
economic  conditions  compared  to  those  on  the  Mainland. 
103.5  Urbanisation 
Zanzibar  has  nine  urban  localities  which  accommodate  about  32%  of  the  total 
population  (1988).  The  four  main  urban  areas  are  the  towns  of  Zanzibar  on  Unguja 
island,  and  Mkoani,  Choke  Choke  and  Wete  on  Pemba  island.  The  remaining  urban 
areas  are  very  small  towns.  There  exists  a  curious  pattern  in  which  Pemba  island  has 
most  of  the  urban  centres  and  this  can  be  explained  by  the  ethnic  and  class  composition 
in  the  island.  Most  of  the  islanders  have  often  been  of  Shirazi  and  Arab  descent  and 
historically  have  been  the  more  privileged  and  wealthier  groups  and  with  their  wealth 
they  were  able  to  transform  small  settlements  into  small  towns  to  suit  their  lifestyles. 
In  1978  about  30°x5  of  the  population  resided  in  urban  areas.  The  largest  urban  centre  is 
Zanzibar  Town.  it  exhibits  urban  primacy  and  over  71%  of  the  total  urban  population 
(110.500)  in  the  isles  reside  there.  Since  the  Revolution  migration  has  tended  to  focus 
towards  Zanzibar  Town. 
Between  1967  and  1978,  there  were  significant  urban  population  growth  rates  in  Pemba 
too,  with  Mkoani  registering  an  annual  growth  rate  of  10.7%  and  Chake  Chake  with 
6.2%  (Table  8.7).  The  combined  factors  of  rural  deprivation  and  urban  attraction 
contributed  to  this  growth.  Social  and  economic  changes  initiated  during  the  First 
Phase,  including  land  redistribution,  the  curtailment  of  rice  imports  in  an  effort  to 
'encourage'  domestic  production,  depressed  producer  prices,  lack  of  agricultural  credit 
and  low  rate  of  technology  utilisation,  led  to  agriculture  being  neglected  or  abandoned. 304 
with  the  younger  population  moving  to  urban  areas  in  search  of  alternative  economic 
opportunities.  The  land  redistribution  exercise  affected  medium  and  large  land  owners 
and  younger  members  of  their  families  subsequently  migrated  to  urban  areas  or 
emigrated.  Lack  of  experience,  capital  and  labour  affected  many  new  and  small  clove 
farmers  who  replaced  those  whose  land  was  appropriated  by  the  state  or  who  chose  to 
abandon  clove  production  altogether.  From  discussions  with  agricultural  officers  and 
historians,  it  was  mentioned  that  the  destruction  of  clove  trees  was  also  caused  by 
Inexperienced  pickers  and  some  disaffected  people.  This  contributed  to  crop  diseases  and 
other  damage  leading  to  losses  in  production  capacity.  Migration  deprived  rural  areas  of 
its  more  energetic  and  skilled  human  resources  thus  further  swinging  negotiating  and 
bargaining  powers  from  rural  to  urban  areas. 
Urban  Area  1967  Census  1978  Census  Annual  Growth 
Ra  % 
Zanzibar  Town  68490  110506  4.4 
Wete  4469  12874  3.8 
Chake  Chake  8868  9640  6.2 
Mkoani  1714  5678  10.7 
Total  83541  138698,  4.6 
Source:  GoZ.  1984. 
Table  10.7  Population  Growth  rates  for  urban  areas,  1967-1978 
Although  the  percentage  increase  in  urban  population  growth  rates  are  higher  In  Pemba, 
the  actual  numbers  are  much  smaller  compared  to  Unguja.  It  may  be  recalled  that  large 
parts  of  Pemba  were  the  bastion  of  the  opposition  parties  in  the  period  leading  up  to  the 
Revolution  and  a  number  of  people  there  gave  no  support  the  regimes  (First  and  Seconca. 
They  had  lost  political  and  economic  power  and  their  dominant  position  in  the  class  and 
ethnic  hierarchy  that  existed.  Hence  those  with  external  ethnic  or  other  connections 
emigrated.  while  those  with  urban  connections  migrated  from  rural  to  urban  areas. 
Apart  from  labour  and  management  skills  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  there  was  also 
a  flight  of  capital  from  rural  areas. 
Regional 
Head  -q  uarters 
Total  Population 
Male  Female 
Percentage  of 
Urban 
Population 
Sex  Ratio  Child-Adult 
Ratio 
Male  Female 
Zanzibar  53592  56914  71.3  94  .  43  .  42 
Town 
Wete  6196  6678  8.3  93  .  50  . 48 
Chake  Chake  4597  5043  6.2  91  .  55  .  49 
Mkokotoni  577  593  0.8  97  .  53  .  66 
Mkoani  426  406  0.5  105  . 
47  .  49 
Total  65388  69634  87.1 
Source:  1978  Census 
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The  patterns  of  antra-regional  and  rural-urban  migration  between  1967  and  1977  show 
that  the  largest  volume  of  migration  is  from  rural  areas  to  the  regional  urban  centres, 
mainly  Zanzibar  Town.  The  volume  of  rural-urban  migration  was  three  times  that  of 
rural  to  district  urban  centres.  Such  a  trend  is  expected  given  the  smaller  size  and 
opportunities  available  in  district  towns  and  the  peripheral  locations  of  some  of  them. 
Urban  to  rural  migration  is  insignificant  (Table  8.8).  However,  district  urban  centres 
still  exert  some  attraction  having  an  effective  ratio  of  +.  60. 
Urban  sex  ratios  are  predominantly  in  favour  of  females,  for  all  the  major  urban  centres 
with  the  exception  of  Mkoani,  in  Pemba  (Table  10.8).  They  are  most  imbalanced  in 
Chake  Chake  and  Wete  in  Pemba,  followed  by  Zanzibar  Town.  This  would  suggest  that 
there  is  a  considerably  greater  tendency  for  migration  of  young  women  from  rural  to 
urban  areas,  either  following  relatives,  in  search  of  work  or  due  to  marriage. 
The  volume  of  inter-regional  urban  migration  was  much  higher  than  that  of  intra- 
regional  rural-urban  migrations.  Regional  headquarters  were  the  main  receiving  areas, 
while  rural  zones  frequently  are  the  main  source  areas  (Table  10.9). 
Place  of 
residence  (1967) 







ness  ratio 
Regional  2867  310  3177  +2557  +.  80 
Headquarters 
District  1214  304  1518  +910  +.  60 
Headquarters 
Rural  Areas.  295  3762  4057  -3467  -.  85 
I  Total  4376  4376  87521  -  _j  - 
Source:  1978  Census. 
Table  10.9  Volume  of  In  and  Out  Migration  between  urban  and  Rural  areas 
(1967-1978) 
In  the  1967-1978  intercensal  years.  Zanzibar's  urban  population  growth  rate  was 
estimated  to  be  4.6%  per  annum  (GoZ,  1981)  implying  that  rural  areas  continued  to  lose 
their  populations  (Table  10.9).  This  has  severe  implications  in  the  losing  areas  given  the 
smaller  numbers  remaining  and  the  absence  of  appropriate  technology  in  rural 
production  and  the  low  level  of  technology  utilisation.  This  creates  a  situation  of  labour 
shortages  in  an  otherwise  labour  demanding  environment. 
By  inference,  a  proportion  of  the  male  adult  population  subsequently  migrated  to  the 
Mainland,  Kenya  or  Middle  East,  leaving  behind  a  higher  urban  female  sex  ratio.  The 
destinations  are  mentioned  because  of  the  historical  ties  that  exist  with  Zanzibar. 
Clearly  through  restricting  population  movement,  Zanzibar  has,  denied  itself  the 
advantages  of  emigration  acting  as  a  safety  valve,  and  of  emigrants'  remittances  flowing 
back  to  the  Isles  to  act  as  an  injection  of  revenue.  By  the  early  1980s  the  effects  of 306 
population  pressure  on  resources  became  increasingly  apparent.  This  ranges  from  the 
per  capita  requirements  of  various  services,  such  as  health  and  education,  to  transport 
infrastructure,  housing,  urban  amenities,  and  ultimately  even  land  based  resources. 
Such  a  situation  has  caused  widespread  concern  and  in  discussions  with  government 
officials  most  showed  an  awareness  and  sensitivity  to  the  situation.  One  report  notes 
that;  The  forest  area  of  Zanzibar  has  declined  significantly  in  recent  years  because  of 
the  growing  demand  for  firewood  and  building  poles  and  the  shortening  of  fallow  periods 
in  the  coral  rag  areas"  (GoZ,  1987:  33).  This  attests  to  the  gravity  of  the  situation. 
The  same  report  reveals  the  considerable  and  growing  pressure  on  the  very  limited  and 
diminishing  resources  for  providing  essential  services  and  the  pressure  is  ever 
increasing  with  the  fast  growing  population.  It  goes  on  to  state  that: 
`Zanzibar's  population  is  estimated  to  have  increased  by  one  third  since  1976. 
During  that  time,  real  GDP  per  capita  fell  by  44%.  Unfortunately,  the  decline  in 
Zanzibar's  economy  has  meant  that  it  has  been  unable  to  sustain  its  social 
services.  Buildings,  such  as  schools  and  other  physical  infrastructure, 
particularly  the  water  supply  and  road  system,  have  deteriorated  badly  through 
lack  of  maintenance  and  spare  parts.  Although  services  have  continued  to  grow,  if 
only  to  keep  pace  with  population  growth,  the  quality  has  declined  as  the  resources 
required  to  sustain  them  have  diminished  steadily"  (GoZ,  1987:  87). 
Just  as  there  is  pressure  on  financial  resources  and  personnel,  there  is  also  considerable 
pressure  on  natural  resources,  terrestrial  and  marine,  all  of  which  are  of  immediate  need 
to  the  majority  of  the  population.  Obviously  the  existing  trends  are  far  from  sustainable 
and  poses  a  threat  to  the  delicate  ecology  of  the  Isles. 
1Q.  3.6  Urbanisation  and  the  bureaucracy 
Remittances,  migration  and  emigration  are  part  of  a  tendency  which  is  intricately 
linked  to  urbanisation.  It  has  been  shown  in  the  previous  chapter  that  Zanzibar 
experiences  a  relatively  high  degree  of  urbanisation,  and  this  undoubtedly  contributes 
towards  urban  bias  (Lipton,  1975,1977).  The  tendency  for  bloated  bureaucratic 
structures  to  exist  in  SIS  was  discussed  In  chapter  four.  Zanzibar  is  no  exception  to  these 
tendencies.  Earlier  in  this  chapter  the  size  of  the  public  sector  in  terms  of  employment 
was  shown  to  be  quite  large  and  the  economic  reality  implies  that  the  government  is 
unable  to  continue  to  support  it.  A  large  number  of  those  employed  by  the  government 
tend  to  be  in  urban  areas.  Much  of  the  employment  is  on  the  basis  of  personal  contacts 
and  kinship  and  a  system  of  patronage.  Even  if  economic  logic  suggests  that  the 
bureaucracy  be  reduced  rapidly,  island  practice  will  resist  it.  In  the  ERP  it  was  planned  to 
retire  staff  over  the  age  of  55  in  just  6  months!  This  was  unrealistic,  and  of  course  did  not 
occur  and  reflects  the  general  lack  of  understanding  of  the  sensitivity  of  this  matter  in 
SIS.  In  addition  vacant  posts  were  to  be  abolished,  future  employment  restricted  and  a 
register  of  staff  be  prepared. 307 
It  is  projected  that  by  the  mid-1990s  well  over  35%  of  the  population  will  be  in  urban 
areas.  The  average  urban  population  of  19  small  low-income  countries  is  29%  of  the 
population  (Commonwealth  Secretariat,  1991).  Zanzibar's  urban  population  is  just 
above  that  (estimated  to  be  34%  by  early  1990s).  Such  a  large  proportion  also  entails  an 
equal  demand  on  urban  and  other  amenities  and  is  a  potent  source  of  political  pressure 
on  government  and  the  whole  system  based  on  personalism  and  patronage.  Unless  there 
does  occur  a  dramatic  change  in  the  fortunes  of  the  rural  sector,  urban  growth  will 
continue  to  outpace  the  rural.  The  weight  of  the  evidence  briefly  discussed  here  and  in 
greater  length  in  the  preceding  chapter,  supports  the  contention  that  a  high  degree  of 
urbanisation  exists  in  Zanzibar.  While  not  a  new  phenomenon,  it  has  certainly 
accelerated  over  recent  years  and  is  indicative  of  the  pressures  occurring  in  rural  areas. 
Given  the  urban  nature  of  bureaucracy  and  the  need  to  support  the  ebbing  economy  and 
the  growing  urban  population,  the  issue  of  spatial  resource  distribution  becomes  biased 
Moreover  these  are  in  short  supply.  so  it  has  emerged  that  the  most  realistic  option  is  to 
adopt  policy  measures  which  will  attract  additional  resources  from  outwith  the  Isles.  In 
this  respect  Zanzibar  has  opted  to  solicit,  amongst  other  means.  international  aid,  loans 
and  grants. 
1Qa7  Migration  trends  in  recent  years 
There  is  no  reason  to  suggest  that  rural-urban  migration  would  be  reduced  significantly 
between  1978  and  the  1980s.  Regrettably,  the  migration  data  and  analysis  for  the  1988 
Census  was  to  be  published  by  1991  from  which  it  would  have  been  possible  to  test  the 
hypotheses  made  here  was  not  available.  However,  some  inferences  can  be  made  from 
the  socio-economic  survey  of  the  Isles  (chapters  12  and  13)  regarding  migration  patterns 
and  trends.  The  suggestions  are  that  rural-urban  migration  has  continued  and 
international  migration  (including  to  the  Mainland)  may  have  increased  in  volume 
although  the  duration  may  be  shorter  and  the  patterns  increasingly  cyclic. 
Between  1978  and  1988  population  growth  rates  have  increased  (3%  per  annum).  Between 
1967  and  1978  it  was  2.7%  per  annum.  Trends  in  fertility.  mortality  and  emigration 
suggest  that  growth  rates  will  remain  high.  For  example.  it  is  unlikely  that  the  Crude 
Birth  Rates  will  fall  within  the  near  future.  The  average  number  of  children  desired  by 
Zanzibari  women  between  the  ages  of  12-49  years  is  6.5  (n=13,249)  and  it  is  estimated 
that  there  have  been  only  modest  decreases  in  Infant  Mortality  Rates,  from  135/  1000  to 
130/000  between  1978  and  1988  (GoZ,  1989).  This  is  despite  the  considerable  efforts  of 
government  and  health  agencies  over  the  last  two  decades  to  reduce  their  level.  Infant 
Mortality  Rates  are  higher  in  rural  areas  (average  =  133/  1000)  compared  to  urban  areas 
(Zanzibar  Town  average  =  113/  1000)  and  these  differentials  are  attributed  to  differences 
In  knowledge,  attitudes  and  practices  in  all  aspects  of  primary  health  care  between  rural 
and  urban  areas  (GoZ.  1989). 308 
Crude  Death  Rates  were  17/  1000  in  1978  and  given  the  higher  population  growth  between 
1978  and  1988  it  is  very  likely  that  this  too  has  decreased  somewhat.  In  1978  the 
emigration  rate  was  -0.5%  but  given  the  changing  socio-economic  situation  that  has 
occurred  since.  it  is  likely  that  the  rate  of  permanent  emigration  may  have  decreased, 
even  if  slightly. 
Clearly  population  growth  rates  have  increased,  and  so  for  the  1978-1988  intercensal 
period  it  was  readjusted  upwards  from  2.7%  to  3.0%  per  annum.  With  over  226,184 
people  now  living  in  urban  areas,  implies  that  35.3%  of  the  population  are  urban 
residents,  an  increase  of  about  2.7%  from  1978.  Interestingly,  this  indicates  that  the  rate 
of  urbanisation  has  decreased  between  1978-1988.1  The  reasons  for  this  can  be  partly 
explained  by  the  freedom  of  movement  that  has  been  permitted  since  1984/85,  and 
consequently  an  increased  level  of  the  urban  population  moves  on  to  the  Mainland  and 
other  areas  outside  Zanzibar.  However,  this  may  in  fact  contribute  to  less  emigration,  as 
some  migrants  perceive  their  movements  as  temporary  and  maintain  two  or  more 
households  on  either  side.  Predictably,  the  forthcoming  migration  analysis  of  the  1988 
census  should  confirm  these  movements  and  trends. 
Such  perceptions  introduce  a  contentious  situation  regarding  the  definition  of  migration 
or  emigration.  For  example  there  is  evidence  that  the  frequency  and  volume  of  travel 
between  Zanzibar  and  the  Mainland  and  between  Zanzibar  and  elsewhere  have  increased 
substantially  after  1984  in  response  to  freedom  of  movement  and  liberalisation.  From 
discussions  with  officials  in  the  department  of  statistics,  many  of  those  involved  in  this 
upsurge  in  movement  are  people  engaged  in  economic  activities,  and  those  from 
Zanzibar  often  stay  with  kin  on  the  Mainland  or  elsewhere,  and  may  even  establish 
another  home  there.  However,  most  perceive  their  'permanent  abode'  as  being  in  the 
Isles  even  if  they  have  stayed  on  the  Mainland  over  the  past  5  years  or  more.  In  the  light 
of  the  frequent  contacts  they  have  with  'home'  (Zanzibar),  they  do  not  consider 
themselves  as  having  migrated  or  emigrated.  Moreover  the  short  distances  involved, 
especially  to  the  Mainland  (about  40  Km.  )  adds  to  this  complication.  This  is  interesting 
and  lends  support  to  the  fact  that  perhaps  the  officially  declared  volumes  of  remittances 
are  a  fraction  of  what  actually  flows  in  given  the  fact  that  travellers  can  carry  on  their 
person  any  amount  of  money. 
103.8  Population  densities  (1967-1988)  and  migration 
The  net  effects  of  the  demographic  trends  is  that  the  Isles'  population  will  grow  much 
faster  and  continue  to  pressurise  the  limited  resources  (as  demonstrated  in  chapters  8 
1  At  the  time  of  writing  the  information  required  for  further  analysis  of  urban  growth  was  not  available  despite 
assurances  that  they  would  have  been  published  by  that  time.  Thus  the  figures  for  urban  population  are  our  own 
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and  9).  A  comparison  of  population  densities  in  1967,1978  and  1988  shows  that  some 
districts  have  experienced  faster  growing  populations  causing  significant  population 
pressure  in  the  agriculturally  fertile  areas  (figures  10.2.10.3  and  10.4).  and  in  the  capital 
(Town  and  West  district).  By  1988  population  densities  in  the  rural  districts  of  Zanzibar 
varied  between  350  persons  per  square  kilometre  in  Wete  (Pemba)  to  99  persons  per 
square  kilometre  in  Central  district.  The  variations  in  population  densities  to  some 
extent  reflect  soil  types  and  natural  fertility  and  the  agricultural  or  economic  activities 
taking  place  in  there. 
In  districts  where  population  densities  are  very  high  (e.  g.  Pemba  in  general  and  North-A 
in  Unguja)  it  is  believed  that  the  carrying  capacity  of  the  land  has  been  reached  and 
especially  when  livestock  populations  are  also  considered.  1  This  may  help  to  explain 
why  there  has  been  a  tendency  for  inter-island  migration  flows  to  be  predominantly  in 
the  direction  of  Unguja  island,  and  within  rural  areas,  towards  soil  rich  and/or  urban 
areas. 
The  high  population  densities  in  Pemba  island  reveal  some  of  the  explanations  for 
migration.  First  there  is  a  movement  from  areas  of  poorer  soil  fertility  to  richer  ones, 
then  rural  to  urban,  Pemba  to  Unguja  and  finally  emigration  from  the  Isles.  Similarly 
there  are  movements  from  the  southern  and  central  areas  of  Unguja  to  the  north  and 
urban  areas.  Such  movements  explain  the  higher  population  growth  in  agriculturally 
fertile  and  urban  areas.  Despite  this,  even  in  the  soil  poor  areas,  population  densities 
continue  to  grow.  reflecting  fertility  trends. 
1  District  breakdowns  for  livestock  were  not  available,  but  generally  there  are  more  livestock  in  Pemba  island. 310 
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Figure  10.2  District  population  densities,  1967 311 
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Fignre  10.3  District  population  densities,  1978 312 
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Figure  10.4  District  population  densities,  1988 313 
The  liberal  policies  of  the  mid-1980s  have  indirectly  encouraged  movements  to  the 
Mainland.  They  have  also  targeted  emigrant  Zanzibaris  wherever  they  may  be  to  utilise 
resources  they  have  and  encourage  them  to  invest  in  the  Isles.  With  such  encouragement 
and  the  ever  diminishing  employment  and  other  economic  opportunities  in  the  Isles, 
migration  in  the  post-1980s  was  inevitable.  Trading  activities  between  the  Mainland 
and  Isles,  and  improvements  in  the  marine  and  air  transport  services  encourage  these 
movements.  From  1983/84  there  has  been  a  sharp  increase  in  passenger  movement, 
both  embarking  and  disembarking  (Figure  10.5).  These  include  traders  and  business 
persons  taking  advantage  of  the  new  opportunities,  included  in  this  growing  volume  of 
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Figure  10.5  Embarking  and  disembarking  Air  and  Sea  Passengers  (1978-1988) 
Given  restrictive  immigration  policies  still  being  enforced  by  the  Zanzibari  government, 
immigration  from  the  Mainland  would  be  negligible.  However,  even  here  there  are 
considerable  movements  especially  during  clove  harvest  times  when  labour  demand 
tends  to  peak.  Some  of  those  participating  in  these  activities  choose  to  remain  to  fill  in 
the  general  shortage  of  labour  in  rural  areas. 
Policies  restricting  immigration  were  recently  questioned  when  the  government 
announced  that  a  joint  team  had  been  formed  to  study  and  recommend  uniform 
immigration  laws  for  the  United  Republic  of  Tanzania.  The  Daily  News  (August  21, 
1988:  p.  3)  reported  that  "The  Minister  of  State  in  the  Second  Vice-President's  Office, 
Emb  ed 
Di 
-  ------ 
embark 
-  -----  ---  - 
" 
------  -  -  ---------- 
Ndugu  Ali  Salum  Mohamed  has  said  that  the  use  of  passports  for  travel  between  the 
Mainland  and  Zanzibar  was  necessary  to  control  the  movement  of  people.  "  This 314 
confirms  that  the  Isles  government  is  still  sensitive  regarding  movements  of  population 
especially  to  Zanzibar.  This  phenomena  is  not  unique  to  Zanzibar  and  most  SIS  now  ban 
permanent  immigration  except  in  cases  where  specialists  are  required  on  grounds  of 
limited  space  and  high  population  densities  (Caldwell  et  al.  1980:  134).  On  the  other 
extreme  some  employed,  and  indeed  still  employ.  periodic  immigration  to  solve 
population  crises  (e.  g.  Cape  Verde  and  Seychelles).  By  virtue  of  being  a  partner  in  the 
Union  Zanzibar  can  effectively  encourage  some  of  Its  "excess"  population  to  spill  over  to 
the  much  less  densely  populated  Mainland. 
1Q3.8  Migration  and  emigration  -  The  costs 
Apart  from  the  possibility  of  potential  emigrants  going  to  the  Mainland  and  nearby 
areas  such  as  Kenya,  a  small,  but  not  unimportant  section  (in  terms  of  education  and 
skills)  of  the  population  with  kin  in  the  Middle  East  also  leave. 
Those  who  have  successfully  managed  to  emigrate  often  remit  money  and  goods  back 
home.  Evidence  of  the  positive  aspects  of  remittances  in  Zanzibar  appear  in  the  form  of 
new  housing  and  small  businesses  such  as  cafes  which  in  turn  contribute  to  the 
construction  industry.  trade  and  commerce.  Many  goods  appearing  on  the  new  private 
sector  dominated  retail  market  originate  from  the  Middle  East,  especially  Oman  and  the 
Emirates.  Other  come  from  the  Far  East  e.  g.  Hong  Kong,  Taiwan,  and  Singapore 
(personal  communications  with  2  of  the  largest  and  fastest  growing  private  trading 
enterprises  in  Zanzibar  Town). 
Based  on  the  prevailing  economic  situation  in  the  Isles  and  precedents  In  other  SIS,  the 
motivations  for  emigrating  are  often  economic,  however,  it  is  pertinent  to  assess  to  what 
degree  such  a  situation  exists.  It  is  useful  to  identify  which  members  of  the  family  unit 
emigrate,  their  destinations,  what  are  the  economic  gains  and  the  spatial  implications 
of  migration/emigration.  These  questions  are  raised  and  the  results  presented  and 
analysed  in  the  following  chapters  (12  and  13).  The  following  plates  (Plate  3  and  4)  show 
an  aspect  that  is  striking  when  visiting  rural  areas,  that  is  most  of  the  population 
consists  of  the  very  young  and  very  old.  This  means  that  the  more  able  bodied  youth 
have  left.  Consequently  there  is  an  artificial  shortage  of  qualitative  labour  in  rural 
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Plate  3  Rural-urban  migration  has  removed  the  able  bodied  youth  leaving  behind  the 
very  young  and  old 
Plate  4  Mothers  and  children  attending  a  nutrition  class  in  rural  Unggja 316 
Emigration/migration  does  not  only  entail  benefits,  there  are  also  costs,  to  the 
household,  the  rural  economy  and  the  country.  especially  if  there  are  no  or  very  little 
flows  in  terms  of  remittances.  Other  equally  important  costs  include  higher  dependency 
ratios  as  a  result  of  the  younger  population  moving  away  leaving  behind  a  few  who 
shoulder  the  burden  of  the  very  young  and  very  old.  The  rural  areas  lose  the  more 
energetic,  skilled  and  innovative  individuals  and  this  loss  may  not  be  compensated 
either  by  remittances  or  by  other  form  of  trickle-down  effects  from  urban  and  national 
development  (Connell,  1980;  Jones,  1990).  Agricultural  decline  enhanced  by  labour 
shortages  and  in  turn  production  of  cash  and  food  crops  falls.  Given  that  most  emigrants 
tend  to  be  males,  the  sex  ratio  is  expected  to  change,  showing  a  greater  female  to  male 
ratio  in  towns  as  more  and  more  young  men  emigrate  to  seek  economic  opportunities 
elsewhere.  Likewise,  the  rural  sex  ratios  are  expected  to  change  as  more  and  more  women 
migrate  to  urban  areas.  In  both  cases  there  are  labour  implications.  For  example  an 
Interesting  observation  in  Zanzibar  Town  is  that  women  take  up  some  jobs  which 
hitherto  were  done  by  men,  this  includes  labourers  in  the  construction  industry. 
Cultural  changes  occur  as  new.  though  not  always  necessarily  better.  Ideas  and 
behaviour  are  brought  back.  Traditional  social  cohesion  is  threatened  by  greater 
individualism  which  is  generated  by  some  of  those  moving  away  as  they  settle  elsewhere 
and  fail  to  maintain  their  links  with  the  areas  they  originate  from.  The  recent 
migration  trends  and  patterns  will  undoubtedly  have  a  number  of  socio-cultural 
implications.  Roux  in  his  study  of  Wallis  (1980)  noted  that  migration  has  numerous 
socio-cultural  effects  on  society.  The  decline  of  customary  authority  is  anticipated  along 
with  the  increasing  contacts  with  the  outside  world  and  growing  independence  of 
individuals  with  money  incomes.  This  situation  is  expected  to  be  further  exacerbated  by 
the  development  of  the  tourist  sector,  the  arrival  of  wealthier  visitors,  and  the  adoption 
and  enhancement  of  new  consumption  patterns  and  trends,  and  possibly  even  a  decline 
in  religious  observance  and  other  behaviour. 
An  example  of  negative  consequences  of  emigration  occurs  in  the  Comoros,  where 
according  to  Newitt.  (1984:  91)  "there  has  been  a  natural  tendency  for  qualified 
Comorians  to  seek  employment  abroad  and  not  return  to  the  poverty  and  lack  of 
prospects  in  the  islands*.  Closer  home,  it  was  reported  in  the  Daily  News  that 
"Representative  Bakari  Hamad  Hamisi  (Tumbe)  decried  the  abscondment  of  trained 
manpower  stressing  that  planned  development  in  all  sectors  would  stall  in  the  absence 
of  local  experts.  The  government  would  have  to  do  something  to  stop  the  brain  drain.  '  He 
said"  (The  Daily  News.  June  15,1991  p.  1).  Sunshine  (1985)  and  Hope,  (1986)  have  noted 
that  in  the  Caribbean,  there  exists  a  'visa'  mentality  and  an  obsessive  desire  to  emigrate 
hence  contributing  to  the  brain  and  skill  drain.  This  in  turn,  according  to  Lisk  (1987) 
has  hampered  the  development  of  human  resources  in  the  area.  In  the  extreme,  there  is 317 
the  case  of  Montserrat,  where  migration  has  virtually  crippled  business  development 
and  government  services  (Lowenthal  and  Comitas,  1962). 
Despite  the  disadvantages,  it  is  interesting  that  the  former  President  of  Zanzibar  and 
current  President  of  the  United  Republic  of  Tanzania,  Mr.  All  Hassan  Mwinyi,  while  on  a 
visit  to  Bonn  In  1988  told  Tanzanians  living  in  Germany  (FRG  by  then)  that.  "the 
economic  situation  back  at  home  had  greatly  improved...  He  advised  them  to  seriously 
make  plans  to  build  houses  at  home  by  sending  money  in  cash  or  goods  that  would  fetch 
them  money  to  build  houses"  (Daily  News,  September  1.1988:  p.  1).  Such  a  position 
demonstrates  the  nature  and  complexity  of  the  problem  at  hand.  Although  encouraging 
emigration  may  bring  about  some  Immediate  benefits,  there  are  some  profound  pitfalls 
related  to  development,  especially  shortages  of  skilled  personnel,  which  tends  to  plague 
many  SIS  and  Zanzibar. 
1Qa9  Migration  and  emigration:  The  benefits  (remittances) 
In  the  light  of  the  preceding  discussions,  clearly  then,  a  policy  of  persuading  emigrant 
Zanzibaris  to  contribute  in  national  development  exists,  and  this  also  includes 
encouraging  those  at  home  to  go  elsewhere  to  seek  better  economic  opportunities. 
Entrenched  in  these  policies  is  the  issue  of  remitting  incomes  to  Zanzibar  to  assist  in 
sustaining  the  economy.  There  is  the  possibility  that  in  the  short  and  medium  terms, 
remitted  incomes  may  form  the  basis  of  a  new  subsistence  economy'  in  Zanzibar. 
In  some  African  SIS  and  other  small  countries,  the  relative  importance  of  remittances  is 
very  high.  For  example  in  Cape  Verde  in  1980  remittances  accounted  for  48%  of  GDP. 
and  this,  according  to  UNCTAD  (1985:  66)  is  amongst  the  highest  proportions  recorded  in 
the  world.  A  similar  situation  existed  in  Yemen  before  the  Gulf  War.  Connell  (1988:  28) 
notes  that  remittances  "in  small  island  nations,  where  international  migration  is 
important,  as  this  represents  a  very  substantial  component  of  cash  incomes,  much  more 
than  the  contributions  made  by  international  migrants  within  Europe".  Wilson  (1989) 
comments  on  the  importance  of  migration  and  remittances  to  the  economy  of  Western 
Samoa,  which  in  many  respects  in  not  too  dissimilar  to  Zanzibar's,  in  the  light  of  its 
economic  problems,  high  population  growth  rate  (3%),  dependence  on  agriculture  in 
terms  of  exports  and  employment  and  having  a  special  economic  relationship  with 
another  country,  in  this  case  New  Zealand.  He  notes  that;  "One  of  the  most  outstanding 
features  of  the  economy  of  Western  Samoa  is  the  significance  of  invisibles  and  transfers 
in  the  current  account.  Taking  1978  as  an  example  for  which  verifiable  data  is  available, 
earnings  from  exported  commodities  contributed  21%  of  total  foreign  exchange  earnings 
whereas  private  remittances  made  up  39%.  It  is  clear  that  contribution  to  the  cash 
economy  of  the  country...  has  become  increasingly  important  in  recent  years.  "  (Wilson, 
1989:  131).  From  the  data  presented,  Zanzibar  has  clearly  arrived  at  such  a  situation  and 
has  added  a  new  characteristic  in  its  economy. 318 
In  chapter  four  it  is  shown  that  In  many  SIS,  particularly  the  smallest  ones,  remittances 
dominate  the  economy  (Rubenstein,  1983).  Connell  (1988:  27)  has  argued  that  in  many 
SIS  remittances  are  the  largest  single  source  of  foreign  exchange,  greater  then  exports  or 
aid.  Official  statistics  for  Zanzibar  show  that  remittances  have  increased  substantially 
particularly  since  1984.  This  coincides  with  the  introduction  of  liberalised  banking 
regulations,  trade  liberalisation  policies  and  the  increased  movement  of  people  to  and 
from  Zanzibar.  In  recent  years  a  dramatic  change  in  volumes  remitted  has  occurred.  For 
example,  in  1984  remittances  were  a  mere  0.1%  of  GDP.  By  1988  they  were  26.5%  of  GDP, 
signifying  a  rapid  and  substantial  growth  in  such  a  short  time  and  it  remains  a  growing 
trend  (Figure  10.6).  Data  from  the  People's  Bank  of  Zanzibar  (PBZ)  show  that  99.7%  of 
the  1988/89  remittances  were  held  in  foreign  accounts,  implying  that  only  0.3%  was  held 
in  local  currency.  Sending  remittances  in  foreign  exchange  suggests  that  a  fair  amount 
of  the  money  originates  from  outside  East  Africa  but  also  given  the  constant  devaluation 
of  the  Tanzania  Shilling  it  is  safer  and  attractive  to  hold  and  send  currency  in 
convertible  form.  Over  900/6  of  those  holding  such  accounts  were  Zanzibaris. 
However,  unofficial  remittances  have  not  been  taken  into  account  mainly  because  these 
do  not  go  through  any  'formal'  channel  and  it  is  difficult  to  assess  the  amounts  sent. 
Moreover,  it  is  complex  to  quantify  as  they  are  not  necessarily  transmitted  in  monetary 
form.  I  In  the  light  of  liberal  policies  it  can  be  assumed  that  a  large  proportion  is 
remitted  through  banks.  A  low  estimate  is  that  non-monetary  remittances  may  form  at 
least  a  third  of  the  official  transfers. 
There  were  some  remittances  filtering  in  before  1984,  it  is  believed  that  the  amounts 
were  negligible  compared  to  the  existing  situation  (personal  communications  with 
banking  officials).  To  obtain  an  indication  of  the  growing  volumes  of  personal 
remittances,  they  are  compared  against  total  foreign  exchange  earnings  (Table  10.7).  In 
1988  foreign  aid  and  loans  amounted  to  T.  Shs.  1344.8  million,  while  remittances  were 
T.  Shs  285.6  million  or  about  21.2°  of  foreign  aid  and  loans  or  38.9%  of  exports  In  for 
the  same  year.  The  sources  of  remittances  are  mainly  the  Mainland  and  the  Gulf  and 
according  to  banking  officials  there  are  indications  that  some  is  reinvested  in  small 
businesses  and  other  investments. 
Remittances  in  kind  can  come  in  the  form  of  food,  building  materials,  goods  for  sale,  such  as  electronics,  clothes 
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Figure  10.6  Total  amounts  remitted  through  banks  against  GDP 
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Figure  10.7  Total  foreign  exchange  earnings  against  personal  remittances  through 
Banks.  1984-1988 
When  total  foreign  exchange  earnings  for  Zanzibar  are  compared  against  remittances  (in 
T.  Shillings),  a  trend  similar  to  other  migration/  remittance  dependent  SIS  appears, 
introducing  a  peculiar  and  new  characteristic  in  the  economy,  which  in  turn  suggests 
that  emigration  is  a  contributing  factor  (Figure  10.7).  By  1988  private  remittances  were 
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just  over  25%  of  the  Isles'  foreign  export  earnings  (Figure  10.8).  Comparing  with 
elsewhere,  Roux  (1980)  in  an  assessment  of  remittances  of  Wallis-Futuna  between  1970- 
78  notes  that  unofficial  transfers,  or  what  he  terms  as  Tree  remittances'.  accounted  for 
between  33-5O  x6  of  annual  remittances  in  1978.1 
The  upswing  in  remittances  is  particularly  noticeable  by  1986  (Figures  10.6,10.7  and 
10.8).  By  1989/90  this  trend  was  expected  to  have  increased,  even  though  official  figures 
were  not  available?  This  suggests  that  perhaps  remittances  are  playing  an  important 
role  in  the  economy,  from  grassroots  to  higher  levels  of  social  and  economic  activities. 
If  so,  then  it  has  brought  about  formidable  changes  in  the  character  of  the  Isles' 
economy.  The  nature  of  these  investments  and  uses  of  remittances  are  discussed  and 
analysed  in  the  following  chapters,  and  generally  there  is  evidence  that  they  play  an 
important  role  in  a  large  proportion  of  households  and  especially  urban  ones. 
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Sources:  data  from  PBZ  and  NBC 
Figure  10.8  Total  amounts  remitted  through  main  banks  between  1981-1989  ('000 
T.  Shillings) 
1  Includes  consumer  goods,  plane  tickets  and  important  money  collections  for  churches. 
2  This  prediction  was  made  by  PBZ  officials  during  discussions  in  1990.  assuming  the  existing  banking  policies 
would  remain  in  force  and  other  attractive  ones  which  were  being  considered  would  be  implemented.  These 
include  streamlining  foreign  exchange  banking  processes.  Meanwhile  there  were  on-going  efforts  studying  very 
closely  financial  and  banking  procedures  in  other  SIS/IMS  within  the  region  with  the  intention  of  emulating 
what  would  be  positive  for  Zanzibar. 321 
In  Zanzibar  remittances  arrive  through  the  main  banks,  the  People's  Bank  of  Zanzibar 
(PBZ)  and  the  National  Bank  of  Commerce,  Zanzibar  Branch  (NBC).  In  the  former, 
liberal  banking  policies  advocated  by  the  government  have  allowed  Zanzibaris  to  open 
and  maintain  foreign  accounts  since  1983/84.  At  both  banks,  remittances  are  growing 
sharply  each  year  (Figure  10.8).  However,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  rapid  growth 
is  also  accounted  for  by  levels  of  devaluation  which  the  United  Republic  has  undertaken 
as  a  result  of  agreements  in  negotiations  with  the  IMF.  Thus  the  values  in  T.  Shillings 
appears  to  be  greater. 
Despite  the  liberal  economic  policies,  a  significant  proportion  of  remittances  do  not  pass 
through  banks  as  some  is  carried  physically  or  sent  in  non  monetary  form,  including 
vehicles,  and  other  high  value  consumer  and  capital  goods.  An  unknown  amount  is 
undoubtedly  being  invested  in  the  Mainland  and  possibly  elsewhere,  as  the  more 
entrepreneurial  Zanzibari  citizens  most  probably  make  good  use  of  that  opportunity. 
Reasons  for  not  remitting  through  banks  include  tax  evasion  and  the  effects  of 
traditional  (small)  business  practices  which  have  tended  to  be  informal. 
The  main  concern  is  the  duration  which  remittances  can  be  sustained.  It  can  be  argued 
that  even  if  the  flows  will  peak  in  the  short  term  and  then  subside,  once  the  early 
investments  are  made  in  appropriate  sectors,  they  will  have  allowed  a  section  of  the 
population  to  partake  in  more  meaningful  economic  activities  as  well  as  invest  in 
important  sub-sectors  such  as  housing,  diversification  within  agriculture  and  fishing. 
This  means  that  part  of  the  indigenous  resources  will  have  been  utilised  positively. 
Plate  5A  rapidly  expanding  urban  hinge  in  Zanzibar  Town  with  evidence  of 
considerable  construction  activities 322 
Although  over  time  the  amounts  and  regularity  of  remittances  tends  to  fall.  for 
international  migration  this  process  tends  to  be  slower  than  in  internal  migration. 
Given  the  thinking  of  many  migrants.  It  is  reasonably  safe  to  define  Zanzibar-Mainland 
remittances  as  international.  Given  the  nature  of  the  economy.  rural-urban  migrants 
are  unlikely  to  be  able  to  realise  amounts  large  enough  to  make  constant  remittances 
and  over  time  they  are  more  likely  to  bring  their  kin  over.  reducing  the  amounts  that  are 
sent  to  the  source  areas.  The  possibility  of  return  migration  is  considered  to  be  higher 
with  international  migration,  either  as  a  result  of  family  ties.  changing  situation  in  the 
host  country,  changing  fortunes  of  the  emigrant  or  as  a  result  of  the  emigrants  achieving 
what  they  had  set  out  to  do.  This  trend  is  quite  common.  and  not  limited  to  island 
economies. 
Insofar  as  Zanzibar  is  concerned,  there  is  the  issue  of  the  future  of  the  Union  between  the 
two  countries,  and  it  is  increasingly  becoming  a  point  of  contention  with  the  evolving 
multi-party  democracy  in  Tanzania.  There  are  several  sensitive  issues  to  be  resolved, 
including  the  nature  of  the  new  political  parties.  Will  they  be  able  to  maintain  links  with 
their  Mainland  counterparts?  What  of  parties  originating  in  Zanzibar,  will  these  be 
acceptable  in  the  Mainland?  Despite  the  end  of  the  cold  war  and  diminishing  regional 
strategic  interests.  Zanzibar,  like  most  SIS  is  still  vulnerable,  and  especially  so  with  the 
Increasing  presence  of  foreign  business  interests,  growing  Issues  of  ethnicity  and 
religious  revival. 
10.4  Aid,  Loans  and  Grants 
The  economic  recovery  programmes  initiated  and  implemented  by  the  Third  Phase 
governments  are  all  heavily  dependent  on  external  financing.  This  is  because  of 
Zanzibar's  inability  to  raise  the  revenues  required  for  its  development.  It  is  dependent 
on  external  sources  to  follow  through  the  ERP  and  stimulate  activities  which  may 
perhaps  generate  additional  revenues,  which  in  turn  may  allow  it  to  become  more  self- 
reliant  in  the  future.  This  is  another  curious  yet  common  characteristic  of  many 
developing  SIS  and  SS;  that  it  has  often  become  necessary  to  be  dependent  to  achieve 
greater  self-reliance! 
Given  the  pessimistic  scenario  over  the  short  term,  and  the  extremely  limited  foreign 
exchange  earning  capacity,  it  is  complex  and  virtually  impossible  to  obtain  loans  from 
external  sources,  as  repayments  are  difficult.  '  The  government  undertook  specific 
policy  measures  to  be  eligible  for  international  aid.  The  consultancy  which  carried  out 
the  review  and  assessment  of  the  economy  of  Zanzibar  to  identify  development  problems 
and  formulate  the  ERP  was  itself  part  of  an  aid  package.  2  The  report  recommends  that 
1  If  a  country  risk  index  were  to  be  computed  for  the  Isles.  it  is  unlikely  to  be  favourable  for  loan  considerations. 
2  This  is  the  consultancy  review  by  Peat  Marwick  McLintock  with  the  assistance  of  Mokoro  Limited  financed  by 323 
the  government  Immediately  seek  aid  from  external  sources  to  embark  on  the  proposed 
projects.  "...  the  ERP  can  only  materialise  with  extraordinary  assistance  from 
international  donors.  Zanzibar  should  make  every  effort  to  secure  increased 
commitments  from  donors  both  for  balance  of  payment  support,  rehabilitation  projects 
and  technical  assistance.  Because  of  Zanzibar's  links  with  the  Gulf,  particular  attention 
should  be  paid  to  attracting  increased  assistance  from  that  region"  (op.  cit.  :  17).  Finally 
the  summary  supports  the  GoZ's  stated  intention  of  setting  up  a  donor  conference  to 
launch  the  ERP.  However,  even  as  the  report  was  released,  a  glimpse  at  the  Second  Union 
Five  Year  Plan  (1988-1993)  reveals  that  a  large  proportion  of  the  development  projects 
proposed  in  It  required  a  significant  proportion  of  external  financing,  most  of  which  is 
expected  to  come  from  donors.  '  By  1986/87  over  60%  of  Zanzibar's  development  budget 
requires  a  foreign  component.  This  is  an  exceptionally  high  proportion  even  by  SIS 
standards.  Comparatively,  the  Mainland's  proportion  for  foreign  component 
requirements  for  the  development  budget  is  just  under  50%.  Focus  of  most  of  the  projects 
in  the  ERP  Is  on  re-developing  the  economic  infrastructure,  which  over  the  years  has 
deteriorated  immensely. 
For  the  Isles  this  new  trend  is  not  atypical.  If  anything.  Zanzibar  has  been  a  very  late 
arrival  at  the  international  borrowing  and  aid  receiving  scene.  This  is  not  entirely 
unusual  because  of  the  extremely  limited  prospects  for  sustained  economic  growth  for 
most  IMS/SIS,  they  no  options  but  to  look  towards  foreign  aid  and  external  investment 
as  a  means  of  solving  economic  problems  to  a  greater  extent  than  in  larger  countries 
(Connell,  1988:  75).  Zanzibar's  current  situation  provides  a  strong  case  for  urgent 
external  assistance.  Interestingly  too.  is  the  fact  that  overall  per  capita  aid  flows  to 
SIS/IMS  have  been  exceptionally  high  by  global  levels  (Connell  op.  cit.  )  They  are  even 
higher  for  those  places  which  have  continued  to  remain  territories  with  a  dependent 
relationship  such  as  the  French  overseas  departements  (e.  g..  La  Reunion  in  the  Indian 
Ocean  and  Martinique  in  the  Caribbean).  According  to  Sevelle,  (1984:  22)  in  nine  Pacific 
states  aid  is  equivalent  to  50.6  of  all  income  and  in  twelve  over  50%  of  their  respective 
government  expenditures.  Insofar  as  Zanzibar  is  concerned  this  is  a  new  but  common 
trend  with  other  SIS.  and  a  significant  departure  from  its  early  post-Revolution 
experiences  where  aid  and  loans  were  a  small  fraction  of  its  development  budget. 
the  Overseas  Development  Administration  following  a  request  for  technical  assistance  in  this  area  from  the 
Zanzibar  Permanent  Planning  Commission  (PPC). 
This  plan  is  also  based  on  a  wider  Economic  Recovery  Programme  covering  the  Union.  but  which  pays  little 
attention  to  the  specific  problems  of  Zanzibar  hence  the  recommendation  which  subsequently  came  about 
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Figure.  10.9  Contributions  of  Donors  and  GcZ  in  Public  Investment  Programmes  in 
Zanzibar,  1987-1991 
Given  the  extremely  low  per  capita  income  and  GDP  compared  to  most  other  SIS/IMS, 
and  especially  large  developing  countries,  the  actual  volume  of  aid,  loans  and  grants  in 
Zanzibar  is  comparatively  small,  and  perhaps  this  explains  why  it  has  not  been  very 
difficult  to  attract  aid.  Given  the  situation  of  SIS  in  general.  Zanzibar  has  a  greater 
potential  to  obtain  aid.  However,  earlier  policies  rejected  this  approach,  instead 
stressing  on  self-reliance  and  was  supported  when  clove  prices  were  higher.  More 
recently,  it  even  lacks  the  capacity  to  absorb  efficiently  development  assistance  and  this 
is  yet  another  constraining  factor  which  is  largely  a  result  of  lack  of  skilled  and 
experienced  personnel.  The  confusion  relating  to  the  process  and  role  of  attracting  aid 
and  loans  within  the  Union  have  been  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  but  this  has 
now  been  resolved.  Until  the  1980s  it  exhibited  a  negative  image  to  the  main  donors 
(Western  economies)  being  the  so  called  'Cuba  of  Africa'.  Zanzibar  has  frequently  tended 
to  look  towards  the  East  rather  than  the  West  for  development  assistance,  the  latter  of 
which  is  often  the  more  'generous'  provider  of  loans  and  aid.  During  the  first  phase  the 
largest  share  of  its  loans  and  aid  came  from  China  and  East  Germany. 
The  funding  for  Public  Investment  Programme  between  1987/88  -  1991/92  shows  that 
over  82%  of  the  total  investment  comes  from  external  sources  and  the  remainder  from 
the  GoZ.  Figure  10.9  shows  the  respective  proportions  towards  public  investment 
programmes  between  1987-1992.  External  funding  has  become  the  dominant  source  of 
development  in  Zanzibar  to  proportions  which  exceed  by  far  most  other  SIS  and 
confirms  the  change  that  has  happened  during  the  Third  Phase  with  respect  to  depending 
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on  external  sources  for  the  Isles'  development  objectives.  Zanzibar  is  almost  totally 
dependent  on  foreign  funding  for  its  development  and  this  situation  is  unlikely  to 
change  for  the  foreseeable  future.  This  trend  highlights  one  of  the  most  significant 
differences  between  the  Third  Phase  and  the  previous  ones.  With  about  90%  of  its 
development  budget  dependent  on  external  financing,  evidently  Zanzibar  is  exploiting 
the  'small  country  bias'  that  marks  the  aid-giving  policies  of  most  donor  nations  (Eisen, 
1973;  De  Vries,  1975). 
Loans  accounted  for  just  about  12%  of  the  total  development  budget.  It  is  also  difficult 
for  the  country  to  obtain  these  for  amongst  other  reasons;  "loans  are  a  Union  matter  in 
which  Zanzibar  is  competing  for  assistance  with  other  parts  of  the  Union.  "  (GoZ,  1988:  4). 
It  Is  difficult  to  ascertain  the  amounts  received  in  aid  and  loans  prior  to  the  Third  Phase, 
but  most  of  these  have  been  through  domestic  borrowing  and  from  Mainland  banks. 
The  increased  dependency  on  external  resources  is  in  recognition  of  the  situation  in  the 
Isles  and  its  special  problems  and  requirements.  In  relation  to  this  the  ERP  Summary 
notes  that  "As  many  of  Zanzibar's  problems  are  similar  to  those  of  the  Mainland,  the 
majority  of  the  ERP  prescriptions  are  appropriate  for  Zanzibar.  However,  Zanzibar 
needs  to  develop  its  own  ERP  to  take  into  account  Zanzibar's  particular  problems  and 
possibilities"  (op.  cit.:  4).  It  further  recommends  that  "Zanzibar  should  ensure  that  the 
Mainland  is  aware  of  Zanzibar's  economic  interests  through  regular  consultation;  when 
URT's  policies  are  still  not  appropriate,  Zanzibar  should  investigate  ways  to  alleviate 
the  consequences"  (op.  cit.:  5).  Thus  even  if  it  had  been  long  recognised  that  the  Isles 
required  a  separate  approach  in  a  number  of  its  development  aspects,  it  is  not  until 
1987/88  that  a  formal  recognition  and  pronouncement  was  made,  and  subsequent 
policies  clearly  show  that  these  are  now  being  implemented.  Examples  of  this  include 
the  fact  that  Zanzibar  led  the  way  in  liberalising  its  economy  well  before  the  Mainland. 
Available  data  show  the  relative  important  position  that  has  been  taken  up  by  grants 
and  loans  between  1986-1988  (number  5  in  Table  10.9).  Between  1986-1988,  as  a 
proportion  of  total  imports,  loans  and  grants  have  decreased  mainly  because  of  the 
government's  inability  to  access  these  and  also  partly  due  to  deliberate  policies 
restricting  borrowing  due  to  the  accumulation  of  debt. 
Table  10.10  shows  recent  programmes  and  projects  which  focus  on  the  rehabilitation 
and  maintenance  of  the  economic  infrastructure  and  the  geographical  sources  of  funding 
(donors).  Most  of  the  projects  are  donor  assisted  and  a  minority  comprise  of  loans  such 
as  those  through  the  African  Development  Bank,  which  is  yet  another  indication  of  the 
economic  difficulty  that  Zanzibar  has  in  obtaining  loans.  As  in  the  experience  of  the 
Gambia,  receiving  loans  from  multilateral  agencies  is  preferred  compared  to  those  from 
bilateral  agreements  which  often  entail  political  conditions,  many  of  which  may  not  be 
in  the  interest  of  the  receiving  country. 326 
1986 
US  $  Mill. 
1987 
US  $  Mill. 
1988 
US  $  Mill. 
COMMODITIES 
1.  Exports  10.0  2.9  5.9 
2.  Imports  31.5  19.9  18.2 
3.  Balance  of  Trade  -21.5  -17.0  -12.3  4.  Trade  Credit  4.4  2.5  0.7 
5.  Grant  &  Loans  LLI  jU  1Q,  2 
6.  Balance  of  Trade  0.2  -2.6  -2.0  SERVICES 
1.  Total  earnings  0.5  0.2  2.0 
2.  Total  payments  1.1  0.9  1.5 
3.  Balance  on  services  -0.6  -0.7  0.5 
TRANSFER 
1.  Total  earnings  1.2  2.2  1.7 
2.  Total  Payments  1.5  1.4  1.8 
3.  Balance  on  transfer  -0.3  0.8  -1.0 
4.  Balance  of  Trade,  -0.7  -2.5  -1.6 
Services  and  Transfer 
INVESTMEN  TS 
1.  Total  Earnings  9.7  0.8  2.8 
2.  Total  Payments  3.3  0.9  1.5 
3.  Balance  on  Transfer  6.4  -0.1  1.3 
Errors  and  Omissions  +6.9  -1.3  1.2 
Balance  of  all  payments  -1.2  -3.9  0.9 
Changes  in  Foreign  1.2  3.9  -0.9 
Exchange  Reserves 
Source:  Peoples  Bank  of  Zanzibar,  1989. 
Table  10.9  Balance  of  Payments  (1986-1988) 
The  degree  of  dependency  on  donors  is  exhibited  by  recent  a  speech  by  the  Minister  of 
Finance  to  the  House  of  Representatives,  in  which  the  following  donors  countries  and 
organisations  were  thanked  by  the  Minister  of  Finance:  Belgium,  Britain,  China, 
Denmark,  Egypt,  Finland,  Ireland,  Germany,  Italy,  Korea,  Oman,  Sweden,  and 
Switzerland.  Organisations  (bilateral,  multilateral  and  Non-Governmental)  were  the 
EEC,  FAO,  IDB,  Save  the  Children's  Fund,  UNDP,  UNESCO  and  WHO  (GoZ,  1991:  25). 
Project  Year  Donor/Lending 
Coun  A  enc 
1  Rehabilitation  of  Bububu-  1989  DANIDA 
Mkokotoni  Road 
2  Construction  Konde-Ole  1989/90  EEC 
Road  (Pemba) 
3  Rehabilitation  of  Zanzibar  1989/90  Finland 
Town  Water  Supply 
4  Rural  Electrification  On-going  Norway 
5  Urban  Electricity  1989/90  Switzerland 
Rehabilitation  -  Zanzibar 
Town 
6  Urban  Power  Distribution  1990  African  Development  Bank 
(Phase  U)  (ADB) 
7  Ports  Expansion  and  On-going  EEC 
Rehabilitation  (Zanzibar  & 
Mkoani,  Pemba) 
8  Zanzibar  Airport  On-going  (1989)  Oman 
Expansion  (Phase  I 
Source:  GoZ  (1989) 
Table  10.10  Projects  under  Foreign  Aid  (1988/89) 327 
10.5  Summary  and  conclusions 
There  Is  no  doubt  that  the  basic  characteristics  of  the  economy  of  Zanzibar  have 
undergone  a  critical  transformation  between  the  mid-1980s  and  the  current  period.  Its 
economy  is  characteristic  of  one  based  on  MIRAGE  with  its  foundations  increasingly 
based  on  aid,  migrant  remittances  and  trade  (re-exports).  The  implications  are  that,  at 
least  in  the  short  and  medium  terms,  there  is  little  reason  to  believe  that  Zanzibar  can 
achieve  a  greater  degree  of  self-reliance.  Given  the  bias  and  dependency  on  urbanisation, 
migration  and  migrant  remittances,  aid,  public  sector  employment  and  the  increased 
dependency  on  trade,  disintegration  of  agriculture  and  rural  sector,  increased  rural- 
urban  and  inter-regional  disparities  and  the  forms  of  dependency  beleaguering  many 
SIS,  the  economy  is  barely  a  sustainable  one. 
Its  survival  is  dependent  on  external  'generosity'  and  the  future  lies  in  maximising  the 
various  elements  of  interdependence.  taking  advantage  of  concessionary  schemes  and 
the  strategic  significance  it  has  vis-a-vis  the  Mainland,  the  Gulf  and  Asia.  However,  it 
still  has  to  translate  its  aspirations  for  self-reliance  from  rhetoric  to  reality  especially 
in  critical  areas  such  a  food  production  and  subsistence  fisheries  to  maintain  or  even 
increase  the  subsistence  safety-net.  Meanwhile  it  will  have  to  pursue  the  'new 
alternative',  one  of  a  negotiated  multivariate  dependence,  or  more  precisely  a 
diversification  of  dependency.  Without  other  alternatives,  this  appears  to  be  the  "room 
to  manoeuvre"  that  Zanzibar  has  found. 
Apart  from  the  changes  identified  and  discussed  in  this  chapter,  there  are  others  that  are 
equally  important  and  these  occur  in  the  areas  of  agriculture  and  rural  development  and 
trade.  Agriculture  and  the  rural  sector  continue  to  be  the  backbone  of  the  economy. 
However,  there  is  evidence  that  in  recent  years  there  has  occurred  a  shift  in  emphasis 
towards  trade  and  commerce,  which  forms  the  new,  'quasi-engine  of  survival'  (as 
opposed  to  growth)  for  the  SIS.  Moreover,  these  changing  characteristics  entail  deeper 
forms  of  dependency  and  double  dependency  relationships.  The  following  chapter  will 
identify  them  and  discuss  their  significance  to  SIS  development. 328 
11.0  A  lture,  Rural  Development  and  Trade 
11.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  has  three  objectives.  The  first  is  to  investigate  and  highlight  the  existence 
of  spatial  disparities  in  Zanzibar  and  then  link  these  to  the  successes  or  failures  of  post- 
Revolution  socio-economic  development  programmes.  The  existence  and  enhancement 
of  polarised  areas  in  terms  of  their  development  status  is  a  consequence  of 
inappropriate  development  policies  and  entail  serious  long  term  economic  and  social 
problems.  Some  of  the  consequences  are  identified  and  discussed  in  the  following 
sections. 
Second  it  assesses  the  development  constrains  in  the  rural  areas  and  especially  in  the 
dominant  activity.  agriculture.  It  analyses  the  agricultural  sector  in  Zanzibar 
highlighting  the  importance,  problems  and  prospects  of  the  sector.  Two  thirds  of  the 
population  live  in  rural  areas  and  agriculture  is  their  main  occupation,  providing  cash, 
food  and  employment.  In  recent  years,  agriculture  has  generally  deteriorated 
contributing  to  a  growing  expenditure  on  food  imports,  rural-urban  migration  and 
falling  foreign  exchange  earnings.  The  rural  sector  is  a  major  source  of  food  for  urban 
centres  and  supplies  exports  and  various  raw  materials  and  labour  for  local  industries. 
Under  existing  circumstances  it  has  the  most  potential  to  stimulate  further  economic 
growth.  Rural  development  is  therefore  seen  as  critical  for  providing  a  subsistence  safety 
net,  reducing  dependence  on  expensive  food  imports,  providing  employment  and 
generating  capital  for  reinvestment.  However,  for  this  to  occur,  reinvestments  are  also 
required  in  the  rural  areas  to  increase  the  quality  of  life  there.  This  chapter  examines 
the  problems  associated  with  rural  development  in  Zanzibar  and  the  spatial  structure 
that  has  evolved,  largely  as  a  result  of  policies  pursued  since  the  Revolution,  showing 
how  this  has  created  an  additional  set  of  development  constraints  for  the  economic  and 
social  development  of  the  Isles. 
Third,  and  though  not  so  apparently  related  to  the  above,  but  certainly  in  response  to  the 
conditions  in  the  rural  areas  and  the  limited  prospects  of  agriculture  is  the  re-emergence 
of  trade  and  commerce.  The  fastest  growing  economic  activity  is  trade,  especially  after 
the  liberalisation  policies  of  the  mid-1980s.  Before  that,  trade  (and  commerce)  was 
dominated  by  state  owned  import  and  export  corporations,  and  retail  trade  by  a  small 
but  weak  private  sector  mainly  selling  foodstuffs,  clothes  and  a  small  range  of  consumer 329 
goods.  Since  1983/84  there  has  occurred  a  dramatic  change,  with  the  state  sector  playing 
a  reduced  role  while  the  private  sector  is  expanding.  This  chapter  analyses  the  growing 
importance  of  trade  as  an  alternative  economic  activity  in  Zanzibar  and  assesses  its 
potential  as  an  'engine  of  growth',  the  implications  of  recreating  a  merchant  class  in 
Zanzibar  and  the  new  position  that  Zanzibar  is  occupying  in  the  world  economic  system 
as  a  result  of  the  economic  linkages  that  have  evolved. 
11.2  Rural  development 
About  two  thirds  of  the  population  depend  on  the  rural  sector  -  it  provides  food,  raw 
materials,  primary  exports  and  foreign  exchange,  supplies  labour  to  the  urban  areas.  As 
in  many  other  peripheral  SIS,  the  rural  sector  has  been  the  basis  for  economic  growth, 
and  will  remain  so  for  the  foreseeable  future.  Fairbairn  (1982:  13),  in  addressing  the  role 
of  the  rural  sector  on  island  economies,  notes  that; 
'In  many  Island  countries  employment  opportunities  are  not  expanding  fast  enough 
to  absorb  additions  to  the  labour  force,  so  that  the  number  of  those  who  are  either 
openly  without  jobs  or  who  are  only  partially  employed  is  rising  as  a  consequence. 
This  is  most  serious  among  countries  where  out-migration  has  been  minimal.  Rural 
development  is  therefore  seen  as  critical  for  alleviating  unemployment.  " 
In  the  light  of  such  a  situation,  which  is  relevant  to  Zanzibar,  the  case  for  rural 
development  remains  justified  and  appropriate.  Despite  recent  development  in  terms  of 
liberalisation,  migration  in  Zanzibar  is  anticipated  to  remain  largely  rural-urban, 
involving  the  younger  population  and  contributing  to  a  growing  'shortage'  of  rural 
labour.  The  constant  decline  in  living  conditions,  the  lack  of  prospects  in  rural  areas 
and  the  expectation  that  the  rural  sector  will  continue  to  sustain  the  island  economy  but 
under  worsening  conditions  motivate  the  young  to  move  away.  The  weak  economy 
implies  a  shortage  of  resources  for  providing  schools,  health  centres,  economic 
infrastructure,  such  as  feeder  roads,  water,  energy  and  recreational  facilities  for  the 
Isles"  as  a  whole,  although  it  is  often  the  rural  and  more  peripheral  areas  that  suffer  first 
and  most. 
Rural  development  has  been  overshadowed  by  an  emphasis  on  the  provision  of  social 
services  for  the  urban  population  and  the  demands  of  the  industrial  and  services  sectors. 
After  the  Revolution  the  development  process  was  set  to  transform  the  traditional, 
predominantly  rural  based  occupations,  to  modern,  highly  productive,  and  mainly 
urban-based  enterprises.  The  rural  sector  was  regarded  as  something  of  a  'residual' 
sector,  a  reservoir  of  cheap  and  unskilled  labour  with  which  to  foster  industrial 
development.  Traditional,  and  especially  subsistence,  agriculture  was  seen  to  contribute 
little  to  economic  growth.  Fairbairn  (1982)  observed  the  same  diagnosis  in  the  Pacific 
economies.  In  spite  of  this,  and  largely  because  of  the  inherent  weaknesses  of  import 
substitution  and  other  policies,  the  importance  of  both  agriculture  and  rural 
development  has  remained. 330 
It  was  shown  in  chapter  seven  that  the  First  Phase  government  launched  a  series  of 
uncoordinated  programmes  related  to  rural  development.  These  included  land 
redistribution,  housing  and  access  to  basic  needs  such  as  water.  health  and  schools  -  all 
part  of  the  effort  to  bring  about  egalitarianism  and  chip  away  at  the  extreme  differences 
that  existed  between  ethnic  groups  and  classes  in  Zanzibar.  There  is  a  spatial  dimension 
to  these  developments  appearing  in  the  form  of  growing  disparities  between  rural  and 
urban  areas  and  between  the  islands  comprising  Zanzibar.  Explanations  for  this 
include  Its  colonial  legacy.  the  agricultural  potential  of  different  areas  and  access  in 
terms  of  transport  (distance  and  fragmentation).  However,  over  the  post-independence 
period  location  of  development  programmes  has  tended  to  have  an  urban  bias  and 
generally  converges  towards  already  fairly  well  developed  areas. 
112.1  Rural  Development  and  the  Urban  Bias 
Although  development  planning  was  practised  during  the  Second  Phase,  there  lacked 
adequate  emphasis  or  a  philosophy  on  rural  development.  In  contrast,  during  the  same 
period,  rural  development  was  given  top  priority  on  the  Mainland.  In  Zanzibar  it  was 
simply  expected  that  ministries  and  departments  responsible  for  various  aspects  related 
to  the  rural  sector  would  develop  and  implement  appropriate  programmes  and  projects. 
These  were  largely  uncoordinated  and  hence  unsustainable.  As  a  result  of  this,  rural 
incomes  fell  reducing  demand  for  various  goods  while  industry  continued  to  place 
demands  for  the  dwindling  foreign  exchange. 
Although  official  statements,  party  directives  and  policies  constantly  emphasised  on 
self-reliance,  equality  and  rural  development,  there  was  little,  if  any,  co-ordination 
between  provision  of  basic  needs  and  the  expertise  to  supply  those  services,  and  the 
steadily  deteriorating  rural  conditions  became  a  disincentive  for  trained  people  to  go 
and  live  there.  There  was  an  over-emphasis  on  the  provision  of  services,  to  the  extent 
that  the  government  over-extended  its  capabilities.  Moreover,  with  falling  rural 
incomes  and  increasing  amount  of  public  investments  went  to  urban  areas.  In  the  First 
Three  Year  Plan  (1978-81)  about  55%  of  the  planned  expenditure  was  in  rural 
development.  However.  this  amount  is  disproportionate  to  the  67%  of  the  population 
residing  in  rural  areas.  Most  basic  amenities  were  already  concentrated  in  urban  areas 
and  about  45%  of  development  expenditure  was  destined  there  (to  a  third  of  the 
population).  Much  of  the  urban  investments  were  in  industrial  development,  housing, 
energy.  radio  and  television,  transport  and  services. 
Zanzibar,  like  many  other  developing  countries,  exhibits  an  'urban  conspiracy'  in  the 
allocation  of  resources.  Basically  an  urban  bias  existed  in  public  investment 
programmes  and  this  highlights  the  difficulties  of  establishing  rural  projects,  (most  of 
which  are  rarely  prestigious  anyway  and  do  not  provide  politicians  with  much  political 331 
credit  in  terms  of  tangible  achievements),  and  where  concerted  comprehensive  policy 
formation  is  already  difficult  to  achieve  this  tends  to  give  way  to  the  demands  for 
prestigious  projects  associated  with  modernisation  and  urban-industrial  development. 
Plate  7  Hotel  Yk  Bwawani 
Plate  6  Michenr$ni  Housing  Scheme  with  empty  dual  carriageway 332 
Evidence  of  this  include  the  ambitious  housing  projects,  dual  carriage  ways  in  a  country 
with  under  a  thousand  registered  vehicles,  the  first  colour  television  station  in  Sub- 
Saharan  Africa.  an  executive  jet  for  the  Presidency.  and  several  others.  Although  the 
housing  project  had  a  rural  component.  a  large  share  of  the  resources  went  into 
inappropriate  large  blocks  reminiscent  of  housing  estates  of  post-war  and  Eastern 
Europe  such  as  the  Michenzant  flats  (Plate  6)  -  note  the  dual  carriage  way  and  the 
unsightly  block  of  flats.  In  addition.  many  of  the  projects  reflected  poor  planning  and 
understanding  of  projects.  For  example,  the  location  of  the  first  modem  tourist  hotel 
(Hotels  Ya  Bwawani)  in  a  swampy  area  infested  by  mosquitoes  (Plate  7). 
The  attempt  to  establish  manufactures  (import  substitution)  attracted  a  large  share  of 
Investment  to  urban  areas,  even  though  a  few  establishments  such  as  sugar  refining  and 
essential  oils  distillery  were  located  in  rural  areas.  Some  had  linkages  with  the  rural 
sector.  albeit  a  limited  one.  in  that  they  demanded  inputs  such  as  coconuts.  sugar-cane. 
fruit,  fish  and  cereals  (for  animal  feed,  dairy  products,  choir  and  fibres.  In  general  the 
rural  sector  was  increasingly  supporting  the  urban  sector  and  getting  little  in  return  and 
contributing  to  spatial  differentiation  between  rural  and  urban.  However.  as  it  will  be 
demonstrated  in  a  later  section,  spatial  Inequalities  exist  between  both  rural  and  urban 
areas.  and  the  islands. 
1122  Spatial  Differentiation 
One  of  the  problems  of  Zanzibar's  contemporary  development  is  that  successive 
governments  have  paid  little  attention  to  internal  differences  within  the  islands,  in 
spite  of  these  reflecting  considerable  disparities.  Such  disparities  are  evident  at  several 
spatial  scales  -  between  the  two  islands,  within  them  and  between  rural  and  urban  areas. 
Historic.  ethnic,  class  and  political  differences  compound  the  problem. 
It  would  be  naive  to  pretend  that  the  pre-Revolution  ethnic  conflict  would  have  stopped 
with  the  coming  of  independence.  There  is  a  north-south  divide  between  Unguja  and 
Pemba  island,  differentiation  between  rural  and  urban  and  between  agricultural  richer 
areas  and  the  poorer  ones  (agro-economic). 
To  demonstrate  that  regional/spatial  disparities  exist,  some  district  level  disaggregated 
data  at  is  used.  These  include  some  basic  socio-economic  indicators  which  have 
implications  on  aspects  such  as  infant  mortality,  fertility,  nutrition,  health,  and 
quality  of  life.  The  data  used  include, 
9  levels  of  illiteracy  amongst  women 
9  access  to  piped  water  by  households,  and 333 
"  access  to  own  toilet  facilities  by  households 
This  information  is  then  depicted  spatially  highlighting  the  more  backward  or 
disadvantaged  areas  (districts)  and  this  underlines,  amongst  other  things,  the 
differentials  in  quality  of  life  which  affects  population  movements.  The  data  is  obtained 
from  the  Mortality,  Fertility  and  Contraception  Survey  carried  out  by  the  Statistical 
Unit  of  the  Ministry  of  Health  (GoZ,  1988)  and  measures  levels  of  illiteracy  among 
women  below  the  age  of  30  years  (n=8265),  respondents  with  access  to  piped  water 
(n=13514)  and  own  toilet  facilities  (n=13445).  The  information  is  converted  into  district 
percentages  and  a  graphic  presentation  is  made  (figure  11.1). 
The  results  show  that  an  average  of  47.3%  of  women  in  Pemba  are  illiterate  compared  to 
20.9%  in  Unguja.  In  rural  Unguja  it  is  27.5%  and  Zanzibar  Town  8.8%.  The  general 
picture  that  emerges  is  one  of  inter-island  and  rural-urban  differentiation  in  terms  of 
provision  of  and  access  to  primary  education.  The  levels  of  illiteracy  amongst  women  in 
Pemba  is  well  above  the  national  average  of  31.1%  and  therefore  it  follows  that  aspects 
which  are  correlated  to  education,  such  as  infant  mortality  and  low  infant  nutrition  will 
be  lower  in  Pemba. 
Temporal  data  comparing  between  1978-1988  of  major  geographical  areas  show 
interesting  patterns  and  trends  (1978  data  from  Census  Survey.  n=84701).  The  overall 
percentage  of  illiterate  women  has  decreased  from  45.7%  in  1978  to  31.1%  in  1988. 
Although  this  may  be  perceived  as  a  positive  achievement  in  terms  of  development  of 
society,  the  percentage  change  (decrease  In  illiteracy)  during  the  10  years  in  Pemba  is 
only  20.3  %  compared  to  the  whole  of  Zanzibar  which  is  32.0%.  Town  district  has 
reduced  illiteracy  by  61.2%  and  rural  Unguja  by  40.6%.  It  is  evident  that  the  pace  of 
change  is  in  favour  of  Unguja  and  urban  areas. 
This  pattern  is  not  restricted  to  literacy.  Access  to  water  supply  depicts  a  similar 
situation.  The  national  average  shows  that  29.5%  of  the  respondents  had  access  to  piped 
water,  69.6%  use  well  water,  and  1.3%  use  other  sources.  In  Pemba  only  16.4%  of 
respondents  had  access  to  piped  water  and  82.2%  used  well  water.  In  Unguja  41.9%  had 
access  to  piped  water.  This  average  is  raised  because  of  Zanzibar  Town's  99.9%  with 
access  to  piped  water.  About  30%  of  rural  Unguja  had  access  to  piped  water,  although 
district  level  data  shows  extreme  differences.  Central  and  North  'A'  have  the  lowest 
population  with  access  to  piped  water  with  2.1%  and  7.4%  respectively.  West  district  has 
62.7%,  which  Is  higher  than  both  the  national  and  island  averages. 334 
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Figure  11.1  Spatial  differentiation  in  female  illiteracy,  households  access  to  piped  water 
and  toilet  facilities  in  Zanzibar  (1988) 335 
The  situation  is  very  different  in  Pemba  where  none  of  the  districts  approach  the 
national  average.  Micheweni  has  the  lowest  with  3.7%  followed  by  Mkoani  (11.5%). 
Chake  Chake  has  the  highest  proportion.  The  report  (GoZ,  1988)  observes  that  with  the 
exception  of  Zanzibar  Town  area,  the  water  supply  situation  has  deteriorated  in  the  past 
ten  years  and  the  piped  water  system  in  Pemba,  installed  several  years  ago,  has  fallen 
into  a  state  of  disrepair  and  the  provision  of  piped  water  is  poor.  For,  example,  in  1978 
almost  50%  of  households  had  access  to  piped  water  and  this  dropped  to  41.9%  in  1988. 
This  reduction  has  not  affected  Zanzibar  Town,  despite  its  rapid  population  growth  rate. 
The  drop  in  proportions  of  households  connected  to  piped  water  supplies  is  smaller  in 
Unguja  Rural  compared  to  Pemba  island. 
The  last  indicator,  which  is  Important  insofar  as  hygiene  is  concerned,  also  shows 
similar  trends.  In  Pemba  island  only  23.1%  of  respondents  had  their  own  toilets 
compared  to  49.9%  in  Unguja  rural.  In  contrast,  Zanzibar  Town  had  95.2%  of  its 
respondents  with  access  to  their  own  toilets.  Within  Pemba,  Micheweni  and  Mkoani  had 
the  lowest  percentage  of  respondents  with  their  own  toilets.  that  is  10.2%  and  19.0  % 
respectively.  Wete  had  27.1%  and  Chake  Chake  36.2  %,  the  highest  in  the  island.  On 
Unguja  Island  North  'A'  district  had  the  lowest  percentage  with  access  to  own  toilets 
(16.1%)  and  it  was  49.2%  of  households  in  South  district.  In  North  'B'  it  was  50%i6. 
Unguja's  average  is  57.4  %  and  West  district  is  above  this  with  72.9%. 
The  proportion  of  respondents  without  access  to  own  toilet  facilities  has  decreased  from 
5.6%  to  2.6%  in  the  Zanzibar  Town  district,  while  in  the  rural  areas  of  Unguja  nearly  a 
half  the  population  do  not  have  access  to  own  toilet  facilities.  The  percentage  of 
respondents  without  access  to  own  toilets  in  Pemba  has  increased  from  71.1%  in  1978  to 
76.7%  in  1988. 
The  measures  used  have  provided  a  clear  indication  of  the  levels  of  socio-economic 
differentiation  between  different  areas,  and  they  reflect  a  wide  range  of  other  factors  that 
affect  development  in  the  different  areas.  For,  example,  there  is  a  dichotomy  between  the 
lower  levels  of  soclo-economic  development  occurring  in  Pemba  and  its  contribution  to 
the  economy  of  the  island,  mainly  through  clove  production,  but  also  food.  Then  there  is 
also  a  dichotomy  between  the  fertile  and  coral  rag  areas,  and  finally  between  rural  and 
urban,  primarily  Zanzibar  Town.  The  coral  rag  areas  also  provide  a  considerable 
amount  of  root  and  tree  crops,  chillies,  tobacco  and  livestock  (ruminants  such  as  goats). 
Although  a  considerable  amount  of  the  food  is  sold  to  urban  areas,  most  is  consumed 
within  the  household  and  since  income  levels  are  generally  lower  in  coral  rag  areas,  even 
rice  (often  imported  and  expensive)  is  consumed  at  much  lower  levels.  Zanzibar  Town 
has  benefited  disproportionately  to  others,  particularly  rural  Unguja  and  Pemba. 
Basically  what  is  being  argued  here  is  that  generally  the  areas  which  suffer  from 
backwardness  contribute  equally,  if  not  more  to  the  economy,  and  yet  receive  less  in 336 
return  and  this  contradicts  the  development  objectives  and  principles  of  the  country. 
In  the  long  term  this  situation  is  damaging  to  the  development  process  in  Zanzibar.  For 
example,  in  Pemba  island  deeply  embedded  political  (ethnic  based)  problems  and  class 
based  conflicts  have  resurfaced  in  the  form  of  dissidence  and  at  least  one  underground 
movement  claiming  a  religious  leaning  and  which  has  occasionally  distributed  seditious 
literature  to  the  public.  The  so  called  Bismillah  Party  has  called  for  a  referendum  on  the 
Union  with  the  Mainland.  1  Whatever  the  reasons  for  the  existence  of  such  a  movement. 
there  is  a  general  belief  that  Pemba  island,  the  main  producer  of  cloves,  has  received  less 
than  its  fair  share  in  terms  of  socio-economic  development.  Such  discontent  is  then 
transformed  Into  political,  ideological,  religious  and  racial/ethnic  conflicts  and  these 
confrontations  increase  uncertainty  and  its  effects  on  economic  and  political  stability 
and  security  in  a  SIS  are  considerable. 
11.3  The  agricultural  economy 
Like  most  other  SIS.  Zanzibar  has  a  dualistic  agricultural  sector.  characterised  by  cash 
and  food  crop  production.  Cash  crop  agriculture  is  dominant  and  has  formed  the 
backbone  of  the  economy  since  the  1800s.  producing  mainly  cloves  and  copra,  and  has 
generally  remained  unchanged  despite  various  efforts  aimed  at  diversifying  the  economy 
since  the  1964  Revolution.  In  spite  of  the  emphases  of  recent  programmes  aimed  at 
diversifying  the  island  economy,  agriculture  will  continue  to  be  the  dominant  sector  of 
the  economy  for  some  time  since  it  is  important  for  domestic  food  production  and 
employment. 
1131  The  relevance  of  SIS  agriculture  to  Zanzibar 
The  importance  of  the  agricultural  sector  to  small  countries  dependent  on  agriculture 
has  been  emphasised  by  Persaud  (1982:  128)  when  stating  that;  "Agriculture's  large 
contributions  to  employment  and  GNP  means  that,  although  it  tends  not  to  be  the  most 
dynamic  sector,  the  whole  economy  becomes  sensitive  to  what  takes  place  in  it.  If 
policies  cause  premature  declines  in  these  contributions,  they  severely  constrain  the 
development  process"  (Persaud.  op.  cit.  ).  In  Zanzibar  agriculture  plays  such  a  role  in  that 
it  absorbs  a  large  share  of  paid  and  self-employed  labour,  provides  food  and  nutrition, 
has  kept  down  the  wages  cost  of  the  manufacturing,  trade  and  service  sectors,  and 
expanded  its  purchases  from  these  sectors.  In  addition  it  provides  surpluses  in  the  form 
of  savings  and  foreign  exchange  for  capital  investment  for  industrial  and  other  sectors, 
The  Sunday  News  of  July  12,1987  (p.  1)  reports  that  the  "Zanzibar  authorities  are  investigating  the  source  and 
objectives  of  a  seditious  leaflet  which  has  clandestinely  circulated  here  during  the  past  two  weeks.  The  23  page 
document,  in  stencilled  form,  is  reported  to  contain  racial  overtones  aimed  at  fomenting  (sic)  hatred  and  mistrust 
among  the  islanders.  It  also  denounced  certain  government  policies  particularly  the  move  to  liberalise  the 
economy.  " 337 
while  supplying  raw  materials  for  processing  industries.  However,  in  recent  years 
production  has  been  falling  leading  to  decreased  contributions  to  GDP  and  employment 
and  so  further  exacerbating  the  downward  spiralling  of  the  economy,  and  leading  to  the 
stagnation  of  the  development  process.  This  partially  explains  why  the  island  economy 
has  been  extremely  vulnerable  particularly  since  the  1980s. 
Zanzibar,  like  many  other  SIS  and  indeed  even  continental  developing  countries,  has 
been  unable  to  narrow  the  gap  between  population  growth  and  food  production.  The 
same  trends  have  occurred  in  the  Caribbean  region,  e.  g.,  in  Jamaica,  Trinidad  and 
Tobago  (Hope  1981;  1982;  McIntosh  1985),  in  the  larger  Pacific  SIS  such  as  Fiji,  Solomon 
Islands,  Tonga,  Vanuatu  and  Western  Samoa  (Yang  1979)  and  in  the  Indian  Ocean  Islands 
of  Comoros  and  the  Maldives.  This  is  a  major  problem  confronted  by  many  SIS, 
particularly  those  that  have  not  managed  to  reduce  population  growth  rates  on  the  one 
hand  and  expand  food  production  on  the  other. 
Connell  (1984)  and  Sharma  (1985)  have  identified  a  number  of  factors  that  contribute  to 
the  failure  of  the  agricultural  sector  in  responding  to  the  increasing  demands  for  food. 
Zanzibar  has  experienced  each  of  these  factors  and  others: 
"  The  pattern  of  specialisation,  developed  primarily  under  colonial  rule,  emphasised  a 
very  small  number  of  export  crops,  discouraged  domestic  food  production  and 
infrastructure  in  particular  areas.  In  Zanzibar  clove  and  coconut  production  was 
introduced  from  about  1818  by  the  Omani  Arabs.  This  was  part  of  the  pre-European 
colonial  development  in  which  a  plantation  economy  gradually  replaced  trade  as  the 
main  economic  activity  a  trend  which  has  persisted.  For  example,  between  1976  and 
1985  about  82.5%  of  the  country's  export  earnings  were  derived  from  clove  exports 
and  by  1985/86  this  proportion  reached  98%.  However,  earnings  in  real  terms  have 
fallen  drastically,  largely  due  to  the  decline  of  clove  export  prices  particularly  after 
1982  when  price  fetched  was  US  $  9000  per  ton.  By  1985/86  the  price  dropped  to  US  $ 
3200  per  ton,  and  currently  it  is  less  than  US  $  2000  per  ton.  The  same  is  true  for 
copra  which  fetched  about  US  $  380  per  ton  in  1978,  falling  to  around  US  $  166  per 
ton  by  1984.  The  development  of  the  transport  infrastructure  followed  the  main 
growing  and  processing  areas,  focusing  around  the  main  towns  and  administrative 
centres.  In  Unguja  island  the  road  network  radiates  outwards  from  Zanzibar  Town. 
In  Pemba  island  the  road  network  extends  outwards  in  a  dendritic  pattern  from  the 
main  trunk  road  stretching  from  the  North  to  South  dividing  the  island 
approximately  along  the  centre  between  the  fertile  and  less  fertile  areas.  Pemba  has 
three  ports  and  Zanzibar  one,  which  is  the  main  one  for  the  Isles  as  a  whole. 338 
"  Government  has  directed  capital  investment  to  agriculture.  After  the  Revolution 
there  were  attempts  to  encourage  domestic  food  production,  particularly  rice.  State 
farms  producing  rice  and  sugar  cane  were  introduced.  More  recently  the  World  Food 
and  Agriculture  Organisation  (F.  A.  O.  )  and  the  Netherlands  government  have 
contributed  to  these  efforts.  Rice  production  has  been  encouraged  to  offset  the 
growing  food  import  bill,  however  these  efforts  have  not  been  successful  and 
Zanzibar  remains  in  a  situation  of  acute  food  (import)  dependency  where  the 
population  generally  has  a  form  of  dietary  dependency  on  rice,  sugar  and  wheat  flour. 
The  government  clearly  regards  agriculture  as  important  to  the  economy,  although  it 
also  appears  that  there  is  a  lack  of  understanding  of  the  constraints  facing 
agricultural  productivity  and  growth.  This  is  reflected  through  the 
inappropriateness  of  policies  that  have  been  pursued. 
"  Rates  of  investment  in  agriculture  have  been  generally  low.  In  many  SIS,  the  period 
following  independence  saw  significant  investments  in  the  social  sector,  though 
often  at  the  expense  of  the  more  productive  sectors,  particularly  agriculture.  In 
Zanzibar  for  example,  an  average  of  65%  of  development  resources  went  into  social 
services,  leaving  the  remainder  to  be  shared  out  among  the  remaining  sectors.  In  the 
productive  sectors,  apart  from  an  attempt  at  establishing  an  industrial  base  (import 
substitution)  and  agriculture,  in  practice  emphasis  has  been  on  cash  crop  production, 
despite  the  need  to  increase  food  crop  production.  In  1971  a  mere  5.5%  of  the 
development  budget  was  allocated  to  agriculture.  By  1978/79  this  rose  to  17.6%  and 
since  then  agriculture  has  taken  up  a  significant  proportion  of  public  investment  and 
it  is  envisaged  that  by  1993  it  will  take  the  largest  share  of  the  public  investment 
programme  -  26%  of  total  investments.  However,  despite  the  growing  proportions 
going  into  agriculture  (since  1979),  the  performance  of  the  sector  so  far  does  not 
reflect  the  investments  made,  that  is  Zanzibar  is  no  nearer  to  achieving  food  self- 
sufficiency  or  even  being  able  to  reduce  by  a  significant  proportion  Its  food  import 
bill. 
"  Population  growth  has  been  rapid,  and  especially  so  in  urban  areas.  The  population 
growth  rate  in  Zanzibar  currently  is  3.0%  per  annum  and  expected  to  grow,  making  it 
amongst  the  highest  in  Africa,  surpassed  only  by  a  few  countries  such  as  Kenya  (with 
4%  per  annum).  The  urban  population  growth  rate  between  1967-88  was  nearly  4% 
and  is  expected  to  increase.  Over  35%  of  the  population  are  in  urban  areas  (1988). 
This  is  a  result  of  both  high  population  growth  rates  and  rural-urban  migration 
rates.  Pressures  for  urban  biased  pricing  and  other  policies  are  pronounced  with  the 
overall  development  policies  favouring  the  urban  population.  This  caused 
considerable  difficulty  to  the  government  once  it  considered  removing  food 339 
subsidies,  particularly  for  rice  and  sugar.  1  Thus  Zanzibar  has  experienced  the 
paradoxical  situation  in  which  low  agricultural  investments,  which  in  turn  implies 
low  agricultural  productivity  have  been  accompanied  by  a  rapidly  growing  urban 
population  which  expects  to  be  fed  from  the  rural  sector. 
Land  tenure  problems  have  beleaguered  most  SIS..  Sharma.  (1985)  gives  the  example 
of  Fiji  where  over  70%  of  farmers  use  communal  land.  Being  unable  to  offer 
collateral  for  borrowing  they  become  ineligible  for  most  forms  of  credit  and  are 
generally  ignored  by  extension  services.  In  Zanzibar  there  was  some  land 
redistribution  after  the  Revolution,  but  the  manner  in  which  this  was  implemented, 
the  absence  of  adequate  guarantees  relating  to  land  ownership,  and  the  lack  of  a  clear 
manner  of  inheritance  or  transfer  of  land  have  caused  numerous  problems 
sometimes  leading  to  a  situation  of  inertia  in  land  use.  This  insecurity  has  acted  as  a 
serious  disincentive  to  agricultural  expansion,  and  even  if  agricultural  credit  was 
available,  the  uncertainty  associated  with  land  ownership  alone  would  render  most 
ineligible  for  credit.  The  rapidly  growing  population  pressure  also  further 
compounds  the  problems  of  tenure. 
"  Migration  of  agricultural  producers  to  urban  areas.  The  loss  of  the  more  youthful 
rural  population  has  contributed  to  a  decline  in  the  agricultural  labour  force, 
resulting  in  static  or  falling  production  (especially  of  food)  While  migration  reduces 
pressure  for  land,  it  also  implies  less  labour  under  conditions  of  limited 
technological  advances  (GoZ,  1983:  82),  added  to  which  the  selectivity  of  migration 
results  in  high  dependency  ratios  in  the  rural  areas  (86.6  to  100  in  1988).  Evidence  of 
this  expose  is  provided  in  chapters  12  and  13. 
"  Stagnation  in  agricultural  practice  and  technology.  Little  effort  has  been  made  to 
encourage  farmers  to  improve  on  traditional  methods.  The  use  of  fertilisers.  whether 
organic  or  chemical,  is  extremely  low.  Over  90%  of  small  farmers  do  not  use  even 
organic  fertilisers.  2  Ignorance,  high  costs  and  problems  of  supply  are  largely 
responsible  for  this.  Some  farmers  note  that  chemical  fertilisers  (T.  S.  P)  tend  to 
encourage  weeds  causing  increased  labour  demand  (GoZ,  1981:  77).  Between  1975  and 
1983  an  average  of  1095  tons  of  chemical  fertiliser  per  annum  was  imported. 
1  Personal  communications  with  Ministry  of  Finance  officials 
2  Personal  communications  with  KILIMO  experts  and  verified  by  survey  results. 340 
However.  by  1983  a  mere  600  tons  was  imported.  Clearly  with  such  low  per  capita 
fertiliser  consumption,  it  is  unrealistic  to  expect  significant  increases  in  food 
production.  Despite  the  increasing  scarcity  of  fertile  land.  Intensification  is  not 
widespread.  Current  practices  tend  to  be  contradictory.  acting  as  if  land  was  in 
abundance.  The  transformation  to  intensively  producing  small  holdings  has  yet  to 
be  achieved,  something  that  is  quite  urgent  for  a  country  facing  such  a  severe 
situation.  These  are  problems  relating  to  both  land  reform  and  technological 
improvement 
Whilst  outlining  the  factors  generally  constraining  agricultural  production  and  more 
specifically  food  production  in  Zanzibar.  it  is  appropriate  to  explain  in  some  detail  its 
agricultural  system. 
1132  Agriculture  Systems  of  Zanzibar 
There  are  two  major  agricultural  systems  in  Zanzibar.  There  is  the  plantation  zone  on 
the  more  fertile  areas  on  the  eastern  sides  of  both  islands,  and  the  other  is  on  the  eastern 
side  where  cropping  is  on  relatively  poor  shallow  soils  of  the  coral  rag.  Smallholder 
production  consists  of  mixed  cropping.  According  to  KILIMO  files,  the  total  cultivable 
area  of  the  plantation  zone  is  about  130,000  Ha,  out  of  which  over  85%  is  under  crops, 
leaving  only  a  small  proportion  for  possible  expansion.  1  In  the  coral  rag  area,  less  than 
20%  of  the  area  is  cultivated,  but  certain  places  are  under  severe  pressure  with  fallow 
periods  falling  from  5  to  less  than  two  years  (GoZ,  1987a,  1989c).  Many  of  the  households 
in  these  areas  sustain  themselves  by  participating  in  fishing. 
Sixty  percent  of  the  total  cultivable  area  is  planted  with  food  crops,  cassava  being  the 
most  widespread  food  crop  grown  by  most  households.  Other  commonly  produced  foods 
include  bananas,  sweet  potatoes,  legumes  and  maize.  These  are  inter  cropped,  grown  as 
mixed  crops  and  or  in  other  complex  associations  often  under  tree  crops.  Where  suitable 
land  and  adequate  water  is  available  rice  is  grown  and  this  is  often  In  the  lower  valley 
areas  (Plate  8).  Relatively  little  livestock  is  kept  by  rural  households,  though  it  tends  to 
be  more  important  in  Pemba  than  Unguja.  The  average  number  of  livestock  kept  by 
rural  households  is;  in  Unguja  11%  had  cattle,  6%  goats  and  29%  poultry.  In  Pemba  37% 
had  cattle,  10%  goats  and  65%  poultry. 
1  KILIMO  is  the  Kiswahili  for  the  Ministry  of  Agriculture,  Forestry  and  Fisheries. 341 
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Besides  rice.  cassava  is  an  important  staple  and  forms  the  subsistence  safety  net  for 
most.  However,  in  recent  years  its  production  has  been  severely  affected  by  an  'imported' 
pest,  the  'cassava  mealy  bug",  a  non-indigenous  pest  which  is  believed  to  have  spread 
from  the  Mainland.  In  response  to  this  infestation,  it  is  reported  by  the  Daily  News 
(November  17,1988)  that  the  Union  and  Isles  Ministers  for  agriculture  issued  a  joint 
statement  resolving  to  enforce  regulations  governing  the  importation  of  plants,  seeds 
and  fruits  to  control  the  spread  of  plant  diseases.  '...  the  joint  statement  comes  in  the 
wake  of  a  devastating  attack  on  cassava  by  the  mealy  bug  and  the  green  mites,  which 
were  first  spotted  on  the  Mainland".  Cassava  production  in  Zanzibar  island  has  been 
affected  particularly  since  1988  (table  11.1  and  figure  11.2). 
Although  improved  crop  husbandry  and  technologies  are  available  for  crops  such  as 
cassava,  legumes  and  cereals,  productivity  has  generally  remained  low  and  expansion  of 
food  crops  is  still  constrained  by,  amongst  other  factors,  poor  agricultural  practices. 
Integrated  packages  of  crop  husbandry  have  yet  to  be  developed,  accepted  and  practised 
widely.  One  report  points  out  that  'While  there  is  land  scarcity  many  farms  are  not 
intensively  cropped"  (GoZ 
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Imports  by 
principal  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
commodities 
Total  242.7  155.3  562.5  684.4  684.7  605.3  994.7  981.7  1502.4  2009.1  2896.3 
imports 
Beverages  0.7  0.4  17.5  1.1  13.1  3.9  7.6  9.8  10.2  15.9  6.9 
and  tobacco 
Food  38.4  69.4  228.4  214.3  245.5  239.9  630.4  343.7  706.4  843.6  1268.6 
Food,  39.0  69.8  245.9  215.4  258.6  243.8  638.0  353.5  716.6  859.5  1275.5 
beverages 
and  tobacco 
Food  as  a%  15.8  44.7  40.6  31.3  35.9  39.6  63.4  35.0  47.0  42.0  43.8 
of  Total 
Imports 
Source:  GoZ  (1982,1984);  GoZ,  Department  of  Customs  and  Sales  Tax  (u.  d). 
Table  11.1  Food  as  a  percentage  of  Total  Value  of  Imports  1978-1988 
(T.  Shs.  Million) 
This  situation  is  further  compounded  by  the  poor  levels  of  agricultural  extension 
delivery.  Even  where  extension  advice  is  delivered.  it  is  often  not  taken  up,  the  reasons 
for  which  include  inaccessibility  to  credit  and  poor  marketing  prospects.  Paradoxically, 
what  extension  and  research  is  available  is  mainly  through  donor-funded  projects,  some 
of  which  focus  on  cash  crops  or  rice  (import  substitution  crop),  a  situation  common  to 
many  LDCs. 
Cash  crop  production  can  be  divided  into  three  main  types.  The  first,  the  main  cash 
crops  include  cloves  and  coconut.  Fruits  such  as  citrus,  pummelo,  mango,  paw  paw, 
rambutan  and  durian,  together  with  spices  such  as  black  pepper,  vanilla,  nutmeg, 
chillies,  cashew  and  other  nuts  are  have  export  potential.  Though  grown  in  small 
amounts  they  are  becoming  increasingly  important  as  a  source  of  income.  Finally  there 
are  the  Import  substitution  crops,  such  as  rice,  and  sugar  cane,  which  are  grown  to  offset 
expensive  food  Imports.  1 
Table  11.1  shows  the  relative  position  that  food  occupies  in  total  imports  between  1978 
and  1988.  During  this  period  the  value  of  food  imports  was  an  average  of  44%  of  the 
total.  Compared  to  a  sample  of  19  low-income  small  developing  countries  during  1988, 
food  accounted  for  19.6%  of  their  merchandise  imports.  The  highest  was  Mauritania 
(39.6%)  and  the  lowest  Maldives  with  8.3%  (Commonwealth  Secretariat,  1991).  With 
44%,  Zanzibar's  proportion  is  obviously  well  in  excess  of  the  average  and  serves  to  show 
the  severity  of  the  problem. 
1  From  untitled  and  undated  IÜLIMO  handout  and  discussions  with  KILdMO  officials. 343 
Up  until  the  clove  prices  collapsed.  Zanzibar  could  'afford'  to  be  a  food  importer  given  the 
comparative  advantages  it  once  enjoyed  as  a  major  producer  and  exporter  of  a  high  value 
crop.  A  large  share  of  its  fertile  land  was  given  to  the  production  of  cash  crops.  Natural 
forest  land  and  a  wide  variety  of  natural  vegetation  was  cleared  to  expand  cash  crop 
production.  Currently  only  small  proportions  of  the  primary  forest  and  natural 
vegetation  cover  exist  (estimated  to  be  less  than  1.3%  of  total  forested  area). 
Until  recently  (1989/90)  the  agricultural  pricing  and  marketing  policies  pursued 
continued  to  favour  export  crops  and  as  in  many  other  SIS  were  geared  to  meeting  what 
Axellne  (1986:  57)  refers  to  as  `the  political  needs  of  low  consumer  prices.  '  In  so  doing,  it 
discouraged  the  domestic  food  production  for  local  markets  (Connell  1988).  Food  and 
cash  crop  producer  prices  also  exhibit  interesting,  though  conflicting  patterns, 
militating  against  food  production.  The  producer  price  of  cloves  is  higher  than  for  rice, 
and  both  have  generally  been  artificially  lower  than  real  market  prices  (Table  11.2). 
Despite  falling  world  prices  for  cloves,  the  domestic  prices  continues  to  be  more  a  more 
attractive  proposition  than  the  production  of  rice,  which  until  recently  has  been 
subsidised.  The  same  is  true  for  cloves  relative  to  other  food  crops.  Prices  for  copra  are 
slightly  above  those  of  rice,  added  to  which  it  is  less  labour  demanding  and  can  be  farmed 
more  widely  even  In  relatively  less  fertile  soils. 
One  report  states  that  poor  pricing  policies  are  reflected  both  in  the  fall  in  real  producer 
prices  and  the  increasing  consumer  subsidy  for  rice  (GoZ,  1987a:  4).  This  is  also 
Illustrated  by  the  producer  prices  of  cloves  and  copra  and  the  retail  price  of  rice  (Table 
11.2).  Imported  rice  determines  the  price  at  which  locally  produced  rice  is  exchanged  and 
influences  the  price  of  a  range  of  alternative  staples.  Only  in  1986/87  did  the  producer 
price  of  rice  (per  kg.  )  exceed  that  of  copra,  though  it  remained  far  below  that  of  cloves. 
After  the  removal  of  subsidies  in  1988/89.  the  producer  price  of  rice  reflected  market 
demand  more  accurately  and  may  lead  to  increased  production  of  rice  and  the  cheaper 
and  less  demanding  crops  such  as  legumes,  cassava,  maize,  sweet  potatoes  and  yams. 344 





Current  Constant 




TShs/K  1980=100  TShs/K  1980=100  TShs/K 
1980  1  19.25  100  2.75  100  6.40 
1981/82  19.25  87  8.00  254  7.00 
1982/83  25.00  69  8.00  224  7.20 
1983/84  25.00  50  8.00  145  8.56 
1984/85  25.00  52  8.00  131  10.00 
1985/86  65.00  44  16.00  98  11.50 
1986/87  65.00  96  16.00  74  17.00 
1987/88  100.00  25.00  32.30** 
1988/89  100.00  25.00  55.50** 
*  Grade  1  prices.  **  Source  for  these  years  from  The  Daily  News,  15  August,  1988:  3 
Source:  Zanzibar  State  Trading  Corporation  (ZSTC),  Department  of  Statistics. 
Table  11.2  Producer  Prices  for  Cloves  and  Copra  and  retail  price  of  Rice. 
1980-89 
The  poorer  sections  of  the  population  have  been  forced  to  reduce  consumption  of 
expensive  rice  and  resort  to  cultivate  and  consume  alternative  food  crops.  Such  a 
phenomenon  Is  not  new.  Apart  from  a  widespread  problem  of  nutrition  which  already 
exists,  especially  amongst  children,  reports  about  food  shortages  and  nutrition  problems 
in  Zanzibar  in  the  1930s  show  that  there  was  a  high  correlation  between  low  earners  and 
poor  nutrition  (Bowles,  1991;  Ferguson,  1991).  The  shift  in  consumption  to  crops  such  as 
cassava  can  lead  to  nutrition  problems.  However,  such  a  change  has  been  slower  in  the 
more  densely  populated  islands  of  the  Caribbean  and  the  Indian  Ocean,  reflecting  the 
difficulty  of  overcoming  preferences  for  certain  foods  (Momsen,  1986,  Thaman  and 
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Figure  11.2  Producer  Prices  for  Cloves,  Copra  and  Rice  1980-1989 
Because  of  low  domestic  production,  the  importation  of  food  and  beverages  in  most  SIS 
tends  to  be  high  and  this  is  indicative  of  the  lop-sided  structures  of  their  economies  and 
the  scarcity  of  land.  McGee  (1975)  defines  food  dependency  where  such  imports  represent 
more  than  a  third  of  all  imports  by  value.  This  applies  to  many  SIS  e.  g.,  Cape  Verde, 
Comoros.  Dominica,  Grenada,  Kiribati,  St.  Kitts-Nevis,  St.  Vincent,  Sao  Tome,  Tuvalu, 
and  Zanzibar.  Connell  (1988:  )  points  out  that  food  dependency  or  'dietary  colonialism', 
has  encouraged  substantial  trade  imbalances  and  resulted  in  the  decline  of  subsistence 
agricultural  systems.  Increased  cash  cropping  accompanies  food  import  dependency  and 
has  frequently  produced  both  a  decline  in  absolute  food  production  per  capita  and  in  the 
variety  of  planted  species.  This  encourages  further  exposure  to  the  fluctuations  of  world 
commodity  markets  and  a  reduction  in  the  ability  of  traditional  agricultural  systems  to 
withstand  hazards  which,  if  relatively  infrequent,  can  be  devastating  (Currey,  1980). 
In  the  Comoros,  the  lack  of  food  self-sufficiency  in  an  otherwise  poor  economy 
correlates  with  poor  diet  and  health,  problems  not  unlike  those  found  in  Zanzibar  where 
malnutrition,  particularly  among  rural  children,  is  widespread.  A  survey  in  1988  found 
that  38.9%  of  rural  children  in  Zanzibar  (under-fives)  were  less  than  80%  of  the  weight 
normal  for  their  age,  while  in  urban  areas  the  proportion  (29.4%)  was  much  lower  (GoZ, 
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t  is  possible  to  increase  domestic  food  production  and  reduce  dependency  on  food  imports 
and  this  has  been  achieved  In  a  few  SIS.  For  example.  in  Sao  Tome  a  decade  ago  almost 
90%  of  all  food  was  imported  from  Portugal,  though  now  it  is  less  than  50%  (UNCTAD, 
1986),  while  in  the  Comoros,  food  imports  have  fallen  from  about  36%  of  its 
merchandise  imports  in  1980  to  27%  in  1988.  However,  it  is  not  certain  whether  this 
reflects  increased  domestic  production,  or  is  a  result  of  foreign  exchange  shortages  for 
importing  food.  Cape  Verde  has  depended  on  food  aid,  despite  this  being  somewhat 
irregular,  to  maintain  nutrition  standards  and  revenue  derived  from  the  sale  of  food  aid 
has  funded  public  investment  programmes  which  in  turn  contributed  to  the  reduction  in 
rural-urban  migration.  Food  aid  has  also  had  a  positive  effect  in  arresting  the  process  of 
desertification  and  environmental  degradation  in  Cape  Verde  (UNCTAD,  1985). 
A  combination  of  factors  such  as  marketing  practices,  pricing  policies,  declining  soil 
fertility,  the  advancing  age  of  farmers,  shortages  of  labour,  foreign  exchange  problems, 
loss  of  agricultural  land,  crop  diseases,  land  ownership  and  disputes,  lack  of  physical 
planning,  inappropriate  technologies,  political  instability  and  urban  bias  in  commodity 
prices  all  contribute  to  the  decline  of  both  cash  and  food  crop  production  (Axeline,  1986; 
Brookefield,  1987;  Driesen,  1988;  Hope,  1981;  Ward,  1980).  For  the  SIS  with  rapid 
population  growth  rates,  increasing  unemployment,  and  growing  dependency  on  food 
imports,  the  situation  becomes  even  more  unfavourable.  A  report  on  agricultural 
production  in  Zanzibar  reveals  that  "there  is  a  general  consensus  that  agricultural 
production  has  stagnated  in  recent  years.  This  has  certainly  been  the  case  with  the  main 
agricultural  exports,  cloves  and  copra,  where  purchases  have  been  declining...  "  GoZ 
(1987b:  3).  A  number  of  constraints  contribute  to  the  decline  in  agricultural  production, 
but  the  main  ones  appears  to  be  the  lack  of  producer  incentives,  and  the  low  crop  prices 
offered  by  government  to  producers. 
Agricultural  production  statistics  including  estimates  of  yields  in  Zanzibar  do  not  chart 
the  problem  adequately  as  observed  in  the  Economic  Recovery  Programme  (GoZ,  1987a). 
Such  a  problem  is  an  inherent  weakness  of  many  SIS  and  LDCs  in  general.  For  example, 
estimates  of  production  and  of  cultivated  area  show  little  consistency  year  on  year,  no 
correlation  between  production  and  area.  Such  a  situation  makes  the  planning, 
monitoring  and  evaluation  of  production  very  difficult. 
Plotting  the  curves  for  estimated  production,  yields  for  the  main  food  crops,  it  can  be 
shown  that  production  has  stagnated  (Figures  8.3  and  11.3).  This  is  also  noted  by  one 
report  which  states  that;  "The  declining  trend  in  clove  output  have  also  been 
corroborated  by  similar  trends  in  the  production  of  other  export  crops  (i.  e.  copra  and 
chillies)  and  also  of  food  crops  like  rice,  pineapples,  millet,  cassava  and  others"  (GoZ, 
1986b:  2).  The  Second  Union  Five  Year  Plan  (1988/89-1992/93)  noted  that  the  production 
of  rice  has  been  fluctuating  and  falls  far  short  of  demand  in  the  face  of  a  rapidly  rising 347 
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Figure  11.3  Estimated  areas  cultivated  for  main  food  crops,  1978-1988 
Production  of  other  food  crops  such  as  bananas  and  cassava  have  been  fluctuating  too 
and  up  until  1988  have  fallen  far  short  of  projections  laid  out  in  the  Second  Union  Five 
Year  Plan  (1988/89-1992/93).  Evidently,  unless  additional  measures  are  taken, 
projected  food  production  targets  are  unlikely  to  be  met  within  the  near  future  (Tables 
11.3  and  11.4). 
CROPS  1988  9  1989/90  199M  I  1991/92 
_L292/93  Rice  44.3  45.4  46.6  47.8  49.1 













Wheat  flour  17.5  18.0  18.5  19.0  19.5 
Source:  JMT  (1989) 
Table  11.3  Estimated  demand  of  main  foods  1988-1993 
('000  tons) 
CROPS  1988/89  1989/90  1990/91  1991/92  1992/93 
Rice  37.3  45.7  50.9  52.0  54.3 
Paddy 
Maize  2.2  2.5  2.8  3.1  3.4 
Sugar  3.0  3.5  4.5  6.0  6.0 
Cowpeas  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.0  1.0 
Source:  JMT  (1988) 
Table  11.4  Planned  output  of  main  food  crops  1988-1993 
(000'  tons) 
Figures  11.4  and  11.5,  illustrating  three  year  running  means  for  food  and  cash  crop 
production  between  1978-1988,  show  that  there  has  been  a  decline  in  the  production  of 
cassava  and  sweet  potatoes  from  1983  and  bananas  from  1985.  Yams  and  rice  have 
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maintained  a  fluctuating  but  overall  constant  output.  Cassava  and  bananas  will  have 
been  affected  by  the  outbreak  of  crop  diseases  particularly  from  the  late  1980s  further 
exacerbating  the  falling  trends.  Broadly  there  is  some  overlap  between  these  trends  and 
those  shown  in  Figure  11.4. 
250000, 







Source:  GoZ,  (1990)  KILIMO  files 




ýMMMMN  ^'" 
-  --  --------- 
ýMNNIý 
-------  - 
cý  c; 
LO  co  r- 
Go  co  co  co  co  co  CO  co 
0  0)  01  C)  C)  (7)  C)  C) 
r  r-  rrr  r- 
YEAR 
--------  Cassava  ---  Rice 
Banana  -------  Yams 
-------  Sweet  Potato 
Plgure  11.4  Estimated  food  production  1978-1988 
Clove  production  continues  to  be  erratic  though  generally  declining,  while  copra  too 
shows  a  steady  decline  from  1983  onwards  (figure  11.5)  and  it  appears  that  there  is  little 
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Figure  11.6  Estimated  cash  crop  Production  1978-1988 
The  Second  Union  Five  Year  Plan  (1988)  admitted  that  attempts  aimed  at  agricultural 
diversification  between  1981  and  1987  fell  far  short  of  the  objectives  set  out  by  GoZ,  and 
that  the  problem  remained  urgent  (JMT,  1989:  62).  Several  constraints  are  identified. 
These  include  a  serious  shortage  and  the  necessity  to  intensify  production.  Already  an 
increasing  amount  of  marginal  land  has  come  under  cultivation  with  fallow  periods 
becoming  shorter.  compounding  the  probability  of  serious  environmental  degradation.  1 
A  critical  problem  is  that  increasing  the  island's  food  self-sufficiency  will  require 
substantial  inputs.  Not  only  is  the  necessary  capital  outlay  and  technology  lacking,  but 
so  is  the  expertise.  Most  modern  agricultural  inputs  require  a  substantial  foreign 
exchange  component  and  yet  foreign  exchange  is  in  short  supply.  A  gloomy  government 
report  states  that  "foreign  exchange  reserves  have  fallen  to  around  US  $  26  million 
compared  to  US  $  39  million  in  1980"  (GoZ:  1989:  2).  This  is  over  a  33%  decline  from 
1980  and  reflects  a  very  serious  situation  bearing  in  mind  that  even  in  1980  foreign 
exchange  supply  was  a  problem. 
1  The  traditional  fallow  system  consisted  of  cultivating  an  area  for  between  2  to  3  years  and  laying  the  land  to 
fallow  for  between  5  to  10  years.  Because  of  land  pressure  and  falling  incomes,  in  some  areas  this  has  been 
shortened  to  about  two  years. 350 
The  government  has  persisted  with  policies  and  programmes  aimed  at  increasing 
domestic  food  production,  and  has  launched  yet  another  programme  known  as  Mpango 
wa  Taifa  wa  Kujttosheleza  kwa  Chakula  1984-2000  -  MTAKULA.  1  Early  indications  for 
this  programme  (1990s)  show  little  signs  of  success.  To  begin  with  the  projected 
population  growth  rates  were  then  put  at  2.66%  per  annum,  they  now  stand  at  3%  per 
annum.  The  targets  set  are  expressed  in  somewhat  general  terms,  stating  that  by  the  year 
2000  the  islands  should  achieve  a  greater  degree  of  food  self-sufficiency.  Based  on  the 
recommendations  included  this  seems  unlikely. 
1135  Agricultural  Marketing 
Inappropriate  marketing  structures  and  poor  marketing  policies  pose  major  obstacles  to 
increased  agricultural  output,  giving  insufficient  incentives  to  producers.  The  poor 
transport  infrastructure  creates  distance  and  transport  friction  leading  to  fewer  crops 
reaching  the  market.  It  also  entail  high  costs  of  production  and  marketing  in  an 
economy  which  already  has  very  low  per  capita  incomes.  The  net  results  are  shortages  in 
supply,  high  costs  of  food  and  smaller  income  levels  for  producers. 
The  absence  of  production  and  marketing  co-operatives,  and  lack  of  agricultural  credit 
further  compound  the  situation  (GoZ,  1987a:  80-81).  The  relevant  institutions 
(parastatals)  concerned  with  marketing  have  proven  to  be  top  heavy  and  inefficient,  both 
to  themselves  but  more  importantly  to  the  farmers.  They  have  high  overheads  and  these 
are  inevitably  passed  on  to  the  farmers,  effectively  reducing  their  income  levels.  Poor 
and  inadequate  storage  (by  the  parastatals)  lead  to  high  wastage.  Prices  offered  to 
farmers  are  too  low  and  do  not  reflect  the  market  reality  thus  discouraging  any 
expansion  in  production.  Even  the  institutions  responsible  for  crop  marketing  reflect 
the  bias  for  cash  crop  production,  i.  e.,  towards  the  export  of  cloves. 
1136  Land  Use  Related  Problems 
Land  shortage  has  become  a  problem  of  increasing  magnitude  with  the  potential  for 
much  social  conflict.  In  response  to  recent  agricultural  policies  which  include  the 
removal  of  subsidies  on  imported  rice  the  demand  for  and  speculation  of  agricultural 
land  has  grown.  In  some  cases  land  has  been  idle  often  as  a  result  of  disputed  ownership, 
partly  as  a  result  of  the  complex  laws  and  regulations  governing  land  ownership. 
Disputing  parties  often  let  the  land  lie  idle  until  such  time  as  government  agents  resolve 
the  dispute.  As  a  result  of  the  combination  of  traditional  land  ownership  and  cultural 
practices.  government  intervention  in  land  redistribution  after  the  Revolution,  inept 
legislation  concerning  land  rights  and  transfers,  and  the  political  sensitivity  that  is 
1  National  Programme  for  Self  Reliance  in  Food. 351 
attached  to  land  issue,  the  land  ownership  disputes  remain  widespread. 
A  government  report  (GoZ.  1987a)  recommended  that  the  implementation  of  the  1985 
Lawrence  Report  had  studied  the  land  tenure  problems  of  Zanzibar  and  had  suggested 
ways  of  resolving  them.  1  Basically  it  suggested  that  appropriate  amendments  be  made  to 
the  existing  land  tenure  system.  Recent  controversies  illustrate  the  problem.  The  Daily 
News  (25  July.  1991:  5)  reported  on  a  conflict  between  villagers  and  a  well-known  local 
individual.  It  mentioned  that  the  Zanzibar  President,  Dr.  Salrnin  Amour, 
'...  gave  a  ruling  of  the  Shakani  village  land  controversy  in  which  a  senior 
government  official  and  a  group  of  peasants  were  at  loggerheads  over  farm  land 
stretching  for  about  nine  kilometres.  He  said  those  holding  land  titles  in  the  area 
be  allowed  to  continue  with  their  normal  business.  He  said  those  farming  in  the 
area  but  who  do  not  possess  land  titles  should  continue  to  farm  there.  But  if 
someone  comes  along  with  a  title  demanding  the  plots,  the  court  will  decide  the 
matter.  However,  the  Zanzibar  leader  said  if  by  July  23,1992,  no  one  claims  the 
plots  then  those  occupying  them  will  be  entitled  to  apply  for  ownership  titles.  The 
controversy  surfaced  this  year  when  Ndugu  Abdullah  Ahmed,  a  resident  of  Shakani 
village  petitioned  to  Dr.  Amour  claiming  that  a  member  of  the  Isles  Revolutionary 
Council  Ndugu  Said  Idd  Bavuai  has  taken  the  farm  lands  belonging  to  about  70 
peasants.  The  President  immediately  formed  a  probe  team  to  Investigate  the  issue. 
The  Committee  recommended  that  Ndugu  Bavuai  continue  to  develop  farm  plots 
which  no  one  claimed  ownership.  '  (The  Daily  News,  25  July  1991:  5). 
The  emergence  of  such  disputes  are  symptomatic  of  the  problems  relating  to  scarcity  of 
land  and  the  problems  associated  with  land  use  and  ownership.  The  Government 
recognises  that  the  existing  land  tenure  system  with  its  lack  of  adequate  security  for 
farmers,  and  the  lack  of  any  compensatory  transfer  mechanism,  is  a  disincentive  to  long 
term  investment  in  tree  crops  and  land  management  (GoZ,  1987:  2).  However,  it  has  been 
slow  to  reform  the  land  tenure  system. 
The  decision  by  the  Isles  Presidency  in  this  case  links  with  a  statement  by  the  Chief 
Minister  in  which  he  called  for  the  maximum  utilisation  of  available  land.  The  Daily 
News  (21,  January,  1990:  p.  3)  disclosed  that  the  Zanzibar  Chief  Minister,  Dr.  Omar  All 
Juma,  "...  called  for  maximum  utilisation  of  scarce  land  in  the  Isles.  He  said  that  despite 
the  land  shortage.  the  available  lands  were  under-utilised.  He  also  called  upon  those 
allocated  plots  to  develop  them.  "  Obviously  while  the  government  acknowledges  that 
land  ownership  and  land  use  disputes  are  politically  sensitive  issues,  it  is  also  recognises 
that  food  and  cash  crop  production  are  of  paramount  importance  to  the  Isles  and  the 
longer  it  takes  to  resolve  the  two  issues,  the  longer  it  will  take  the  economy  to  approach 
stability  and  recovery. 
There  is  an  immediate  threat  to  the  ecology  and  economy,  both  of  which  are  affected  by 
the  world  market  structure  that  pays  less  and  less  to  primary  producers  thus  forcing 
1  The  report  was  not  available  to  the  author,  but  the  relevant  sections  are  cited  in  the  GoZ  Report  (1987a). 352 
them  to  cultivate  more  land  and  produce  more  for  less.  This  has  potentially  devastating 
environmental  and  ecological  consequences  particularly  for  SIS,  given  their  small 
area..  high  population  pressure  and  fragile  Island  ecosystems.  In  recognition  of  this  and 
of  other  environmental  problems  a  Commission  for  the  Lands  and  the  Environment  has 
been  established  in  Zanzibar,  though  this  too  has  come  under  considerable  economic 
and  political  pressure. 
More  recently  new  forces  have  come  Into  play  in  the  demand  for  land.  The  Economic 
Recovery  Programme  includes  a  programme  seeking  to  exploit  the  Isles'  latent  tourism 
potential.  This  is  being  implemented  in  a  rapid  and  seemingly  haphazard  manner. 
Several  areas  to  the  north-west  and  along  the  eastern  coast  of  Unguja  island  have  been 
designated  for  tourism  development  and  distributed  to  local  and  overseas  investors. 
However.  some  coastal  agricultural  areas  and  important  fishing  landing  points  have 
been  lost  to  the  new  developments.  This  has  the  potential  to  create  resentment  towards 
tourism  which  may  be  doing  little  in  terms  of  contributing  to  the  rural  economy. 
There  has  been  a  lack  of  co-ordination  between  the  authorities  responsible  for 
encouraging  foreign  investment,  tourism  and  land  distribution  and  thus  the  'scramble' 
for  land  goes  on  unabated.  By  1991  It  was  reported  that  19  new  hotels  and  lodges  had 
been  built  by  local  and  foreign  investors  in  Unguja  and  a  further  74  applicants  planned 
to  establish  hotels  during  the  same  year  (The  Daily  News,  June  15,1991).  Despite  their 
attractiveness  on  the  surface,  conflicts  and  flash  points  exist.  For  example,  some 
villagers  in  one  locality,  Mangapwani,  were  required  to  move  elsewhere  to  allow  the 
development  of  a  beach  hotel  in  the  area  by  a  large  international  hotel  group  (Plate  9). 
Although  they  were  compensated,  given  the  rate  of  devaluation,  inflation,  land 
speculation  and  the  scarcity  of  fertile  land,  it  is  unlikely  that  those  who  move  away  will 
find  the  compensation  adequate. 353 
1137  Population-Land  pressure 
The  man:  arable  land  ratio  has  been  a  useful  parameter  in  discussing  general  policy 
options  for  small  states.  It  has  been  argued  that  in  areas  of  land  abundance  it  might  be 
possible  to  have  a  dualistic  agricultural  structure  with  family  and  large  commercial 
farms  producing  both  food  and  cash  crops,  but  where  land  is  scarce,  a  'unimodal'  family 
farm  structure  tends  to  be  the  appropriate  form  of  organisation  to  facilitate  optimum 
resource  use,  labour  intensity  and  cropping  pattern  (Persaud.  1982:  132).  However,  it  is 
also  true  that  state  intervention  and  the  effects  of  factors  such  as  crop  value  and  labour 
requirements  influence  the  type  of  farming  structures  that  develop. 
Elsewhere,  Newitt  (1984)  reports  that  in  the  Comoros  high  population  pressure  on 
resources  has  resulted  in  soil  erosion  and  declining  per  capita  food  production  levels. 
Uncertainties  surrounding  land  tenure  allied  to  increasing  population  pressure.  has 
encouraged  squatting  and  share-cropping.  Insecurity  and  doubt  restrains  initiatives  and 
stifles  experimentation  in  agriculture  (Driesen,  1988a:  154).  In  1977  the  population  per 
square  kilometre  in  the  Comoros  was  170  per  square  kilometres.  In  Zanzibar  it  was 
around  201  persons  per  square  kilometre  (1978)  and  by  1988  it  increased  to  no  fewer  than 
260.  The  consequences  of  this  include,  for  example  potentially  severe  gully  erosion,  such 
as  that  taking  place  in  Pemba  island  or  the  ever  shortening  fallow  periods  in  the  coral 
rag  areas,  evidence  of  the  growing  negative  environmental  impacts  which  will  inhibit 
further  agricultural  growth  and  entail  high  costs  In  rehabilitating  the  land. 
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Rodman  (1984)  and  Thompson  (1985).  in  studies  of  Vanuatu  and  Grenada  respectively, 
note  that  land  pressure  slowed  the  development  of  some  forms  of  agriculture,  while 
increasing  population  pressure  and  the  devotion  to  cash  crops  have  contributed  to 
inequality  of  land  ownership.  This  is  happening  in  Zanzibar,  evidence  is  showing. 
Under  such  conditions,  rural-urban  migration  will  be  increasingly  used  as  a  safety- 
valve.  This  leaves  the  economy  in  a  vicious  loop  of  both  declining  productivity  and 
incomes,  growing  unemployment  and  underemployment,  and  a  generally  poorer  quality 
of  life. 
1138  Subsistence  Agriculture 
The  importance  of  subsistence  agriculture  in  many  SIS  cannot  be  under  estimated.  It 
provides  fresh  food  and  essential  nutrition,  insulates  households  and  even  the 
economies  of  SIS  from  the  vagaries  of  international  price  fluctuations  and  in  so  doing 
providing  a  subsistence  safety  net  for  rural  and  even  urban  households.  Geddes  et. 
al.  (1982),  Taylor  (1987),  and  Connell  (1988)  point  out  that  despite  the  allure  of  export 
commodity  production,  tourism,  Industrialisation  and  other  'primrose  paths'  for 
development,  it  remains  true  that  the  bulk  of  the  rural  population  in  SIS  is  dependent  on 
domestic  agriculture  for  subsistence.  Hence  support  for  subsistence  agriculture  and 
artisanal  fisheries  should  remain  at  the  forefront  of  the  Isles'  national  development 
strategies. 
Insofar  as  Zanzibar  is  concerned,  subsistence  production  has  yet  to  be  given  due 
emphasis.  Throughout  the  period  of  economic  stagnation  and  decline  it  is  subsistence 
cultivation  that  has  kept  the  Isles  populace  from  the  brink  of  famine.  Yet,  there  has  been 
little  research  in  food  crop  production  and  extension  services  are  inadequate  while  the 
lack  of  improved  production  techniques  and  food  crop  prices  have  militated  against 
encouraging  production  for  the  market. 
An  UNCTAD  report  of  1986  stressed  that  increased  food  production  is  crucial  to 
agricultural  development  and  rural  income  strategies,  and  in  the  absence  of  this  no  rural 
poverty  eradication  or  urban  fair-pricing  strategy  would  be  effective  for  long,  without 
either  a  large  and  growing  non-agricultural  export  sector  or  secure  access  to  food  aid.  Up 
till  the  late  1980s  non-agricultural  sectors  were  not  expanding  and  nor  was  there  a  secure 
access  to  food  aid  in  Zanzibar,  although  efforts  have  been  made  in  that  direction  since. 
Connell  (1988:  43)  adds  that  further  emphasis  must  be  placed  on  tariff  restrictions  and 
import  restrictions  of  foods  produced  locally  in  order  to  reduce  the  volume  and  expense 
of  food  imports.  However,  as  it  was  shown  during  the  First  Phase  (and  indeed  the  Second) 
such  policies  need  to  be  complemented  with  appropriate  pricing  policies￿  maintenance 
of  the  transport  infrastructure,  facilitation  of  the  marketing  process,  and  provision  of 
credit  and  extension  services.  By  1992/93  most  aspects  of  such  policies  were  in  place  and 
gradually  implemented  in  an  effort  to  encourage  domestic  food  production  of  the  main 355 
foods  imported  and  alternative  foods.  1 
Root  crops  form  a  significant  part  of  the  Zanzibari  diet  and  many  of  these  are  grown 
around  the  household  or  inter-cropped  with  cash  and  other  crops.  They  require 
relatively  little  labour  and  can  grow  in  relatively  poor  soils.  In  the  light  of  the  land  and 
labour  constraints  and  conflict  between  food  and  cash  crops,  it  has  been  suggested  that 
all  SIS  can  and  should  put  emphasis  on  root  crop  research  too  (Connell.  1988).  The 
importance  of  subsistence  production  in  Zanzibar  has  been  obscured  in  the  fog  of  more 
visible  and  short-term  development  goals  and  foreign  exchange  requirements.  thereby 
endangering  the  basic  issues  of  health  and  nutrition. 
In  the  attempt  to  'breath'  life  into  the  island  economy  it  has  been  necessary  to  adopt 
stringent  economic  recovery  and  structural  adjustment  policies  as  recommended  by  the 
International  Monetary  Fund,  the  World  Bank  and  other  bilateral  organisations.  2 
However,  the  appropriateness  of  such  a  programme  is  questionable.  given  the  Isles' 
unique,  complicated  and  particularly  stringent  sets  of  development  constraints. 
11.4  Trade  and  Commercial  activities  in  the  Zanzibari  Economy 
Until  economic  liberalisation  policies  were  adopted,  the  role  of  trade  (international  and 
inter-state)  in  Zanzibar  was  centred  on  clove  exports  and  the  import  of  a  small  range  of 
food  and  consumer  goods.  The  main  actor  in  this  trade  was  the  state. 
In  most  SIS  total  imports  are  greater  in  relation  to  total  incomes  from  exports  reflecting 
the  narrow  range  of  domestic  productive  activity  and  the  consequent  demand  for 
imported  goods:  in  general  there  is  a  correlation  between  imports  and  national  income 
(Connell,  1988).  This  applies  to  Zanzibar.  where  the  import  content  reflects  similar 
patterns.  Considerable  pressure  is  exerted  on  domestic  resources  to  pay  for  food  and 
energy  imports,  and  this  restricts  investment  in  projects  that  can  contribute  to  economic 
growth.  This  reflects  the  difficulties  in  creating  productive  capital  bases  in  small 
countries  with  low  incomes  and  rising  population  facing  unfavourable  terms  of  trade 
(Charle,  1986:  20).  For  example,  in  the  sample  of  19  low  income  small  economies  (1990) 
about  79%  exhibited  negative  balances  on  their  current  accounts  (Commonwealth 
Secretariat,  1991:  42.  -  table  18).  There  is  a  tendency  for  imports  to  rise  faster  than 
exports.  while  agricultural  products,  the  mainstay  of  their  exports.  continue  to  suffer 
from  the  suffer  from  the  unstable  world  market  prices.  Although  primary  agricultural 
1  This  policy  had  started  to  gained  momentum  by  1992,  but  its  effects  are  yet  to  be  seen.  Perhaps  by  1993/94  there 
maybe  signs  of  increased  domestic  production  of  rice  and  alternative  food  crops. 
2  IMF  conditionalities  are  been  applied  as  a  result  of  the  United  Republic  of  Tanzania  succumbing  to  the  conditions 
laid  out  by  the  body  in  order  to  gain  access  to  increased  development  aid,  grants  and  loans.  This  also  affects 
Zanzibar  indirectly  through  Union  financial  and  monetary  matters.  Aspects  such  as  devaluation,  money  supply, 
and  interest  rates  are  jointly  determined  and  consequently  affect  the  economy  of  Zanzibar  whatever  internal 
economic  policies  may  be.  This  continues  to  be  a  sensitive  issue  with  the  Union. 356 
products  continue  to  dominate  Zanzibar's  export  sector,  a  new  phenomenon  has  re- 
emerged  in  recent  years,  this  is  the  're-export'  of  goods  particularly  to  the  Mainland  (see 
following  section  on  interstate  trade). 
Because  of  falling  output  and  of  world  prices,  Zanzibar  is  unable  to  earn  the  same 
amounts  of  foreign  exchange  as  it  could  between  the  late  1960s  and  early  1980s.  In  the 
report.  Zanzibar  Economy  and  Strategies  for  its  Recovery  (GoZ,  1989a:  17-18),  it  is 
mentioned  that: 
The  balance  of  trade  and  the  current  account  balance  have  shown  deterioration 
with  deficits  recorded  for  1984  through  1988.  Deterioration  in  the  terms  of  trade 
is  one  of  the  factors  responsible  for  the  unfavourable  developments.  Zanzibar  has 
also  been  hit  hard  by  the  slump  in  the  commodity  market.  In  the  circumstances, 
increasing  reliance  has  been  on  external  assistance  and  the  run-down  of  foreign 
exchange  reserves.  Despite  the  other  positive  aspects  of  trade,  and  particularly 
import  liberalisation,  increased  import  of  foreign  goods  is  a  factor  responsible  for 
the  imported  component  of  inflation' 
In  an  effort  to  make  up  for  the  shortfall  of  urgently  needed  foreign  exchange  for  the 
Economic  Recovery  Programme  (ERP),  the  GoZ  has  set  out  to  attract  foreign  investment, 
aid,  grants  and  loans,  grants.  Although  external  borrowing  is  relatively  small  compared 
to  most  SIS,  It  has  generally  been  in  terms  of  foreign  exchange  loans  (under  'soft'  or 
concessionary  terms)  and  local  currency  borrowed  from  the  Bank  of  Tanzania  (BOT)  and 
the  Peoples'  bank  of  Zanzibar  (PBZ).  Meanwhile  financial  stringency  is  enforced  by  the 
ERP  under  circumstances  of  declining  revenues,  devaluation  and  inflation. 
Attracting  direct  overseas  investment  is  now  a  common  strategy  in  most  SIS,  and  this  is 
often  supplemented  by  the  transfer  of  private  capital  from  national  residents  overseas. 
In  the  light  of  the  shortage  of  capital  investments  and  increasing  unemployment,  SIS  are 
creating  attractive  environments  to  draw  in  private  and  foreign  investment.  However, 
such  investments  also  imply  that  a  large  share  of  profits  is  repatriated,  while 
contributions  to  domestic  taxation  is  small.  Connell  (1988:  75)  points  out  that,  "trade 
deficits  have  been  made  possible  by  unilateral  transfers  from  foreign  governments  and 
migrants".  He  argues  that  it  is  crucial  for  many  SIS  and  for  their  governments  to  adopt 
policies  aimed  at  stimulating  export  flows  to  counterbalance  this. 
11.41  International  trade 
Zanzibar's  international  trade  developed  new  trends  towards  the  end  of  the  1980s.  By 
1988  export  flows  increased  in  volume.  especially  of  non-traditional  agricultural 
products.  However,  imports  too  increased  substantially  between  1984/85  and  1987  by 
nearly  forty  times.  The  Isles  experienced  a  rapidly  deteriorating  balance  of  payments 
situation,  up  to  1988  both  in  international  or  interstate  trade  (Figure  11.6).  1  Towards  the 
1  Personal  communication  with  banking  and  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Planning  officials. 357 
end  of  the  1980s  the  balance  of  payments  situation  between  Isles  and  the  Mainland 
gradually  began  to  level  out  such  that  by  1989/90  it  is  reported  that  for  the  first  time  in 
many  years  Zanzibar  achieved  a  positive  balance  of  payments  situation  with  its  partner 
(GoZ,  1992). 
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Figure  11.6  Trade  between  Zanzibar  and  Foreign  Countries  and  Mainland  Tanzania, 
1976.1988 
Total  imports  levels  have  grown  substantially  since  1984  and  trends  indicate  an 
Increase,  but  total  exports  are  not  keeping  up  with  imports.  This  is  a  largely  a  result  of 
the  structure  and  contents  of  its  merchandise  exports,  which  has  remained  unchanged. 
This  phenomenon  raises  some  interesting  questions.  If  per  capita  incomes  are  still  low 
(approximately  US  $  120)  and  income  from  cloves  exports  remain  low,  how  does 
Zanzibar's  private  sector  afford  to  Import  these  goods  and  to  whom  do  they  market  them 
given  the  small  population  and  its  low  purchasing  power?  The  answers  lie  with  the 
changed  nature  of  trade  between  the  two  Union  partners  (Interstate  trade).  Figure  11.6 
shows  a  sharp  rise  in  imports  from  1984  though  by  1987  there  had  also  been  a  rise  in 
exports  to  the  Mainland. 
Liberalisation  policies  have  encouraged  increased  trade,  but  the  nature  of  the  trade  is 
unique  in  that  the  larger  share  of  exports  are  really  "re-exports"  of  imported  consumer 
goods.  On  the  positive  side,  the  government  and  traders  benefit  from  revenues  generated 
when  the  goods  are  exported  to  the  Mainland  and  other  countries  within  the  region. 
However  on  the  negative  side,  it  does  little  to  assist  the  overall  balance  of  payments 
situation.  In  fact  the  positive  balance  of  interstate  trade  is  overtaken  by  a  large  deficit  in 
total  international  balance  of  payments  (T.  Shillings  4,038  million  =  US  $  27.3  million 
in  1989/90).  Other  benefits  include  the  creation  of  employment  opportunities. 
stimulating  other  economic  activities  and  generation  of  revenues  through  taxes. 
However,  this  trend  is  not  sustainable  since  to  continue  with  tit  would  put  the  economy 
--"  Mainland  Imports  """"-""»".. 
Exports  to  Mainland 
International  Imports 
Exports  International 358 
Into  a  severe  balance  of  trade  situation,  forcing  it  to  continue  to  borrow  and  expand  its 
external  debt.  Alternative  means  of  generating  foreign  exchange  are  yet  to  be  secured  and 
this  implies  that  the  government  will  have  to  depend  on  external  support  not  only  for 
development  objectives,  but  also  for  short  and  medium  term  consumption. 
1142  Interstate  Trade 
For  most  of  the  post-independence  period  interstate  trade  (i.  e.,  between  Zanzibar  and  the 
mainland)  has  been  balanced  heavily  in  favour  of  the  Mainland.  Figures  11.6  and  11.7 
show  trends  in  interstate  balance  of  trade  from  1975  and  the  balance  of  trade  between  the 
two  side  has  always  been  in  favour  of  the  Mainland  up  until  1987.  Sudden  increases  in 
the  volume  of  trade  are  experienced  from  1985  with  increased  exports  to  the  Mainland. 
This  has  subsequently  affected  the  balance  of  trade  situation  between  the  two  countries, 
such  that  by  the  1990s  the  balance  of  trade  has  swung  in  favour  of  the  Isles. 
More  recently  the  gap  has  narrowed.  Much  of  the  change  is  due  to  increased  're-exports' 
to  the  Mainland.  Zanzibar  is  taking  advantage  of  the  large  and  relatively  more 
prosperous  Mainland  market  through  the  economic  relationship  that  exists  between  the 
two  sides  through  the  Union.  Exports  to  the  Mainland  consist  of  a  few  agricultural 
products  and  manufactures  such  a  spirits.  However,  "re-exports"  make  up  the  bulk  of  the 
export  contents.  Merchants  In  the  Isles  are  able  to  import  consumer  goods  under 
relatively  favourable  customs  and  excise  conditions  (compared,  that  is,  to  those  of  the 
Mainland)  and  then  these  are  re-exported  to  the  Mainland,  since  duties  between  the  two 
countries  are  relatively  small.  This  is  attractive  to  Mainland  traders,  since  first  it 
removes  the  need  for  seeking  foreign  exchange  and  second  the  problems  associated  with 
imports.  such  as  documentation  and  other  uncertainties.  However.  on  the  other 
extreme.  the  balance  of  trade  between  Zanzibar  and  other  countries  (international)  has 
widened  dramatically  over  the  same  period  (Figures  11.6  and  11.7). 
Clearly  indicating  the  value  of  this  activity  for  Zanzibar,  the  Hon.  Minister  of  Finance 
stressed  that  "more  efforts  are  still  needed  to  increase  the  volume  of  trade  with  the 
Tanzania  Mainland"  (GoZ,  1991:  4)  The  statement  confirms  that  this  is  also  a  deliberate 
policy  by  GoZ.  It  appears  that  interstate  trade  is  a  positive  economic  aspect  that  the 
Union  has  facilitated.  However.  although  there  does  not  appear  to  be  apparent  economic 
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Figure  11.7  Zanzibar's  Balance  of  Trade  position  between  1975-1988 
Despite  the  positive  balance  of  trade  with  the  mainland,  the  level  of  imports  from  the 
Mainland  has  also  gone  up.  However.  there  is  an  inbuilt  advantage  here  to  Zanzibar. 
Most  of  the  Mainland  imports  are  largely  obtained  by  local  currency  (Tanzania 
Shilling),  conserving  scarce  foreign  exchange.  These  include  food,  fuel,  spares  and 
building  material  and  GoZ  also  raises  revenues  from  duties  on  these  imports. 
11.43  The  contribution  of  trade  to  government  revenues 
The  growth  of  trading  activities  have  meant  that  it  is  now  contributing  a  substantial 
share  of  government  revenues.  By  the  late  1980s  it  was  reported  that;  "Revenue  receipts 
from  cloves  which  were  second  to  only  sales  tax  in  terms  of  collections  have  since  been 
replaced  by  import  duties  (GoZ,  1989:  18).  Although  sources  of  government  revenue  have 
continueD  to  be  limited  and  are  confined  primarily  to  customs  duty,  sales  and  income 
tax  and  profits  from  parastatals,  GoZ  acknowledges  that  in  the  short  term,  revenues 
from  both  import  duty  and  sales  tax  have  improved  significantly  mainly  because  of  re- 
exports  (table  11.4  and  figure  11.8) 360 
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Source  1983/84  1984/85  1985A6  1986/87  1987/88  1988/89 
Im  rt  Dut  79.4  117.4  156.8  177.7  343.5  477.4 
Export  Duty 













Income  Tax  25.4  47.6  48.6  59.2  92.5  113.1 
Parastatal 
anisations  141.2  217.3  88.5  107.9  150.9  180.5 
Others  116.4  50.4  98.6  167.2  202.3  202.9 
Source:  GoZ,  (1988a.  1988c  1991) 
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there,  something  which  would  have  had  a  more  positive  and  perhaps  long  term 
contribution  to  the  Zanzibari  economy.  GoZ  attributes  this  failure  to  develop 
manufacturing  for  both  import  substitution  and  exports  due  to  "...  high  production  costs, 
production  bottlenecks  and  inadequate  marketing  strategies"  (GoZ.  1991:  12). 
Basically,  the  last  six  years  have  seen  the  creation  of  an  elaborate  and  fairly  efficient 
international  trading  network.  extending  to  the  Middle  and  Far  East,  areas  from  which 
most  of  the  imported  goods  originate.  Liberal  banking  policies  help  guarantee  safer  and 
quick  transactions  encouraging  trade.  However,  the  pattern  of  trade  developing  in 
Zanzibar  over  the  last  eight  years  is  different  from  those  in  most  other  SIS.  Zanzibar 
does  not  benefit  so  much  from  trade  structures  which  grant  preferential  access  to  some 
goods  from  SIS  such  as  the  Lome  Conventions  of  the  EEC  or  the  Caribbean  Basin 
Initiative.  Nor  does  it  effectively  participate  in  the  regional  organisations  concerned 
with  economic  development  such  as  the  Indian  Ocean  Commission  (IOC),  mainly  because 
of  its  status  not  being  recognised  as  an  independent  entity  but  rather  an  extension  of  a 
larger  Mainland  state.  The  confusing  status  generally  leads  to  an  erroneous 
international  understanding  that  it  lacks  autonomy  and  therefore  loses  many 
opportunities.  1  However,  the  fact  remains  that  it  remains  with  a  very  narrow  range  of 
exports  and  so  has  little  to  offer  to  Western  markets.  Moreover,  its  economic  and 
political  ties  are  closer  and  stronger  with  the  East  African  mainland,  the  Middle  and  to  a 
lesser  extent  the  Far  East.  Being  a  double-dependent  entity,  it  participates  in  the  global 
economic  system  mainly  through  the  'emerging  cores'  and  the  other  peripheries.  The 
new  trading  patterns  and  links  that  Zanzibar  has  developed  herald  its  formal  relinking 
into  the  global  economic  system,  although  it  continues  to  occupy  an  extreme  peripheral 
position. 
In  general  international  trade  has  not  favoured  SIS  and  many  have  been  unable  to  raise 
their  output  and  exports  despite  a  period  of  rapid  expansion  of  world  trade.  This 
situation  is  largely  caused  by  the  relatively  small  income  elasticity  of  demand  for 
primary  commodities  globally,  with  dire  consequences  to  primary  producing  SIS 
(UNCTAD.  1985).  Zanzibar  is  mainly  an  exporter  of  a  single  cash  crop  there  has  been  no 
expansion  in  global  trade  for  cloves  and  nor  is  it  likely  to  happen.  Its  inability  to 
diversify  into  service  industries  and  manufactures  for  export  implies  that  it  will 
continue  to  rely  on  crop  exports  for  capital  formation. 
1  For  example  Zanzibar  is  omitted  from  many  of  the  island  oriented  regional  meetings/organisations  of  the  South 
West  Indian  Ocean  region.  encompassing  Seychelles,  Comoros,  Reunion,  Mauritius  and  Madagascar,  largely  as  a 
result  of  its  unique  status,  and  therefore  cannot  benefit  from  any  successful  aspect  of  such  a  regional  grouping, 
despite  of  the  fact  that  it  shares  a  lot  in  common  with  some  of  the  other  islands  and  could  learn  as  well  as  impart 
to  the  other  positive  and  negative  experiences.  However,  it  does  participate  in  the  regional  fisheries  and  marine 
research  and  development  programme  (The  South  West Indian  Ocean  Programme). 362 
11.44  The  role  of  the  Private  sector 
With  liberalisation.  the  private  sector  (especially  merchants)  has  re-emerged  and  is 
gradually  assuming  a  dominant  position  in  the  economy.  as  it  did  prior  to  the 
Revolution.  Their  operations  are  more  efficient  and  they  maintain  elaborate,  usually 
personal  and  effective  international  trade  and  commercial  network  based  on  trust  and 
kin.  This  gives  them  access  to  short  term  credit  facilities  and  they  can  also  order  goods 
together,  reducing  overheads.  While  the  early  signs  in  economic  performance 
undoubtedly  causes  much  pride  to  the  proponents  of  the  liberal  economic  policies,  past 
experience  in  which  the  trade  sector  was  dominated  by  private  capital  has  shown  that 
there  is  in  reality  little  benefit  for  the  island  economy.  especially  if  there  is  no  or  little 
indigenous  reinvestments  in  other  productive  sectors  in  the  economy.  Although  the 
government  is  attempting  to  create  the  appropriate  conditions  for  this  to  occur.  It  is  not 
without  problems.  For  example,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  a  good  percentage  of  private 
investments  applications  remain  on  paper,  which  signifies  a  degree  of  uncertainty  and 
related  difficulties. 
At  the  moment  it  is  unknown  to  what  degree  private  capital  is  influencing  the  state  or  to 
what  extent  there  is  a  flight  of  capital  from  the  Isles.  Nor  is  there  evidence  of  it  being 
reinvested  in  productive  sectors  apart  from  agriculture  and  hotels.  In  urban  areas  there 
is  a  clear  indication  of  a  construction  boom,  while  in  rural  areas  there  is  an  increased 
level  of  demand  for  land,  presumably  for  agricultural  production,  if  not  speculation.  The 
once  'dormant'  merchant  class  has  re-emerged  and  is  assuming  greater  economic  and 
political  influence  as  the  interests  of  the  'bureaucratic  bourgeoisie'.  the  merchant  classes 
and  international  capital  converge.  It  will  be  of  significant  interest  to  see  how  the  pace 
and  direction  of  political  and  economic  developments  in  Zanzibar  proceed  over  the  next 
decade. 
11.5  Summary  and  Conclusions 
Using  secondary  sources,  this  chapter  showed  the  existence  of  distinct  regional 
disparities  in  Zanzibar,  particularly  between  rural  and  urban  areas.  This  reflects  on  the 
weaknesses  in  the  planning  and  implementation  of  development  policies  as  well  as 
problems  associated  with  the  scarcity  of  resources.  It  also  highlights  the  dangers 
associated  with  the  neglect  of  peripheral  areas,  and  especially  those  which  produce  the 
largest  share  of  cash  and  food  crops.  Inevitably  the  urban  lobby  applies  pressure  on 
government,  further  compounding  the  problem  and  enhancing  rural  underdevelopment. 
The  implications  of  this  is  migration  and  a  stagnation  in  rural  production.  Agriculture 
remains  the  backbone  of  Zanzibar's  economy  even  though  its  importance  has  declined 
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In  chapter  10  it  was  shown  that  Zanzibar  had  became  increasingly  dependent  on  aid  for 
development  and  as  a  form  of  subsistence.  In  this  chapter  it  has  been  shown  that  trade 
has  emerged  as  an  important  part  of  the  economy.  The  combination  of  the  newly 
emerging  sectors  encroaching  on  the  contributions  of  agriculture  has  meant  that  the 
latter's  role  in  the  economy  in  terms  of  GDP.  food.  taxation  and  foreign  exchange 
earnings  has  decreased.  However,  it  still  provides  considerable  employment  and  food 
The  regional  disparities  that  exist  are  a  geographical  consequence  of  the  concentrations 
of  incomes  in  the  island  economy,  both  between  social  groups  and  geographical  areas. 
This  is  reflected  by  expanding  class  differences,  and  rural-urban  and  inter-island 
dichotomies.  The  poverty  and  underdevelopment  of  rural  Unguja  and  Pemba  are  the 




12.0  Detailing  the  Zanzibari  Mirage  Economy  and  its  spatial 
and  structural  consequences 
12.1  Introduction 
The  conclusions  in  chapters  6.8  and  9  are  largely  based  on  secondary  sources.  It  was 
necessary  to  obtain  original  information  to  support  the  analyses  and  discussions  in 
chapters  7.10  and  11.  where  several  important  conclusions  are  made  about  Zanzibar's 
contemporary  development.  These  are  based  on  information  either  obtained  from 
government  (official)  or  other  secondary  sources.  Other  information  was  obtained 
through  observations.  discussions  and  interviews  with  various  officials  and  other 
experts.  Nevertheless,  there  remained  the  need  to  verify  some  of  the  analyses  and  seek 
explanations  for  others.  This  chapter  attempts  to  do  this  by  presenting  the  analyses 
and  findings  of  the  survey  of  seven  sample  areas  that  represent  a  socio-economic  profile 
of  Zanzibar.  The  chapter  presents  the  general  characteristics  of  the  socio-economic 
analysis  such  as  age,  sex,  occupation,  incomes,  food  preferences,  gradually  focusing  on 
the  variables  relating  to  the  implications  of  a  MIRAGE  economy  for  the  rural  and  urban 
areas  and  the  two  islands.  These  include  migration,  remittances,  rural  economic 
activities  and  resources  use. 
The  results  presented  here  are  drawn  mainly  from  the  survey,  secondary  sources  being 
used  to  complement  the  findings.  The  most  recent  secondary  sources  include  the  1991 
Zanzibar  Household  Budget  Survey  (HBS),  the  primary  results  of  the  1988  Census  and 
others.  The  objectives  of  the  survey  are  to  establish  the  differing  socio-economic 
conditions  between  rural  and  urban  areas  and  between  Unguja  and  Pemba  households. 
It  also  seeks  to  identify  the  scale  and  nature  of  variations  In  social,  economic  and 
cultural  aspects  of  development  between  these  areas  and  in  doing  so  assess  and  explain 
the  existing  patterns  and  status  of  regional  development.  These  include  some  of  the 
endogenous  factors  which  inhibit  the  socio-economic  development  of  Zanzibar. 
Where  the  degree  of  fragmentation  is  small  as  is  the  distance  between  the  two  islands 
and  from  the  islands  to  the  Mainland.  Under  these  circumstances  there  should  be 
relatively  small  differences  in  their  socio-economic  development.  However,  as  it  was 
demonstrated  in  chapters  7-11,  the  reality  is  diferent.  Zanzibar  faces  a  plethora  of 
constraints  ranging  from  demographic  to  physical  and  these  exert  different  pressures, 
producing  a  variety  of  impacts  in  different  areas,  which  are  reflected  at  the  macro  level 
by  the  contemporary  MIRAGE  economy. 366 
Zanzibar  is  small.  yet  it  exhibits  considerable  spatial  variation,  including  inequalities. 
The  identification  of  such  problems  helps  explain  the  lopsided  patterns  of  development 
occurring  in  Zanzibar.  For  example,  the  flow  of  population  through  rural-urban 
migration  is  primarily  directed  towards  Zanzibar  Town  in  Unguja  with  peripheral  and 
predominantly  rural  coral-rag  areas  losing  population.  The  implications  of  this  include 
a  shortage  of  rural  labour  affecting  agricultural  production,  especially  food  and  cash 
crops.  The  differences  in  the  development  status  between  the  two  islands  appear  to 
favour  Unguja  island.  Within  Unguja  it  is  the  urban  areas  that  attract  the  bulk  of  the 
population  (Zanzibar  West  and  Town  regions)  and  this  has  tended  to  bias  the  limited 
resources  of  the  state  towards  urban  areas. 
One  of  the  main  problems  relating  to  Zanzibar's  development  stems  from  recent 
attempts  aimed  at  reversing  socio-economic  and  socio-spatial  injustices,  particularly 
those  resulting  from  the  early  post-Revolution  period  (chapters  6  and  7).  Although 
inequalities  were  more  pronounced  before  the  Revolution,  recently  a  widening  of  class 
(social  and  economic)  differences  have  taken  place.  Overall  class  distinctions  may  have 
been  reduced  but  not  eliminated,  with  a  'bureaucratic  bourgeoisie'  emerging  to  replace 
the  former  dominant  classes,  plantation  owners  and  mercantile  classes.  Economic 
liberalisation  has  led  to  the  emergence  of  the  mercantile  class,  which  has  a  growing 
influence  in  the  economic  and  political  life  in  the  Isles. 
The  survey  covers  many  aspects  spanning  a  wide  range  of  social,  economic  and  policy 
matters  that  directly  or  indirectly  influence  or  hinder  the  development  process  in  the 
islands.  The  manner  in  which  these  are  interrelated  has  already  been  explained  by  the 
model  in  chapter  two,  but  what  is  attempted  here  is  a  direct  analysis,  isolating  the  more 
obvious  factors.  For  example,  if  the  demographic  analyses  support  the  position  that 
there  exists  a  movement  of  the  younger  population  from  rural  to  urban,  or  from  Pemba 
to  Unguja.  then  it  follows  that  this,  a)  contributes  to  a  shortage  of  labour  in  rural  area 
and  Pemba  island,  and/or,  b)  contributes  to  decreasing  pressure  on  land,  partly  due  to 
falling  demand  for  it,  c)  a  decline  or  stagnation  in  food  and/or  cash  crop  production, 
and  d)  a  type  of  safety  valve  responding  to  growing  population  pressure  on  resources. 
One  or  a  combination  of  these  will  confirm,  a)  some  of  the  hypotheses  made  In  chapter 
one.  b)  the  experiences  in  other  SIS  in  a  similar  situation  and,  c)  some  observations 
made  by  recent  government  reports  such  as  the  ERP,  relating  to  the  probable  effects  of 
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12.2  Background  to  the  survey  and  analyses 
Testing  the  nature  and  implications  of  the  MIRAGE  economy  is  possible  through  survey 
analysis.  The  main  objective  of  this  chapter  is  to  tease  out  the  nature  of  such  an 
economy  based  on  the  findings  of  a  survey  conducted  in  different  sample  areas  within 
Zanzibar  in  1989/90.  Complementing  the  primary  survey,  use  is  made  of  recently 
published  preliminary  results  of  the  1988  Census  of  the  population  and  in  particular 
the  1991  Zanzibar  Household  Budget  Survey. 
The  survey  data  was  collected  using  a  stratified  random  approach,  the  strata  being 
chosen  to  represent  the  different  economic  sub-regions  of  the  two  islands  comprising 
Zanzibar,  i.  e.,  Unguja  and  Pemba.  In  all  345  households  were  contacted,  though 
allowing  for  non-cooperation  and  non-responses  some  305  returns  form  the  basis  of  this 
analysis.  The  geographical  breakdown  of  the  sample  returns  is  shown  in  Table  12.1. 
The  sampling  procedure  was  based  on  taking  a  proportion  of  households  (at  least  300/6) 
within  an  administrative  unit  known  as  taws,  which  is  essentially  a  branch  of  a  ward 
(kata).  The  sampling  procedure  was  influenced  by  the  local  administrative  structure, 
since  written  permission  was  required  for  each  area,  which  was  the  verified  by  the 
branch  secretaries  or  chairpersons,  taking  up  considerable  time.  Thus  the  areal 
sampling  unit  was  the  tawt.  This  was  manageable  given  the  time,  resources  and 
logistical  support  at  hand. 
The  survey  sought  to  identify  the  main  features  characterising  the  socio-economic 
development  of  Zanzibar.  especially  those  emerging  more  recently.  The  results  will 
assist  in  providing  an  understanding  of  the  current  socio-economic  and  sociocultural 
characteristics  of  Zanzibar  and  illustrate  how  these  have  changed  over  time  and  space, 
with  concomitant  implications  to  the  SIS  economy.  They  show  how  Zanzibar  differs 
from,  and  in  some  respects  shares  similar  experience  with  other  SIS.  Specifically  the 
aims  of  the  survey  were  to:  - 
"  To  test  arguments  concerning  economic  and  social  development  that  existing 
(secondary)  information  could  not  explain  sufficiently. 
"  To  provide  a  check  against  the  existing  data/information  and  the  observations  made 
in  earlier  chapters  in  this  study. 
0  To  present  further  analysis  of  the  spatial  variability  of  development  problems  in 
Zanzibar. 
"  To  test  the  hypotheses  postulated  in  chapter  one  relating  to  the  existence  of  spatial 
disparities  and  their  implications.  Examples  include  the  outcome  of  economic 368 
development  policies  affecting  aspects  such  as  population  movement.  Others 
include  differences  in  agricultural  activities  (because  of  contrasting  agro-economic 
zones  and  agricultural  policies)  that  result  in  widening  income  differentials. 
The  questionnaire  survey  focused  on  the  dominant  socio-economic  and  cultural  factors 
relating  to  development.  The  following  aspects  were  studied:  - 
The  main  socio-economic  activities  in  each  of  the  sample  areas.  A  physical  survey  of 
the  selected  areas  was  conducted  to  assess  this.  The  intention  was  to  confirm  that 
the  areas  represented  the  main  economic  zones  existing  in  the  islands. 
"  Respondents'  views  regarding  developmental  issues  affecting  their  immediate 
environment.  Interviews  were  conducted  in  the  selected  settlements  to  obtain 
peoples'  perceptions  on  developmental  problems  in  their  respective  areas.  The 
issues  that  were  addressed  include  the  following: 
Q  The  socio-economic  background:  socio-economic,  cultural,  educational 
background  of  respondents,  such  as  household  size,  income,  economic 
activities  and  education. 
O  Economic  activities:  subsistence  and  cash  crops  cultivation,  artisanal 
fisheries,  service  and  informal  sector  activities,  unemployment  and 
underemployment  and  non-farm  activities  are  identified  in  different 
areas,  highlighting  the  differentiation  in  economic  activities  in  a  small 
area. 
Q  food  and  nutrition:  to  assess  food  preferences  in  different  areas  in  the 
light  of  recent  socio-economic  changes.  The  intention  is  also  to  assess 
the  importance  of  food  crops  other  than  rice  and  the  degree  of  food 
dependency  on  imported  foods. 
Q  Water  and  energu:  main  forms  of  energy  and  sources  of  water  used  in 
different  areas  and  associated  problems. 
0  Population:  migration  trends,  rural-urban,  inter-island  and  international 
(including  inter-state)  and  the  motives  and  effects  of  such  movements. 
0  Remittances:  evidence  of  flows,  duration  and  significance  of  remittances 
from  migrants. 
Aartculture  land  use:  types  of  land  ownership,  tenure  and  land  use, 
evidence  of  environmental  deterioration  due  to  land  use  and  population 
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The  statistical  methods  applied  consist  mainly  of  graphs,  descriptive  statistics  and  non- 
parametric  statistical  tests,  testing  for  differences  in  the  principal  variables  between  the 
sister  islands  and  between  rural  and  urban  areas.  They  also  provide  an  overall  picture 
of  the  socio-economic  characteristics  prevailing  in  Zanzibar  in  the  early  1990s.  Chi 
Square  (x2)  Is  used  to  test  for  significance  and  measures  of  association  since  the  nature 
of  the  responses  and  data  are  categorical.  It  is  also  used  to  test  hypotheses  that 
compare  and  contrast  the  responses  between  the  different  areas.  The  significance  level 
(alpha  levels)  for  the  tests  was  determined  at  .  05  (or  at  95%).  The  responses  are 
tabulated  as  percentages.  Where  appropriate.  histograms  and  pie  charts  are  produced 
to  present  visually  the  similarities  or  differences  and  reveal  other  important  aspects. 
Since  not  all  the  assumptions  of  X2  are  met  and  because  many  tables  are  greater  than  2 
x  2.  additional  measures  such  as  Continuity  Coeff  dents,  G  Statistics.  Yate's  Continuity 
Correction.  Cramer's  V  and  Phi  are  calculated  to  assist  in  arriving  at  more  accurate 
results  and  conclusions. 
DISTRICT  SAMPLE  DOMINANT  SAMPLE 
AREA  ECONOMIC  HOUSE-HOLDS 
(Taws)  ACTIVITIES  (approximate 
population 
covered 
Zanzibar  Vikokotoni  Urban  56 
Town  and  (commerce,  (263) 
West  services,  wage 
em  lo  ent 
Zanzibar  Kitumba  &  Rural  51 
Central  Kidimni  (agriculture)  240 
Zanzibar  Uroa  Rural  46 
Central  (agriculture  &  (216) 
fishing) 
-  -------------  Zanzibar  Mangapwani  Rural  29 
North  (agriculture  &  (136) 
fishing) 
Wete  Kipangani  Urban  37 
(commerce,  (174) 
services,  wage 
em  lo  ent 
Mkoani  Michenzani  Rural  33 
a  riculture  (155) 
Chake  Pujini  Rural  54 
Chake  a  'culture  254 
Total  -  305 
1438 
Source:  URT  (1988)  Population  Census:  Preliminary  Report. 
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In  some  instances  responses  for  some  cells  are  few  so  caution  was  exercised  when 
making  the  relevant  analyses.  The  main  weakness  of  x2  is  when  the  number  of  cells  in 
a  table  increases  disproportionately  to  the  sample  size.  Although  the  overall  sample  size 
Is  306,  not  all  households  were  required  to  respond  to  all  questions  since,  for  example, 
many  urban  households  do  not  participate  in  agriculture.  For  example,  not  all 
households  participate  in  fisheries  and  some  questions  apply  only  to  those  engaged  in 
that  activity.  In  appreciation  of  the  sensitivity  of  X2  to  sample  size,  where  possible,  the 
cells  were  reduced  to  the  minimum  through  combining  similar  responses. 
In  developing  the  sampling  framework,  the  following  factors  were  considered;  a)  the 
type  of  information  that  is  required  and  the  applicability  of  the  data  obtained,  b)  the 
degree  of  representation  of  the  sample  to  the  general  population  as  an  economic, 
physical,  social  and  cultural  cross-section  of  the  population,  c)  the  degree  of  accuracy 
and  depth  of  information  sought,  d)  the  time  and  resources  available,  and  e)  the 
conditions  under  which  the  survey  was  conducted.  1  Table  12.1  provides  an  overview  of 
the  manner  in  which  the  samples  were  drawn  and  Figure  12.1  shows  the  location  of  the 
sample  areas. 
1  At  the  time  of  the  research,  the  political  situation  in  the  islands  was  rather  tense  with  pockets  of  political  and  socio- 
cultural  unrest  taking  place.  Some  officials  and  indeed  several  respondents  were  unwary  of  in  depth  interviewing 
which  at  times  sought  personal  opinions  taking  place  during  the  same  period.  Due  to  logistical  and  other  difficulties 
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12.3  Migration 
Migration  is  characteristically  important  in  SIS.  In  the  survey  the  respondents  were 
asked  whether  there  were  any  members  of  their  households  who  had  moved  away  in 
recent  years.  that  is  over  the  last  10  years.  They  were  also  asked  to  identify  which  these 
household  members  were,  where  they  went  to  and  what  were  the  reasons  for  their 
departure.  The  movements  indicated  are  either  permanent  and  at  least  of  one  year. 
This  definition  is  important  as  many  of  those  leaving  anticipate  that  their  departures  are 
temporary,  though  they  often  spend  more  than  two  years  away.  For  others  this 
movement  has  become  permanent.  Over  the  last  decade  nearly  one  in  six  households  of 
those  surveyed  (i.  e.  52)  had  at  least  one  member  who  had  migrated  or  emigrated. 
Emigrating  includes  movement  to  the  Mainland.  Although  migration  to  the  Mainland 
may  appear  easy  because  of  proximity,  in  reality  political  and  economic  restrictions  have 
constrained  such  movement.  It  is  only  since  the  1980s  that  such  movements  have 
become  increasingly  frequent.  The  direction  and  flow  of  movement  is  shown  in  Figure 
12.2 
Over  55%  of  the  migrants  and  emigrants  in  the  household  samples  originate  from 
Pemba.  This  not  only  supports  the  observation  both  in  Unguja  and  the  Mainland  that  it 
is  Pemba  islanders  who  are  more  involved  in  migration,  but  also  shows  that  the  trends 
that  appeared  in  the  1978  census  have  continued.  In  1978  the  proportion  of  Zanzibaris 
born  in  the  islands  enumerated  on  the  Mainland  was  6.4%  of  which  2%  were  from 
Zanzibar's  urban  population  and  4.4%  were  rural  in  origin  (URT,  1982).  From  the 
survey,  it  was  calculated  that  15.7%  of  the  households  had  someone  who  had  migrated 
or  emigrated  within  the  last  10  years.  On  the  basis  of  this  observation,  the  1988 
migration  statistics  should  indicate  a  considerable  increase  in  the  proportions  that 
migrate  from  Pemba  and  those  emigrating  from  the  Isles. 
The  survey  sought  to  find  out  what  numbers  and  proportions  of  the  sample  ever 
migrated  from  the  islands.  It  is  known  from  the  1976  census  that  only  a  small 
proportion  of  the  population  migrated  from  the  islands,  largely  because  of  stringent 
regulations  against  emigration.  However,  from  1972  onwards  and  particularly  by  the 
1980s,  these  regulations  were  relaxed,  while  the  means  of  travel  and  transport  had 
Improved  and  the  economic  motivations  which  underpin  such  movements  were  more 
apparent.  These  include  the  liberalisation  policies  both  in  the  islands  and  on  the 
Mainland.  The  oil  boom  in  the  Middle  East  in  the  1970s  created  a  demand  for  labour 
and  many  skilled  and  unskilled  Zanzibaris  of  Middle  East  descent  migrated  there  in 
search  of  better  economic  opportunities. 373 
Figure  12.2  Directions  and  patterns  of  migration  in  the  1980s 374 
Nearly  one  sixth  of  the  total  households  interviewed  had  at  least  one  person  who  had 
emigrated.  Figure  12.3  shows  that  Pemba  households  tend  to  have  a  larger  proportion 
of  people  who  had  emigrated  compared  to  Unguja.  Also  comparing  rural  and  urban 
households,  the  results  show  that  a  greater  proportion  of  urban  households  will  have  at 
least  one  member  that  has  migrated  (Figure  12.4).  This  suggests  the  possibility  that 
migration  is  taking  place  in  stages,  in  which  for  example,  a  person  moves  from  rural 
Pemba  to  a  nearby  urban  area  or  Zanzibar  and  from  there  they  go  on  to  the  capital  or 
abroad. 
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Figure  12.3  Migrants  in  households  (Unguja-Pemba) 
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Figure  12.4  Migrants  in  households  (Rural-Urban) 
From  the  contingency  analysis  (see  following  box),  the  x2  statistic  testing  between 
Unguja  and  Pemba  households  shows  that  there  are  significant  differences  between 
households  that  have  a  migrant  and  those  that  do  not.  This  implies  that  the  existing 
differences  cannot  be  accrued  to  chance. 375 
Sunmary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pemba 
df  :1 
Total  x  2:  6.3202  p-  . 
0119 
G  Statistic:  6.20058 
Contingency  Coefficient: 
.  14225 
Cromer's  V: 
.  14372 
x2  (with  continuity  correction):  5.56383  p=  .  0183 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Rural-Urban 
df  :1 
Total  x  2:  1.2484  p=  .  2639 
G  Statistic:  1.2133 
Contingency  Coefficient: 
. 
10647 
Cromer's  V:  .  0639 
x2  (with  continuity  correction):  . 
9051  p=  . 
3414 
In  contrast  the  results  of  the  x2  test  comparing  the  rural  and  urban  populations  support 
the  null  hypothesis  (see  box  above)  which  states  that  there  are  no  significant  differences 
between  the  rural  and  urban  households  that  have  migrants.  These  results  suggest  and 
support  the  contention  that  migration  is  predominantly  from  Unguja  to  Pemba  and  from 
rural  to  urban. 
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Figure  12.5  Proportions  of  household  members  who  migrated 
Among  household  members  migration  tends  to  be  selective.  Predominantly  it  is  sons 
and  daughters  who  are  the  chief  migrants  followed  by  other  relatives  and  husbands 
(Figure  12.5).  It  is  clear  from  these  proportions  that  a  greater  percentage  of  males  are 
involved  in  migration,  the  ratio  being  about  3:  1.  In  both  island  sample  populations  sons 
account  for  over  40%  of  household  members  moving  away.  In  Unguja,  in  terms  of 
percentage,  sons  are  followed  by  other  members  of  the  household,  such  as  cousins. 
nephews  and  nieces  (26%),  followed  by  daughters  (17.4%)  and  husbands  (13%).  In 376 
Pemba  It  is  daughters  (24.7%),  husbands  (20.7%).  and  other  members  of  the  household 
(13.8%)  who  follow  sons  in  terms  of  being  the  main  migrants  (Figure  12.6).  Although 
there  are  similarities  in  the  members  of  household  who  migrate,  proportionally,  more 
husbands  and  daughters  migrate  from  Pemba  compared  to  Unguja.  In  contrast  the 
proportion  of  other  relations  is  greater  in  Unguja. 
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Figure  12.6  Household  members  who  migrated  (Ungnja-Pemba) 
Comparing  rural  and  urban  households  (Figure  12.7),  the  proportion  of  other  relations 
and  daughters  who  migrated  is  similar.  The  main  differences  occur  in  urban  areas 
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Figure  12.7  Household  members  who  migrated  (Rural-Urban) 
Clearly,  it  is  the  younger  generation  who  tend  to  migrate,  often  sons  and  daughters  but 
also  other  young  members  of  the  households.  What  is  also  interesting  is  the  frequency 
of  husbands  who  migrate  but  leave  behind  households,  remitting  money.  Some  would 
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even  have  another  household  or  family  at  their  new  destination.  However.  for  many  this 
trend  is  synonymous  to  'suitcase  farming',  where  they  would  move  for  a  certain  period 
to  pursue  a  given  economic  activity.  However,  the  'temporariness'  is  where  the 
similarities  end.  For  many  what  was  a  temporary  movement  would  become  a  long  term 
one.  often  even  culminating  with  making  long  term  business  investments  where  they 
have  moved  to.  ' 
Finally  the  x2  tests  for  the  islands  and  for  the  rural  and  urban  areas  show  that  there  are 
no  significant  differences  between  the  sample  populations  according  to  the  members  of 
households  who  migrate  (see  boxes  below). 
SunTnary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pernba 
df  :3 
Total  x  2:  1.73073  p=  .  6301 
G  Statistic:  1.73896 
Contingency  Coefficient:  . 
17947 
Cramer's  V:  .  18244 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Rural-Urban 
df  :3 
Total  x  2:  3.3155  p=  .  3455 
G  Statistic:  3.7947 
Contingency  Coefficient:  . 
2448 
Cramer's  V:  . 
2525 
The  survey  sought  to  establish  the  main  motivations  for  migrating.  Apart  from  Todaro's 
"bright  city  lights"  theory,  it  is  expected  that  there  may  be  other  reasons  that  have  to  do 
with  the  side-effects  of  the  development  policies  and  strategies  in  the  past.  From 
discussion  with  government  and  non-governmental  organisation  officials  and  evidence 
from  elsewhere  in  the  literature  review,  the  lack  of  adequate  economic  opportunities  and 
decline  of  the  rural  sector  have  been  the  catalyst  for  the  movement  of  people  away  from 
those  areas.  Also,  from  the  analysis  in  chapter  11  it  would  appear  that  this  situation 
has  been  compounded  by  inappropriate  and  inadequate  agricultural  policies.  Thus 
apart  from  finding  out  what  proportion  of  the  sample  population  have  members  of  their 
household  who  migrated,  it  is  also  pertinent  to  find  out  the  motivations  for  doing  so. 
The  evidence  shows  that  economic  factors  are  the  main  motivations  for  migrating  with 
over  67%  of  the  households  expressing  that  the  migrants  moved  for  purely  economic 
reasons  (Table  12.2).  A  further  9.6%  cited  that  access  to  land  for  agriculture  was  the 
main  reason  for  migrating.  Although  this  is  also  an  economic  reason,  the  respondents 
stressed  the  need  for  more  and  better  land  and  it  is  also  tied  to  pressure  on  land  from 
where  they  moved.  Besides  economic  factors,  there  are  other  reasons  too.  Marriage 
tends  to  have  socio-economic  and  sociocultural  motivations,  with  most  of  those  getting 
1  This  explanation  was  derived  from  discussions  with  experts  from  the  statistics  department  in  Zanzibar  and  other 
government  and  development  agency  officials.  This  is  particularly  true  in  Dar  es  Salaam  and  Tanga. 378 
married  subsequently  moving  to  places  that  are  relatively  better  off  economically.  About 
23%  of  the  households  indicated  that  those  who  moved  did  so  to  get  married.  There  is 
an  ethnic  and  cultural  bias  in  marriage  and  this  ultimately  influences  the  geographical 
destinations  of  those  getting  married.  and  so  it  is  quite  common  for  Zanzibaris  of  Arab 
descent  to  get  married  to  people  of  similar  descent  who  reside  outside  the  islands. 
Reasons  for  UNGUJA  PEMBA  ZANZIBAR 
moving  ROW 
COUNT  TOTAL 
Rc'4 
COLUMA% 
Economic  17  18  35 
48.6  51.4  67.3 
73.9  62.1 
Land  /  5  0  5 
agriculture  100.0  0.0  9.6 
21.7  0.0 
Marriage  1  11  12 
8.3  91.7  23.1 
4.3  37.9 
COLUMN  23  29  52 
TOTAL  44.2  55.8  100.0 
Source:  Survey 
Table  12.2  Reasons  for  migrating/emigrating 
Economic  constraints  influence  migration,  especially  for  young  males  who  move  in 
search  of  better  economic  opportunities.  Inevitably,  most  of  them  end  in  urban  areas. 
In  contrast  the  female  migrants  moved  to  get  married.  However,  caution  is  required 
here  since  even  if  some  of  them  migrated  for  reasons  other  than  marriage,  in  a 
conservative  society  where  many  of  the  norms  regarding  young  women  are  a  sensitive 
issue,  it  is  likely  that  respondents  may  have  been  reluctant  to  state  that  the  daughters 
moved  for  such  reasons. 
In  Pemba,  problems  concerning  land  do  not  appear  to  be  a  motivation  for  migration. 
However,  this  does  not  reveal  whether  scarcity  of  land  could  be  a  trigger  for  seeking 
other  alternatives.  So  although  economic  motivations  are  paramount,  the  results  do  not 
necessarily  suggest  that  there  is  an  abundance  of  land  in  Pemba.  At  the  same  time,  the 
responses  show  that  a  greater  proportion  of  the  female  population,  especially  from 
Pemba  migrate  for  reasons  of  marriage. 
Having  established  who  the  migrants  are  and  why  they  migrate,  it  follows  that  their 
geographical  destinations  may  provide  some  interesting  insights.  It  is  known  that 
colonial  legacies,  cultural  similarities,  post-Independence  policies,  and  skills  influence 
the  destinations  of  migrants. 
The  main  destinations  are  the  Mainland  (50%)  followed  by  the  Middle  East  (25%)  and 
inter-island  movement.  with  the  main  share  going  from  Pemba  to  Unguja.  Movement  to 
the  Mainland  is  facilitated  through  socio-economic  and  sociocultural  links  as  well  as  the 379 
political  union.  Historical  and  cultural  links  between  Zanzibar  and  areas  of  the  Middle 
East  encourage  movement.  More  recently  links  to  both  geographical  areas  have  become 
apparent. 
The  census  analysis  report  for  1978  observed  that  there  had  been  a  relatively  constant 
flow  of  migrants  between  Zanzibar  and  Mainland  Tanzania,  especially  Dar  es  Salaam, 
stating  also  that  it  was  possible,  although  at  the  time  there  was  no  explicit  evidence. 
that  there  may  be  substantial  emigration  from  Zanzibar  to  the  Arabian  Peninsular, 
especially  up  to  1975  (URT.  1982:  167).  The  survey  shows  that  these  observations 
continue  to  apply  for  the  period  between  the  1980s  and  1990s. 
UNGUJA  PEMBA  ZANZIBAR 
Destinations  ROW 
COUNT  TOTAL 
ROW 
COL  04AW 
Middle  East  6  7  13 
46.1  53.9  25.0 
16.1  24.1 
Mainland  11  15  26 
42.3  57.7 
47.8  51.7  50.0 
Kenya  1  1  2 
50.0  50.0  3.8 
4.4  3.5 
Inter-Island  2  6  8 
25.0  75.0  13.4 
8.7  20.7 
Others/Europe  3  0  3 
100.0  0.0  5.8 
13.0  0.0 
COLUMN  23  29  52 
TOTAL  44.2  55.8  100.0 
Source:  Survey 
Table  12.3  Destinations  of  migrants 
Inter-island  migration  accounts  for  13.4%  of  the  sample  households,  and  of  this  11.5% 
move  from  Pemba  to  Unguja  and  3.8%  from  Unguja  to  Pemba  (Table  12.3).  This  shows 
that  the  trends  seen  in  1978  in  which  it  was  observed  that  the  largest  volume  of 
migration  was  from  rural  to  urban,  mainly  to  Zanzibar  Town,  are  continuing.  At  the 
time  the  volume  of  migrants  from  rural  to  regional  centres  was  almost  three  times  that 
of  rural  to  smaller  (district)  urban  centres  (URT.  1982:  166).  Inter-island  migration  in 
1978  showed  that  the  Net  Migration  for  Unguja  and  Pemba  islands  were  +11211  and 
-11211,  while  the  Net  Migration  Rates  (%)  were  53.5  and  17.7  respectively  (URT, 
1982:  160). 
Migration  to  Kenya,  Europe  and  other  areas  is  modest  numerically.  This  can  be 
explained  by  difficulties  regarding  emigration  restrictions  into  Kenya,  especially  during 
the  1970s  and  1980s  and  the  relative  difficulty  of  entering  the  commercial  sector  there. 380 
The  lack  of  appropriate  skills  required  in  Europe.  cultural  differences  and  stringent 
immigration  regulations  that  are  in  force  there,  make  migration  to  the  metropoles  even 
more  difcult. 
From  the  evidence  derived  in  the  preceding  analysis,  certain  directions  of  migration  flow 
can  be  identified  and  volumes  of  migration  can  be  approximated  (Figure  12.2). 
Although  not  possible  to  specify  volumes  accurately,  the  information  from  the  survey 
permits  the  generation  of  approximate  flows.  Moreover  the  findings  show  that  some 
trends  identified  in  the  1967  census  may  still  be  valid  and,  indeed,  may  have  increased. 
The  report  on  migration  following  the  1978  census  (URT.  1982)  points  out  that 
migration  to  towns  in  Zanzibar  is  more  urban  oriented  than  in  Mainland  Tanzania; 
culturally  Zanzibaris  are  more  urban  oriented  than  Mainland  Tanzanians  so  that 
movement  to  urban  areas  is  more  likely  to  involve  the  whole  family.  Finally,  the  report 
notes  that  there  were  (and  this  remains  the  case)  fairly  limited  employment 
opportunities  in  urban  centres  in  the  Isles  and  thus  some  of  those  seeking  employment 
generally  migrate  to  the  Mainland  (Dar  es  Salaam  and  Tanga),  Kenya  (Mombasa)  or  to 
the  Middle-East.  The  flows  are  depicted  in  Figure  12.2.  It  is  expected  that  the  main 
flows  of  remitted  incomes  would  be  from  the  destinations  and  the  amounts  remitted 
may  generally  reflect  the  volume  of  migrants  and  relative  wealth  of  the  receiving  areas. 
Considering  the  argument  that  many  considered  migration  as  temporary,  the  survey 
sought  to  establish  whether  there  had  been  any  return  migrants  within  the  households 
over  the  last  ten  years.  There  were  a  total  of  14  such  households  (from  a  sample  of  52) 
with  return  migrants,  out  of  which  12  came  from  Pemba  (Table  12.4).  The  results  show 
that  Pemba  island  has  a  greater  share  of  return  migrants,  and  this  is  expected  given 
that  most  migrants  originate  from  Pemba.  During  the  survey  it  was  noted  that  some 
migrants  retained  their  links  with  their  places  of  origin  by  moving  frequently  between 
their  two  or  more  homes.  1  The  possibility  of  having  more  than  one  wife  permits  this 
trend,  especially  if  one  of  the  wives  lives  on  the  other  island  or  the  Mainland.  If  the  wife 
happens  to  be  in  a  rural  area,  she  will  maintain  the  household  with  a  small  farm 
supported  by  remittance  from  the  husband.  The  migrant  husband  or  partner  would 
usually,  though  not  exclusively,  migrate  to  an  urban  area. 
Problems  exist  with  the  definition  of  return  migrants.  Many  of  the  return  migrants 
continue  to  maintain  homes  elsewhere  although  at  the  time  of  the  survey  they  had 
returned  and  stayed  for  over  a  year.  However.  given  their  respective  situations  and 
nature  of  economic  activities,  it  is  likely  they  will  continue  to  move  between  the  two  or 
more  destinations. 
1  Through  subsidiary  questions  asked  to  interviewees  to  elaborate  their  responses,  though  not  included  in  the 
questionnaire.  Also  confirmed  with  officials  from  the  Zanzibar  Statistic  department. Return  migrants  UNGUJA  PEMBA  ZANZIBAR 
COUNT  ROW 
ROWN  TOTAL 
COL  UMM% 
Return  migrants  2  12  14 
COLUMN  2  12  14 
TOTAL  14.3  85.7  100.0 
Source:  Survey 
12.4  Remittances 
Table  12.4  Return  migrants 
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From  the  preceding  analysis  evidently  migration  has  become  an  important  issue  in 
Zanzibar  and  is  a  response  to  economic  factors,  both  at  the  sending  and  receiving  ends. 
In  the  former.  there  are  economic  pressures  which  stimulate  movement,  while  in  the 
latter  there  is  the  promise  of  better  economic  opportunities.  Although  economic  factors 
stimulate  migration,  it  is  not  clear  to  what  extent  they  are  important.  This  importance 
is  obscured  in  part  by  the  fact  that  the  total  volume  of  remittances  is  influenced  by 
moneys  remitted  from  the  growing  and  ongoing  interstate  trade  that  is  carried  out  at 
various  levels.  In  addition,  it  is  expected  that  a  considerable  part  of  remitted  incomes 
does  not  necessarily  pass  through  banks  and  the  post  office  and  so  cannot  be  traced 
easily.  Even  when  asked,  many  of  the  respondents  were  not  sure  about  the  total 
amounts  remitted  to  their  households,  while  others  were  reluctant  to  divulge  such 
information.  Thus  rather  than  their  amounts,  respondents  were  asked  to  state  how 
important  such  incomes  were  to  their  households,  based  on  the  regularity,  amounts 
and  impact  to  the  household. 
Respondents  were  asked  whether  their  respective  households  received  any  remittances 
from  abroad.  The  definition  of  'abroad'  implied  outside  the  islands,  including  the 
Mainland  as  well  as  from  abroad  proper.  It  must  also  be  remembered  that  there  are 
also  inter-island  flows  of  remittances,  predominantly  from  Unguja  to  Pemba,  and 
though  information  was  not  specifically  sought  on  this,  it  was  frequently  mentioned 
during  the  interviews.  Equally  there  are  also  urban-rural  remittances  (within  Zanzibar) 
which  may  be  of  some  significance  to  rural  households. 
Over  16%  of  the  total  sample  reported  receiving  remittances  from  some  members  of  their 
household  who  migrated  (Table  12.6).  Between  the  two  islands,  a  greater  proportion  of 
Pemba  households  (26%)  receive  remittances,  compared  to  only  10%  of  Unguja 
households.  Given  that  most  migrants  are  from  Pemba,  such  a  distribution  is  expected. 382 
Response  UNGUJA  PEMBA  ZANZIBAR 
COUNT  ROW 
RON%  TOTAL 
COL  WAR; 
Yes  18  32  50 
36.0  64.0 
9.9  26.0  16.4 
No  164  91  255 
64.3  35.7 
90.1  74.0  83.6 
COLUMN  182  123  305 
TOTAL  59.7  40.3  100.0 
Source:  Survey 
Table  12.5  Households  receiving  remittances  from  abroad  (Unguja-Pemba) 
Comparing  rural  and  urban  areas  (Figure  12.6),  a  greater  proportion  of  the  urban 
households  (25.3%)  obtain  remittances,  compared  to  rural  ones  (12.6%).  Such  a 
distribution  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  most  emigrants  tend  to  come  from  urban 
areas,  rural  migrants  going  first  to  urban  areas  or  from  Pemba  to  Unguja  island.  Thus 
if  there  are  remittances  to  rural  areas,  these  would  tend  to  originate  from  urban  areas. 
Moreover,  given  that  the  amount  of  overseas  remittances  is  likely  to  be  larger,  this 
means  that  urban  households  will  have  also  received  larger  amounts. 
Response  URBAN  RURAL  ZANZIBAR 
COUNT  ROW 
ROW  TOTAL 
COL  MAW 
Yes  23  27  50 
25.3  12.6 
46.0  54.0  16.4 
No  68  187  255 
74.7  87.4 
26.7  73.3  83.6 
COLUMN  91  214  305 
TOTAL  29.8  70.2  100.0 
Source:  Survey 
Table  12.6  Households  receiving  remittances  from  abroad  (Rural-Urban) 
A  X2  test  between  the  islands  and  between  rural  and  urban  areas  generates  similar 
results.  The  x2  statistic  with  continuity  correction  suggests  that  the  Ho  is  rejected, 
Implying  that  there  are  significant  diferences  in  the  receipt  of  remittance  between  the 
households  in  Unguja  and  Pemba  island  and  between  rural  and  urban  areas  (see  boxes 
below).  It  is  also  likely  that  where  there  is  a  greater  tendency  for  the  population  to 
emigrate  remittances  will  be  more  important,  as  is  apparent  from  the  second  test. 383 
Sunnary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pemba 
df  :1 
Total  x2:  14.0875  p=  .  0002 
G  Statistic:  13.8305 
Contingency  Coefficient: 
.  2097 
Phi: 
.  2145 
x2  (with  continuity  correction):  12.9287  p=  .  0003 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis: 
df  : 
Total  X2 
G  Statistic: 
Contingency  Coefficient: 
Phi: 
th  continuity  correction): 
Rural 
1 




.  1564 
6.569  p=  .  0014 
Of  the  48  households  responding  to  the  question.  the  main  geographical  sources  of 
remittances  include  the  Middle  East  (41.3%)  lollowed  by  the  Mainland  (34.8%),  other 
places  (15.2%).  Kenya  (6.5%)  and  Comoros  (2.2%)  (See  Figure  12.8).  1  Such  a 
distribution  underscores  the  historical,  political  and  economic  links  that  continue  to 
exist  particularly  with  the  Middle  East.  However,  further  analysis  shows  that  such 
proportion  is  contributed  mainly  by  the  Zanzibar  urban  samples  (Vikokotoni  and 
Kipangani).  which  as  explained  earlier,  are  distinctive  since  many  of  the  residents  tend 
to  have  particularly  strong  links  with  the  Middle  East.  The  same  applies  to  the  Pemba 
sample.  although  there  it  is  not  exclusively  urban  oriented.  Historically  many  Pemba 
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Figure  12.8  Geographical  Sources  of  Remittances  (Unguja-Pemba) 
1  Mainland  here  implies  the  mainland  side  of  Tanzania. 384 
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Figure  12.9  Geographical  Sources  of  Remittances  (Rural-Urban) 
The  other  areas  important  for  remittances,  though  modest  in  terms  of  absolute 
household  numbers  affected,  include  Kenya  (Mombasa)  where  again  there  are  historical 
and  economic  links  and  the  Comoros.  Slightly  more  households  in  Pemba  (78.6%), 
compared  to  72.2%  In  Unguja,  receive  remittances,  from  the  two  main  geographical 
sources,  the  Mainland  and  Middle  East  though  overall  there  is  no  significant  difference 
in  the  pattern  of  remittances  received  between  the  two  islands.  However,  such 
differences  are  significant  statistically  between  urban  and  rural  households  (see  boxes 
below).  Looking  at  Figure  12.9,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  larger  percentage  of  urban 
households  receiving  remittances  from  the  Middle  East  as  opposed  to  a  large  section  of 
rural  households  receiving  remittances  from  the  Mainland,  account  for  these 
differences. 
Sumnary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pemba 
df  :  4 
Total  x2:  2.12646  p  =.  7125 
Contingency  Coefficient: 
. 
2102 
Cromer's  V:  .  21501 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Rural-Urban 
df  :4 
Total  x2:  14.311  p=  .  0064 
Contingency  Coefficient: 
.  4871 
Cramer's  V: 
.  5578 385 
More  important  than  their  origins  is  the  question  of  the  significance  and  uses  made  of 
remitted  incomes.  Households  receiving  remittances  were  asked  to  indicate  how 
significant  these  were  to  their  budgets,  responses  being  collapsed  into  three  basic  ones, 
i.  e.,  very  sign  ant,  signylcant,  and  made  little  or  no  difference.  As  mentioned  earlier, 
the  reason  for  using  this  approach  was  the  general  reluctance  to  state  amounts  of 
money  received  by  households. 
Overall,  remittances  were  of  some  significance  for  62.6%  of  the  households  and  made 
little  or  no  difference  to  the  remaining  37.4%  (n  =  49)  -  see  also  Figure  12.10  below.  In 
other  words,  for  nearly  two  thirds  of  the  households  remittances  were  of  significance  for 
their  domestic  budget.  Negligible  differences  exist  between  islands,  the  same  being  also 
the  case  between  rural  and  urban  areas  (Figures  12.10  and  12.11). 
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Figure  12.10  Significance  of  Remittances  (Unguja-Pemba) 386 
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Figure  12.11  Significance  of  Remittances  (Rural-Urban) 
The  similarities  in  receipt  and  role  of  remittances  in  the  domestic  budget  between  the 
islands  and  between  rural  and  urban  areas  are  confirmed  by  the  X2  statistics  shown  in 
the  boxes  below. 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pemba 
df  :2 
Total  x  2: 
.  0757  p  =.  9629 
G  Statistic:  .  0757 
Contingency  Coefficient:  .  0393 
Cramer's  V:  .  0393 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Rural-Urban 
df  :2 
Total  x  2:  1.4125  p  =.  4935 
G  Statistic:  1.4248 
Contingency  Coefficient:  .  1674 
Cramer's  V:  .  1698 
While  remittances  are  clearly  of  importance,  their  uses  vary.  Three  main  'use  categories' 
were  identified,  these  being  the  purchase  of:  -  1)  consumer  goods,  2)  domestic  assets,  3) 
capital  and  business  investments.  The  majority  of  households  (87.8%)  used  remittances 
for  the  purchase  of  consumer  goods  such  as  food  and  clothing  and  other  daily 
requirements  such  as  fuel  and  travel.  Almost  twice  the  number  of  households  in  Pemba 
(compared  to  Unguja)  used  remitted  incomes  mainly  for  purchasing  consumer  goods 
(see  Table  12.7).  A  very  small  proportion  of  households  made  other  uses  of  remitted 
incomes.  Thus  only  4  households  bought  major  household  assets  (e.  g.  sewing  machines 387 
or  a  radio  set),  while  only  2  households  reported  making  some  major  capital 
investments  such  as  establishing  a  business  or  constructing  a  house.  Both  cases  were 
in  Unguja. 
Main  Uses  UNGUJA  PEMBA  ZANZIBAR 
COUNT  ROW 
ROW%  TOTAL 
COLGMM% 
Purchase  of  15  28  43 
consumer  goods  34.9  65.1  87.8 
83.3  90.3 
Purchase  of  1  3  4 
household  25.0  75.0  8.2 
assets  5.6  9.7 
Capital  and  2  0  2 
Business  100.0  0.0  4.0 
investments  11.2  0.0 
COLUMN  18  31  49 
TOTAL  36.7  63.3  100.0 
Source:  Survey 
Table  12.7  Main  Uses  of  Remittances  by  Unguja  and  Pemba  Households 
Comparing  rural  and  urban  households  (Table  12.8).  the  majority  of  them  used  remitted 
incomes  for  the  purchase  of  consumer  goods  are  in  urban  areas.  Those  purchasing 
household  assets  and  making  major  investments  are  also  predominantly  in  urban 
areas.  These  results  suggest  that  the  benefits  of  remitted  incomes  are  greater  for 
households  in  urban  areas  and  in  Unguja  island.  These  trends  would  also  suggest  the 
migration  of  the  rural  population  to  urban  areas  does  little  in  the  way  of  generating 
incomes  and  investments  for  the  areas  that  they  leave.  It  can  be  concluded  that  rural 
areas  suffer  considerably  by  losing  the  more  youthful  and  skilled  population,  since  they 
get  very  little  in  return  and  the  long  term  results  appear  to  reinforce  such  movements. 
Main  Uses  RURAL  URBAN  ZANZIBAR 
COUNT  ROW 
ROW  TOTAL 
COL  UMN% 
Purchase  of  18  25  43 
consumer  goods  41.8  58.2  87.8 
100.0  80.6 
Purchase  of  0  4  4 
household  0.0  100.0  8.2 
assets  0.0  12.9 
Capital  and  0  2  2 
Business  0.0  100.0  4.0 
investments  0.0  6.4 
COLUMN  18  31  49 
TOTAL  36.7  63.3  100.0 
Source:  Survey 
Table  12.8  Main  Uses  of  Remittances  by  Rural  and  Urban  Households 388 
While  emigration  is  often  associated  with  the  'remittance  economy',  over  time  the 
amount  and  regularity  of  remittances  usually  falls  (Connell,  1988).  The  decline  is  more 
rapid  for  rural-urban  migration  than  for  international  migration.  In  the  latter  the 
probability  of  return  migration  is  considered  to  be  higher.  It  was  shown  earlier  (in 
chapter  10)  that  the  official  volumes  of  remittances  coming  into  Zanzibar  have  increased 
substantially  since  1984/85.  At  this  juncture  then,  it  is  necessary  to  assess  whether 
there  are  links  between  the  people  who  migrated  recently  (during  the  past  10  years)  and 
the  household  receiving  remittances. 
In  the  preceding  analyses  it  was  shown  that  over  16%  of  households  in  the  survey 
received  remittances  and  that  about  17%  of  households  had  someone  who  had  migrated 
in  recent  years.  The  proportions  are  similar,  and  a  cross  tabulation  was  attempted  to 
assess  whether  it  is  the  same  people  who  migrated  that  are  sending  remittances  to  the 
households  remaining  in  the  islands  ('Table  12.9).  The  results  show  that  over  94%  of 
the  migrants  had  remitted  something  at  some  point.  Although  it  was  not  possible  to 
establish  the  regularity  of  remittances,  it  became  known  that  much  of  the  remitted 
incomes  were  not  sent  through  banks  and  that  some  came  in  the  form  of  goods  or  food. 
Remittances  Husband  Son  Daughter  Other  ZANZIBAR 
COUNT  ROW 
ROW%  TOTAL 
COL  MAIN 
Sent  9  12  11  10  49 
18.4  24.5  22.4  34.7  94.2 
Not  sent  0  3  0  0  3 
0.0  100.0  0.0  0.0  5.8 
Total  9  22  11  10  52 
100.0 
boiace:  purvey 
Table  12.9  Remittances  sent  by  household  members 
More  sons  and  husbands  send  remittances,  though  this  is  expected  given  that  it  is 
males  who  dominate  international  migration.  However,  daughters  who  quite  often 
emigrate  for  reasons  of  marriage,  also  send  remittances,  suggesting  that  there  are 
economic  benefits  relating  to  movements  caused  by  marriage.  The  family  links,  such  as 
through  sons  and  daughters  who  alone  account  for  40%  of  the  sampled  households 
with  migrants,  confirm  that  it  is  the  younger  generation  who  emigrate  most. 
The  importance  of  the  remittance  economy  needs  to  be  viewed  against  the  economy  of 
the  islands  as  a  whole.  The  issues  of  employment,  unemployment  and  the  range  of 
available  economic  activities  is  of  critical  importance  to  SIS  and  to  rural-urban 
interaction  within  them.  The  adoption  of  economic  liberalisation  policies  recently  will 
have  had  some  impact  on  employment  since  one  of  the  prerequisites  of  continued 
development  aid  tied  to  external  support  is  that  the  GoZ  has  had  to  reduce  its  role  as 389 
the  dominant  employer  and  to  permit  a  greater  degree  of  participation  by  the  private 
sector  in  the  economy.  Meanwhile  Zanzibar  remains  a  primary  producing  economy 
focusing  on  the  export  of  cash  crops  and  so  a  large  percentage  of  the  population 
continues  to  be  engaged  in  agriculture.  although  this  proportion  is  smaller  when 
compared  to  say  the  Mainland  due  to  the  higher  degree  of  urbanisation  in  Zanzibar. 
Agriculture  is  undoubtedly  the  most  Important  sector.  not  only  because  it  provides  cash 
crops  for  exports  and  raw  material  for  processing  and  manufactures,  but  also 
subsistence  for  the  largest  section  of  the  population.  According  to  the  1991  HBS  (see 
Figure  12.12).  38.8%  of  the  total  sample  population  (n  =  1794)  are  farmers.  The  state 
sector  is  the  largest  employer  outwith  agriculture.  employing  18.1%  of  the  sample,  a 
phenomenon  that  fits  the  MIRAGE  model  and  is  characteristic  of  many  other  SIS  in  the 
developing  world.  The  percentage  of  the  sample  that  is  unemployed  (18.1%)  is  quite 
prominent.  The  private  sector's  share  of  employment  is  5.3%  and  those  categorised  as 
employers,  account  for  the  smallest  share  (0.2%).  About  5%  of  the  sample  are 
categorised  as  self-employed,  i.  e..  those  engaged  in  their  own  small  scale,  often  informal 
economic  activities.  The  role  of  homemakers  and  unpaid  family  workers  is  important, 
considering  that  14%  of  the  sample  is  engaged  in  such  activities  and  contributing 
substantially  to  the  household  in  terms  of  labour  availability  and  foregone  labour  costs. 
Fshing  is  also  Important,  though  only  5.7%  of  the  sample  is  engaged  in  this  activity. 
From  this  profile  of  the  employment  characteristics,  a  more  detailed  analysis  is 
neccessary  -  comparing  the  range  of  occupations  between  the  islands  and  between 
rural  and  urban  areas.  Such  information  illustrated  the  differentiation  of  economic 
activities  between  these  areas  and  helps  explain  the  motivations  and  patterns  of 
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Figure  12.12  Types  of  occupation  (Zanzibar) 
The  x2  statistics  for  both,  Unguja  and  Pemba  and  rural  and  urban  areas  indicate  that 
there  is  a  clear  and  significant  difference  in  the  types  of  occupations  and  economic 
activities  available  within  the  pairs  being  compared  (see  boxes). 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pemba 
df  :  11 
Total  x2:  125.8823  p=  . 
0001 
G  Statistic  132.4207 
Contingency  Coefficient:  . 
256 
Cramer's  V:  . 
2648 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Rural-Urban 
df  :  11 
Total  x2:  489.0798  p=  . 
0001 
G  Statistic  529.1448 
Contingency  Coefficient:  .  4631 
Cramer's  V:  .  5226 
The  results  confirm  the  existence  of  considerable  differences  in  occupation  between  the 
areas  being  compared,  reflecting  the  variations  in  economic  opportunities  and 
resources.  This  reveals  the  underlying  concentration  of  'development',  partially  due  to 
the  spatial  concentration  of  public  investments  in  certain  areas  during  the  three  phases. 
5.3% 
nO  18.1% 391 
For  example,  while  a  larger  share  of  Pemba's  sample  population  is  engaged  in 
agriculture  and  fisheries  (49%  and  6%  respectively),  employment  in  the  state  sector 
shows  a  distinct  bias  in  favour  of  Unguja  with  14%  (regular  and  casual)  compared  to 
Pemba's  10%  (Figures  12.13  and  12.14).  There  is  a  greater  percentage  of  unpaid  family 
workers  (8.5%),  self-employed  (6%)  and  fishermen  (6%)  in  Pemba,  while  the  proportion 
of  those  employed  in  the  private  sector,  homemakers,  and  'others'  is  greater  in  Unguja. 
Unguja  island  has  over  22%  of  its  sample  population  registered  as  unemployed, 
compared  to  Pemba's  13%. 
These  differences  show  that  economic  activities  in  Pemba  are  distinctly  associated  with, 
and  affected  by,  developments  in  the  rural  sector.  It  has  more  arable  land  with  a  high 
value  cash  crop.  In  contrast.  Unguja  has  a  predominance  of  urban  oriented  economic 
activities  which  are  concentrated  in  Zanzibar  Town,  with  the  rural  areas  producing  low 
value  food  crops.  The  greater  degree  of  unemployment  (nearly  double)  in  Unguja  reflects 
the  movement  of  people  from  Pemba  and  from  rural  to  urban  areas  and  the  shortage  of 
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Source:  HBS,  1991 
Figure  12.13  Occupation  (Rural-Urban) 
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Even  in  urban  areas  farming  is  important  and  over  one  fifth  (18.1%)  of  the  sample 
population  is  engaged  in  it.  About  one  quarter  (25%)  of  the  urban  sample  population  is 
unemployed  compared  to  13%  in  rural  areas  and  those  employed  by  the  government, 
both  regular  and  casual,  make  up  for  21.8%  of  the  urban  sample.  Conversely,  only 
5.7%  of  the  rural  sample  are  employed  by  the  state  sector.  Regular  and  casual  private 
employment  predominantly  both  occur  in  urban  areas,  accounting  for  6%  of  the  urban 
sample  population.  This  contrasts  significantly  with  the  rural  percentage  of  1.3%. 
Fishing  is  predominantly  a  rural  activity  employing  over  9%  of  the  rural  population  and 
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Source:  HBS,  1991 
Figure  12.14  Occupation  (Unguja-Pemba) 
Unpaid  family  workers  comprise  8%  of  the  rural  sample,  compared  to  3,8%  of  the 
urban.  Their  role  is  important  in  rural  areas,  often  providing  much  needed  labour, 
especially  during  harvests.  The  percentage  of  unpaid  family  workers  is  much  smaller  in 
urban  areas  (3.8%).  A  larger  share  of  the  rural  population  is  self-employed  (own 
account  workers)  compared  to  the  urban  (4.2%)  an  indicator  of  the  high  degree  of 
unemployment  and  underemployment  in  the  latter  areas.  Employers  and  those  engaged 
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in  other  activities  make  up  for  the  smallest  percentage  in  both  rural  and  urban  areas. 
This  too  emphasises  the  narrow  range  of  economic  activities  available  in  Zanzibar. 
The  differentiation  of  occupations  in  the  four  areas  emphasises  the  regional  variations 
within  the  Isles.  Despite  its  small  size,  spatial  variations  in  economic  activities  and 
development  continue  to  exist.  This  helps  explain  the  current  population  distribution  in 
the  islands  and  the  pressures  that  encourage  migration  and  emigration.  The  lack  of  a 
spatial  dimension  in  planning,  both  in  the  past  and  currently  under  the  various 
economic  recovery  programmes  (which  tend  to  approach  planning  only  from  a  macro- 
economic  view),  threatens  to  widen  this  gap. 
Economic  activities,  the  skills  and  types  of  employment,  determine  the  earnings  of  the 
population,  and  this  in  turn  determines  the  broad  income  groups  that  exist  in  Zanzibar. 
Again,  using  the  1991  HBS  data,  it  can  be  shown  that  there  are  considerable  income 
differentials  in  the  household  monthly  disposable  incomes  between  both  the  Unguja  and 
Pemba  islands  and  rural  and  urban  households  (n  =  594).  The  results  are  presented  in 
Figures  12.15  and  12.16.  Eight  broad  income  groups  are  used  in  the  analysis  and  these 
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Source:  HBS,  1991 
Figure  12.15  Income  groups  (Unguja-Pemba) 
The  results  show  there  are  considerable  differences  in  household  monthly  incomes 
between  all  the  areas  being  compared,  i.  e.,  between  Unguja  and  Pemba  island,  and 
between  rural  and  urban  households.  For  example,  in  Figure  12.15  Pemba  island  has  a 
smaller  percentage  of  households  that  earn  less  than  6,999  shillings  (17%)  compared  to 
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Unguja  (26%).  Conversely,  there  is  a  larger  percentage  of  households  in  Pemba  earning 
between  7.000  -  14,999  shillings  than  in  Unguja.  The  proportion  earning  between 
15,000  -  19,999  is  nearly  the  same  in  both  samples,  while  there  is  a  greater  percentage 
of  Unguja  households  (16%)  in  the  higher  income  brackets  (over  30,000)  compared  to 
Pemba  (10.4%). 
The  x2  value  indicates  that  there  is  a  significant  difference  in  income  groups  of  the 
households  between  the  two  islands  (see  box  below).  and  the  preceeding  sections  clearly 
show  differences  in  their  respective  proportions  of  income  groups. 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pemba 
df  :7 
Total  x  2:  16.6599  p=  .  0197 
G  Statistic:  16.8634 
Contingency  Coefficient:  .  1652 
Cromer's  V:  .  1675 
An  analysis  similar  to  the  preceding  one  is  made  comparing  the  rural  and  urban  sample 
populations.  1  A  proportionate  bar  chart  is  presented  (Figure  12.16)  for  the  three  areas. 
(the  urban,  and  the  rural  coral  and  non-coral  areas).  The  chart  shows  considerable 
differentials  between  the  income  groups  in  the  three  areas.  The  difference  between  rural 
and  urban  households  is  evident. 
Generally,  there  is  a  greater  proportion  of  households  earning  less  than  14,999  shillings 
a  month  in  the  rural  areas  compared  to  urban  areas.  In  contrast,  there  is  a  greater 
proportion  of  urban  households  earning  over  15,000  shillings  a  month  and  a  small 
percentage  (18.6%)  earning  less  than  9,999  shillings  per  month.  This  means  that  in 
contrast  to  rural  households,  a  very  small  proportion  of  urban  ones  makes  up  for  the 
low  income  groups,  reflecting  a  bias  in  favour  of  urban  households  in  terms  of  better 
incomes.  About  a  third  of  the  rural  coral  households  earn  less  than  6,999  shillings, 
compared  to  a  quarter  of  the  non-coral  households  and  4%  of  urban  households.  Over 
40%  of  urban  households  earn  more  than  20,000  shillings  a  month,  while  the  rural 
non-coral  and  coral  areas  earning  the  same  amounts  accounts  for  only  14.9%  and 
15.6%  respectively.  In  the  middle  income  groups  (7,000-14,999),  the  rural  sample 
populations  seem  to  fare  better,  and  within  the  rural  areas  the  rural  non-coral  area  has 
a  larger  share.  This  is  indicative  of  its  arable  land  and  cash  crop  economy. 
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Source:  HBS,  1991 
Figure  12.16  Income  groups  (Rural-Urban) 
These  results  exhibit  marked  rural-urban  and  rural  coral  and  non-coral  variations  in 
incomes.  Such  spatial  variations  in  an  otherwise  small  area  help  explain  the 
motivations  and  direction  of  migration  within  and  even  outwith  Zanzibar.  At  one  level 
they  explain  rural-urban  migration  motivations  in  general  and  at  another  the 
movements  from  Pemba  to  Unguja.  The  income  variations  and  proportions  of  different 
income  groups  also  mirror  the  types  of  economic  activities  in  different  areas.  Overall, 
they  show  a  bias  in  higher  incomes  both  towards  urban  areas  and  Unguja  island.  To 
some  extent  this  reflects  the  concentration  of  development  in  certain  areas,  while  also 
outlining  the  constraints  or  limitations  that  the  coral  areas  on  the  eastern  fringes  of  the 
Isles  impose  on  development.  However,  It  is  also  true  that  the  lack  of  a  spatial 
dimension  in  the  Isles  development  planning  bears  some  responsibility. 
12.5  Demographic  implications  of  migration 
Initially  the  study  sought  to  identify  some  of  the  basic  and  current  socio-economic 
characteristics  of  the  population.  Information  on  age,  household  sizes,  education, 
ethnicity  was  collected  and  used  to  show  how  these  are  affected  by  migration.  The 
objective  was  to  not  only  to  give  a  socio-economic  profile  of  Zanzibar  as  a  whole,  but 
what  Is  more  important  is  to  identify  spatial  differentiation  in  these  variables. 
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The  analysis  uses  data  from  the  1991  HBS  mainly  because  the  sample  population  Is 
larger  (n  =  3589)  affording  a  more  detailed  examination  of  differences  between  the 
islands,  and  rural  and  urban  areas,  both  using  14  age  groups.  Figure  12.17  presents 
the  proportions  of  the  sample  in  their  respective  age  groups  differentiating  between  the 
Unguja  and  Pemba  populations.  The  graph  reveals  that  there  are  proportionally  more 
children  between  the  age  groups  1-14  in  Pemba  island,  which  reflects  the  higher  fertility 
rate  there.  The  total  fertility  rates  (TFR)  in  1988  for  Pemba  were  9.1  (i.  e.,  the  average 
number  of  children  a  woman  gives  birth  to  during  her  productive  life-span).  In  Unguja 
rural  it  was  8.2,  in  Zanzibar  Town  6.7  and  Zanzibar  as  a  whole  8.2  (GoZ  1988d,  1988e). 
It  also  shows  a  sudden  change  in  proportions  at  the  age  group  15-19.  Coincidentally, 
this  is  at  the  time  when  most  children  complete  their  universal  primary  education,  and 
some  continue  to  secondary  schools  and  others  seek  other  alternatives,  such  as  work. 
This  information  complements  observations  and  comments  made  in  previous  chapters 
relating  to  the  movement  of  the  youth  from  Pemba  and  indeed  rural  households.  1  The 
differentiation  between  age  groups  continues  until  the  35-39  age  group  when  it  swings 
the  other  way,  levelling  out  at  the  older  age  groups. 
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Figure  12.17  Population  age  groups  (Unguja-Pemba) 
A  x2  test  between  the  sample  population  of  the  two  islands  confirms  the  observations 
made,  indicating  that  a  significant  difference  between  the  age  groups  exists  (see  box 
below). 
1  This  is  also  presented  and  discussed  in  the  following  chapter. 397 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pemba 
df  :  14 
Total  x2:  28.5208  p=  . 
0121 
G  Statistic:  28.6825 
Contingency  Coefficient: 
. 
089 
r.  -.,,  u.  noa' 
A  similar  analysis  is  made  between  rural  and  urban  areas  and  the  results  are  displayed 
in  Figure  12.18.  It  shows  considerable  differences  between  age  groups  in  the  rural  and 
urban  populations.  As  in  the  previous  graph,  it  reveals  that  a  high  percentage  of  those 
between  the  ages  0-9  is  in  rural  areas  and  again  this  reflects  the  differential  fertility 
rates.  However,  the  majority  of  those  in  the  age  groups  10-39  are  in  urban  areas. 
These  variations  such  as  between  the  age  groups  10-14  in  this  case,  and  15-19  in  the 
previous  one,  are  linked  to  the  movement  of  the  younger  population  from  rural  to  urban 
areas  and  from  Pemba  to  Unguja.  The  older  population  (from  the  age  group  40  onwards 
and  especially  over  65  years)  remain  in  rural  areas. 
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Figure  12.18  Population  age  groups  (Rural-Urban) 
A  x2  test  is  made  between  the  rural  and  urban  population  and  yields  similar  results  to 
the  Unguja-Pemba  tests  (see  box  below).  That  there  is  a  significant  population 
movement  from  Pemba  to  Unguja  island,  and  from  rural  to  urban  areas  is  to  be 
expected  given  that  Pemba  island  plays  a  peripheral  role  to  Unguja  and  is 
predominantly  rural. 398 
Sunnary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Rural-Urban 
df  :  14 
Total  x2:  40.9039  p=  .  0002 
G  Statistic:  41.2574 
Contingency  Coefficient:  .  1061 
Cromer's  V:  .  1067 
The  trends  also  suggest  that  migration  patterns  have  remained  similar  to  observations 
made  in  the  1978  census  (see  also  chapter  10).  Equally  important  is  that  they  support 
the  hypotheses  about  Zanzibar  being  a  MIRAGE  economy.  Finally  such  an  age 
distribution  has  implications  for  labour  supply  and  agricultural  production  in  rural 
areas.  For  the  urban  areas  this  translates  into  excess  labour  availability  and  thus 
unemployment  and  underemployment.  This  situation  contributes  to  demographic  and 
economic  pressures  on  urban  areas  and  these  in  the  long  term  lead  to  the  existence  of  a 
strong  urban  lobby  which  in  turn  influences  development  policies  in  the  SIS  to  their 
advantage. 
Given  the  differential  fertility  rates  and  population  movements,  it  could  be  expected  that 
there  would  be  significant  differences  between  the  composition  of  Unguja  and  Pemba 
households  (i.  e.,  by  size)  and  between  rural  and  urban  households.  Household  size  is 
shown  in  Figures  12.19  and  12.20  which  reveal  considerable  variations.  For  example, 
Figure  12.19  shows  that  a  larger  proportion  of  Unguja  households  are  small,  i.  e., 
between  1-4  members,  while  the  situation  changes  in  favour  of  Pemba  with  households 
consisting  of  more  than  5  members.  However.  Unguja  has  a  greater  proportion  of 
households  with  more  than  10  persons.  In  the  case  of  Pemba  island,  most  of  the 
members  would  consist  of  the  very  young  and  the  old,  implying  a  high  age  dependency 
ratio.  The  data  also  suggests  that  explanations  for  smaller  household  sizes  in  Unguja 
are  perhaps  due  to  a  lower  fertility  rate  there  compared  to  Pemba  where  household  sizes 
are  larger.  The  larger  household  sizes  in  Pemba  is  evidence  of  population  pressure  on 
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Figure  12.19  Numbers  of  people  in  households  (Unguja-Pemba) 
Similar  variations  occur  between  rural  and  urban  households.  According  to  Figure 
12.20,  more  rural  households  have  between  1-2  and  5-8  members,  while  a  larger  share 
of  urban  households  has  3-4  and  over  9  members.  From  the  graph  it  appears  that 
urban  households  on  the  whole  tend  to  be  bigger.  This  would  suggest  that  the  greater 
proportion  of  urban  households  with  large  numbers,  i.  e.,  in  excess  of  9  is  largely  due  to 
a  rural-urban  migration,  while  the  rural  households  with  5-8  members  are  largely 
accounted  for  by  higher  fertility  rates. 
There  are  considerable  implications  following  from  such  a  demographic  structure  for 
both  the  rural  and  urban  areas.  The  former  suffer  from  a  quantitative  and  qualitative 
labour  shortage.  while  the  urban  areas  have  an  abundance  of  the  more  youthful  and 
innovative  labour,  though  this  contributes  to  prominent  urban  underemployment  and 
unemployment.  These  results  concur  with  observations  made  in  chapters  10  and  11  - 
that  much  of  the  surplus  urban  youths  originate  through  rural-urban  migration. 
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Figure  12.20  Numbers  of  people  in  households  (Rural-Urban) 
Finally,  the  x2  values  for  both  tests  reject  the  null  hypothesis  since  they  exceed  their 
respective  critical  values  significantly  (see  boxes),  implying  that  there  are  significant 
differences  in  the  sizes  of  households  between  the  two  islands.  These  results  confirm 
the  analyses  made  earlier.  Migration  is  to  an  extent  to  be  linked  to  an  illiterate  and 
educationally  impoverished  population. 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pemba 
df  :5 
Total  x2:  22.1169  p=  .  0005 
G  Statistic:  22.8834 
Contingency  Coefficient:  . 
1905 
Cramer's  V:  . 
194 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Rural-Urban 
df  :5 
Total  x2:  68.7038  p=  .  0001 
G  Statistic:  59.0541 
Contingency  Coefficient:  .  322 
Cramer's  V:  .  3404 
mmmmmýzmmw= 
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Overall,  the  level  of  literacy  in  Zanzibar  has  improved.  1  According  to  the  1978  census 
and  the  1988  Mortality  and  Fertility  Survey,  illiteracy  fell  from  65.5%  (1978)  to  34.0% 
(1988e).  However,  as  shown  in  chapter  11,  spatial  variations  in  these  changes  are 
considerable  and  obviously  this  reflects  on  the  socio-economic  status  of  the  respective 
areas  with  long  term  development  implications.  including  demographic  aspects. 
1  The  definition  of  literacy  used  by  the  1978  census  was  anyone  who  could  write  in  Kiswahili.  The  1988  Fertility  and 
Mortality  survey  considered  a  person  literate  provided  they  could  write  in  any  language. 
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The  survey  shows  that  about  70%  of  the  respondents  in  Unguja  had  some  level  of 
education  compared  to  30%  in  Pemba  (Figures  12.21,12.22  and  Table  12.10).  Clearly 
fewer  Pemba  islanders  tend  to  have  any  educational  attainment  compared  to  their 
counterparts  in  Unguja.  This  suggests  that  there  are  spatial  variations  in  educational 
and,  by  implication,  skills  attainment. 
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Figure  12.21  Educational  attainment  of  respondents  (Unguja-Pemba) 402 
Education  UNGUJA  PEMBA  ZANZIBAR 
COUNT  ROW 
ROW  TOTAL 
COLGMAX 
Yes  142  61  203 
70.0  30.0  66.6 
78.0  50.0 
No  40  61  101 
39.6  60.4  33.0 
21.9  50.0 
COLUMN  182  123  304 
TOTAL  59.8  40.2  100.0 
source:  swavey 
Table  12.10  Education  attainment  of  respondents 
The  X2  statistics  for  both  tests  exceed  the  critical  value  considerably  and  it  is  stated  that 
there  are  considerable  differences  in  the  attainment  of  education  between  the  islands 
and  between  rural  and  urban  samples  (boxes).  Pemba  and  rural  residents  have  a  much 
lower  educational  attainment.  This  has  implications  to  the  respective  populations  in 
training.  skills  and  quality  of  life.  Moreover.  it  would  support  the  contention  that  the 
more  skilled  population  has  moved  away  from  Pemba  and  rural  areas,  leaving  behind 
those  with  a  lower  level  of  educational  (and  skills)  attainment.  This  concurs  with  the 
observations  made  in  chapters  10  and  11.  that  it  is  often  the  more  skilled  and  youthful 
population  who  migrate  from  rural  areas.  However,  it  is  also  equally  possible  that  the 
delivery  of  and  access  to.  skills  and  education  tend  to  favour  urban  areas  and  Unguja 
Island  in  particular. 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Between  Unguja-Pemba 
df:  1 
Total  x2:  25.8514  p=  .  0001 
G  Statistic:  .  25.7157 
Contingency  Coefficient:  .  2799 
Phi:  .  2916 
Cramer's  V:  .  24.6038  p=  .  0001 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Between  Rural-Urban 
df  :1 
Total  x2:  23.2541  p=  .  0001 
G  Statistic:  .  25.7949 






Cramer's  V:  . 
21.9895  p=  . 
0001 
The  survey  results  are  also  consistent  with  the  findings  of  the  surveys  on  mortality. 
fertility  and  contraception  in  Zanzibar  (GoZ.  1988d,  1988e)  which  found  that  illiteracy 
amongst  young  adult  women  in  rural  areas  is  higher  than  those  from  urban  areas.  The 
same  report  shows  that  nearly  21%  of  women  aged  under  30  in  Unguja  are  illiterate 
compared  to  about  47%  in  Pemba.  The  combination  of  lower  educational  achievements 
and  age  group  discrepancies  such  as  those  in  rural  areas  and  in  Pemba  will  no  doubt 
limit  the  development  potentials  of  those  areas. 403 
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Figure  12.22  Educational  attainment  of  respondents  (Rural-Urban) 
58.4% 
The  largest  proportion  of  educational  attainment  is  at  the  primary  and  secondary  school 
levels  -  accounting  for  nearly  54%  of  the  sample  population.  A  very  small  percentage 
achieved  higher  levels  of  education  (1.3%).  Figures  12.21  and  12.22  show  clearly  that  a 
smaller  proportion  of  Pemba  islanders  attains  primary  and  secondary  education  (45.5%) 
compared  to  Unguja  (59%).  Similar  trends  are  reflected  in  the  1991  HBS,  with  56.7%  in 
Pemba  and  71.9°/6  in  Unguja.  Twice  the  proportion  of  people  in  Unguja  get  secondary 
education  compared  to  Pemba  and  this  is  reflected  both  in  the  survey  and  the  HBS. 
Also  a  larger  proportion  of  Pemba  respondents  had  no  education. 
The  x2  values  for  both  the  Unguja-Pemba  and  rural-urban  tests  support  the  claim  that 
there  is  a  significant  difference  in  educational  achievement  at  various  levels  of 
educational  (none,  primary,  secondary,  vocational,  Koran  school,  technical  and  higher) 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pemba 
df  :6 
Total  x2:  40.9499  p=  . 
0001 
Contingency  Coefficient:  . 
3435 
Cramer's  V:  . 
3658 
Sumnary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Rural-Urban 
df  :6 
Total  x2:  39.7131  p=  . 
0001 
Contingency  Coefficient:  . 
3389 
Cramer's  V:  . 
3603 
The  X2  results  (boxes  above)  confirm  all  the  preceding  observations  implying  that  rural 
areas  and  Pemba  are  unlikely  to  benefit  directly  from  their  population  attaining  better 
Rural 
and  higher  education.  Such  a  situation  has  wider  implications,  for  health,  nutrition, 
and  in  production. 404 
Ethnicity,  and  the  linkages  which  it  generates,  are  also  of  considerable  importance  in 
the  understanding  of  Zanzibari  migration.  For  example,  it  is  common  for  some 
Zanzibaris  of  Arab  origin  to  migrate  to  the  Middle  East,  particularly  Oman,  but  also 
Yemen  and  the  United  Arab  Emirates,  seeking  employment.  Female  emigration  follows 
from  intermarriage  with  males  from  the  Gulf  and  Arabian  Peninsula.  Marriages  to 
Zanzibaris  who  emigrated  several  years  ago  and  to  nationals  of  the  Middle  East  are  also 
common. 
Some  households  were  found  to  have  contacts  with  their  kin  on  the  Mainland  and  took 
advantage  of  this  by  establishing  businesses  there.  For  many  this  has  facilitated  the 
move  to  the  Mainland.  though  contact  with  the  Isles  is  maintained.  Although  this 
movement  can  be  long  term,  it  is  not  necessarily  permanent,  a  phenomenon  also 
common  to  many  other  SIS.  The  tendency  for  migrants  to  go  to  areas  in  which  they 
have  established  links  is  known.  What  is  important  is  that  once  migration  is  facilitated, 
and  especially  to  places  where  better  economic  opportunities  are  available,  the 
possibility  of  remitting  some  savings  or  investment  capital  arises.  While  for  many  years 
this  was  difficult  in  Zanzibar,  the  barriers  have  since  been  removed  (Chapters  8  and  10). 
Considerable  amounts  of  money  are  being  remitted  through  banks,  though  what  is  not 
known  Is  their  impact  on  peripheral  areas. 
Caution  is  necessary  when  considering  issues  of  descent  or  origin.  The  issue  of 
ethnicity  and  ethnic  identity  remains  a  sensitive  issue  in  Zanzibar  and  is  often  entwined 
in  a  complex  manner  into  local  politics  and  allegiances.  Some  respondents  found  it 
difficult  to  categorise  themselves  after  more  than  a  generation  of  mixed  marriages, 
whilst  others  'preferred*  to  state  their  origins  from  one  place  or  another  depending  on 
how  they  perceived  themselves.  For  example,  descendants  of  mixed  marriages  may 
perceive  themselves  as  of  Arab  origin  particularly  if  this  entails  relative  prosperity  or 
higher  social  standing.  They  may  refer  to  themselves  as  indigenous  Africans  if  they  are 
in  a  predominantly  African  populated  area  or  sympathise  with  the  common  good  of  the 
African  population.  Finally,  there  were  those  who  gave  their  origins  as  Zanzibari  largely 
from  their  nationalist  stance.  However,  some  were  uneasy  about  such  questions, 
especially  considering  the  overt  and  covert  role  of  ethnicity  in  local  politics.  and  gave 
'neutral'  responses  by  simply  declaring  that  they  were  Zanzibari.  A  measure  of  tact  was 
essential  with  this  matter  and  where  relevant  the  question  was  re-phrased  in  a  more 
acceptable  manner. 
The  results  from  the  survey  are  displayed  in  Figures  12.23,12.24  and  12.25  (n  =  306 
households).  Over  84%  claimed  their  origins  as  in  Zanzibar,  i.  e.,  either  from  Unguja  or 
Pemba.  Those  with  Middle-Eastern  origins  made  up  6.5%  of  the  sample,  while  those 
originating  from  the  Mainland  accounted  for  5.6%.  According  to  the  1978  census,  15% 
of  all  migrants  from  the  Mainland  live  in  Unguja  (15%)  and  only  1.8%  in  Pemba.  This 405 
corresponds  fairly  closely  to  the  distribution  in  Figure  12.25.  Only  a  small  percentage  of 
respondents  was  from  elsewhere.  On  the  premise  that  areas  of  origin  influence 
migration  destinations,  the  results  suggest  that  the  direction  of  migration  would  be 
between  the  islands  of  Pemba  and  Unguja,  to  the  East  African  mainland  and  the  Middle- 
East  respectively. 
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Figure  12.23  Origins  of  Zanzibari  Respondents 
Figure  12.24  reveals  that  the  vast  majority  of  the  respondents  in  Unguja  and  Pemba 
come  from  the  same  areas,  with  just  over  3%  of  Pemba  respondents  originating  from 
Unguja  and  7.7%  of  Unguja  respondents  originating  from  Pemba.  A  larger  percentage  of 
Pemba  respondents  declared  Middle-Eastern  origins  (13%).  Unguja's  share  was  lower  at 
2.7%.  There  was  a  larger  proportion  of  Unguja  respondents  of  Mainland  origins  (8.2%) 
compared  to  Pemba's  2.4%.  A  greater  proportion  of  Pemba  respondents  declared 
Kenyan  origins  (3.3%)  while  there  were  none  in  Unguja.  Those  of  Comorian  descent 
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Figure  12.24  Origins  of  Unguja-Pemba  Respondents 
Figure  12.25  compares  the  responses  from  the  rural-urban  samples.  Those  from  the 
urban  areas  revealed  origins  from  a  wider  range  of  geographical  sources.  Most  urban 
respondents  came  from  their  own  island,  followed  by  the  Middle-East  and  the  Comoros. 
An  interesting  dimension  is  that  rural  respondents  originating  from  areas  other  than  the 
islands  are  mainly  from  the  Mainland  (7%).  This  is  a  partly  the  result  of  labour 
migrants  from  the  Mainland  to  Zanzibar  who  have  subsequently  settled  permanently. 
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Figure  12.25  Origins  of  Rural-Urban  Respondents 
These  results  reveal  a  number  of  important  facets.  They  show  that  most  respondents 
are  indigenous  to  Zanzibar,  although  a  larger  share  of  those  in  Unguja  came  from  the 
other  island,  compared  to  those  in  Pemba.  As  expected,  it  shows  that  a  larger 
proportion  of  those  with  Middle  Eastern  origins  are  in  Pemba.  However,  they  also  show 
that  those  originating  from  the  Comoros,  the  Middle  East,  Kenya  and  other  areas  tend 
to  be  urban  dwellers.  The  reasons  for  this  is  can  be  traced  to  their  historical  roots 
during  the  height  of  the  Arab  influence  and  the  development  of  mercantilism  in 
Zanzibar.  In  contrast,  many  of  those  with  Mainland  origins  tend  to  be  rural  dwellers 
and  this  is  explained  by  migrant  labourers  from  the  Mainland  who  come  to  work  in 
rural  farms. 
The  results  also  show  that  the  urban  composition  of  the  sample  has  wider  geographical 
origins  than  the  rural  sample.  This  suggests  that  the  urban  population  comprises 
people  who  have  moved  in  from  many  different  areas,  but  also  confirms  that  many  of 
those  of  Arab  and  Comorian  origin  are  resident  in  urban  areas.  This  conforms  with  the 
tendency  for  the  land  owning  classes,  who  were  often  Arabs  and  Asians,  to  reside  in 
urban  areas.  The  land  redistribution  policies  of  the  First  Phase  alienated  the 
predominantly  Arab  and  Asian  land-owning  groups  who  then  moved  to  urban  areas.  In 
contrast,  the  rural  sample  indicate  origins  from  within  the  islands  and  the  Mainland. 408 
The  X2  results  testing  for  differences  between  the  origins  of  respondents  of  different 
areas  are  shown  below  (boxes),  the  null  hypothesis  stating  that  there  are  no  significant 
differences  in  the  origins  of  the  interviewees  between  the  islands  and  between  rural  and 
urban  area.  However.  the  X2  values  indicate  otherwise.  asserting  that  there  are 
significant  differences  between  the  sample  populations  in  both  tests. 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Penba 
df  :6 
Total  x2:  205.18912  p  =.  0001 
Contingency  Coefficient:  .  62745 
Cromer's  V:  .  80581 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Rural-Urban 
df  :6 
Total  x2:  110.7224  p  =.  0001 
G  Statistic 
Contingency  Coefficient:  .  5155 
Cromer's  V:  .  6015 
The  results  can  be  explained  by  Zanzibar's  historical  legacy  and  policies  that  have  been 
implemented  since  the  Revolution.  These  have  also  had  significant  influence  on  the 
migration  players.  Thus  Zanzibari  migration  (and  subsequent  remittances),  exhibit  the 
following  characteristics.  Those  with  Arab  heritage  tend  to  migrate  from  Pemba  to 
Unguja  and  to  the  Middle  East.  Some  go  to  the  East  African  mainland.  Those  without 
Arab  heritage,  migrate  within  the  Isles  and  a  few  to  the  Mainland.  As  migrants  tend  to 
be  skilled.  the  implications  for  remittances  are  obvious. 
12.6  Implications  of  the  MIRAGE  economy  to  agricultural  production 
Rural  out-migration  has  implications  for  agricultural  production  and  the  rural  economy 
as  a  whole.  This  section  seeks  to  assess  such  implications  on  agriculture.  comparing 
the  agricultural  activities  between  the  islands,  its  development  and  the  relationship 
between  migration  and  land  and  labour  availability.  Other  aspects  discussed  include 
the  use  of  modern  agricultural  technology  to  increase  yields  and  possible  environmental 
impacts  emanating  from  land  use  pressures. 
About  68%  of  the  survey  households  are  engaged  in  agricultural  activities,  cultivating 
some  land  for  food  and  cash  crops.  Figure  12.26  depicts  the  size  of  the  main  food 
cropping  areas  in  1982  (GoZ,  1984).  Cassava  occupied  the  largest  area  followed  by 
bananas  and  paddy.  Potatoes  and  maize  also  occupy  fairly  large  areas.  Cassava, 
bananas  and  potatoes  are  important  to  many  rural  households  and  provide  the  poorer 
urban  households  with  a  source  of  cheap  carbohydrates.  Although  rice  is  also  an 
important  crop,  domestic  production  falls  far  short  of  demand.  However,  following  the 
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Figure  12.26  Area  which  main  food  crops  occupy 
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Cash  crops  are  an  important  source  of  income  for  many  rural  households.  For  Zanzibar 
cloves  and  copra  have  been  the  dominant  cash  crops  for  many  years.  However,  the 
recent  drop  in  prices  for  the  two  crops  has  meant  that  they  have  become  less  attractive 
to  many  farmers.  Overall,  the  cultivated  land  area  in  1982  was  put  at  135,938  hectares 
out  of  which  59.5%  was  under  cash  crop  production  and  40.5%  under  food  crops, 
highlighting  Zanzibar's  dependency  on  cash  crop  exports.  Meanwhile,  the  majority  of 
the  population  continues  to  depend  on  subsistence  agriculture  for  provision  of  domestic 
food  supply.  The  low  production  of  food  is  partly  because  of  low  productivity. 
Meanwhile  pressure  on  land  in  parts  of  Pemba  has  lead  to  some  of  it  being  lost  to  soil 
erosion  (GoZ.  1984). 
The  survey  sought  to  assess  whether  individual  households  engaged  in  agriculture  have 
expanded  or  contracted  their  farm  sizes.  As  such.  this  would  indicate  whether 
households  are  producing  more  for  the  market  and  responding  to  agricultural 
incentives.  Conversely.  it  may  suggest  that  either  the  policies  are  ineffective  or  that 
some  factors  of  production  constrain  expansion.  Most  of  the  households  stated  that 
there  was  a  difference  in  the  area  which  they  cultivated  (67.7%).  while  24.4%  had 
increased  the  size  of  their  plots  (Table  12.11).  Only  7.9%  stated  that  they  had 
decreased  the  size  of  plots  they  normally  cultivated. 410 
An  interesting  pattern  emerges  when  comparing  responses  between  the  islands.  In 
Unguja  29.8%  indicated  an  Increase  in  area  cultivated  compared  to  18.1%  in  Pemba, 
while  decreases  were  noted  as  3.9%  in  Unguja  and  12.3%  Pemba.  Clearly,  the  statistics 
suggest  there  are  factors  inhibiting  agricultural  expansion  in  Pemba,  possibly  land  or 
labour  shortages  or  both.  However,  the  main  expansion  of  the  cultivated  area  in  Unguja 
may  be  due  to  its  harsher  economic  climate  with  many  households  unable  to  partake  in 
producing  a  relatively  high  value  crop'such  as  cloves  and  being  forced  to  strengthen  the 
'domestic  subsistence  safety  net'  by  producing  more.  The  evidence  of  'extensißcation'  as 
opposed  to  'Intensification'  is  indicative  also  of  low  agricultural  technology  utilisation  by 
most  households. 
Area  changes  UNGUJA  PEMBA  ZANZIBAR 
COUNT  ROW 
ROW%  TOTAL 
COL  UNAN 
Increased  37  19  77 
66.1  33.9  24.4 
29.9  18.1 
The  same  82  73  56 
52.9  47.1  67.7 
66.1  69.6 
Decreased  5  13  155 
27.8  72.2  7.9 
4.0  12.3 
COLUMN  124  105  229 
TOTAL  54.2  45.8  100.0 
Source:  Survey 
Table  12.11  Changes  in  cultivated  areas 
The  reasons  for  these  changes  (or  non-change)  in  the  land  cultivated  by  households 
were  grouped  into  five  broad  categories:  1)  land  shortages  and  conflicts,  2)  labour 
shortages.  3)  decrease  in  household  size  (falling  demand  for  food  and  shortage  of 
labour),  4)  increase  in  household  size  (and  hence  increased  demand  and  availability  of 
labour)  and  5)  economic  and  market  motivations  emanating  from  new  agricultural 
policies  (n=217). 
About  65%  of  respondents  reported  that  they  had  not  increased  the  sizes  of  their 
holding  due  to  the  combination  of  land  shortage  and  land-use  conflicts,  while  about 
5.6%  indicated  that  they  had  decreased  their  holding  due  to  the  reduction  of  household 
size  (Table  12.12).  About  19.3%  increased  their  cultivated  shambas  due  to  the 
expansion  of  their  respective  household  sizes  and  just  over  100/6  did  this  in  response  to 
the  new  agricultural  policies.  Ultimately,  it  appears  that  more  households  have 
Increased  their  holding  compared  to  those  that  did  not.  It  appears  that  labour  shortage 
is  an  important  parameter  in  agricultural  production  since  it  and  the  reduction  in 
households  size  affected  a  total  of  24%  of  the  households. ý« 
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Causes  for  changes  UNGUJA  PEMBA  ZANZIBAR 
in  cultivated  areas  ROW 




Land  47  54  101 
shortage/conflicts  46.5  53.5  46.6 
same  40.9  52.9 
Labour  shortage  18  22  40 
(same)  45.0  55.0  18.4 
15.6  21.6 
Decrease  in  5  7  12 
household  size  41.7  58.3  5.6 
reduc  4.3  6.9 
Increase  in  26  16  42 
household  size  61.9  38.1  19.3 
(increased)  22.6  15.9 
Market/economic  19  3  22 
motivations  86.4  13.6  10.1 
-CincreasedD 
22.6  2.9 
COLUMN  115  102  217 
TOTAL  53.0  47.0  100.0 
Source:  Survey 
Table  12.12  Causes  for  changes  in  cultivated  land  areas 
Broadly.  a  greater  proportion  of  households  in  Unguja  did  not  increase  cultivated  land 
due  to  unavailability  of  land  and  labour  shortages.  Overall  a  small  proportion  of 
households  reduced  cultivated  areas,  with  the  larger  proportion  emanating  from  Pemba. 
This  is  presumably  also  due  to  a  decrease  in  household  size  (presumably  lack  of  spare 
labour).  However.  there  were  differences  in  the  proportion  of  households  that  increased 
cultivated  land  both  because  of  increased  household  sizes  and  in  response  to  market 
motivations,  largely  in  favour  of  Unguja  island.  This  can  partly  be  explained  by  an 
incoming  population  (migrants  from  both  Pemba  and  labour  migrants  from  the 
Mainland.  Other  reasons  include  that  agriculture  in  Unguja  is  increasingly  moving 
towards  food  production  and  that  the  overall  population  of  Unguja  island  is  also  larger 
and  growing  faster  hence  placing  a  greater  demand  for  food. 
Comparing  the  islands.  the  z2  test  shows  that  there  is  a  significant  difference  in  the 
motivations  or  reasons  for  changes  in  cultivated  areas  between  the  islands  (see  box). 
This  suggests  that  the  forces  influencing  agricultural  production  differ  between  the 
islands,  and  to  a  large  extent  labour  availability,  as  influenced  by  migration,  plays  an 
important  role. 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Penba 
df  :4 
Total  x2:  14.50907  p=  .  0058 
G  Statistic:  15.81877 
Contingency  Coefficient: 
.  25034 
Cramer's  V: 
.  25858 412 
In  summary.  both  land  and  labour  supply  conditions  inhibit  expansion  of  the  cultivated 
area.  Regarding  land  supply.  the  existing  land  laws  compound  the  difficulty  in  transfer 
of  land  occupancy.  Apart  from  the  general  shortage  of  land.  liberalisation  policies  are 
also  partly  responsible  for  creating  land  speculation.  inflating  the  price  of  land.  The 
combination  of  land  speculation  and  crop  price  incentives  has  lead  to  an  increase  in 
land  use  conflicts.  Rural-urban  migration  has  helped  to  create  a  shortage  of  labour, 
such  that  during  clove  harvests,  especially  in  Pemba,  a  substantial  amount  of  additional 
labour  has  to  be  shipped  in  from  Unguja  and  the  Mainland.  '  The  situation  is 
exacerbated  by  the  reliance  on  traditional  cultivation  methods  which  are  labour 
intensive  and  which  give  low  outputs  per  unit  area  of  land.  Seasonal  migration  of 
labour  is  encouraged  during  the  clove  picking  season  though  in  recent  years  this  has 
been  difficult  to  obtain  due  to  low  pay  as  a  result  of  falling  clove  prices,  inflation,  the 
high  costs  of  transport  to  and  from  the  islands.  and  especially  to  Pemba. 
Assuming  that  population  pressure  and  hence  demand  for  increased  cash  and  food  crop 
cultivation  has  increased  the  pressure  on  land,  the  households  were  asked  whether  they 
lay  any  of  their  land  to  fallow.  The  assumption  is  that  due  to  the  general  perception 
that  land  is  being  exhausted  through  over-cultivation  and  with  little  use  being  made  of 
fertlllsers,  fallowing  is  necessary  to  recharge  the  fertility  of  the  soil.  Its  existence  would 
Indicate  whether  there  is  adequate  available  land  to  practice  fallowing. 
The  responses  show  that  46%  of  the  respondents  (n  =  84)  indicated  that  some  of  their 
land  was  put  to  fallow  (Table  12.13).  About  77.8%  of  Unguja  households  practice 
fallowing,  presumably  because  there  is  less  fertile  land  available  there  and  the 
population  increase  and  demand  for  food  due  to  migration  contributes  to  its  exhaustion 
more  quickly.  In  Pemba  the  proportion  is  smaller  (59.6°/6).  However,  what  is  also  true  is 
that  the  fallowing  cycles  have  become  shorter,  currently  ranging  between  one  and  two 
years  and  therefore  not  giving  the  land  adequate  time  to  recharge.  The  long  term 
consequences  will  be  falling  yields  per  unit  area.  Such  a  situation  is  a  recipe  for 
ecological  upheavals. 
I  This  point  was  made  by  an  agricultural  expert  in  the  Isles  and  later  reported  in  national  newspapers. 413 
Fallowing  practice  UNGUJA  PEMBA  ZANZIBAR 
COUNT  ROW 
ROMI;  TOTAL 
COLUMN% 
Yes  21  34  101 
38.2  61.8  46.6 
77.8  59.65 
No  6  23  40 
20.7  79.3  18.4 
22.2  40.35 
COLUMN  27  57  84 
TOTAL  32.1  67.9  100.0 
Source:  Siavey 
Table  12.13  Respondents  practising  fallowing 
The  x2  statistic  shows  a  marginal  significance  only  after  the  G  statistic  is  computed  and 
then  only  at  the  0.10  level  of  significance  (see  box).  The  Ho  is  therefore  accepted  but 
with  caution  as  it  is  appreciated  that  the  reasons  for  practising  fallowing  may  differ 
between  the  two  islands. 
Suim  ry  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pena 
df  :1 
Total  x2:  2.66372  p=  .  1025 
G  Statistic:  2.78068 
Contingency  Coefficient:  . 
17532 
Cramer's  V:  .  17808 
Householders  that  practised  fallowing  were  asked  to  provide  the  reasons  for  doing  so  (n 
=  54).  The  results  are  shown  in  Figure  12.27.  Predictably.  the  most  common  reason 
provided  was  the  decline  in  soil  fertility  (46.3%).  particularly  in  the  case  of  Unguja 
(94.7%).  Next  were  those  who  stated  that  they  had  no  need  for  more  land  (38.9%).  a 
response  which  came  predominantly  from  the  Pemba  households.  Labour  shortages 
accounted  for  11.1%.  and  again  this  affected  mainly  Pemba  households  (17%).  Only  a 
very  small  proportion  (3.7%)  gave  distance  to  farms  as  a  constraining  reason.  These 
results  suggest  that  land  fertility  decline  is  a  disturbing  factor  particularly  in  Unguja. 
They  also  suggest  that  labour  shortages  in  Pemba  contribute  to  the  apparent  lack  of  the 
need  to  expand  cultivated  land  area.  Other  reasons  include  the  absence  of  economic 
incentives.  the  (old)  age  of  many  producers  and  conflicts  relating  to  land  ownership  and 
use.  Significant  differences  exist  between  the  two  islands  in  the  reasons  given  for 
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Figure  12.27  Reasons  for  practising  fallowing 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pemba 
df  :3 
Total  x2:  29.70731  p=  . 
0001 
G  Statistic: 
Contingency  Coefficient:  . 
59573 
Cramer's  V:  . 
74171 
The  respondents  were  then  asked  whether  the  land  they  had  was  adequate  for  their 
needs  (n=  231).  Overall,  nearly  80ß6  of  Unguja  households  stated  that  what  they  had 
was  enough,  compared  to  about  40%  in  Pemba  (Figure  12.28).  Conversely,  17.1%  and 
5996  respectively  indicated  that  they  did  not  require  additional  land,  at  least  in  the  short 
term  (Figure  12.27).  However,  such  demands  reflect  the  nature  of  the  Zanzibari 
agricultural  system,  which  is  largely  based  on  the  household  (including  labour)  and  the 
variations  in  cropping  within  the  Isles.  Thus  it  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  a  general 
satisfaction  for  land  exists  and  serves  to  highlight  the  problems  associated  with 
migration  from  Pemba  and  from  rural  to  urban  areas,  urban  biased  agricultural  pricing 
policies  (especially  in  the  past)  and  the  lack  of  appropriate  technological  advancement  to 
increase  agricultural  production. 415 
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Figure  12.28  Demand  for  Land 
The  results  show  a  significant  difference  in  demand  for  land  between  the  two  sample 
households  representing  the  islands.  The  x2  statistic  by  far  exceeds  the  critical  value, 
therefore  confirming  that  a  significant  difference  for  land  requirements  between  the  two 
populations  exists  (see  box  below). 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pemba 
df  :2 
Total  x2:  57.68499  p=  . 
0001 
G  Statistic:  65.65 
Contingency  Coefficient:  . 
44701 
Cramer's  V:  . 
49975 
Despite  efforts  by  government,  technological  change  in  agriculture  has  not  been 
sufficient  to  register  any  significant  increases  in  production  of  food  or  cash  crops.  A 
tiny  proportion  of  the  land  is  irrigated  and  modem  farming  techniques  and  practices  are 
a  rarity.  Generally,  a  trend  has  emerged  in  which  a  decreasing  proportion  of  the  rural 
population  is  effectively  engaged  in  agriculture.  Such  a  situation  will  stifle  the 
anticipation  for  increases  in  domestic  food  production  in  Zanzibar. 
The  above  situation  partly  explains  why  the  food  production  programme  (MTAKULA), 
has  had  limited  success,  while  at  the  same  time  there  has  been  an  influx  of  a  young 
under-  and  unemployed  population  in  the  urban  areas.  The  other  equally  important 
factor  is  that  there  do  exist  differences  in  land  usage  and  requirements  between  the 
islands  and  therefore  separate  and  more  appropriate  measures  will  be  required  in addressing  the  problems  in  the  two  islands. 
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To  assess  the  role  of  modem  agricultural  technology  in  agriculture,  respondents  were 
asked  whether  they  made  any  use  of  modem  Inputs.  such  as  fertilisers  and  pesticides 
(Table  12.14).  A  number  of  respondents  (39%)  mentioned  falling  yields  and  declining 
fertility  as  evidence  of  environmental  degradation  and  46%  gave  this  as  a  reason  for 
practising  land  fallowing  (n=  54).  About  28.2%  of  the  respondents  reported  using  some 
kind  of  fertiliser.  with  15%  using  modem  inputs.  About  71.8%  of  the  respondents  did 
not  use  any  type  of  fertiliser.  The  survey  results  supports  one  agricultural  study  (GoZ, 
1983)  which  found  that  over  90%  of  farmers  rarely  use  natural  fertiliser.  The  same 
study  also  noted  that  by  1981/82  there  was  a  small  increase  in  the  use  of  various 
modern  Inputs  and  much  of  this  was  in  response  to  recent  crop  diseases  and  falling 
fertility.  In  informal  discussions  with  some  of  the  farmers  it  was  established  that  the 
main  constraints  in  the  use  of  natural  fertiliser  and  modern  inputs  lay  in  flaws  in 
extension  services.  acceptance  of  new  technologies.  the  associated  costs  and  difficulties 
in  the  supply  of  modern  inputs  and  the  increased  demand  of  labour  that  is  caused  by 
adopting  some  modem  inputs. 
Do  you  use  modern  UNGUJA  PEMBA  ZANZIBAR 
farming  practices?  ROW 
COUNT  TOTAL 
ROW% 
COLL4AW 
No  78  44  122 
63.9  36.1  71.8 
79.6  61.1 
Yes:  Chemical  18  9  27 
fertilisers  only  66.7  33.3  15.9 
18.4  12.5 
Yes:  A  Combination,  2  19  21 
pesticides  and  9.5  90.5  12.3 
fertiliser  2.0  26.4 
COLUMN  98  72  170 
TOTAL  57.7  42.3  100.0 
Sauce:  Survey 
Table  12.14  Households  applying  different  agricultural  methods 
Comparing  the  uses  of  modem  inputs  in  agriculture  between  the  islands  reveals 
considerable  differences.  The  X2  statistic  is  significant  well  over  the  critical  value. 
suggesting  a  significant  difference  in  the  usage  of  agricultural  inputs  between  the 
islands.  However,  this  difference  generally  reflects  the  different  emphases  of  crop  and 
soil  types  in  the  islands.  Overall,  it  must  be  remembered  that  there  is  a  low  utilisation 
of  modern  agricultural  inputs. 417 
Sunnary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pemba 
df  :2 
Total  x2:  22.79402  p=  .  0001 
G  Statistic:  24.57161 
Contingency  Coefficient: 
.  34385 
Cromer's  V: 
.  36617 
Comparing  the  responses  between  the  islands,  it  appears  that  a  larger  proportion  of 
Unguja  households  do  not  make  use  of  any  modern  agricultural  inputs  (79.6%). 
Meanwhile  the  proportion  using  a  'package'  of  inputs,  is  greater  in  Pemba  (26.4%). 
Because  of  the  'Die  Back"  and  'Sudden  Death*  crop  diseases  affecting  cloves, 
particularly  in  Pemba,  chemicals  are  used  there  more  frequently.  The  nature  of 
agriculture  practices,  land  quality.  types  of  crops  and  crop  husbandry  in  Unguja  have 
meant  that  the  use  of  fertiliser  is  more  common  there.  Apart  form  these  factors,  high 
transport  costs  and  difficulties  in  supply  of  inputs  have  further  constrained  the 
widespread  use  of  fertiliser  in  general  and  particularly  in  Pemba.  Furthermore,  the 
costs  of  inputs  on  both  islands  and  the  absence  of  agricultural  credit  coupled  with 
unfavourable  crop  pricing  policies  have  also  restricted  the  spread  in  use  of  modern 
inputs.  With  72%  of  households  not  using  any  improved  techniques  or  technology,  the 
expected  increase  in  output  may  be  difficult  to  achieve.  Even  for  some  of  those  using 
improved  technology,  the  effects  may  not  be  an  increase  in  output,  but  rather  arresting 
any  further  decline  in  output. 
Finally.  and  relating  to  demographic  pressures  through  demand  for  land  and  related 
resources  such  as  food.  wood  and  water,  the  survey  sought  to  establish  whether  there 
was  any  clear  evidence  of  environmental  degradation.  Official  documents  have  pointed 
out  some  disturbing  signs  of  environmental  degradation.  which  are  perceived  to  be  the 
result  of  population  pressure  and  poor  land  management  (GoZ,  1983).  The  main 
problem  appears  to  be  shortening  fallow  periods  in  the  coral  rag  areas  and  soil  erosion 
which  have  had  major  impacts  on  the  deterioration  and  supply  of  arable  land. 
The  respondents  were  asked  whether  they  have  encountered  any  forms  of  environmental 
degradation  in  and  around  their  respective  areas  in  recent  years  (n=306)  indicating  the 
evidence  they  saw  and  what  forms  of  degradation  affected  them  in  their  respective 
areas.  Most  respondents  said  that  they  had  not  witnessed  any  environmental 
degradation  (64.1%).  Those  that  did  not  know  or  were  not  sure  accounted  for  7.2%  of 
the  total  sample  (Figure  12.29).  In  Pemba  41.5%  of  the  households  reported  land 
degradation  compared  to  20%  in  Unguja.  These  responses  reflect  the  consequences  of 
poor  agricultural  practice  and  population  pressure  on  land  and  confirm  that 
environmental  degradation  is  taking  place. 418 
Evidently  more  respondents  from  Pemba  experience  or  perceive  environmental 
degradation  than  their  counterparts  in  Unguja.  It  is  also  possible  that  the  forms  and 
degrees  of  degradation  differ  between  the  two  islands  due  to  different  soils,  climatic 
factors,  cultivation  methods  and  crops  being  cultivated,  differing  population  pressures, 
land  use  and  land  carrying  capacity.  Physical  evidence  shows  that  soil  erosion  is  more 
common  in  Pemba  due  to  its  hilly  topography  and  different  agricultural  practices, 
although  on  both  islands  the  exploitation  of  wood  for  energy  and  building  is  widespread 
and  intensive. 
Respondents  declaring  that  environmental  degradation  of  some  sort  was  taking  place 
were  also  asked  to  provide  evidence  of  the  negative  environmental  changes  taking  place 
around  them.  The  results  are  shown  in  Figure  12.29  There  is  a  clear  difference  in  the 
evidence  or  indicators  of  environmental  degradation  given  by  respondents  from  both 
islands  and  this  is  supported  by  the  X2  statistic  (79.3468  at  6  degrees  of  freedom) 
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Figure  12.29  Indicators  of  environmental  degradation 
Falling  yields  was  the  most  common  indicator  of  environmental  degradation  accounting 
for  39%  of  the  respondents.  This  means  that  the  soils  have  been  overworked  for  a  long 
time  while  little  use  of  fertiliser  is  made.  Curiously,  this  cause  is  of  significance  only  to 
Pemba  island  as  no  one  from  Unguja  mentioned  it. 419 
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Source:  Survey 
Figure  12.30  Reasons  for  environmental  degradation 
Visibly  declining  amounts  of  natural  flora  and  fauna,  mainly  wild  plants  and  animals 
were  given  as  evidence  by  18%  of  the  respondents.  This  means  that  recently  (over  the 
last  10  years)  there  has  occurred  a  considerable  change  in  the  surrounding 
environment.  Here  again,  in  contrast  to  the  previous  case,  all  the  respondents 
answering  to  this  question  were  from  Unguja  island  (18%).  A  combination  of  factors, 
that  is  declining  yields,  changes  in  the  flora  and  fauna,  deforestation  and  soil  erosion 
were  given  as  evidence  by  16%  of  the  respondents.  Here  most  of  the  respondents  were 
from  Unguja.  Deforestation  was  mentioned  by  15%  of  the  households  as  an  indicator 
and  of  these  most  were  from  Pemba.  The  other  indicators  were  soil  erosion  and 
decreasing  pasture  land.  The  latter  was  not  given  mention  by  Pemba  respondents.  The 
smallest  proportion  of  the  sample  (2%)  mentioned  declining  natural  water  supplies  as 
an  indicator  and  these  were  mainly  from  Unguja. 
The  variety  of  responses  reflect  a  divergence  of  what  the  respondents  from  the  two 
islands  witness  or  experience  and  perceive  as  environmental  degradation.  Judging  from 
the  experiences  and  views  of  the  respondents,  it  is  noted  that  there  are  different  forms 
and  degrees  of  environmental  degradation  between  the  islands  reflecting  the  nature  of 
population  pressure,  land  use  and  resources  exploitation.  Physical  examination  of  parts 
of  the  islands  that  were  visited  supports  this  observation  and  any  subsequent 
campaigns  or  measures  taken  to  combat  these  factors  have  to  take  into  account  that 
despite  the  islands  occupying  a  small  area  there  is  considerable  differentiation  between 420 
and  within  the  islands. 
Evidently.  the  various  programmes  broadcast  by  the  media  and  the  campaigns  by  the 
agricultural  and  other  departments  have  made  an  impact  and  some  people  are  more 
aware  of  the  problem.  It  is  obvious  that  it  was  difficult  for  some  respondents  to  admit  to 
and  point  out  problems  which  they  felt  that  perhaps  they  were  responsible  for. 
However,  many  (24%)  thought  that  population  pressure  was  a  major  cause.  while  18% 
of  the  respondents  attributed  It  to  over-cultivation  (Figure  12.30).  About  17%  said 
excessive  wood  cutting  was  the  problem.  while  8%  attributed  this  to  land  shortages. 
The  respondents  were  asked  to  identify  the  causes  of  environmental  degradation. 
Interestingly.  only  a  small  proportion  responded  to  the  question  (n  =  88).  Although  the 
question  seems  simple  and  straightforward  enough,  it  proved  to  be  quite  difficult  to 
respond  to  as  the  majority  (33%)  indicated  that  they  were  not  sure  about  the  causes. 
Some  also  expressed  that  the  issue  was  more  complex  than  it  appeared  to  be  on  the 
surface.  offering  a  combination  of  practical  and  fatalistic  reasons  grounded  in  spiritual 
belief. 
There  were  differences  between  the  two  islands  in  the  reasons  or  causes  of 
environmental  degradation  (Figure  12.30).  While  in  Unguja  over  52%  said  they  did  not 
know  or  were  not  sure.  in  Pemba  this  proportion  was  only  20%.  indicating  either  that 
the  problem  affects  Pemba  more  or  respondents  there  are  more  aware,  or  both.  Over 
cultivation  (23%)  and  land  shortages  (13%)  seem  to  be  the  more  dominant  indicators  in 
Unguja.  In  Pemba  it  was  population  pressure  (36%)  and  wood  cutting  (25°x6)  that  were 
the  main  causes  of  degradation. 
12.7  Implications  of  the  MIRAGE  economy  for  rural  areas 
Past  development  policies  and  consequently  the  MIRAGE  economy  has  several 
implications  for  the  rural  areas.  The  more  important  of  these  are  discussed  in  this 
section.  One  of  Zanzibar's  main  problems  is  that  of  having  to  Import  food.  Apart  from 
taking  up  about  a  half  of  Its  export  earnings,  there  also  exists  the  food  or  cash  crop 
dilemma  prevalent  in  many  SIS.  This  Is  a  progression  from  the  development  of 
plantation  economy,  when  clove  production  was  encouraged,  while  rice  and  wheat  flour, 
both  of  which  are  produced  more  cheaply  elsewhere,  were  imported.  However,  in  the 
case  of  Zanzibar,  clove  prices  and  production  have  fallen  drastically,  and  so  have 
incomes,  while  the  population  is  growing  rapidly.  Fifty  years  later,  the  situation 
remains  extraordinarily  the  same.  Despite  having  a  range  of  other  foods,  and  at  least 
two  major  attempts  aimed  at  being  self-sufficient  in  food,  Zanzibar  continues  to  be  a  net 
Importer  of  rice,  wheat  and  sugar.  The  demand  for  these  foods  is  growing  and  domestic 
production  is  unable  to  fulill  the  gap. 421 
There  is  also  a  considerable  degree  of  malnutrition,  particularly  amongst  infants  and 
young  children  in  the  islands,  and  this  is  related  to  food  consumption  habits  and 
preferences.  In  the  coral  rag  areas  a  considerable  amount  of  cassava  is  produced  and 
but  rice  remains  the  most  preferred  food.  Cassava  and  sorghum  serve  as  reserve  foods, 
although  with  the  withdrawal  of  food  subsidies  and  growing  costs  of  living,  cassava, 
other  root  crops  and  plantain  (bananas)  have  become  increasingly  important  foods.  The 
survey  sought  to  investigate  to  what  extent  there  are  differences  in  the  preference  and 
consumption  of  the  main  staples  and  what  are  the  main  sources  of  proteins  in  the 
different  areas.  It  also  assess  to  what  extent  the  population  is  dependent  on  imported 
food  and  establishes  which  areas  have  a  higher  or  greater  preference  for  this. 
Most  respondents  reported  that  rice  was  the  most  preferred  cereal  in  their  households 
and  was  consumed  frequently  (86%).  The  remaining  foods  registered  a  very  small 
preference  (Figure  12.31).  Although  cassava  is  one  of  the  most  widespread  grown  food 
crops,  a  very  small  percentage  of  the  respondents  indicated  that  they  consumed  it 
regularly.  Moreover  cassava  is  frequently  grown  as  a  'reserve  crop',  and  is  only 
consumed  when  other  preferred  foods  are  unavailable  or  too  expensive  to  buy.  l  These 
results  were  expected  given  that  rice,  wheat  flour  and  sugar  are  amongst  the  important 
food  items  consumed  in  most  households. 
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Figure  12.31  Food  preferences  in  Zanzibar  (staples) 
I  It  is  also  quite  possible  that  these  responses  actually  reflect  what  most  households  preferred  as  opposed  to  what  they 
actually  consumed. 422 
Data  on  actual  expenditure  on  different  food  types  by  households  was  obtained  from  the 
1991  HBS  (n  =  594).  and  this  is  displayed  as  a  proportionate  bar  chart  (Figure  12.32). 
In  terms  of  the  proportions  of  the  household  budgets  spent  on  domestic  food 
consumption,  the  results  (taking  the  total  for  Zanzibar)  show  that  cereals  (mainly  rice, 
wheat  and  sorghum)  rank  the  highest  (32.8%).  followed  by  meat  and  eggs  (11.9%)  and 
marine  products  (8.2%).  These  are  followed  by  fruits  (7.1%).  legumes  (6.1%).  oil  and  fat 
(5.9%),  and  roots  and  tubers  (5.1%). 
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Figure  12.32  Rural-urban  household  expenditures  on  food 
However,  the  Figure  (12.32)  also  shows  some  variations  in  expenditure  on  some  foods  in 
between  the  coral,  non-coral  and  urban  areas.  For  example,  the  households  in  the 
poorer  coral  areas  spend  a  smaller  proportion  on  meat  and  eggs  and  fruits,  while  the 
non-coral  areas  expend  the  smallest  proportion  on  fruits,  presumably  because  they 
grow  most  of  their  own.  The  urban  households  expend  a  smaller  percentage  than  the 
rest  on  legumes.  These  consumption  differentials,  such  as  that  on  meat  and  eggs  and 423 
marine  products  show  that  the  households  in  the  coral  rag  areas  spend  (and  hence 
consume)  less  of  these  proteins  compared  to  the  urban  and  the  non-coral  areas.  Such 
patterns  of  consumption  mirror  the  differentiation  in  the  levels  of  nutrition  and  rural 
poverty  levels. 
The  survey  results  reveal  that  spatial  variations  in  food  preferences  are  small  (Figures 
12.31.12.32.12.33  and  12.34).  Similar  responses  were  obtained  when  comparing  the 
rural  and  urban  sample  populations.  The  urban  population  showed  an  overwhelming 
preference  for  rice  (Figures  12.32  and  12.33).  Although  a  high  percentage  of  the  rural 
sample  also  expressed  the  same,  some  of  the  households  indicated  preference  for  other 
foods  such  as  wheat  (16.4%).  tubers  (2.8%)  and  maize  (0.5%).  This  reflects  the  lower 
purchasing  power  of  the  rural  population,  suggesting  that  the  rural  population  probably 
exerts  less  pressure  on  the  government  to  import  rice  and  wheat  flour.  The  soil  types 
and  different  agroeconomic  zones  dictate  different  crop  mixes  and  mirrors  the  types  of 
food  and  cash  crops  are  grown  and  foods  consumed  in  different  areas.  On  the  whole 
these  observations  reveal  a  general  bias  in  food  preferences  and  that  there  is  a  distinct 
food  or  'dietary  dependency'  on  rice  and  wheat.  Rice  also  has  a  status  connotation  and 
a  household  consuming  rice  may  be  perceived  as  being  better  of 
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Figure  12.33  Food  preferences  in  Unguja  and  Pemba  (staples) 
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Figure  12.34  Food  preference  in  Rural  and  Urban  area  (staples) 
Rice  and  bread  (wheat  flour)  are  acquired  foods  which  have  established  themselves  over 
the  years.  Many  argue  that  through  the  mix  of  people  and  cultures,  these  foods  are 
indigenous,  though  only  a  small  proportion  is  produced  locally.  It  is  difficult  for  most 
people  to  imagine  going  without  rice,  bread  and  sugar;  their  preference  for  these  foods  is 
considerable  and  the  'dietary  dependency'  or  'colonialism'  is  complete,  and  this  has 
serious  economic,  social  and  political  implications  for  the  government. 
Nutrition  and  nutrition  deficiencies  are  related  to  the  consumption  of  proteins  by  the 
households.  Figure  12.32  shows  a  wide  variation  in  household  expenditures  on  protein 
foods.  For  example,  the  coral  (3.2%)  and  non-  coral  (10.8%)  areas  spend  a  smaller 
percentage  of  their  total  food  expenditure  on  meat  and  eggs  compared  to  urban  areas 
(16.9%).  The  coral  areas  (0.8%)  also  spend  less  than  the  non-coral  (6.5%)  and  urban 
(3.4%)  areas  on  marine  products  and  milk.  Rural  households  tend  to  spend  more  on 
non-meat  and  fish  protein  sources  compared  to  urban  ones.  Rural  coral  and  non-coral 
households  spend  8.8%  and  8.9%  respectively  on  legumes,  while  the  urban  ones  spend 
only  3.3%.  A  very  small  percentage  of  their  domestic  cash  consumption  is  spent  on 
vegetables,  with  the  non-coral  households  spending  4.4%,  coral  household  4.1%  and 
urban  household  2.9%. 
Such  expenditure  patterns  suggest  that  rural  households  spend  less  on  meat  and  fish, 
major  sources  of  protein.  Instead  they  spend  more  on  vegetable  sources  of  proteins. 
This  pattern  is  also  explained  by  the  fact  that  meat  is  expensive  and  vegetables  are 
considerably  cheaper.  However,  it  also  reflects  the  higher  degree  of  malnutrition  and 
associated  factors  such  as  infant  mortality  rates,  in  rural  areas.  The  lower  educational 
attainment  and  rural  incomes  are  linked  to  this. 
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Respondents  were  also  asked  to  identify  the  main  proteins  that  were  consumed  by  their 
households  regularly  (n  =  306).  The  results  show  that  fish  is  the  main  source  of  protein 
with  97.1%  of  household  consuming  it  (Table  12.15).  This  is  expected  given  its 
abundance.  A  very  small  percentage  of  households  stated  that  they  consumed 
vegetables  and  meat  regularly. 
Protein  UNGUJA  PEMBA  ZANZIBAR 
COUNT  ROW 
RCWX  TOTAL 
COL  L  4?  ' 
Meat  1  3  4 
25.0  75.0  1.3 
0.5  2.4 
Ftsh  179  118  297 
60.3  39.7  97.1 
97.8  95.9 
Vegetables  3  2  5 
60.0  40.0  1.6 
1.6  1.6 
COLUMN  183  123  306 
TOTAL  59.8  40.2  100.0 
Source:  Survey 
Table  12.16  Main  proteins  consumed  in  Unguja  and  Pemba 
Fish  is  consumed  more  regularly  by  more  households  in  Unguja  and  than  in  Pemba 
(97.8%  and  95.9%  respectively).  A  larger  proportion  of  Pemba  households  (2.4%) 
consumes  meat  regularly  compared  to  Unguja  (0.5%).  The  overall  picture  suggests 
there  is  very  little  variation  in  the  consumption  of  types  of  protein  between  the  islands. 
A  similar  comparison  is  made  between  the  rural  and  urban  populations  and  the  results 
show  similarities  in  fish  consumption  (Table  12.16).  However  there  are  some  variations 
in  the  regular  consumption  of  meat  and  vegetables  between  the  rural  and  urban 
populations.  While  4.3%  of  urban  households  consume  meat  regularly,  there  were  none 
in  the  rural  sample.  A  greater  proportion  of  urban  households  (3.3%)  also  consumed 
vegetables  compared  to  0.9%  in  rural  areas. 
Protein  RURAL  URBAN  ZANZIBAR 
COUNT  Raft/ 
RGw%  TOTAL 
COL  LMkW 
Meat  0  4  4 
0.0  100.0  1.3 
0.0  4.3 
Fish  212  85  297 
71.4  28.6  97.1 
99.1  92.4 
Vegetable  2  3  5 
40.0  60.0  1.6 
0.9  3.3 
COLUMN  214  92  306 
TOTAL  69.9  30.1  100.0 
Source:  Survey 
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The  types,  frequency  and  amounts  of  protein  consumed  show  a  bias  in  favour  of  urban 
areas,  implying  that  the  rural  households  experience  problems  associated  with  low 
protein  consumption  (malnutrition),  and  within  rural  areas  this  will  be  emphasised  in 
the  coral  areas. 
It  is  expected  that  the  exploitation  and  uses  of  resources  will  also  have  spatial  variations 
and  reflect  demographic  pressures.  The  availability  and  uses  of  water  supplies  and 
energy  in  Zanzibar  are  two  relevant  cases.  Although  the  islands  are  said  to  be  well 
endowed  with  extensive  fresh  ground  water  supplies,  surface  water  resources  are 
seasonal,  limited  and  not  reliable.  Successive  post-Revolution  governments  have  made 
significant  achievements  in  the  provision  of  water  supplies.  One  report  estimates  that 
40%  of  the  population  has  access  to  clean  water  supplies,  i.  e.,  90%  of  the  urban  and 
35%  of  the  rural  population.  A  significant  proportion  obtain  their  water  from  a  number 
of  unprotected  springs  (GoZ,  1987).  There  is  clearly  an  urban  bias  in  water  supply  as 
revealed  by  Khamis  (1972)  when  he  reports  on  the  achievements  in  providing  water 
supplies  to  outlying  areas  that,  "water  is  now  plentiful  in  all  towns  of  Pemba  island"  (my 
emphasis),  clear  confirmation  of  an  urban  bias  as  early  as  the  1970s.  This  bias  has 
already  been  noted  in  chapter  11  when  highlighting  the  regional  disparities  in 
infrastructural  and  social  development  between  the  islands.  The  question  is,  to  what 
extent  does  it  vary  spatially  and  to  what  extent  does  it  affect  the  populations  in  different 
areas? 
The  respondents  were  asked  whether  they  faced  any  difficulty  in  obtaining  domestic 
water  supplies.  The  majority  (75.8%)  indicated  that  they  experienced  supply  problems 
Crable  12.17),  however  subsequent  analysis  shows  that  most  (91.6%)  of  these  are  rural 
households  (Table  12.18).  This  supports  observation  made  in  chapter  11  that  there  is 
an  urban  bias  in  the  infrastructure.  It  is  predominantly  Pemba  households  that 
experience  supply  problems  -  whether  urban  or  rural.  About  400/6  of  the  Unguja 
households  did  not  experience  perennial  problems  in  water  supplies.  The  1988  study 
on  Mortality,  Fertility  and  Contraception  in  Zanzibar  (GoZ,  1988d)  revealed  that  over  99% 
of  the  Zanzibar  Town  population  compared  to  28%  of  Unguja  rural  population  had 
access  to  piped  water  supplies.  In  that  study,  about  70%  of  the  Unguja  sample  had 
access  to  a  well  compared  to  83.1%  In  Pemba.  This  verifies  the  antra-  and  inter-island 
differences  in  access  to  water  supply  and  this  is  confirmed  by  the  survey. 427 
Facing  water  UNGUJA  PEMBA  ZANZIBAR 
supply  problems  ROW 
COUNT  TOTAL 
ROW% 
COL  WAX 
Yes  109  123  232 
47.0  53.0  75.8 
59.6  100.0 
No  74  0  74 
100.0  0.0  24.2 
40.4  0.0 
COLUMN  183  123  306 
TOTAL  59.8  40.2  100.0 
Source:  Survey 
Table  12.17  Households  experiencing  water  supply  problems  (Unguja-Pemba) 
Facing  water  RURAL  URBAN  ZANZIBAR 
supply  problems  ROW 
CWWT  TOTAL 
RM 
COL  04A% 
Yes  196  18  232 
91.6  8.4 
84.5  21.3  75.8 
No  36  56  74 
39.1  60.9 
15.5  75.7  24.2 
COLUMN  214  92  306 
TOTAL  69.9  30.1  100.0 
Source:  Survey 
Table  12.18  Households  experiencing  water  supply  problems  (Unguja-Pemba) 
The  x2  tests  reveal  significant  differences  in  difficulties  in  domestic  water  supply 
between  Unguja  and  Pemba  households.  A  further  analysis  between  rural  and  urban 
households  shows  similar  results  (see  boxes). 
Summary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pemba 
df  :1 
Total  x2:  65.6023  p=  .  0001 
Contingency  Coefficient:  .  4201 
Phi: 
.  4630 
x2  (with  continuity  correction):  63.4153  p=  .  0001 
Sunnary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Rural-Urban 
df  :  1 
Total  x2:  94.7541  p=  .  0001 
Contingency  Coefficient: 
.  4851 
G  Statistic:  89.7541 
Phi: 
.  4630 
%2  (with  continuity  correction):  91.6875  p=  .  0001 428 
It  was  established  that  the  respondents  were  facing  different  types  of  supply  problems, 
many  associated  with  the  distribution  of  the  relevant  infrastructure.  Nearly  39%  of  the 
households  complained  of  poor  access  to  and  availability  of  clean  water  (Figure  12.35). 
About  28%  reported  dry  taps  while  over  8%  complained  about  long  distances  to  their 
usual  water  sources.  Distance  affects  over  14%  of  total  households  and  all  of  these 
were  in  Unguja  island.  About  70ß6  of  Pemba  households  reported  problems  of 
availability  of  potable  water  from  natural  sources  (wells  and  springs)  compared  to  about 
50%  of  households  dependent  on  these  in  Unguja.  Piped  water  supply  breakdowns 
affected  over  42%  and  28%  of  Unguja  and  Pemba  household  respectively.  Overall,  it 
appears  that  water  supply  problems  are  associated  with  distributional  constraints  and 
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Figure  12.35  Households  experiencing  water  supply  problems 
The  availability  and  consumption  of  energy  at  the  household  level  is  an  important 
matter  in  most  SIS  precisely  because  of  their  supply  problems.  This  has  several 
economic  and  environmental  implications  to  those  with  fast  growing  populations  such 
as  Zanzibar's.  '  The  economic  ones  relate  to  its  fuel  import  bill,  affecting  also  household 
budgets,  while  the  environmental  is  associated  to  the  rapid  depletion  of  wood  resources. 
1  Surprisingly,  there  is  no  evidence  of  indigenous  research  into  the  possibility  of  exploiting  abundant  alternative  energy 
sources  such  as  solar  panels/collectors,  wind  or  wave  energy. 429 
The  costs  of  generating  electricity  are  high  since  the  fuel  is  imported  in  small  amounts 
and  transported  over  long  distances,  making  the  unit  costs  considerable.  Although  a 
large  share  of  the  Isles'  electricity  is  'imported'  from  the  Mainland,  there  have  been 
problems  of  supply  and  reliability  and  it  is  predominantly  distributed  to  the  urban 
consumers  in  Unguja.  However,  currently  there  is  a  rural  electrification  programme 
being  implemented  on  the  island. 
About  55%  of  electricity  sales  in  Unguja  are  for  domestic  consumption  (GoZ.  1986)  and 
much  of  this  in  urban  areas.  The  vast  majority  of  households  rely  on  wood  and 
charcoal  for  cooking  and  kerosene  for  lighting  (Plate  10)..  Other  sources  include 
paraffin  and  gas,  but  because  they  are  imported  they  are  costly  and  the  supply  erratic. 
Fuel  imports  amounts  to  an  average  of  10%  of  Zanzibar's  import  bill.  According  to  the 
1991  HBS,  1.8%  of  the  households  use  kerosene  and  gas,  5.7%  use  charcoal  and  89.1% 
wood  for  cooking.  Although  electricity  is  more  widespread  in  Unguja  compared  to 
Pemba,  only  3.7%  of  the  households  use  it  for  cooking  compared  to  1.5%  in  Pemba 
(1991  HBS).  This  reflects  the  supply  and  costs  of  cookers,  the  limited  distribution  of 
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Plate  1O.  Loads  of  wood  fuel  and  charcoal  for  sale  in  Zanzibar  Town 
The  survey  sought  to  establish  the  problems  associated  to  domestic  energy  supply  and 
identify  which  energy  sources  were  most  commonly  used  for  lighting  and  cooking.  The 
responses  bear  some  similarities  to  the  1991  HBS.  though  the  categories  differ 
somewhat.  In  contrast  to  the  HBS,  the  survey  recognises  that  households  do  not 430 
necessarily  use  a  single  source  of  energy  and  the  definition  of  domestic  uses  includes 
lighting,  cooking  and  any  others.  The  results  show  that  wood  and  charcoal  and  a 
combination  of  these  are  by  far  the  most  common  domestic  energy  sources  (Figure 
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Figure  12.36  Percentage  of  households  using  different  energy  sources  (Unguja- 
Pemba) 
About  59.2%  of  the  total  sampled  households  (Zanzibar)  use  a  combination  of  wood, 
charcoal  and  paraffin  as  their  main  sources  of  energy,  22.5%  use  wood  and  10.5%  use 
wood  and  charcoal  (Figures  12.36  and  12.37).  The  use  of  charcoal  and  kerosene  is 
more  common  in  Pemba.  A  larger  percentage  of  households  in  Unguja  use  wood, 
electricity  and  gas  compared  to  those  in  Pemba.  This  reflects  the  availability  and 
distribution  of  various  types  of  energy  sources  in  different  areas.  For  example, 
electricity  is  distributed  over  wider  areas  in  Unguja  and  the  main  consumer  of  electricity 
and  gas  is  the  urban  population.  The  high  costs  of  electricity  and  other  imported  fuels 
inhibit  the  poorer  rural  populations  from  using  them,  and  so  they  to  resort  to  vegetative 
sources.  This  is  shown  in  Figure  12.36  where  most  rural  households  use  a  combination 
of  energy  sources  and  account  for  80.8%  of  the  rural  sample  (wood,  kerosene  and 
charcoal),  while  another  12.1%  use  wood  and  5.1%  charcoal.  None  of  the  rural  sampled 
households  use  gas  or  electricity,  while  34%  use  kerosene.  In  contrast,  about  14.1%  of 
urban  households  use  electricity,  6.5%  kerosene  and  1.1%  gas.  A  much  smaller 
percentage  uses  a  combination  of  sources  (8.7%).  A  larger  share  of  the  urban  sample 
use  either  wood  (46.7%)  or  charcoal  (22.8%).  There  is  no  doubt  that  there  is  a 
1  Included  in  wood  are  other  sources  such  as  coconut  shells  and  other  agricultural  waste  products. 
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significant  differentiation  in  the  consumption  of  different  types  of  energy,  with  the  urban 
households  consuming  most  of  the  imported  fuels  (kerosene,  gas  and  electricity)  as  well 
as  vegetative  sources.  Rural  households  mainly  utilise  vegetative  sources,  while 
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Figure  12.37  Percentage  of  households  using  different  energy  sources 
(Rural-Urban) 
The  main  constraints  relating  to  the  supply  or  availability  of  different  energy  sources  are 
either  cost  or  availability  of  the  different  forms  of  energy  or  both.  Overall,  cost  is  the 
biggest  constraint.  Supply  alone  is  not  a  major  problem,  although  the  combination  of 
costs  and  erratic  supply  of  energy  sources  affects  41%  of  households  (Tables  12.19  and 
12.20).  The  supply  of  wood  and  charcoal  is  reliable  even  in  urban  areas,  since  this  is 
bussed'  in  daily.  It  seems  that  costs  affect  the  imported  fuels  and  wood  or  charcoal  that 
has  to  be  transported  to  consumers  from  different  areas  in  the  Isles,  i.  e.,  from  rural  to 
urban  areas,  or  from  rural  'supply  areas'  to  rural  'demand  areas'  (Plate  11). 
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Plate  11.  Rural  bus  off-loading  wood  fuel  at  the  market 
Problems/  UNGUJA  PEMBA  ZANZIBAR 
Constraint  of  ROW 
energy  supply  TOTAL 
COUNT 
Rc  % 
COL  UMN% 
Costs  136  31  167 
81.4  18.6  54.7 
74.7  25.2 
Availability  8  2  10 
and  reliability  80.0  20.0  3.3 
of  Supply  4.4  1.6 
Both  costs  and  38  90  128 
reliability  of  29.7  70.3  41.0 
SUP  Ply 
20.9  73.2 
-  COLUMN  182  123  305 
TOTAL  59.7  40.3  100.0 
Source:  Survey 
Table  12.19  Supply  problems  of  energy  (Ungyja-Pemba) 433 
Sunwry  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Unguja-Pemba 
df  :2 
Total  x2:  82.4137  p=  .  0001 
G  Statistic:  85.3682 
Contingency  Coefficient:  .  4612 
Cromer's  V:  .  5198 
The  survey  established  that  there  is  a  difference  in  the  supply  constraints  between 
Unguja  and  Pemba  island  and  between  rural  and  urban  areas.  First,  this  is  shown  by 
the  cross-tabulated  data  (Tables  12.19  and  12.20)  and  confirmed  by  the  respective 
contingency  analyses  (see  following  boxes).  The  X2  statistics  indicate  significant 
differences  In  the  types  of  constraints  facing  the  sample  populations  representing  the 
areas  being  compared.  From  the  Tables.  it  appears  that  In  Unguja  cost  is  the  main 
constraint  In  energy  supply  affecting  74.7%  of  households  there,  while  costs  and  supply 
affect  20.9%.  In  Pemba  the  situation  is  somewhat  different  in  that  the  combination  of 
costs  and  supplies  affect  the  majority  of  households  (73.2%).  Cost  alone  affects  only 
25.2%  of  the  sample  households  on  the  island.  This  suggests  that  costs  are  higher  in 
Unguja  as  a  result  of  perhaps  diminishing  resources  (wood)  and  higher  demand  by 
households.  In  Pemba  it  is  the  combination  of  costs  and  reliability  of  supply  of  energy 
that  affect  the  majority  of  households.  affecting  mainly  the  non-wood  fuels. 
From  discussions  with  some  respondents  it  became  quite  evident  that  frequent  power 
failures  (electricity)  and  infrequent  supply  of  gas  and  paraffin  are  common.  Also  prices 
of  gas  and  paraffin  have  been  increasing.  Related  to  electricity,  gas  and  paraffin  are  the 
costs  of  the  necessary  equipment  for  their  use,  such  as  cookers.  Despite  the  small  size 
and  a  rural  electrification  programme.  the  power  grid  in  the  Isles  has  yet  to  reach 
outlying  areas. 
Problems/  RURAL  URBAN  ZANZIBAR 
Constraint  of  ROW 
energy  supply  TOTAL 
COUNT 
ROA% 
COL  GMkM 
Costs  90  77  167 
42.1  84.6  54.7 
53.9  46.1 
Availability  2  8  10 
and  reliability  0.9  8.8  3.3 
of  supply  20.0  80.0 
Both  costs  and  122  6  128 
reliability  of  57.0  6.6  41.0 
supply  95.3  4.7 
COLUMN  214  91  305 
TOTAL  70.2  29.8  100.0 
Source:  Survey 
Table  12.20  Supply  problems  of  energy  (Rural-Urban) 434 
Sunnary  of  contingency  table  analysis:  Rural-Urban 
df:  2 
Total  X2:  71.8129  p-  .  0001 
G  Statistic:  82.8323 
Contingency  Coefficient: 
.  4366 
Cramer's  V: 
.  4852 
The  study  has  established  that  some  profound  differentials  exist  in  the  basic  socio- 
economic  characteristics  between  rural  and  urban  areas  and  between  Unguja  and 
Pemba  Islands.  Despite  Pemba  having  nearly  half  a  dozen  designated  urban  areas,  it 
exhibits  predominantly  rural  characteristics  and  although  Unguja  has  only  one  major 
urban  area,  it  is  large  enough  to  affect  and  'even  out'  the  rural  indicators  of  the  island. 
However,  the  rural-urban  comparisons  and  tests  have  shown  that  there  are  significant 
differentials  in  population  distribution  by  age,  and  household  sizes.  Other  differentials 
exist  in  the  attainment  of  education  and  training,  types  of  occupation,  which  in  turn 
determine  the  household  incomes  and  income  groups.  These  favoured  urban  areas  and 
Unguja  island,  although  most  cloves  are  produced  in  Pemba. 
Income  and  education  affect  the  types  of  foods  consumed  by  households  with 
implications  for  nutrition.  The  survey  has  confirmed  the  existence  of  a  considerable 
degree  of  dietary  preference  and  dependency  throughout  the  Isles.  This  has  economic 
and  political  implications,  especially  with  a  growing  and  powerful  urban  lobby.  What  is 
important  is  many  of  these  variables  interact  with  one  another  and  have  what  may  be 
termed  as  'domino  effects'  on  the  local  and  national  economy.  For  example,  illiteracy  or 
levels  of  education  have  effects  on  health,  types  of  employment  and  migration.  Also 
migration  is  linked  to  remittances.  The  situation  becomes  even  more  precarious  when  a 
large  percentage  of  the  urban  population  that  is  youthful  is  under-employed  or 
unemployed,  leading  to  frustrations  emanating  from  unfulfilled  expectations  and  even 
crime. 
The  survey  has  managed  to  construct  a  socio-economic  profile  that  shows  clearly  that 
despite  nearly  three  decades  of  independence,  spatial  disparities  have  not  narrowed 
significantly  and  continue  to  exist  in  Zanzibar.  These  disparities  are  also  responsible  for 
encouraging  an  important  part  of  the  rural  population  to  migrate  elsewhere,  usually 
urban  areas,  in  search  of  alternative  and  more  rewarding  opportunities.  While 
inappropriate  government  policies  and  development  strategies  are  partly  responsible  for 
this,  it  is  also  true  that  because  of  Zanzibar  being  a  SIS  with  the  concomitant 
development  predicaments  of  smallness  and  underdevelopment,  it  experiences  an 
additional  set  of  constraints  that  severely  restrict  its  room  to  manoeuvre.  For  example, 
low  export  earnings  limit  its  public  Investment  capacity,  so  limiting  the  little  that  is 
available  to  even  fewer  areas. 12.8  Summary  and  Conclusions 
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The  analysis  of  the  implications  of  Zanzibar's  MIRAGE  economy  at  the  micro-scale  has 
revealed  several  interesting  factors  underpinning  the  problems  facing  a  small  tropical 
Island  state.  with  a  rapidly  growing  population  and  a  limited  resource  base.  These 
factors  significantly  temper  the  form,  pattern  and  process  of  rural-urban  relations.  In 
reviewing  the  aspects  of  rural-urban  interaction  In  Zanzibar,  three  factors  emerge  which 
are  relevant  to  a  more  general  view  of  rural-urban  relations  In  the  Isles.  The  relative 
importance  of  these  factors  is  different  compared  to  those  in  equivalent  rural-urban 
interaction  In  most  larger  developing  countries. 
The  first  is  the  small  size  of  Zanzibar,  -  whether  in  an  economic,  areal  or  demographic 
sense  -  which  with  its  limited  resource  endowment  heightens  competition  for  land.  The 
second  is  the  dominating  influence  of  migration  on  the  demography  and  the  economy  of 
the  Isles.  The  persistence  and  magnitude  of  migration  in  relation  to  its  total  population 
size  is  significant,  entailing  several  important  consequences  to  the  island  economy.  The 
third  relates  to  its  ecology.  Zanzibar  consists  of  fragile  interlocking  sets  of  delicately 
balanced  ecosystems.  Its  coral  and  non-coral  Interiors  have  intimate  environmental 
linkages  with  the  coastal  zones,  where  most  urban  centres  are  located.  Thus  pressure 
on  land  resources  in  the  interior  or  rural  periphery  entails  ecologic  as  well  as  economic 
repercussions  In  urban  areas.  The  environmental  reciprocity  between  rural  and  urban 
areas  Is  of  considerable  importance  for  sustainable  development  in  Zanzibar.  a  factor 
which  Is  lacking  In  a  MIRAGE  economy. 
The  results  of  the  survey  provide  some  interesting  insights  that  support  the 
observations  made  in  preceding  chapters  relating  to  Zanzibar's  MIRAGE  economy.  while 
also  confirming  some  of  the  hypotheses  postulated  at  the  outset.  They  reveal 
considerable  evidence  of  spatial  differentiation  between  Unguja  and  Pemba  island,  and 
between  rural  and  urban  areas  and  highlight  some  of  the  consequences  of  such  a 
situation  to  Zanzibar's  contemporary  development.  In  so  doing.  it  has  tested  and 
supported  the  hypotheses  that  Zanzibar's  economic  structure  is  indeed  a  MIRAGE 
economy,  and  that  there  still  exists  considerable  spatial  differentiation  in  Zanzibar 
despite  several  attempts  aimed  at  greater  spatial  and  class  egalitarianism.  The 
approach  to  the  analysis  was  based  on  Zanzibar's  rural-urban  and  inter-island 
interactions  as  exhibited  by  their  core-periphery  relations. 
The  factors  triggering  the  movements  from  rural  to  urban  areas  indicate  some  malaise 
in  the  economic  and  spatial  structure  of  the  island  economy.  The  analysis  has  shown 
some  of  the  dominant  socio-economic  characteristics  at  the  micro  level  of  the  economy 
that  are  associated  with  a  MIRAGE  economy.  Without  recent  census  information,  it  has 
shown  that  there  is  still  considerable  rural-urban  migration  and  some  emigration  taking 
place  in  Zanzibar.  What  is  more  important  are  the  main  directions  and  the  important 436 
consequences  of  such  movements.  The  younger  rural  population  that  is  engaged  in 
rural-urban  migration  leaving  behind  the  old,  with  significant  consequences  on  the 
rural  economy.  Such  movements  are  facilitated  by  networks  based  on  kinship,  a 
phenomenon  which  Bertram  and  Watters  (1985)  referred  to  as  the  'transnational 
corporation  of  kin'  (op.  cit.  :  499). 
The  survey  has  noted  that  it  is  the  larger  Island  of  Unguja  that  is  attracting  the 
incoming  population.  However.  there  is  an  additional  dimension,  in  that  the  Mainland 
also  attracts  some  of  these  movements.  No  doubt  the  special  political,  and  now 
increasingly  economic  relationship  between  the  Mainland  and  the  islands  has  facilitated 
this,  as  prospects  for  better  opportunities  for  many  islanders  are  offered.  However,  at 
the  same  time  the  areas  losing  the  migrants  are  becoming  increasingly  abandoned,  with 
negative  economic  and  social  implications.  Thus  production  in  the  agricultural  and 
marine  sectors  is  stagnating  and  may  even  fall,  further  exacerbating  the  island's 
dependency  on  imported  food,  jeopardising  it  foreign  exchange  earning  capacity.  It  has 
been  noted  elsewhere  that  a  significant  flow  of  remittances  can  have  positive  effects  on 
levels  of  housing.  health,  nutrition  and  education  (Lowenthal  and  Comitas,  1962). 
However,  from  the  evidence  available  clearly  such  benefits  are  accruing  primarily  to 
urban  areas,  further  exacerbating  rural-urban  differentials  and  as  mentioned  earlier, 
relevant  information  flows  will  only  serve  to  heighten  these  movements.  Indeed  the 
volume  of  migration  is  considerable,  such  that  it  was  reported  that  a  Representative  of 
the  People  (equivalent  to  an  M.  P.  )  "...  decried  the  abscondment  of  trained  manpower  (sic) 
stressing  that  the  planned  development  in  all  sectors  would  stall  in  the  absence  of  local 
experts"  (The  Daily  News,  June  15,1991,  p.  1). 
The  movement  of  population  away  from  an  area  that  is  experiencing  population 
pressure  can  be  a  positive  factor.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Pemba  island  has  been 
experiencing  considerable  population  pressure  and  migration  can  be  seen  as  a  'safety 
valve'.  reducing  such  pressures  on  land  and,  Indirectly  Increasing  income  opportunities 
while  reducing  pressure  of  political  resentment  and  local  frustration  (cf.  Cape  Verde, 
Barbados  and  Malta).  Other  positive  outcomes  of  migration  are  remittances.  Where 
they  contribute  to  major  capital  investments,  they  create  jobs  and  spread  some  of  the 
benefits.  However,  in  the  survey  it  was  noted  that  it  is  mainly  the  urban  households 
that  benefited  from  this.  In  some  areas,  return  migrants  may  have  come  back  with  new 
skills  and  innovations  that  they  may  have  otherwise  not  have  acquired  and  spread. 
However,  it  is  also  true  that  information  flows  following  the  aftermath  of  migration 
underpin  rural-urban  contacts  and  perceptions.  Moreover,  a  large  share  of  remitted 
Incomes  tends  to  be  used  for  consumer  goods  such  as  food  and  clothes  (Connell,  1980; 
Marshall,  1982;  Rubenstein,  1983).  This  Is  certainly  the  case  in  Zanzibar  too.  In  the 
long  term  migration  and  remittances  tend  to  encourage  a  demand  for  Imported  (and 
expensive)  consumer  goods,  which  in  turn  pushes  up  agricultural  wages  putting  a 437 
squeeze  on  that  part  of  the  economy  with  the  most  long-term  promise. 
It  appears  that  in  Zanzibar,  as  in  other  small  countries,  migrants  now  constitute  one  of 
Its  more  valuable  exports.  It  has  also  been  noted  that  globally  the  overwhelming  weight 
of  evidence  suggests  that  the  dependence  on  labour  exports  and  remittances  reflects  the 
poverty  and  lack  of  investment  opportunity  from  where  the  migrants  came  from 
(Connell,  et.  aL  1976:  98).  This  appears  to  have  some  relevance  to  Zanzibar. 
It  has  been  argued  that  small  size  can  be  advantageous  in  that  small  states  have  greater 
social  and  political  coherence  and  hence  are  easier  to  administer  than  larger  states 
(Knox.  1967).  Given  the  geographical  characteristics  of  Zanzibar  which  include,  small 
size.  small  relative  distances  within  and  between  the  islands,  very  low  degree  of 
fragmentation,  relative  homogeneity  of  its  people  and  policies  which  aimed  at  spatial 
equity  and  egalitarian  development  for  over  26  years.  It  would  be  fair  to  anticipate  that 
the  degree  of  spatial  inequality  would  have  been  reduced  significantly.  However,  this  is 
not  so  and  is  one  of  the  principal  factors  that  contribute  to  the  islands'  contemporary 
development  problems. 
What  is  clear  at  this  stage  is  that  migration  and  remittances  have  become  an  important 
part  of  Zanzibar's  economic  development  and  therefore  need  to  be  thoroughly 
investigated  so  the  government  can  assess  benefits  and  costs.  This  also  highlights  the 
importance  of  the  political  and  economic  relationships  between  the  source  and  receiving 
countries.  the  sources  being  the  Mainland  and  the  Middle  East.  Clearly,  these  sources 
derive  from  historical  and  political  links  such  as  those  with  the  Mainland  and  the 
Middle  East.  There  is  little  doubt  that  there  is  ample  scope  to  develop  and  benefit  from 
these  increasingly  economic  relationships  and  expand  on  the  scope  for  alternative 
interdependent  action. 
It  has  been  noted  elsewhere  that  migration  (and  remitted  incomes)  has  emphasised  the 
trend  towards  the  'disintensification'  of  the  traditional  agricultural  system  that  has 
followed  the  expansion  of  cash  cropping  (Brookfield,  1972;  Lea,  1972).  Evidence  of  this 
exists  in  Zanzibar  too  in  that  little  improved  technology  or  techniques  are  made  use  of. 
On  the  whole.  these  lead  to  further  agricultural  decline  further  exacerbating  the 
inequities  between  the  islands  and  rural  and  urban.  Support  to  subsistence  farming  is 
important  in  that  it  Is  more  responsive  to  price  changes  and  more  capable  to  develop 
linkages  with  other  sectors  such  as  tourism.  However,  according  to  current  trends 
where  even  tourism  development  occurs  mainly  in  Unguja.  there  are  small  expectations 
for  Pemba  farmers,  unless  the  transport  infrastructure  is  vastly  improved  to  reduce 
transport  effects  and  permit  'export'  of  food  crops  to  the  tourist  market  on  the  sister 
island  or  tourism  is  also  developed  in  Pemba.  Population  pressure  on  land  also  means 
that  the  land  available  for  the  cultivation  of  rice  (which  is  predominantly  rain-fed)  is  also 
limited,  and  land  use  competition  for  tourism,  agriculture  and  construction  is  on  the Increase. 
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Food  production  is  central  to  the  island  economy.  Food  continues  to  be  imported 
despite  the  possibility  of  increased  domestic  production.  Cash  crop  production  has 
been  at  the  expense  of  food  crops  resulting  in  high  levels  of  food  dependency.  The 
survey  has  shown  that  despite  the  availability  of  many  other  foods,  such  as  cassava, 
tubers  and  bananas,  preference  for  rice  is  paramount  and  highlights  the  difficulty  of 
even  changing  preference  to  these  foods.  Given  the  rigid  preference  for  rice.  a  situation 
of  food  dependency  exists  and  will  continue  to  exist  for  some  time.  The  evidence  also 
shows  that  despite  efforts  by  government  to  encourage  domestic  food  consumption, 
cash  crops  still  take  up  considerable  human  and  land  resources,  and  this  is  especially 
true  in  Pemba. 
Apart  from  cash  cropping,  other  factors  affect  agriculture.  These  include  declining  soil 
fertility,  shortages  of  labour,  crop  diseases,  advancing  age  of  farmers,  migration  of  the 
younger  population,  poor  physical  planning  and  delivery  of  technical  services,  poor 
agricultural  technology  utilisation,  inappropriate  agricultural  policies  and  urban  bias 
have  all  affected  agriculture,  and  food  production  in  particular.  Meanwhile  population 
growth  is  outstripping  food  production.  Similar  trends  have  been  noted  elsewhere, 
where  migration  of  rural  producers  led  to  decline  in  the  labour  force  leading  to  a  static 
or  declining  production  and  causing  costly  and  increasing  food  imports  (Connell,  1984). 
Uneven  development  is  not  unique  to  Zanzibar  as  a  SIS,  though  its  degree  appears  to  be 
considerable  and  is  accentuated  by  urban  primacy,  minimal  decentralisation  and  urban 
bias  in  the  allocation  of  resources.  Apart  from  development  policies  that  lack 
Integration  between  the  various  sectors,  the  spatial  dimension  is  largely  neglected.  The 
situation  is  further  compounded  by  high  transport  costs.  This  in  turn  emphasises 
regional  inequality  and  core-periphery  problems  that  increasingly  worsen  any  prospects 
of  realising  spatial  equality  (Alexander,  1980;  Sofer.  1985).  Apart  from  creating  and 
enhancing  an  inefficient  economy,  this  leads  to  resentment  against  government  and 
encourages  nationalism  or  at  least  regionalism.  Elsewhere,  this  has  led  to  secessionist 
threats  (cf.  Vanuatu,  Solomon  islands,  St.  Vincent.  Tuvalu,  Barbuda,  Mauritius,  Nevis, 
Papua  New  Guinea,  and  Fiji).  This  perhaps  explains  why  many  of  the  government's 
recent  political  and  economic  problems  have  emanated  from  Pemba.  The  island  has 
been  a  source  of  dissidence  in  which  there  have  been  calls  for  holding  a  referendum 
against  the  Union.  1  Obviously.  the  problems  outlined  here  may  not  necessarily  be  the 
1  The  Daily  News,  (2/10/1988  p.  3)  Addressing  the  Pemba  North  Regional  Extraordinary  Party  meeting,  the  Chief 
Minister  warned  that  the  Party  will  continue  to  monitor  leaders  who  misuse  their  powers.  This  followed  a  decision  to 
withdraw  from  Party  membership  seven  leaders  in  a  bid  to  get  rid  of  irresponsible  leaders.  He  said  "The  move  by  the 
Party  has  cleared  the  polluted  political  atmosphere  and  restored  peace  which  was  in  danger".  In  the  Daily  News 
(14/9/1988  p.  1)  it  was  reported  that  the  Part  Secretary  general  "...  commended  the  Isles  Party  leaders  for  restoring 
calm  in  Pemba  where  a  few  months  ago  some  misguided  elements  had  been  undermining  the  Party".  In  the  Daily 
News  (7/8/1988  p.  7)  the  Zanzibar  Chief  Minister  said  the  Isles  will  remain  non-racial  despite  manoeuvres  by  its 
foreign  based  adversaries  who  want  the  islands  to  be  a  racist  state...  He  said  there  was  no  room  for  racism  in  the  Spice 439 
core  of  the  political  friction  occurring  and  originating  from  there,  but  they  certainly  fuel 
the  fire,  and  perhaps  even  more  importantly,  they  lead  to  a  distorted  expenditure 
pattern  and  a  dislocated  economy. 
The  survey  has  also  shown  evidence  of  spatial  inequalities  in  public  investments  and 
resource  use  in  the  islands.  The  rural  areas  and  Pemba,  in  general,  are  sources  of  out- 
migration,  demographically  characterised  by  high  birth  rates,  an  aging  population,  low 
income  levels  and  agricultural  productivity,  poor  levels  of  social  services,  educational 
and  medical  services  and  other  infrastructure.  On  the  whole,  it  is  shown  that  the 
spatial  organisation  of  Zanzibar's  economic  activities,  the  small  farming  sector  has 
remained  entrenched  as  a  classical  rural  periphery  in  relation  to  Zanzibar  Town  -  the 
urban  core.  Successes  in  rural  and  agricultural  policy  and  planning  have  been  elusive 
and  as  such  rural  and  agricultural  development  has  become  what  Barker  (1989:  313) 
terms  as  "a  labyrinth  of  ideas,  agencies,  plans  and  projects". 
The  chapter  highlights  the  complex  relations  which  exist  between  rural  and  urban  areas 
and  operate  under  conditions  of  dependent  development  (Potter,  1989).  It  is  important 
that  an  holistic  approach  is  adopted  to  Zanzibar's  development  and  social  change  since 
spatial  and  geographical  factors  can  no  longer  be  taken  for  granted.  For  too  long  there 
has  been  an  over-emphasis  on  national  economic  planning  that  lacked  integrated 
policies  which  Include  the  needs  of  all  areas  of  the  national  territory.  Development  in 
the  region  must  increasingly  stress  on  basic  needs  to  raise  the  overall  quality  of  life  of 
peripheral-rural  residents.  The  situation  in  Zanzibar  shows  that  there  is  also  need  to 
stress  the  social  dimension  of  development,  while  the  spatial  dimension  of  development 
is  required  to  reduce  exploitative  interaction  between  rural  and  urban  areas,  such  as 
through  rural  location  of  new  economic  activities,  and  tourism  development  with 
indirect  multiplier  effects  to  rural  areas. 
The  survey  concluded  that  there  are  conspicuous  spatial  disparities  in  Zanzibar,  despite 
the  perceived  advantages  of  small  size  and  development  policies  aimed  at  eradicating 
class  and  spatial  inequalities.  These  disparities  are  partly  the  result  of  it  being  a  dual 
economy  and  partly  because  of  the  weaknesses  and  inappropriateness  of  its 
development  policies  and  strategies.  There  are  two  levels  of  spatial  disparities,  between 
rural  and  urban  and  between  the  core  and  peripheral  island.  Past  development 
programmes  failed  to  take  advantage  of  a  period  of  relative  prosperity  to  invest 
strategically  in  the  socio-economic  infrastructure.  In  the  long  term  this  has  contributed 
to  political  instability  and  entails  higher  costs  to  maintain  stability.  In  the  long  term 
this  will  require  considerable  efforts  and  resources  to  rectify  the  situation.  Major 
Islands  which  ushered  in  a  popular  government  following  the  1964  Revolution  which  toppled  the  Arab  oligarchy. 
The  Daily  News  (12/6/1987  p.  1)  Speaking  in  Pemba,  the  Chief  Minister,  Seif  Shariff  Hamad  spoke  of  the 
government's  concern  over  a  seditious  leaflet  that  was  being  circulated  clandestinely  in  the  islands.  Not  long  after  the 
Chief  Minister.  who  was  a  Pemba  representative,  was  accused  of  conspiring  against  the  interests  of  the  Party  and 
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changes  in  perceptions  are  required  if  dependency  in  Zanzibar  is  to  be  reduced 
including  the  decolonisation  of  the  mind  and  giving  prominence  to  the  importance  of 
indigenous  rural-based  strategies  of  development  and  change. 
What  is  worrying  is  that  under  structural  adjustment  and  economic  revival 
programmes,  there  is  little  scope  for  spatial  equity.  At  the  macro-level,  purely  economic 
considerations  will  dictate  what  will  take  place  where,  and  this  is  the  direction  which 
current  developments  are  heading,  that  is  an  unsustainable,  lop-sided  and  even  more 
vulnerable  island  economy.  Clearly,  Zanzibar's  ERP  and  liberalisation  strategies  which 
are  part  of  the  neo-liberal  market  based  strategies  are  doubtful.  Corbridge  raises 
several  questions  that  are  of  relevance  to  Zanzibar's  situation  and  the  appropriateness 
of  these  policies.  Essentially.  Zanzibar  Is  required  to  demote  any  industrialisation 
aspirations  and  other  strategies  to  remain  a  commodity  export-based  and  aid  dependent 
economy.  This  relegates  it  to  a  market  for  the  competing  industrial  economies  (and 
market  economics)  importing  food  (note  that  the  global  grain  market  is  dominated  by 
five  'merchants  of  grain'),  and  industrial  goods  (note  Zanzibar's  increasing  trade 
activities  and  re-exports).  Moreover,  demand  for  its  commodities  (apart  from  re-exports) 
are  very  price  Inelastic,  small  and  outwith  its  control,  putting  it  in  a  position  of  extreme 
disadvantage  in  international  trade.  As  Corbridge  (1989:  253)  states  in  the  real  world  of 
imperfect  and  dominated  markets,  can  we  really  be  certain  that  the  direct  entitlements 
of  poor  families  to  food  will  be  fully  replaced  by  market  or  state  directed  transfers?  The 
answer  must  be  'no.  This  underscores  Zanzibar's  MIRAGE  economy. 441 
13.0  Conclusions 
13.1  Introduction 
This  research  has  tested  the  hypotheses  postulated  at  the  outset  regarding  the 
contemporary  development  problems  of  Zanzibar  as  a  SIS.  In  so  doing  it  has  arrived  at 
some  Important  conclusions  and  these  may  be  divided  into  three  broad  groups.  The  first  of 
which  include  the  theoretical  perspectives,  i.  e..  the  relevance  of  dependency  theory  in  the 
analysis  of  SIS  and  the  phenomenon  of  double  dependency  acting  on  Zanzibar  as  a  quasi- 
SIS.  The  second,  concerns  the  problems  of  SIS  of  the  South  West  Indian  Ocean  within  their 
regional  context,  and  the  existence  of  a  typology  of  SIS.  The  last  is  related  to  the  recent 
transformations  occurring  in  the  economy  of  Zanzibar.  However,  first  there  follows  a 
discussion  on  the  results  of  the  hypotheses. 
M.  2  Results  of  the  tests  on  the  hypotheses 
Successive  policies  have  sought  to  strengthen  Zanzibar's  position  within  the  global 
economy.  In  the  First  Phase  it  opted  for  autarchic  policies.  Despite  initial  promise,  in  the 
longer  term  they  have  compounded  the  problems  of  the  SIS,  i.  e.,  they  failed  to  achieve  a 
domestic  food  production  rate  that  is  concomitant  to  population  growth  and  thus  to 
demand.  In  failing  to  diversify  the  economy,  it  became  increasingly  lop-sided.  Meanwhile, 
de-linking  had  limited  effects  and  self-reliance  was  not  achieved.  Moreover,  as  a  primary 
producer  it  is  inevitable  that  the  country  would  continue  to  participate  in  the  global 
market.  Though  Zanzibar  reduced  its  participation  with  the  Western  economies,  it  still 
failed  to  transform  the  dependent  nature  of  its  economy,  in  fact  it  played  a  very  peripheral 
role  and  with  its  union  with  the  Mainland  it  became  a  double-dependent  periphery.  In 
other  respects,  it  has  remained  a  primary  producer  of  export  crops  facing  a  severe  balance 
of  payment  problem  which  has  entailed  economic  stagnation  and  social  uncertainty. 
These  are  reflected  by  the  deteriorating  internal  terms  of  trade  between  rural  and  urban 
areas  and  between  agriculture  and  the  other  sectors,  manifesting  itself  in  population 
movements  and  growing  poverty. 
In  the  1980s,  in  line  with  much  of  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  Zanzibar  adopted  liberalisation 
policies,  signalling  its  re-linking  to  the  global  economy.  However,  these  strategies  have  yet 
to  change  it  structural  deficiencies.  In  the  short  term.  their  only  success  has  been  to  secure 442 
more  development  aid  and  to  further  the  endogenous  development  problems  that  have 
manifested  themselves  in  growing  spatial  disparities.  Through  this,  the  economy  of 
Zanzibar.  has  transformed  into  a  MIRAGE  that  has  become  increasingly  dependent  and  in 
which  prospects  for  a  sustainable  development  are  remote. 
Although  it  can  be  argued  that  dependency  need  not  always  have  negative  repercussions,  its 
adverse  effects  are  of  primary  importance  in  the  case  of  Zanzibar.  First,  the  nature  of  the 
MIRAGE  economy,  as  the  acronym  suggests.  does  not  facilitate  long  term  benefits  since  it  is 
not  sustainable.  Second.  the  structural  adjustment  and  economic  recovery  programmes 
have  had  little  beneficial  effects  in  changing  the  structure  of  the  island  economy.  They  are 
just  as  insensitive  to  the  development  constraints  facing  SIS  as  were  the  previous 
programmes  that  overemphasised  'economic  growth",  overlooking  relevant  social 
development.  while  offering  limited  viable  alternatives.  Third,  is  that  in  'opening  up'  and 
seeking  'room  for  manoeuvre'.  Zanzibar  is  exploiting  the  economic  opportunities  available 
through  the  Union  with  the  Mainland.  However,  even  this  has  been  a  mixed  blessing.  A 
large  share  of  its  exports  to  the  Mainland  really  consists  of  're-exports'  (lacking  value 
added),  and  the  Mainland  cannot  sustain  this  indefinitely.  It  too  continues  to  obtain  access 
to  loans  and  aid  which  may  account  for  some  of  the  foreign  exchange  spent  on  these 
'imports'.  or  through  the  foreign  exchange  that  is  increasingly  obtained  through  the 
Informal  channels.  Such  a  situation  is  not  conducive  for  the  partnership,  reflecting  the 
extreme  narrow  range  of  alternatives  available  to  Zanzibar  and  its  minute  manufacturing 
base.  Above  all,  it  highlights  the  need  for  greater  awareness  of  the  particular  problems  of 
SIS,  both  with  viable  development  policies  and  in  development  theory. 
Supporting  the  principal  hypothesis,  the  study  has  shown  how  Zanzibar  has  become 
increasingly  incorporated  into  to  global  economy  and  in  a  position  of  profound  weakness 
as  it  has  increased  its  external  dependence  on  aid,  skills,  investments  and  many  basic 
imports.  This  situation  has  contributed  to  problems  relating  to  population  movements, 
production  and  spatial  disparities. 
The  study  has  also  shown  that  the  economy  of  Zanzibar  in  the  late  1980s  and  1990s  has  all 
the  characteristics  of  a  MIRAGE  economy.  This  was  shown  at  both  the  macro  and  micro 
levels  and  so  supporting  the  relevant  sub-hypotheses.  At  the  macro  level  it  manifests  itself 
in  a  structurally  lop-sided  economy  with  poor  prospects  for  the  primary  agricultural 
exports  against  the  rising  tide  of  consumer  imports  that  is  aggravating  the  growing  external 
dependency,  debt  and  negative  balance  of  payment  situation.  There  is  little  doubt  that 
under  the  present  circumstances.  Zanzibar  is  in  danger  of  being  condemned  to  an  unequal 
dependence  on  metropolitan  donors  for  its  survival  and  recent  economic  recovery 
programmes  have  reinforced  this  dependency. 443 
With  the  limited  and  declining  prospects  of  the  agricultural  and  rural  sectors  and  following 
liberalisation.  trade  has  become  a  flourishing  activity.  Clearly.  Zanzibar  is  attempting  to 
exploit  trade  as  an  'engine  of  growth"  and  tourism  is  perceived  as  another  alternative. 
However,  induced  growth  in  these  sectors  and  in  the  existing  manner  can  accentuate  centre- 
periphery  one  way  dependence,  especially  when  leakages  exceed  linkages.  Already 
Zanzibar  Is  exhibiting  signs  of  becoming  dependent  on  the  NICs  (the  new  semi-peripheries) 
for  a  large  part  of  its  international  trade  and  with  the  Mainland  for  its  interstate  trade.  In 
the  latter  case  it  also  exhibits  another  dimension  of  double-dependency.  The  volume  and 
nature  of  its  interstate  trade  have  significant  political  and  economic  implications  in  its 
relationship  with  the  Mainland.  Despite  liberalisation,  Zanzibar  remains  a  small 
primary  exporter  in  which  import  dependency  from  the  semi-peripheries  and  dependence 
on  access  to  Mainland  markets  is  high. 
At  the  micro  level,  these  translate  into  increasing  social  and  spatial  inequalities  in 
income,  employment  opportunities,  quality  and  quantity  of  services  between  rural  areas 
and  towns  and  the  islands.  Thus,  apart  from  the  deteriorating  conditions  in  the  rural 
areas,  the  younger  rural  population  Is  being  increasingly  influenced  by  the  demonstration 
effects  and  rapidly  rising  expectations,  luring  them  to  hanker  for  better  lifestyles. 
Consequently,  they  are  voting  with  their  feet  by  flocking  into  urban  centres  and  crossing 
the  channel.  They  are  also  voting  with  their  mouths  by  demanding  imported  foods.  The 
revealed  preference  of  the  rural,  and  indeed  the  urban,  population  cannot  be  ignored  in  the 
economic  recovery  programmes.  Such  demands  of  the  population  are  reflected  in  the 
impending  structural  changes  in  the  macro  economy,  such  as  in  changing  trade  patters, 
dependency  on  aid  and  so  on.  This  is  an  undesirable  situation  since  it  renders  the  Isles 
increasingly  vulnerable  to  the  whims  of  donor  countries. 
Apart  from  the  misplaced  development  strategies,  the  tyranny  of  distance  and 
fragmentation  constrain  many  aspects  of  development  policy  and  planning.  Isolation, 
small  size  and  the  insular  resources  impose  severe  rigidities  that  retard  the  quest  for 
sustainable  development.  This  situation  aggravates  existing  socio-spatial  disparities.  It 
has  also  been  shown  that  self-reliance  has  remained  an  elusive  objective  and  more  recently 
it  has  been  replaced  by  bi-lateral  and  multi-lateral  dependency.  To  some  extent,  it  has  also 
developed  a  double-dependent  relationship  with  its  Union  partner,  the  Mainland. 
Finally,  the  study  has  proven  the  existence  of  a  typology  of  SIS,  especially  within  the 
developing  world.  It  has  shown  how  historical  legacies,  and  geopolitical  factors  play 
important  roles  in  influencing  the  development  prospects  of  such  dependent  economies, 
and  that  it  can  be  expected  that  their  development  prospects  will  continue  to  be  influenced. 
positively  and  negatively  by  the  dominant  global  economies  to  which  they  are  linked. 444 
13.3  The  relevance  of  dependency  theory  in  contemporary  development  analysis 
The  study  has  applied  a  reformulated  dependency  approach  and  shown  its  contemporary 
relevance  in  providing  an  appropriate  framework  for  the  empirical  analysis  of  the 
development  problems  of  SIS.  Thus,  it  has  been  possible  to  examine  and  evaluate  the 
problems  facing  the  peripheral  SIS  within  the  South  West  Indian  Ocean  region.  Through 
comparative  analysis  it  has  explored  the  nature  of  the  political  and  economic 
relationships  of  the  islands  with  the  metropolitan  economies  and  shown  how  these  have 
influenced  their  current  development  status.  Both  the  positive  and  negative  sides  of 
dependent  development  have  been  identified  by  exploring  and  comparing  their  experiences. 
In  most  SIS,  as  indeed  of  much  of  Sub-Saharan  Africa,  structural  concentrations  of 
production,  export  markets  and  employment  are  a  legacy  of  their  colonial  experiences 
which  many  have  failed  to  change  since.  Such  primary  structural  weaknesses  have  induced 
damaging  dependence  and  extremely  vulnerable  economies.  In  the  case  of  Zanzibar, 
concentration  In  agricultural  production  for  exports  is  so  high  that  it  has  failed  to  fulfil 
demand  for  food  through  domestic  production,  creating  yet  another  form  of  dependency, 
that  is  'food  Import'  or  'dietary  dependency'.  Although  it  can  be  argued  that  such  a 
concentration  in  economic  activity  is  in  indigenous  hands,  it  is  also  true  that  it  is 
controlled  by  the  external  market  and  increasingly  small  proportions  of  the  revenues 
generated  are  reinvested  in  the  economy. 
From  the  experiences  of  the  SIS  of  the  region,  their  high  dependence  on  and  lack  of 
influence  on  the  world  market  constitutes  one  of  the  most  serious  problems  that  they  face. 
There  is  also  a  relationship  between  their  export  produce  and  services  and  similar 
concentrations  in  external  links.  Some,  such  as  Seychelles  and  Mauritius  and  to  a  lesser 
extent  the  Maldives,  have  maintained  strong  links  with  their  ex-colonial  powers. 
Although  this  has  made  them  vulnerable  to  political  and  economic  pressures  when  there 
are  economic  upheavals  in  the  economies  of  the  dominant  partners,  it  is  also  true  that  they 
have,  on  the  whole,  fared  better  than  the  SIS  that  opted  for  autarchic  strategies,  e.  g.,  de- 
linking  from  the  metropoles.  Ultimately,  both  the  Comoros  and  Zanzibar  have  'about 
turned'  and  are  attempting  to  re-link  fully  into  the  global  economy.  This  situation  exposes 
the  limited  options  available  for  small,  peripheral  and  vulnerable  economies. 
Related  to  the  above  conclusions,  there  is  a  strong  concentration  of  employment  on  a 
sectoral  basis  and/or  by  a  single  employer.  The  economies  of  most  SIS  have 
concentrations  in  vulnerable  activities,  such  as  agriculture  and  tourism  and  because  of  the 
narrow  range  of  economic  activities  and  opportunities,  governments  or  their  agencies  often 
become  the  major,  if  not  the  largest  employer.  Abrupt  and  long  term  changes  in  these 445 
concentrations  can  lead  to  falling  incomes,  unemployment  and  concomitant  social  and 
political  problems.  This  situation  is  even  more  precarious  when,  for  example,  the  SIS  Is  so 
dependent  on  external  assistance  that  internal  decisions  are  made  externally  (through  "the 
Banks"  and  consultancies)  irrespective  of  the  social  costs  incurred  by  their  directives. 
Dependency  analysis  has  been  useful  in  the  study  of  the  structural  concentrations  in  the 
economies  of  SIS,  and  the  types  and  degrees  of  their  external  linkages.  Such  ties  influence 
economic  performances  through  balance  of  payments,  their  socio-economic  structure  and 
income  distribution.  It  is  also  important  in  the  assessment  of  the  extent  to  which 
governments  are  often  influenced  by  external  interests,  e.  g..  through  major  trading 
partners,  lenders  and  donors. 
The  analysis  has  shown  that  there  can  be  some  advantages  in  dependent  relations  and  an 
example  is  Mauritius'  negotiated  and  preferential  access  to  the  EEC  market.  In  contrast, 
the  empirical  analysis  highlights  the  difficulties  of  breaking  away  from  conventional 
trajectories  of  development  and  that  autarky  is  often  more  costly,  restrictive  and 
undesirable.  There  are  different  levels  and  types  of  dependency  and  the  more  positive  ones 
include  concessionary  schemes  for  trade,  aid  and  migration.  These  are  the  so-called 
'negotiated  dependency'  and  'aid  with  dignity'.  Although  these  will  certainly  increase  the 
income  generating  capacity  of  the  SIS,  the  question  remains  whether  SIS  have  learnt  a 
lesson  and  translate  the  benefits  from  interdependence  into  self-sustaining  growth? 
Moreover,  it  must  be  remembered  that  over-dependence  and  especially  'concentrated 
dependence'  entails  definite  pitfalls.  Internal  development  objectives  become  subjected  to 
considerable  external  influence,  leading  to  problems  of  sectoral  concentrations  and 
inconsistencies. 
In  the  1960s  after  recognising  the  limited  options  available  to  microstates,  Benedict 
suggested  that  'the  best  solution  for  small  territories  is  to  look  for  some  form  of  economic 
integration  with  their  neighbours'  (Benedict,  1967:  8).  However,  many  have  developed 
special  relations  with  the  more  distant  metropolitan  powers  and  in  some  ways  are  better 
off.  Zanzibar  has  followed  the  'Benedict  solution',  and  although  this  has  favourable 
implications,  such  as  security,  access  to  markets,  a  destination  and  economic 
opportunities  for  migrants  and  concomitant  benefits,  it  has  also  created  a  situation  of 
'double-dependency'.  The  double-dependent  factors  include  the  inability  to  pursue 
independently  fiscal  policies  from  the  Mainland.  Its  peripheral  position  in  relation  to  the 
Mainland  was  until  recently  exemplified  by  the  inability  of  direct  connections  through 
travel  or  communications  from  overseas  without  going  through  the  Mainland.  Zanzibar 
was  effectively  a  satellite  of  the  Mainland,  which  itself  is  a  peripheral  economy,  thus 
making  Zanzibar  a  periphery  of  the  periphery.  It  is  only  recently  that  Zanzibar  has  been 446 
able  to  receive  scheduled  long  haul  flights.  Hitherto,  connections  were  made  through  Dar  es 
Salaam.  on  the  Mainland.  Furthermore,  the  connections  between  the  Mainland  and 
Zanzibar  were  infrequent  and  unreliable.  Moreover,  its  economic  policies  or  political 
stance  cannot  differ  much  from  those  of  the  Union  and  indifferent  to  the  special  situation 
of  a  SIS,  and  so  this  was  an  obstruction  to  arriving  at  some  'negotiated  dependency' 
solutions,  especially  when  the  interests  of  the  two  sides  do  not  coincide.  Finally,  through 
increased  economic  ties  with  the  Mainland  it  has  heightened  considerably  its  double 
dependent  position  and  is  vulnerable  to  economic  fluctuations  and  policy  decisions  across 
the  channel. 
Through  dependency  analysis,  the  external  vulnerability  of  SIS  has  been  shown  and 
especially  through  trade  and  unequal  exchange  and  the  increasing  reliance  on 
"development  aid'  that  has  become  a  means  of  'national  subsistence'.  Linked  to  this  is 
financial  and  technological  dependency.  mainly  in  terms  of  resources  and  skills.  The  lack 
of  these  means  that  such  countries  are  unable  to  generate  adequate  capital  formation  thus 
stagnating  development  and  enhancing  underdevelopment.  It  has  been  shown  that  such  a 
situation  has  lead  to  structural  and  spatial  heterogeneity.  Differences  in  productivity  have 
lead  to  marginality  between  different  sectors  and  areas,  widening  income  differentials. 
Moreover.  the  forces  of  'internal  colonialism'  have  aggravated  the  rural-urban  dichotomy. 
Liberalisation  policies  and  quasi-prosperity  favour  the  modem  sectors,  introducing  new 
and  more  expensive  consumption  habits  to  the  population,  thus  'internationalising" 
consumption  patterns.  In  the  long  term  this  entrenches  the  economy  into  a  severely 
vulnerable  and  dependent  position. 
Historically.  Zanzibar  has  experienced  the  excesses  of  problems  of  ethnic  politics.  These 
have  recently  resurfaced  in  various  forms,  in  many  places  in  the  world,  and  largely  as  a 
result  of  spatial  and  social  inequality.  but  also  through  various  political  interest  and 
pressure  groups,  they  have  appeared  in  the  Isles  in  the  form  of  regionalism  and  even 
nationalism.  The  resurgence  of  ethnic  and  regional-autonomous  movements  reveals  the 
persistence  of  spatial  and  social  inequalities,  which  are  partly  caused  by  the  country's 
dependency  and  partly  due  to  the  role  of  internal  colonialism. 
The  case  of  Zanzibar  has  again  underlined  the  basic  geographical  characteristics  of  SIS 
when  examining  their  dependency  structures  and  seeking  appropriate  development 
strategies.  Although  factors  such  as  Its  current  development  status,  resources  base, 
regional  setting  and  geostrategic  location  and  value  are  very  influential,  it  is  small  size 
that  has  proved  to  be  of  overwhelming  importance  in  coping  with  its  dependence  and 
development  problems.  'Smallness'  in  Zanzibar  translates  in  deficiencies  in  human  and 
physical  resources,  inability  to  realise  economies  of  scale,  leading  to  concentrations  in 447 
economic  activities.  This  leads  to  its  weak  trading  position,  effectively  removing  trade  as 
an  alternative.  The  discussion  concludes  that  under  existing  circumstances  eradicating 
dependency  in  SIS  is  virtually  impossible.  The  alternatives  are  to  manipulate  and 
negotiate  dependency  links,  while  diversifying  to  reduce  structural  concentrations.  In  so 
doing,  dependency  analysis  provides  some  room  for  manoeuvre  for  SIS.  Dependency 
analysis  retains  validity  in  that  it  can  be  used  in  strategic  planning  for  SIS  and  in 
formulating  appropriate  development  programmes.  In  this  study  it  has  been  used  to  assess 
Zanzibar's  development  strategies  and  it's  finding  bear  relevance  to  similar  SIS. 
13.4  Conclusions  about  Small  Island  States  in  the  Region 
Using  a  multi-method  approach,  i.  e..  cluster  analysis  and  comparative  analysis,  the  study 
concludes  that  there  exists  a  typology  of  SIS.  First,  the  cluster  analysis  reveals  that  even 
within  developing  small  and  SIS  there  exist  various  categories  of  countries  that  are  at 
different  stages  of  development  and  that  have  different  prospects  for  development.  The 
analysis  has  shown  that  despite  the  similarities  that  SIS  exhibit  even  within  one  region, 
(e.  g.,  Western  Indian  Ocean  Region),  there  are  considerable  differences  in  their  development 
status  and  prospects.  Although  it  has  been  shown  that  small  size  alone  is  not  a 
constraining  factor  to  development,  it  has  also  emerged  that  is  clearly  is  an  additional 
constraint.  Whilst  the  cluster  analyses  and  subsequent  descriptive  statistics  reveal  distinct 
groupings  and  the  comparative  analysis  has  explained  some  of  the  reasons  for  this.  The 
historical  and  comparative  analyses  have  traced  the  influence  of  their  pre-colonial  and 
colonial  legacies.  They  have  also  shown  the  effects  of  the  different  post-colonial 
development  strategies  that  were  adopted  by  each  country. 
This  conclusion  has  an  important  theoretical  implication.  It  was  argued  that  development 
theory  needs  to  recognise  that  there  are  various  degrees  of  underdevelopment  and 
developing  countries  face  a  wide  variety  of  development  constraints,  which  may  require 
different  solutions.  It  has  confirmed  the  existence  of  some  new  peripheries.  However, 
although  the  remit  of  this  study  was  the  SIS,  its  conclusions  are  applicable  to  other 
categories  of  LDCs.  The  results  highlight  the  need  for  a  special  development  agenda  for  SIS 
as  a  category.  although  even  this  has  to  recognise  that  considerable  differences  exist  within 
them.  Finally.  the  analysis  shows  that  different  countries  will  require  a  different  set  of 
solutions  to  their  development  problems  and  'blanket'  solutions  such  as  those  frequently 
dispensed  by  the  international  development  institutions  and  experts  do  not  have  universal 
applicability,  and  do  not  serve  the  interests  of  those  facing  such  problems. 
The  study  of  the  SIS  in  the  South  West  Indian  Ocean  region  has  shown  that  though  small 448 
size  is  a  problem  affecting  all  SIS,  it  is  not  necessarily  a  problem  in  itself.  There  are  other 
extenuating  circumstances  and  factors  that  make  small  size  a  constraint  to  SIS 
development.  It  was  demonstrated  that  all  the  SIS  in  the  region  are  confronted  by  problems 
associated  with  small  size.  However,  other  factors  have  influenced  its  effects,  both 
positively  and  negatively.  Thus  the  effects  of  small  size  of  the  internal  market  can  be 
overcome  by  access  to  a  larger  external  market  and  the  diversification  of  economic 
activities,  as  the  cases  of  Mauritius  and  Seychelles  have  demonstrated.  Thus  while  small 
size  is  an  aggravating  factor,  it  is  not  deterministic.  There  are  alternatives  and 
possibilities. 
13.5  Conclusions  about  Zanzibari  development 
Zanzibar  is  a  small  island  state  with  an  extremely  small,  peripheral,  vulnerable  and 
fragile  economy.  Since  the  1964  Revolution  it  has  attempted  an  autonomous  development 
strategy  following  a  development  philosophy  based  on  self-reliance  and  self-sufficiency. 
However.  the  analysis  has  shown  that  Zanzibar  Is  further  than  ever  from  realising  that 
elusive  goal,  and  in  this  respect.  so  are  many  other  SIS.  Since  independence,  it  has  been 
unavoidably  dependent  on  a  single  export  crop.  Unable  to  grow  enough  to  met  domestic 
food  demand,  it  is  dependent  on  considerable  food  imports.  Nearly  thirty  years  after  the 
Revolution  Zanzibar  is  even  more  dependent  on  external  aid  and  grants  for  its  development 
programmes  and  recurrent  expenditures,  capital  investment,  technology  and 
entrepreneurial  impetus.  Although  it  has  developed  considerable  external  linkages,  these 
are  yet  to  have  positive  and  sustainable  impacts  on  the  Isles.  Such  a  degree  of  dependency 
implies  that  the  notion  of  self-reliance  either  has  to  be  redefined  within  more  realistic 
limits  or  abandoned,  remaining  merely  as  political  rhetoric. 
The  Zanzibari  case  has  highlighted  the  difficulty  of  eliminating  dependency  links  while 
the  comparative  analyses  with  the  cases  of  Mauritius  and  Seychelles  have  shown  that 
maintaining  links  with  the  metropoles  or  core  need  not  necessarily  imply  a  greater  or 
worse  degree  of  dependence  than  would  has  otherwise  existed.  Zanzibar  is  increasingly 
allowing  and  tolerating  conditions  of  growing  and  extreme  dependence  and  increasingly  its 
development  strategies  are  being  influenced  by  external  forces.  This  is  a  precarious 
situation,  especially  since  the  external  and  domestic  interests  (of  the  people)  rarely 
coincide. 
Despite  the  differences  in  the  character  between  all  phases  of  its  post-Revolution 
development  experience.  Zanzibar  failed  to  achieve  economic  diversification.  Moreover, 
many  of  the  objectives  set  after  the  Revolution  have  yet  to  be  realised,  and  this  means  that 449 
similar  constraints  to  those  of  the  1960s  exist.  such  as  an  acute  shortage  of  skills,  lack  of 
capital  and  technology,  etc..  all  of  which  are  necessary  ingredients  for  taking  Zanzibar  to  a 
higher  stage  of  development. 
Indeed  many  of  Zanzibar's  development  achievements  have  been  eroded  since  the  1980s, 
both  in  economic  and  social  terms.  Instead.  the  post-1980s  have  encouraged  Zanzibar  to 
cultivate  and  extend  its  external  dependency  linkages  to  both  the  'traditional'  metropoles 
such  as  the  UK  and  to  the  new  'semi-peripheries'  of  the  Middle  and  Far-East.  This  recent 
phenomenon  is  manifested  in  the  structure  of  its  economy  as  defined  by  the  MIRAGE 
model.  The  study  has  shown  and  supports  the  contentions  that  such  a  structure  is  not 
sustainable  and  indicative  of  a  highly  dependent  and  vulnerable  economy. 
Its  peripheral  position  in  the  global  economy  and  existence  within  the  category  of  LDCs 
identified  as  SIS  has  some  micro  level  and  spatial  implications.  These  form  parts  of  the 
MIRAGE  economy.  The  study  has  shown,  through  the  socio-economic  survey,  how  being  a 
peripheral  MIRAGE  economy  affects  rural  households,  triggering  considerable  population 
movements,  stagnating  agriculture,  spurring  urbanisation,  leading  to  a  distinct  urban  bias 
and  upsetting  the  delicate  island  ecosystem.  It  has  shown  that  a  considerable  degree  of 
spatial  differentiation  exists  in  the  Isles  and  this  is  a  problem  that  has  to  be  confronted 
both  externally  and  internally.  Externally,  Zanzibar  should  attempt  to  move  away  from 
being  a  MIRAGE  economy  and  seek  greater  interdependence.  If  it  has  to  resort  to  greater 
incorporation,  then  it  should  seek  a  'negotiated  dependency'  and  the  'diversification  of 
dependency'.  Internally  it  needs  to  formulate  an  appropriate  set  of  development  objectives 
and  priorities  suited  to  its  immediate  and  long  term  needs,  while  reducing  the  widening 
class  and  spatial  disparities.  The  long  term  prospects  of  this  are  to  reduce  social  friction 
and  unrest  which  globally  is  increasingly  manifesting  itself  in  ethnic  friction  and 
confrontation  between  pressure  and  interest  groups,  while  creating  suitable  conditions  for 
reinvestment  and  therefore  better  prospects  in  the  economy. 
13.6  Policy  assessment  and  future  issues 
The  decline  in  the  agricultural  sector  and  rural  development  derive  partly  from  Zanzibar's 
peripheral  position  in  the  global  economy,  partly  from  its  small  size,  partly  from  economic 
fragmentation  and  partly  from  the  fact  that  strategies  for  economic  development  have  been 
poorly  co-ordinated  and  reflect  external  rather  than  internal  needs  and  pressures.  Indeed. 
Zanzibar's  current  degree  of  underdevelopment,  persistent  inequalities  and  poverty  is  the 
result  of  dependence  that  has  been  reinforced  by  successive  government  policies.  The 
challenges  to  be  confronted  are  substantial  to  say  the  least.  but  there  are  possibilities. 450 
The  case  of  Zanzibar,  as  a  theme  of  the  problems  of  African  dependency,  exhibits  one 
possible  way  forward  and  that  is  through  the  establishment  of  cross-national  African 
economic  links  and  political  arrangements.  Indeed  Zanzibar  points  the  way,  in  the  value 
of  the  link  with  the  Mainland  from  an  economic  view-point.  In  some  respects  this  link  has 
had  differential  benefits  such  as  the  provision  of  building  materials,  some  foods,  security, 
specialised  services  and  access  to  a  larger  market. 
Certainly  if  Africa's  burden  is  in  part  the  legacy  of  nation-statism  imposed  by  Europe,  then 
this  burden  is  all  the  greater  for  SIS  in  the  lock  of  double-dependency.  The  case  of  Zanzibar 
shows  the  possibility  of  such  a  co-operation,  while  also  revealing  the  benefits  and 
drawbacks.  It  also  suggests  that  there  is  a  greater  potential  of  such  a  co-operation  on  a 
regional  basis  through  the  Indian  Ocean  Commission  with  the  other  SIS  that  share  similar 
development  objectives  and  constraints.  Zanzibar  must  pursue  strategies  aimed  at 
swinging  its  growing  external  dependency  into  a  more  interdependent  relationship. 
However.  this  cannot  be  achieved  alone;  it  will  have  to  join  a  growing  international  league 
arguing  for  the  special  case  of  small  and  SIS  over  access  to  international  trade  and  an 
appropriate  International  Economic  Order  that  takes  on  board  the  issues  relating  to  the 
problems  of  SIS.  However.  such  an  approach  needs  to  be  matched  with  internal  policies 
that  address  important  endogenous  development  issues. 
Despite  attempts  at  reducing  social  inequalities  there  are  acute  inequalities  between  rural 
and  urban  areas  and  between  different  categories  of  socio-economic  classes.  There  is  also  a 
chronically  high  level  of  unemployment  and  underemployment  coupled  by  a  range  of 
related  problems.  Additional  employment  opportunities  and  a  viable  population  planning 
policy  may  be  part  of  the  answer,  but  more  importantly  a  policy  that  takes  into 
consideration  a  rural  development  strategy  to  reverse  the  flow  of  population  out  of  rural 
areas  and  to  stimulate  the  development  of  the  traditional  agricultural  sector  is  required. 
However.  it  is  essential  that  rural  development  is  not  perceived  simply  as  agricultural  and 
economic  growth.  It  will  require  the  generation  of  new  employment  opportunities, 
equitable  distribution  of  income,  improvements  in  health  and  nutrition,  housing, 
education  and  other  services  -  factors  that  have  come  under  pressure  in  the  ERPs.  In 
agriculture,  the  policy  will  require  to  sustain  a  pattern  of  growth  that  allows  for  a  balanced 
expansion  for,  and  linkages  with,  all  parts  of  the  economy  and  which  ensure  that  the 
pattern  of  agricultural  growth  is  such  as  to  make  a  strong  and  direct  impact  on  rural 
poverty  addressing  issues  of  infrastructure,  expansion  of  services,  credit  and  price 
arrangements,  employment  and  migration.  These  will  require  co-ordination  In 
programmes  such  as  infrastructure  for  production  and  services  with  expansion  of  new 
sectors  such  as  tourism.  What  is  more  important  is  that.  it  will  require  a  more  integrated 451 
form  of  development  based  on  changing  the  social  relations  of  production  such  that  it 
makes  them  economically  viable  and  sustainable  and  politically  stable.  Meanwhile 
development  programmes  will  still  require  a  greater  political  will  directed  at  a 
diversification  of  the  island  economy. PAGE 
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